



On the Centenary of His Demise The Enduring Legacy of Sun Yat-sen

CAN ULUSOY

Sun Yat-sen as a Modernist Nationalist
and His Political Legacy

LIU NINGNING & CHENG ENFU

Sun Yat-sen's Contribution to Early Stages
of Chinese Modernization

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HISTORY

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REPORT

ZAKIR ABIDOV

A Path to Strengthening
Relations of Uzbekistan
with Foreign Countries

POEM

CAHİT KÜLEBİ

Tale

POEM

WEN YIDUO

Dead Water

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Esentepe Mah. Yüzbaşı Kaya Aldoğan Sk. No: 4 İç Kapı No: 209 Şişli-İstanbul
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At a time when U.S. ambitions for a unipolar world order have lost their appeal, a new order is taking shape thanks to the multipolarization of world politics and the acceleration of cooperation between developing countries, rejecting the globalism of imperialist states. Under these conditions, the new agenda of global cooperation should respond to the needs and aspirations of developing countries seeking joint development and solidarity under the guidance of public-driven projects. In particular, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) -put forward in 2013 by Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China- provides a suitable opportunity and a sound foundation for the implementation of this new agenda of global cooperation.

BRI is an epoch-making move to re-implement the concept of the Silk Road, which dates back 2,000 years, to a time when China was immensely contributing to global prosperity and the development of trade and cooperation. The revival of this concept entails a much more comprehensive approach that also incorporates rail and sea transport, and digital systems.

BRI proposes to bring together over 60 countries across Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America –together accounting for nearly half of the world's gross domestic product– for prosperity and development at the initiative of China. Unlike the Western-centered world order, BRI seeks peaceful collaboration for improving global trade and production towards common goals for humanity. It firmly rejects crude imperialist exploitation. Two thousand years ago, the Silk Road was a conduit for the flow of gunpowder, spices, silk, compasses and paper to the world. Today, it offers artificial intelligence, quantum computers, new energy and material technologies, and space-age visions to developing countries. In addition, the New Silk Road provides incentives and opportunities for the development and implementation of bio-economic schemes in stakeholder countries against the threat of climate change and other environmental threats that bring the entire ecosystem to the brink of extinction.

Türkiye has a significant role –real and potential– in accelerating South-South cooperation. Türkiye is conveniently located as Asia's farthest outpost to the West. It assumes a critical position as a pivotal country on BRI's North-South and East-West axes. However, China's development and BRI's contribution to the future of humanity have remained to a large extent underrecognized and superficially evaluated in Turkish academia, media, and politics. This is mainly because Türkiye's academics, media professionals, and policy makers have been observing China using Western sources. In the same manner, China and BRI's other potential partners have been viewing Türkiye through a Western lens.

BRIQ has committed itself to developing an in-depth understanding of the present era, with a particular emphasis on the new opportunities and obstacles on the road to the New Asian Century.

BRIQ assumes the task of providing direct exchange of views and information among Chinese and Turkish academics, intellectuals, and policy makers. In the meantime, this journal will serve as a platform to bring together the intellectual accumulation of the whole world, especially developing countries, on the basis of the Belt and Road Initiative, which presents a historic opportunity for the common future of humanity.

BRIQ is also devoted to publishing research and other intellectual contributions that underline the transformative power of public-driven economies, where popular interests are upheld as the basic principle, ahead of individual profit. The fundamental tasks of BRIQ are to demonstrate how BRI can contribute to the implementation of this public-driven model, and to help potential BRI partners –including Türkiye- to realize their real potential.

BRIQ stands for the unity of humanity and a fair world order. It will therefore be a publication for the world's distinguished intellectuals, especially those from Eurasia, Africa, and the Americas: the defenders of a new civilization rising from Asia on the basis of peace, fraternity, cooperation, prosperity, social benefit and common development.



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BRIQ follows American Psychology Association (APA) style, 7th edition, <https://www.apastyle.org> and uses American English spelling.

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Academic articles should be between 5000 and 9000 words in length, including abstracts, notes, references, and all other content. Please supply a cover page that includes complete author information, and a fully anonymized manuscript that also contains an abstract (200-word limit) and five keywords.

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Please contact the Editorial Board for interview proposals.

EDITORIAL

The Seed of Revolution in Asia

Over the past 25 years, the global geopolitical landscape has undergone and continues to undergo substantial transformations. The U.S.-centric system has begun its decline not only in economic terms but also in political, ideological, and cultural dimensions. Correspondingly, Asia—led primarily by China—has emerged as the world’s manufacturing powerhouse. At the same time, leading nations of the developing world have been on the rise economically.

The most significant consequence of these changes is the erosion of Atlantic hegemony, which had been established after the Second World War and centered on the Europe-U.S. alliance. It has become evident that this hegemony no longer possesses the authority to dictate global processes. The “rules-based order” devised to enforce Atlantic dominance is now disintegrating. The unipolar world order, dominated by the United States following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, has ceased to exist. Today, the political strategies of the United States, Europe, and developing nations are shaped by the realities of multipolarity.

While the traditional institutions that have long governed the global order are losing their influence, alternative frameworks for international cooperation—where all parties benefit mutually—are gaining strength. The nations of the developing world, uniting through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the expanding BRICS+, are actively reshaping global dynamics. These new forms of cooperation establish a system based on “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.” This emerging order stands in contrast to and as an alternative to the neoliberal international system.

As the first quarter of the 21st century draws to a close, the world is transforming in historical magnitude—comparable to the upheavals of a century ago. The great revolutions of the early 20th century enabled prominent Asian civilizations to rise from the ashes and shook the world. Today, Asia is once again at the forefront, but this time, it is not alone. Alongside Asia, the nations of Africa, Latin America, and the nations of the developing world are asserting their sovereignty against imperialist domination.

At the dawn of the 20th century, nearly the entire world—except Türkiye, Russia, China, and Iran—was under colonial rule. The successive revolutions in Russia, Türkiye, Iran, and China served as a source of inspiration for national independence movements worldwide in their struggles against imperialism. From the mid-20th century onward, socialist-led popular revolutions also took place. These revolutionary movements shared a common ethos, embracing nationalism, populism, collectivism, publicism, and ethnic cohesion. The nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America continue to draw strength from their revolutionary legacies, striving to live with dignity and freedom in today’s multipolar world. The momentum of national independence movements is again gaining strength across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, building upon the traditions of local and worldwide revolutionary breakthroughs.

This issue focuses on the legacy of Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the 1911 Chinese Revolution and one of the pioneers of revolutionary thought, whose influence continues today. Even a century after his demise, this great revolutionary leader continues to serve humanity.

CONTENTS



CAN ULUSOY

PEER-REVIEWED RESEARCH ARTICLE **147-168**

Sun Yat-sen as a Modernist Nationalist and His Political Legacy



LIU NINGNING & CHENG ENFU

PERSPECTIVE PIECE **169-184**

Sun Yat-sen's Contribution to Early Stages of Chinese Modernization



NECATİ DEMİRCAN

PEER-REVIEWED RESEARCH ARTICLE **185-198**


Chinese Revolutionaries' Imagination Between Sun Yat-sen and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk



MAO ZEDONG

HISTORY **199-204**

Speech at the Memorial for the 13th Anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's Death and the Commemoration of the Fallen Soldiers in the Anti-Japanese War (March 12, 1938)



HISTORY **205-210**

Interview with Sun Yat-sen by Osaka Mainichi Shimbun (November 23, 1924):

"Japan, Ignoring its Identity as an East Asian Nation"

An enthusiastic visit after seven years (Prepared by Inan Öner)



XIAO YONGTAO

PEER-REVIEWED RESEARCH ARTICLE **211-224**

**Emerging Middle Powers' Balancing Diplomacy:
Connotations, Motivations, and Implications**



AHMET GEDİK

PEER-REVIEWED RESEARCH ARTICLE **225-247**

The Sino-French Relations in the Context of Alter Globalization



ZAKIR ABIDOV

REPORT **249-252**

Public Diplomacy: A Path to Strengthening Relations of Uzbekistan with Foreign Countries



CAHİT KÜLEBİ

POEM **253-254**

Tale



WEN YIDUO

POEM **255-256**

Dead Water



PHOTOGRAPH **257**

OGONYOK

Revolution in China



PAINTING **258**

QI BAISHI

Twelve Landscape Screens



CHROMOLITHOGRAPH **259**

T. MIYANO

An episode in the Revolutionary War in China

Sun Yat-sen as a Modernist Nationalist and His Political Legacy



CAN ULUSOY*

Assistant Professor
Cappadocia University

**He was born in Bursa in 1983. In 2015, he obtained his PhD from Galatasaray University, Department of Political Science, with his dissertation titled "City and Intellectual in the Province: Bursa Example (1930-1950)." He has authored numerous publications and presentations on urban history, Turkish political culture, and the history of Sufism. He has authored studies analyzing the political, cultural, and religious histories of China in relation to Turkey and Iran. He serves as an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Cappadocia University. He instructs on Masnavi commentary and the interpretation of written and manuscript Ottoman Turkish at the Bursa Mevlevi Lodge, where he serves as an advisor.*

e-mail: can.ulusoy@kapadokya.edu.tr

ORCID: 0000-0002-4465-3201

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ABSTRACT

The year 2025 signifies the centenary of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's demise, the leader of the Chinese democratic movement. Sun is a pioneer among the first group of modernist nationalist leaders in the oppressed regions of the 20th century. Sun first sought to dismantle the Qing Dynasty of Manchu descent, which had been partially colonized by Western powers, and to construct a modern societal framework with a nation-state for the Han ethnicity, alongside an industrialized economic system capable of ensuring prosperity for its populace. Nevertheless, the disregard for the mass line of the nationalist organization he directed and the frailty of the social forces capable of executing the revolution compelled him to envision a Republic across the Empire's boundaries. The insights he gained from the project's failure and the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution prompted Sun to implement an organizational framework that prioritized connections with the populace, a political doctrine that promoted socialized Chinese nationalism over racial Han nationalism, and a revolutionary strategy that unified all societal classes in pursuit of a democratic revolution. Consequently, Sun bequeathed a substantial legacy as the forerunner of the political disposition of subsequent Chinese leaders, who acknowledged China's historical context and preserved the connection between nationalism and socialism. On the centenary of his demise, Sun Yat-sen is more than a mere memory for China. His political legacy continues to hold significance.

Keywords: China, nationalism, republican revolution, socialism, Sun Yat-sen.

Introduction

DR. SUN YAT-SEN IS ONE OF THE FIVE individuals who have significantly influenced modern Chinese political history. Li Hongzhang (1823-1901) epitomizes 19th-century China. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) initiated China's entry into the 20th century. Mao Zedong (1893-1976) is pivotal to this century. Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) guided China from the 20th century into the 21st century. Xi Jinping (born 1953) is the prominent figure and architect of 21st-century China. Mao, Deng, and Xi exemplify a degree of continuity as

leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC); however, they have adhered to distinct political trajectories. Subsequently, all prominent leaders have adopted Sun Yat-sen's legacy. During this time, China has deliberated on whether political ideology and agenda would align with the "Three People's Principles" formulated by Sun Yat-sen, encompassing "Nationalism, the People's Rights, and the People's Welfare." In this regard, the opportunity initiated by Sun Yat-sen remains accessible, and the "Three People's Principles" have preserved their significance via reiterations across the historical continuum of the 20th and 21st centuries.

Consequently, contemplating Sun Yat-sen is an essential prerequisite for comprehending a historical character and the ongoing issues of “nationalism, the people’s rights, and the people’s welfare” in China.

Sun Yat-sen encountered a comparable predicament to that of all modernist nationalist leaders originating from the oppressed world of the 20th century. While Western affiliations were essential for modernization, these leaders’ primary challenge was achieving equilibrium between their nation’s aspiration for autonomy and independence from the West. For an anti-modernist, essentialist thinker and anarchist activist such as Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948), this issue is nonexistent. He may reconcile with the West in its entirety. It does not replicate any mode of existence. Nevertheless, contemporary nationalists must industrialize their nations and educate their populace. Thus, they aim to guarantee their nation possesses sufficient strength to resist future colonialist pressures.

On the other hand, they perceive their nation as “distinct” and possessing its own “essence.” This entrapment is typically addressed by constraining “universal” civilization to national ownership; hence, anything that is deemed civilized is perceived as national. The distressing occurrences during the disintegration of previously distinctive empires within the capitalist realm significantly influence the emotional context of civilizational assertions, particularly regarding development. Sun’s poignant address on December 21, 1923, welcoming students returning from the United States to Linnan, an area of Guangzhou, is profoundly illuminating. Sun asserted that China, the custodian of civilization, would encounter considerable challenges for a brief period. However, because of the potency of its national identity, it would rapidly eclipse the United States and Japan,

establishing itself as the epicenter of civilization (Liu, 1999: 10-15).

Indeed, what is deemed civilized is inherently imbued with the cultural codes and historical context of its origin. Consequently, the modernist and essentialist focuses of Sun’s nationalism incited much debate between two distinct nationalist factions that subsequently opposed each other regarding the relationship they would forge with China’s historical tradition. The intellectual and cultural discord surrounding the political issues at the 3rd General Congress of the Kuomintang (KMT), held from March 15 to 24, 1928, precipitated the initial major schism among the nationalists (Eastman, 1986: 111-112).

Sun is part of the multilingual elite, possessing proficiency in at least one Western language, originating from the socioeconomic classes that have spearheaded nationalism movements in the oppressed countries (Anderson, 2004: 132). His proficiency in English, which enabled him to engage with Western literature and convey it to China, was significant. Sun is among the individuals of his generation who could most distinctly separate himself from conventional political ideology due to his socioeconomic milieu and lack of traditional Chinese schooling. Nonetheless, Sun, who commenced his political journey as a Han nationalist and concluded it as a Chinese nationalist, comprehended the significance of grasping old Chinese political principles and integrating them into China’s modern future through the accumulation of his experiences. The inscription “tianxia weigong” (all share the world) on his tombstone, derived from “Liyun datong,” a foundational text of ancient China, illustrates the link between his ideology, which transitioned from a racist viewpoint to a socialist nationalist perspective, and Chinese traditions (Chen, 2011: 4).



The 1911 Revolution, also known as the Chinese Revolution or the Xinhai Revolution, brought an end to China's last imperial dynasty, the Manchu-led Qing dynasty, and resulted in the creation of the Republic of China on January 1, 1912 (Photo: China Daily, 2017).

A parallel to Sun Yat-sen's endeavors to reconcile the conflict between local identity and Western modernity is evident in the discord between Asianness and Westernness. As detailed below, Sun encountered the racial discrimination that Asians endured from Westerners in various locations. He had much affinity for "Pan-Asianism," which started in Japan and was founded on the concept of the unity of the yellow race. The paramount illustration of this endeavor is the apparel he created (Schell-Delury, 2013: 152). In 1911, he conceptualized the contemporary attire of modern Chinese individuals, drawing inspiration from Japanese school uniforms and Western outfits. By adapting Japanese clothes, representative of the most advanced nation of the yellow race, to align with Western aesthetics, he established a symbol of contemporary Asian creativity. This attire was subsequently associated

with Mao Zedong and emerged as a symbol of Chinese socialism.

Sun Yat-sen moved away from the revolutionary approach of relying upon intellectual circles and military factions that lacked comprehension of the mass line, influenced by the insights gained from the 1911 Xinhai Revolution and the experiences of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. By 1919, Sun had established himself as a revolutionary who emphasized the mass line and fostered strong connections with the grassroots. During this period, Sun was referred to as the "Sun of Eloquence," an English translation of his surname, due to his ability to deliver extensive and uninterrupted talks on the Chinese Revolution and the issues facing China. This contrasts with the conventional Chinese political style, which prioritizes brevity, indirect communication, and even silence (Schell-Delury, 2013: 153).

Sun was a politician referred to by the title of Dr. During the time when warlords were causing trouble all over China, he started utilizing the title of Generalissimo. The utilization of both titles is remarkably impactful. It is not only coincidental that Sun was a “medical doctor” and that the vast majority of the leaders of the Young Turk movement in the Ottoman Empire were medical students. During an era when the Ottoman Empire was seen as the “sick man” of Europe and the Qing Empire as the “sick man” of Asia, these experts assumed the role of “social and political physician.” They committed themselves to rehabilitating their “ailing” nations. Consequently, they did not hesitate to compose political prescriptions. Similarly, as military elites emerged in Turkey during a critical juncture where national salvation necessitated armed intervention, Dr. Sun reemerged as the “Generalissimo,” subsequently aligning himself closely with individuals possessing military backgrounds.

Dr. Sun transitioned from a Han nationalist, elitist viewpoint of democracy and its associated organizational understanding to a socialist Chinese nationalist who prioritized the mass line and advocated for an organized party model among the populace, securing a distinctive position in Chinese history as the inaugural prominent leader of the Chinese democratic revolution.

The People’s Republic of China was founded on its distinctive system, which integrates socialism,

nationalism, and traditional Chinese philosophy, especially Confucianism. It is evident from Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s remarkable struggle practices that he attempted to integrate nationalism and socialism while still using traditional Chinese sources. Sun’s contribution was essential in the development of the democratic revolution initiative centered on the strategy of unifying all national classes and forces. Thus, Sun’s legacy continues to hold significance today, with the Chinese leadership asserting its rightful ownership of it (Xi, 2016).

This study highlights the transformations in Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s political ideology and endeavors resulting from significant milestones in his life. Dr. Sun transitioned from a Han nationalist, elitist viewpoint of democracy and its associated organizational understanding to a socialist Chinese nationalist who prioritized the mass line and advocated for an organized party model among the populace, securing a distinctive position in Chinese history as the inaugural prominent leader of the Chinese democratic revolution.

Han Nationalist Revolutionary Who Looked West

Sun Yat-sen was born in 1866 in Chuieng village, Guangdong province, South China, of Hakka ethnicity. Guangdong was among the provinces in China where capitalist production, consumption relations, and contemporary lifestyles evolved most swiftly, becoming incorporated into the capitalist world economy with the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. This circumstance was essential in establishing South China as the nucleus of modernist movements.

Six years prior to Sun’s birth, China had suffered defeat in the Second Opium War and acknowledged its inability to persist as a conventional empire.

Prince Gong (1833-1898), who assumed power in 1860, initiated the inaugural reform process. With his backing, the new ruling elite, comprising young bureaucrats such as Zeng Guofan (1811-1872), Li Hongzhang, Zuo Zhongtang (1812-1885), Wenxiang (1818-1876), and Yung Wing (1828-1912), resolved to gradually modernize China and safeguard it from external threats by employing political acumen in this reform initiative termed “self-strengthening” (Liu, 1994: 4; Ulusoy, 2023: 95). In a semi-colonial empire, Sun, a product of the reform era, was raised in a nation increasingly acquainted with modern concepts.

In 1864, merely two years prior to Sun’s birth, the Taiping Rebellion, orchestrated by Hong Xiquan (1814-1864), who amalgamated the communal practices of early Christians with an ascetic Protestant ethos and advocated for the expulsion of Western powers, concluded (Wagner, 1998: 136-137; Spence, 1990: 174-175). Audrey Wells asserts that Sun became acquainted with the Taiping Rebellion at a young age and regarded Hong as his hero (Wells, 2001: 1). Due to his family’s inability to finance a private tutor for civil service exam preparation, he traveled to Honolulu, Hawaii, to seek assistance from his elder brother, Sun Mei. It is noteworthy that Sun, who would later be recognized in Chinese history as a revolutionary against the Manchu-established Qing Dynasty, admired Hong in his youth. As previously highlighted, Sun, akin to Hong, was of Hakka descent (Modern China, 1998: 429). Given the substantial support provided by the Hakkas to Hong’s insurrection, it is evident that the recollections of the uprising remain vivid throughout Hakka families. The Taiping Rebellion held a significant position as Sun’s ideological framework began to develop.

The Hakka nationality can be characterized as the segment of the Chinese populace most subje-

cted to fervent Christian missionary propaganda. The Hakkas garnered significant attention from missionaries, leading some to assert that they were one of the lost tribes of the Israelites (Bohr, 2009: 10). Sun’s elder brother was a fervent Christian. He asserted his belief in the savior, revolutionary Jesus, rather than the Jesus represented by the churches (Schell-Delury, 2013: 356). Sun received his education at the Anglican-operated Iolani School and subsequently at Oahu College. Consequently, Sun dedicated part of his adolescence to an environment that facilitated the acquisition of different cultures and languages while also allowing him to watch and be inspired by Christianity. The influence of missionaries on the generations raised in China during this era was significant. Over the years, the inclination towards obtaining Western education and studying in the West has intensified.

Sun witnessed the indigenous populace of Honolulu’s anti-colonial resistance against the United States, which significantly impacted him (Öztürk, 2019: 47). Consequently, Sun’s early intellectual development can be attributed to his birth in Guangdong, upbringing during the reform era, affiliation with the Hakka ethnicity, alignment with a revolutionary interpretation of Christianity influenced by the Taiping, acquisition of modern education in a US-associated province, and exposure to local independence movements there.

Upon his return to the village in 1883, Sun did not adjust to the conventional framework of the community and performed a modernist perspective. In opposition to child trafficking, infanticide, concubinage, foot binding, idol worship, and many other behaviors, Sun audaciously manipulated the finger of a substantial wooden statue referred to as the “Emperor of the North” and proclaimed, “Now you comprehend the type of deity required to safeguard your village.

I fractured and contorted his finger, yet he maintained his grin as before.” Subsequent to this humiliating incident, Sun was deported to Hong Kong, a British territory (Weaver, 1939: 132-133). The impact of Christian schooling on Sun’s attitude towards idols is unequivocal. He has expressed his aspiration to be recognized in history as an iconoclast akin to Abraham, regarded as the progenitor of monotheistic faiths. The primary targets of the Sun’s destruction are the Empire and its customs.

The conviction among China’s young intellectuals, especially Sun, that the Qing Dynasty was incapable of safeguarding the nation intensified, leading to the emergence of Han nationalism. Since 1883, it is acknowledged that Sun actively sought to dismantle gods, with the definite intention of building a nation-state centered on Han nationality.

Following his journey to Hong Kong, Sun had the opportunity to travel extensively and dedicated the subsequent years to analyzing the social and political institutions of the places he explored (Weaver, 1939: 133). Sun studied medical studies in Hong Kong and was baptized there. In 1892, he commenced his career in the Portuguese province of Macao as one of the inaugural Chinese graduates of the Hong Kong medical school. Nevertheless, he persisted in his politicization by opposing the Qing Dynasty and rele-

gating his profession, believing that the dynasty’s failure to resist foreign forces stemmed from its corrupt and feeble governance. The Tonkin War, commencing in the year Sun was dispatched to Hong Kong and concluding in 1885, featured China’s defeat despite notable opposition against France regarding Vietnam’s status, significantly influencing Sun’s political development during this period. The conviction among China’s young intellectuals, especially Sun, that the Qing Dynasty was incapable of safeguarding the nation intensified, leading to the emergence of Han nationalism. Since 1883, it is acknowledged that Sun actively sought to dismantle gods, with the definite intention of building a nation-state centered on Han nationality (Öztürk, 2019: 49).

By 1894, Sun, having established a network of like-minded young intellectuals who were modernist nationalists, composed a petition with his associates to send to the senior official Li Hongzhang as a remedy for China’s issues. Nevertheless, they could not contact Li (Bergère, 2000: 40). In 1894, Sun and his associates, unable to communicate their beliefs to the authorities, resorted to the revolutionary organization and established The Society to Restore China’s Prosperity (Xing Zhong Hui) in Hawaii. The society relocated to Hong Kong in 1895 (Bergère, 2000: 49).

The primary confrontation between the Han nationalists and the Qing Dynasty commenced following the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Despite an extensive historical period during which the Goryeo (918-1392) and Joseon (1392-1897) Dynasties on the Korean Peninsula acknowledged their status as vassal states of China, Japan, having modernized and fortified itself through the Meiji Restoration (1868), engaged in a contest with China for dominance in Korea,



Empress Cixi of the Qing Dynasty (Photo: CGTN, 2018).

culminating in the Sino-Japanese War. Subsequent to the Tonkin War, China fortified its military and naval forces, anticipating a conclusive triumph over Japan. Nonetheless, following the significant setback it endured, the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), which led to the forfeiture of Taiwan Island, the Pescadores Islands, and Liaodong, had a profound impact on Chinese politics. Sun and his organization's members initiated the First Guangzhou Uprising on October 26, 1895, aiming to detach the Canton region from the Qing dynasty; however, they were unsuccessful and subsequently caught and banished (Bergère, 2000: 55-59). Qing operatives abducted Sun, who persisted in his revolutionary endeavors in London following his exile, and transported him to the embassy. The objective was to transport Sun to China and carry out his execution clandestinely. His escape was facilitated by the exceptional endeavors of his pals James Cantilie and Dr. Manson (Sun, 2018: 64-84;

Cantilie, 2001: 63). The unsuccessful abduction attempt by the Qing agents established the mythology of Sun Yat-sen and elevated his status as a leader among Han nationalists (Bergère, 2000: 66-67).

While abroad, Sun Yat-sen asserted that modernization was an indispensable requirement for China. Despite adopting Western social decorum, particularly in attire and behavior (Schell-Delury, 2013: 151), he cultivated an independentist position opposing Western colonialism. Sun was struck by the systematic characteristics of Hong Kong's development. The advancement of Hong Kong sharply contrasts with China's social and economic regression, marked by ineffective and corrupt Manchu governance. Sun personally experienced the challenges he faced in his work, revealing that the Chinese were subjected to prejudice under British governance in Hong Kong and Portuguese governance in Macau (Lee et al., 2013: 357-358).

Sun, who relocated to Japan in 1897, was influenced by Pan-Asianist ideologies promoting the solidarity of the yellow race against Western powers; he endorsed a policy advocating for the modernization of China, a nation-state initiative centered on Han identity, and collaboration among East Asians against Westerners. In contrast to the Japanese policy that subsequently perverted the Pan-Asianist ideology and promoted the notion of the yellow race as a component of a singular empire under Japanese dominion, he persisted in championing robust cooperation among East Asian nations founded on principles of equality (Sun, 1924).

Ahead of the 1911 Revolution, numerous students studying in Japan participated in the revolutionary efforts of Sun Yat-sen and his associates, who received backing from the Pan-Asianist and anti-Qing Japanese elite. On August 20, 1905, Sun convened all nationalist organizations under the Tongmenghui (Chinese Revolutionary Alliance) and spearheaded the formation of the vanguard organization of the Chinese Revolution.

The onset of Japan as a base for revolutionaries and the advocacy of Pan-Asianist ideas on a modernist basis were pivotal in the preparations for the 1911 Revolution. Post-war Chinese intellectuals and students critically assessed their nation and created a campaign to pursue education in

Japan, leveraging the resources available in that country. Numerous students who traveled to Japan for education and political exiles fleeing the Qing regime became acquainted with contemporary life, scientific advancements, and political beliefs; engaged in talks regarding the introduction and adaptation of these concepts in China; and established a central hub for their organization near China. Moreover, numerous educators and advisors from Japan arrived in China, positioning themselves in history to facilitate substantial shifts in China's future (Vogel-Harrel, 2019: 134).

After the war, Japan and China had divergent objectives for reconciliation. The Japanese were uneasy that China, distressed by its defeat, is offering additional economic concessions to Western nations in exchange for backing of its territorial integrity, thus augmenting Western influence in China. The Ōkuma doctrine, named after former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838-1922), aimed to enhance China's institutional and economic fortitude in response to the increasing privileges of the West after the Sino-Japanese War. The Kokumin Shinbun newspaper, which featured Ōkuma's remarks on the matter, underscored the inherent nature of the Sino-Japanese rapprochement by referencing the precedent of Prussia and Austria-Hungary, a comparison later commonly employed by Pan-Asianists. The publication noted that the two states, which were adversaries in 1866, subsequently became close allies and anticipated a similar reunion between China and Japan (Zachmann, 2009: 67-68). The salient aspect of Kokumin Shinbun's elucidation is that the dynasty and a substantial portion of the populace of the two states that engaged in conflict in 1866

were German. Consequently, the justification for an alliance predicated on “racial” unity among China, Japan, and Korea, as observed in the Pan-Asianists of that era, was founded on this precedent. In this context, former Prime Minister and statesman Itō Hirobumi (1841-1909) conferred with Emperor Guangxu in 1898 and provided counsel. Subsequent to Empress Cixi’s coup in the same year, Itō instructed Japanese authorities to embrace and assist Chinese reformers in Japan (Dreyer, 2016: 52). The Chinese, on the other hand, had a blend of jealousy and admiration for the Japanese. Moreover, significant curiosity emerged regarding Japan, which unavoidably fostered the reconciliation between China and Japan. Chinese elite circles noted Japan’s effective rejection of Western colonialism during the Meiji era, its industrialization of the economic foundation, enhanced political participation among the populace, and the attainment of universal education. Despite their thoughts being clouded by emotions such as fear, prejudice, and a sense of cultural superiority, many elites regarded Japan as the inaugural instance of a modern nation. Gina Anna Tam asserts that the relationships between Meiji Japan and China were profoundly transformative for China at the onset of a new century (Tam, 2020: 2-3). Following the war in 1896, Japan promptly dispatched the inaugural set of thirteen Chinese students (Dreyer, 2016: 52).

Ahead of the 1911 Revolution, numerous students studying in Japan participated in the revolutionary efforts of Sun Yat-sen and his associates, who received backing from the Pan-Asianist and anti-Qing Japanese elite. On August 20, 1905, Sun convened all nationalist organizations under the Tongmenghui (Chi-

nese Revolutionary Alliance) and spearheaded the formation of the vanguard organization of the Chinese Revolution (Spence, 1990: 240). Assisted by Huang Xing (1874-1916), a prominent leader of the Tongmenghui, and the renowned philologist and intellectual Zhang Binglin (1869-1936), Sun disseminated the organization’s democratic revolution manifesto, the “Three People’s Principles,” in the *Minbao* newspaper in November (Bergère, 2000: 153; Öztürk, 2019: 50-51).

The “Three People’s Principles” are delineated in the oath of the Xing Zhong Hui (The Society to Restore China’s Prosperity), formed by Sun in 1894, and the oath of the Qingshan Military School (Qingshan Junshi Xuexiao), founded by Sun in Japan in 1903. Objectives include: “Expel the Manchus, restore China, and establish a republic; guarantee fair land distribution.” Then, *Minbao* announces the formulation of the “Three People’s Principles” as “Nationalism, People’s Rights (Democracy), and People’s Well-being” (Weaver, 1939: 133).

In articulating the concept of nationalism in Chinese, Sun preferred the term “minzu zhuyi,” which signifies ethnicity, over “guojia zhuyi,” which pertains to “sovereign state,” a political concept introduced by Emmanuel Sieyès during the French Revolution. This term encapsulated the notion of a Han-centric nation-state while concurrently acting as a safeguard against the feared threat of “racial extinction” (miezhong), in which the white race would dominate the yellow race (Schell-Delury, 2013: 167). The 1911 Xinhai Revolution expanded the notion of country to have a political aspect, expanding the term “race” to encompass all ethnicities within Chinese borders, rather than exclusively the Han.

Sun recognized the political significance of the populace, particularly in light of the lessons derived from the failures in the 1911 Xinhai Revolution and the impact of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, but he held a distinctly elitist perspective on the concept of “people’s rights (democracy)” throughout this period. Sun asserts that for individuals to acclimate to a genuinely democratic system, they must undergo transformation and education via revolutions. As citizens possessing “national consciousness,” they will be prepared for the challenges to democratic existence that may destabilize the nation. Sun compares the Chinese populace to a loose layer of sand, asserting that revolutionary ideals serve as the cement that would bind this loose sand into firm concrete. Undoubtedly, the state is responsible for combining this sand, cement, and water (Schell-De-lury, 2013: 170-171).

The principle of “People’s well-being” (Min-Sheng) sought to abolish the privileges of the Manchus, enhance the welfare of the Han populace, and particularly to allocate land to the peasantry.


The principle of “People’s Well-being” (Min-Sheng) sought to abolish the privileges of the Manchus, enhance the welfare of the Han populace, and particularly to allocate land to the peasantry. The elaboration of this idea with a more socialist interpretation was finalized in 1924, as will be argued below (Ulusoy, 2023: 180). Bergère asserts that the primary influence on Sun’s initial formulation of this principle was the concept posited by American economist Henry George

(1839-1897), which contended that individuals are the proprietors of the value they generate and that the economic value of land ought to be equitably allocated among society (Bergère, 2000: 168-169). In the section on the ‘land question’ of George’s *Progress and Poverty*, which marked the period of its publication, the land-ownership-value problem in the USA, which was articulated with capitalist production, is evaluated, and in particular the land ownership of slave labor is discussed (George, 1935: 333-394). It is logical that Sun, significantly impacted by the Taiping Rebellion and well-acquainted with the USA and its intellectuals, considered George’s ideas as pertinent when addressing China’s welfare issue, predominantly involving landless peasants, during a time when socialist and Fabianist ideologies were prevalent in the USA.

During his time abroad, until he returned to China on December 21, 1911, following the victory of the Xinhai Revolution, Sun tried to spread this revolutionary program wherever he went, organized donation campaigns, and tried to gain the support of Chinese abroad and foreigners who were sympathetic to the Revolution (Weaver, 1939: 133; Bergère, 2000: 210).

The Xinhai Revolution of 1911 and Sun Yat-sen, the inaugural President of the Republic of China

The disintegration of the Qing Empire was unavoidable with the demise of Empress Cixi (1835-1908). Subsequent to the Empress, who adeptly unified the disparate factions within the imperial bureaucracy through her authority, the Manchu bureaucrats, decimated and diminished during the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), were unable to restore the Empire’s central power alongside bure-



On 11 October 1911, the Hubei Military Government was established in Wuchang (Photo: Xinhua, 2016).

autocratic elites, particularly military leaders, from other ethnicities.

The Qing administration, debilitated by several insurrections and incessant assaults, was dismantled by the rebellion that commenced with the Wuchang uprising of 1911 and proliferated across. Despite the inability of the revolutionaries led by Tongmenghui to independently dismantle the Qing dynasty, the Qing lacked the capacity to form a stable government. Consequently, the coalition of military leaders and regional powers from the north, under the command of Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), the head of the newly established Beiyang Army, opted for a provisional compromise with the Tongmenghui, notwithstanding their adherence to monarchism. The Beiyang Army and Yuan Shikai, who delivered the decisive blow to the Manchu forces defending the empire, engaged in rigorous negotiations with the imperial family, reaching an accord that Emperor Pu-Yi would reside in the “Forbidden City” in Beijing, that he would exclusively use the title

of emperor there, that the imperial family treasury would remain under their control, and that the emperor would receive a stipulated monthly salary. The emperor issued an “imperial order” announcing his abdication and the establishment of a “republic” regime to administer the country (Spence, 1990: 267). The proclamation of a “republic” by imperial decree is quite intriguing. Proclaiming a republic through “imperial order” may be viewed as a move by Yuan that undermines the legitimacy of the revolution. The opportunity afforded to Yuan stemmed from the power dynamics among the revolutionaries.

The Tongmenghui, a forerunner of the Xinhai Revolution, did not depend on the populace but instead mobilized the old military forces and different organizations within its reach to instigate an insurrection and established an alliance with the Beiyang Army (ÇKP Tarihi, 2012: 18 and 64). The military forces it depended upon were feeble, and its social foundation comprised intellectuals, students, and urban elites (Wang, 2015: 99).

At the onset of the revolution, marked by the Wuchang Uprising on October 10, 1911, Sun was located in the United States. Sun became the first president of the Republic of China on January 1, 1912, after arriving in China on December 21, 1911 (Bergère, 2000: 209-210). Upon examining the whole political landscape, he swiftly saw that his tenure in government would be short-lived. The 1911 Revolution effectively consolidated the constitutional monarchists inside the nation. Kang Youwei (1858-1927), the pre-eminent figure among constitutional monarchists, contended that Mongolia and Manchuria could not be retained if the Qing dynasty was abolished (Wang, 2015: 75), but Liang Qichao (1873-1929) returned to China post-revolution and established an alliance with Yuan. Indeed, Sun, recognizing his inability to unify the nation, summoned Yuan to assume the presidency, and Yuan was inaugurated as president on March 10, 1912 (Spence, 1990: 267-276).

The revolutionaries, recognizing their inability to dismantle the Qing dynasty independently, relinquished the notion of founding a nation-state centered on the Han ethnicity upon their compelled collaboration with Yuan Shikai. The revolutionaries adopted the slogan of the “Five-Nation Republic,” resulting in a five-colored national flag, where “red” symbolizes the Han, “yellow” denotes the Manchus, “blue” signifies the Mongols, “white” represents the Hui, and “black” indicates the Tibetans (ÇKP Tarihi, 2012: 17).

The complex interactions between revolutionaries and monarchists intensified during the parliamentary elections of the Republic of China, held from December 1912 to January 1913. Four parties participated in the elections. The Tongmenghui transformed into the Kuomintang (KMT - Chinese Nationalist Party) under the leadership of Song Jiaoren (1882-1912). The Republican Party, the Unity Party, and the Democratic Party participated in the



Sun Yat-sen in 1912 standing in front of the Five Races Under One Union flag and the Blue Sky with a White Sun flag (Photo: Xinhua, 2020).

elections as “right-wing” factions. The Republican Party explicitly endorsed Yuan Shikai and was believed to be his party. The Unity Party was founded by Zhang Binglin, a former member of the Tongmenghui. Zhang collaborated with the anti-KMT right-wing factions following the 1911 Revolution. The Democratic Party, previously known as the Progressive Party, is a constitutional-monarchist party with Liang Qichao as its *de facto* leader (Spence, 1990: 279). Despite not securing an outright majority in the house and senate, the KMT garnered a significantly greater number of votes than its competitors, according to the election results (China National Assembly Election, 1912).

The elections were structured with a distinctly elitist rationale consistent with the ethos of 1911. In China, with a population of 400 million, there are merely 40 million voters, consisting of men who pay substantial taxes. The KMT distinctly emerged as the premier party, embodying the inclination of urban elites to engage in governance. The votes obtained by the parties did not originate solely from their own constituents; rather, the results indicated that their influence was derived from fragile and dispersed “elite alliances” inside urban areas. Song Jiaoren, aspiring to become prime minister, believed he could dominate the government of the new Republic through his gentry-merchant allies; however, neither Dr. Sun nor other party leaders concurred with Song’s optimism (Rankin et al., 1986: 64).

Subsequent to the elections, political parties except the KMT consolidated as the Progressive Party (Progressive Party - 1913) to establish a unified stance in support of Yuan Shikai. This name selection represents a captivating junction of Turkish and Chinese political history. The opposition to the national revolutionary and republican party was designated as the “Progressive Party.” Furthermore, Liang, who held the position of Minister of Justice in Yuan’s cabi-

net, was elected as the head of this party. Song Jiaoren, who struggled to establish a government, was killed on Yuan’s orders on March 22, 1913. Liang was implicated in the murder; however, all the hired assassins were inexplicably eradicated (either murdered or vanished), leading to Yuan’s exoneration by the court authorities (Schell-Delury, 2013: 135).

The assassination of Song Jiaoren marked the dissolution of the provisional consensus-based elite unity formed after the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Yuan Shikai, who consolidated all monarchists, initiated a significant assault on the KMT and proclaimed his dictatorial regime. Yuan, a landowner backed by comprador bureaucratic capital, prevailed against the KMT, which lacked popular support, through his alliance with local northern chiefs and the strength of the Beiyang Army. Dr. Sun’s endeavors, having defected to Japan and advocated for a second revolution, proved insufficient, as Yuan’s army quelled the insurgents. With international backing, Yuan initiated plans to restore the monarchy and proclaim himself emperor (Bergère, 2000: 237).

The Most Challenging Years of Sun Yat-sen

Neither the statist modernization of the late Qing period nor the mobilization of proto-liberal democracy advanced in the four years after the 1911 Revolution (Rankin et al., 1986: 64). The historical power bloc that sustained the Qing Empire reestablished its supremacy through a new, mainly militarized coalition by 1913. Nonetheless, the dissolution of the Empire eradicated the ideological instruments, particularly Confucianism, that would direct this coalition, and the efficacy of the civil-bureaucratic systems to oversee the military diminished. Under these circumstances, there was no favorable development for China in comparison to the Qing dynasty, and the situation deteriorated slightly.

Subsequent to Yuan's consolidation of power, he reinstated the examination system for civil servant recruitment and endeavored to enhance civil-bureaucratic oversight over the military. Nonetheless, Yuan, oblivious to the precariousness of the situation, proclaimed himself emperor on March 22, 1916, revealing his inability to secure the allegiance of the elites to whom he had assigned new roles, particularly Duan Qirui (1865-1936), whom he regarded as his closest ally (Rankin et al., 1986: 64).

Dr. Sun established the Chinese Revolutionary Party (CRP) in Tokyo in 1914. The CRP's strategy perpetuated the legacy of Tongmenghui, prioritizing outreach to military factions and clandestine organizations over bolstering the populace base, primarily orchestrating coup-like insurrections and executing assassinations (ÇKP Tarihi, 2012: 23). Yuan quelled all forms of insurrections and coup endeavors orchestrated by the CRP. During World War I, commencing in 1914, Japan appropriated the German colony in Qingdao and presented the Chinese government

with an ultimatum on January 18, 1915, known as the "Twenty-one Demands." This ultimatum included the stipulation that China would become a Japanese protectorate, resulting in a loss of credibility for Yuan and inciting a nationalist upheaval within the nation. Although Yuan prolonged the negotiations with Japan and managed to leak the secret ultimatum to the Western states, thus preventing China from becoming a protectorate in return for certain concessions, he had to face the pressure of public opinion. Conversely, Sun assured Japan a more favorable arrangement in exchange for Yuan's ousting; however, he was unable to elicit a reaction. This initiative by Sun demonstrates his political helplessness (Dreyer, 2016: 62). Nevertheless, this dire circumstance resulted in a transformation in Sun's fortunes. Following this ultimatum, the United States lost confidence in Japan, undermining the longstanding US-Japan partnership against Russia in the region. The United States' hesitance to relinquish sovereignty of China to Japan and its backing of certain



Yuan Shikai, who consolidated all monarchists, initiated a significant assault on the KMT and proclaimed his dictatorial regime (Photo: Sina, 2021).

military leaders expedited the disintegration of the power coalition fighting Sun (ÇKP Tarihi, 2012: 20).

In this era, referred to as the golden years of Chinese industry, the emergence of the industrial proletariat facilitated the rise of class-oriented political philosophies. The national bourgeoisie, unable to execute the democratic revolution independently, commenced collaboration with the working class and other laboring masses based on shared interests against bureaucratic comprador capital and huge landowners.

Following Yuan's unsuccessful attempt to become emperor, Sun returned to the country amidst violent turmoil as it was swiftly disintegrating among warlords and commenced combat against the warlords in Canton. In alignment with the zeitgeist, Sun relinquished the civilian designation of Dr. and reemerged as the Generalissimo; henceforth, the second-in-command was not a Japanese-educated civilian thinker but rather a military academy alumnus, Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) (Gray, 2002: 66).

In 1916, Sun Yat-sen arrived in the Canton region and attempted to build a revolutionary government, but he was exiled by the warlords. In 1917, Sun was compelled to relocate to Shanghai, where he commenced efforts to restructure the Kuomintang with the assistance of the "Green Gang," a mafia group that had longstanding connections with the nationalists (Spence, 1990: 304). On October 10, 1919, Sun reconstituted the KMT and subsequ-

ently created a military government in Guangzhou (Canton) in 1921, assuming the title of Generalissimo. The second KMT under Dr. Sun, in contrast to the first, was distinguished by its more socialist ideas and organizational practices aimed at fostering connections with the populace. The primary factors that transformed the KMT during this period and rendered it the most influential entity in the nation's trajectory include popular support for the KMT, public fatigue from the warlords' incessant conflicts, the May 4 New Culture Movement, the contradictions among imperialist powers following World War I, the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, and the founding of the Communist Party of China in 1921.

The decade from 1914 to 1924 was a formative time during which the dynamics of China's twentieth century emerged. The five years from 1914 to 1919 were highly prolific in the development of new social forces and ideological-cultural constructs upon which the KMT would depend. Also, the period from 1919 to 1924 was highly productive, during which the KMT acquired the strategy, program, organizational framework, national democratic coalition, and foreign backing necessary to unify all of China. The pinnacle of Dr. Sun's leadership occurred during this decade. The domestic and global variables contributing to this success have been enumerated above. The subsequent observations can be made concerning these factors:

Following World War, the reduction in imports and the rise in exports catalyzed fast industrial growth in China to satisfy foreign demand. The "Twenty-One Demands" ultimatum issued by Japan to China prompted a significant boycott of Japanese products within China, thereby elevating the local demand for Chinese goods. In this era, referred to as the golden years of Chinese industry, the emergence of the industrial proletariat facilitated the rise of class-oriented political philosophies.

The national bourgeoisie, unable to execute the democratic revolution independently, commenced collaboration with the working class and other laboring masses based on shared interests against bureaucratic comprador capital and huge landowners. The “national classes,” opposed to allocating the surplus value generated by the nation’s industrial development to warlords and their associated classes, commenced efforts to construct a unified political agenda. The foundational class basis for the cooperation between the KMT and the CPC was predicated on the coalition of the national bourgeoisie, the working class, intellectuals, the petty bourgeoisie, and other laboring classes (ÇKP Tarihi, 2012: 21-27).

The actions extended to more than twenty provinces and over one hundred cities, introducing novel struggle practices and organizational approaches to

China. The emergence of the working class demonstrated that class struggle and the quest for independence were inextricably linked during the democratic revolution, establishing an indissoluble connection between Marxist ideology and patriotism in China through class dynamics. Alongside demonstrations and strikes, several institutions, including newspapers, periodicals, seminars, student organizations, and research institutes, were established to address the challenges faced by China. In 1920, over four hundred periodicals existed, encompassing patriotic-nationalist, socialist-anarchist, and communist ideologies (ÇKP Tarihi, 2012: 37-39). The “New Culture Movement” of May 4 emerged from the intellectual discourse surrounding these institutions.

The May 4th Movement is pivotal in the shift of intellectual paradigms in China. The political cultu-



The demonstration at Tiananmen, May 4, 1919 (Photo: The China History, 2020).

re has been significantly influenced by this mental metamorphosis. Politics, the arena in which public judgments are rendered and the allocation of social surplus value is determined, had until then been perceived in China as a process of negotiation and conflict among elites. Nonetheless, in the presence of mass movements that exceed the social influence of all factions and groups, politics has acquired a new political agent. Dr. Sun and the CPC, emerging from the May 4th movement, recognized the significance of the bond forged with the masses during this process (Wang, 2015: 127).

On July 25, 1919, Lev Karakhan (1889–1937), the Deputy Foreign Commissar of Soviet Russia, issued an official document subsequently referred to as the “First Karakhan Manifesto,” formally titled “Declaration to the Chinese People and the Northern and Southern Governments of China.” As per the manifesto, Soviet Russia proclaimed the nullity of all agreements reached during the Tsarist era concerning economic and political sovereignty against China and showed its determination to rectify all wrongs done to China. The paramount article in the manifesto addressed the restitution of the Chinese Eastern Railway, a segment of the Old Siberian Railway, to China without compensation. Nevertheless, Soviet Russia subsequently asserted that there was no subject “restitution railways without compensation” in the Manifesto and attributed the confusion to an erroneous translation from the French of the Manifesto (Spence, 1990: 307). Nonetheless, the Manifesto was acclaimed as an exceptionally commendable declaration for its era. Subsequent to this declaration, Sun reached out to the Bolshevik Party and the Comintern, and in January 1918, the KMT’s media channels disseminated reports commending the Bolshevik Revolution. Several days later, Sun Yat-sen dispatched a congratulatory telegram to Lenin (Spence, 1990: 305). Representatives of the Comintern arrived in China to foster mutual commu-

nication. The Comintern’s intervention and the Bolshevik Party’s example significantly impacted both the CPC and the KMT. Wang Hui asserts that “the Party’s politicized army and the notions of resisting armed counter-revolution were originally innovations not of the CPC but of the KMT, which remained under the influence of the Comintern during its revolutionary phase” (Wang, 2015: 128).

The Final Initiative: Unifying All National Forces for the Consolidation of China

In the early 1920s, Sun traversed between Canton and Shanghai. Sun was designated president of the People’s Government of China, formed by the remnants of the former Beijing Parliament under the auspices of the Guangdong Warlord Chen Jiongming (1878–1933) during the years 1921 to 1922. Chen ejected Sun from Guangdong when he attempted to establish the region as a base for the unification of China (Spence, 1990: 334). In 1921, while Sun remained aligned with Chen, Comintern envoy Maring (born Henk Sneevliet, 1883–1942) conferred with Sun, resulting in a preliminary agreement to sustain their collaboration. In January 1923, Sun met with Soviet envoy Adolf Joffe (1883–1927) and subsequently issued a declaration of understanding between Soviet Russia and the KMT. Reports indicated the absence of objective conditions for the establishment of socialism or a Soviet government in China, asserting that the historical task was to ensure China’s national unity and complete independence, with the Comintern pledging various forms of support for this objective (Bergère, 2000: 317–321; Spence, 1990: 334–335). By this decision, CPC members joined the KMT through individual involvement. Dr. Sun and the KMT administration were unprepared for the formation of a coalition among the uniting organizations (ÇKP Tarihi, 2012: 73).

The dynamics of power among warlords in China were perpetually fluctuating. Two months subsequent to this deal, warlord Chen Jiongming (1878-1933) was compelled to vacate Guangzhou. Sun, returning to Canton from Shanghai, consolidated military units from Yunnan, Guangxi, Hunan, and Henan, and was subsequently proclaimed Generalissimo and commander-in-chief of the army to centralize control over the weaponry in his possession and that of the KMT (Bergère, 2000: 324; Spence, 1990: 335).

Comintern envoy Michail Markovich Borodin (Michael Gruzenberg, 1884-1951), who arrived in Canton on October 6, 1923, was appointed as an advisor to the KMT by Sun (Bergère, 2000: 324; Spence 1990: 335). It can be said that Borodin indeed exerted influence on the CPC during his tenure, shaped the dynamics between the CPC and the KMT, and orchestrated the assistance allocated to the KMT (ÇKP Tarihi, 2012: 75).

Upon the emergence of the potential for Chen Jiongmin to assault Canton once more, Borodin recommended that Sun implement drastic measures. Borodin, who underscored the necessity of incorporating workers and peasants into the military, asserted that the implementation of an eight-hour workday, a minimum wage, and the expropriation of large landowners' assets would garner substantial support from the workers and peasants. Sun refrained from initiating this program to avoid alarming his military supporters; nonetheless, he asserted that choices about the democratic revolution program would be determined at the KMT Congress. Borodin supported the integration of the democratic revolution with the effort to unify the nation, whereas Sun aimed to achieve the democratic revolution through the formation of a comprehensive alliance and seizing power (Spence: 1990, 335).



PRC President Xi Jinping and CPC leaders at a meeting commemorating the 110th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, capital of China, on October 9, 2021 (Photo: Xinhua, 2021).

Sun, who initiated preparations for the 1st General Congress of the KMT alongside Borodin, was alerted by foreign allies that he was becoming “Sovietized” before the Congress. In response, Sun declared that he would join up with the CPC if they did not endorse the partnership. Sun replied “Lafayette” to the Chinese, particularly those in America, who mentioned Borodin’s Jewish heritage and inquired about his name (Spence, 1990: 337). Sun’s emphasis on the cohesion of all national forces illustrates the pivotal role he occupied in this process. Indeed, the discussions occurred not just inside the KMT ranks but also exhibited fluctuations within the CPC ranks during the Congress.

Upon the announcement of Lenin’s death at the Congress, Sun recalled Lenin as the “Great Man” and stated, “I wish to pursue the path you have illuminated, and even in the face of opposition from my adversaries, my people will pay tribute to me”.

From January 20 to 30, 1924, the First National Congress of the Kuomintang convened in Guangzhou, attended by 165 delegates, 15 percent of whom were communists, and presided over by Sun Yat-sen. Sun appointed Li Dazhao (1889-1927), the library director and Mao Zedong’s colleague at Peking University, to the congress presidency council, while the communist Tang Pingshan (1886-1956) was assigned to present a working report on behalf of the KMT Provisional Central Executive Committee. Notwithstanding this, Chen Duxiu (1879-1942), the main leader of the CPC at that time, criticized Sun’s “Three

People’s Principles” and the “Five Power Constitution” (legislative, executive, judiciary, control, evaluation) that delineated constitutional powers (Caldwell, 2017: 5). Chen asserts that they failed to offer a theoretical foundation for the Chinese Revolution. Veteran KMT member Deng Zeru (1868-1934) delivered a discourse elucidating that the Three People’s Principles, which acquired a socialist dimension through the party program developed by Sun and Borodin, were not in conflict with the tenets of communism (Bergère, 2000: 326-327). Notwithstanding the concerns from Duxiu’s from the left and certain KMT members from the right, under Sun’s leadership and with the backing of Soviet Russia, China’s democratic revolution program and its subsequent trajectory were sanctioned.

Upon the announcement of Lenin’s death at the Congress, Sun recalled Lenin as the “Great Man” and stated, “I wish to pursue the path you have illuminated, and even in the face of opposition from my adversaries, my people will pay tribute to me” (Spence, 1990: 338).

The Three People’s Principles were amended to “anti-imperialist nationalism, democracy, and socialism” during the Congress. The term “democracy” delineated the application of democratic rights by the general populace, while the notion of “guaranteeing favorable living conditions for the populace” was supplanted by “equitable land ownership” and “capital regulation.” In contrast to Sun’s prior elitist perspective on democracy and his economic comprehension confined to developmentalism, it is evident that the agenda has moved further to the left. Furthermore, Sun proposed the motto “Land Belongs to Those Who Work,” which gained prominence in Turkey throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Spence, 1990: 338-339; ÇKP Tarihi, 2012: 75). Mao Zedong quoted that in a speech delivered on April 22, 1945, Sun’s following words:

“The Kuomintang’s principle of nationalism possesses a dual significance. The first is ‘the liberation of the Chinese nation,’ and the second is ‘the equality of all nationalities in China.’ The Kuomintang formally asserts its acknowledgment of the right to self-determination for all nationalities within China, declaring that upon the triumph of the revolution against imperialism and warlords, a free and unified Republic of China will be established” (Mao, 2013: 317).

The progression of Sun’s nationalist ideology, originating from Han nationalism with pronounced racial overtones, transitioned from a five-nation republic to a conceptualization of a homogeneous “Chinese nation” and ultimately evolved into a political identity encompassing diverse nationalities, reflecting a collective historical aspiration for coexistence, is noteworthy (Wang, 2015: 343).

The congress identified the three policies of the KMT as “alliances with the Soviet Union, collaboration with the CPC, and support for the peasants and workers” (ÇKP Tarihi, 2012: 75). In May 1924, the Wampoa Academy was founded as the Soviets began to provide military support to the KMT. Chiang Kai-shek, who traveled to Moscow with the KMT delegation, focused on military organization here and then was appointed head of the Academy by Sun. Zhou Enlai (1898-1976), a prominent CPC cadre, also held the position of vice president as the political commissar of the Academy (Spence, 1990: 338). The Chinese People’s Government commenced the training of thousands of officers and soldiers with the founding of the Academy, secured financial assistance from the Soviets to equip the army, and expedited preparations for the operation aimed at national unification.

Sun, who dedicated his final months to strategizing the Northern Expedition for national unification, accomplished the preparations for the military operation that would commence in 1927. Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, who established the foundational concept and tactics for the Chinese democratic revolution, died on March 12, 1925.

Conclusion

2025 marks the centenary of Sun Yat-sen’s death. In these past 100 years, China has faced significant challenges in effectively executing its democratic revolution. China asserts that it has established a unique path for China (an intrinsic path to China’s modernization) as a consequence of these processes. Post-1978, China emerged as the manufacturing hub for the West, characterized by its inexpensive workforce and disciplined state structure. The West, a hub of technology, finance, and services, sought to transfer the onerous task of production to emerging nations while preserving its profitability through high-value-added products. On the centenary of the Republic of China, China disrupted this cycle, established its technological preeminence, and emerged as a nation with the most advanced productive capabilities.

China’s unique path is characterized by its capacity to transcend the “development spiral” imposed by the West on oppressed nations. In reaction to the substantial social, economic, environmental, and bureaucratic costs associated with globalization and the shift to a market economy, a comprehensive rectification initiative was launched following Xi Jinping becoming the General Secretary of the CPC in 2012, yielding notable outcomes. China has currently attained the objectives that Sun Yat-Sen envisioned in his poignant address to Chinese students from the USA at Linnan on December 21, 1923, following its significant and laborious long march.

The century-long journey of China has been greatly impacted by the seventy-five years of struggle from the Taiping Rebellion to 1925. Sun Yat-sen is unquestionably the most significant individual who has influenced the past thirty years of these seventy-five years. Following Sun’s demise, the entirety of Chinese leadership has grappled with fulfilling the objectives of the democratic revolution he initiated and advancing it farther. In this regard, Sun is crucial to the history of China’s modernization.

Sun’s most significant legacy, which remains pertinent

today, is his transition from Han nationalism to Chinese nationalism, encompassing all Chinese individuals while repudiating Han chauvinism, his shifting of an elitist political approach to mass engagement, his focus on the linkage he forged between socialism and nationalism, and the recognition of the working class and laborers as the most national and patriotic demographic. 🌸

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Sun Yat-sen's Contribution to Early Stages of Chinese Modernization



LIU NINGNING*

Prof. Dr.
Northeastern University, China.

CHENG ENFU**

Prof. Dr.
Chairman of WAPE

** Liu Ningning, Professor at School of Marxism, Northeastern University, China. Graduated from Liaoning University with a Ph.D. in economics and majored in world economy. Research interests include the study of basic issues in modern Chinese history and the study of Marxist political economy.*

e-mail: liuningning@mail.neu.edu.cn

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0006-1684-6424>

***Cheng Enfu, former Dean, Academician, and Professor of the Institute of Marxism, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Chairman of the World Political Economy Association. Cheng Enfu is Editor-in-Chief of International Critical Thought.*

e-mail: 65344718@vip.163.com

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9236-1916>

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ABSTRACT

Sun Yat-sen was a distinguished patriot, a pioneering figure in China's democratic movement, the creator of the Republic of China and the Kuomintang, and the formulator of the "Three People's Principles." In the context of China's early modernization during the Republic of China, the 1911 Revolution dismantled the monarchy and instituted a bourgeois republic, thereby transferring the leadership of early modernization to the modern bourgeoisie and facilitating the transition to modern civilization. It popularized the concept of a democratic republic and established an institutional framework for China's initial modernization. Sun Yat-sen's vision for nation-building and his modernization philosophy significantly contributed to China's early modernization, particularly through the New Three People's Principles and the policies of collaboration with Russia, the Communist Party, and the labor classes and peasants, which exhibited a socialist inclination. Third, it provided some experience for the Communist Party of China to explore the road of China's modernization.

Keywords: 1911 Chinese Revolution, modernization, struggle against imperialism and feudalism, reconstruction, Three People's Principles.

Introduction

DURING THE LATE QING DYNASTY, CHINA experienced further fragmentation due to Western capitalist powers; national capitalism emerged and evolved, the agrarian economy began to fragment, the Qing Dynasty became increasingly inept and corrupt, peasant movements persisted, and new ideologies prolife-

rated. The Westernization school did not accomplish its objective of self-improvement and prosperity, and the reformists did not meet the anticipated expectations for enhancement and affluence. The recent policies implemented at the conclusion of the Qing Dynasty did not succeed in attaining the objectives of self-strengthening and restoration. At this juncture, the bourgeois revolutionaries ascended to the historical stage.

The Revolution of 1911 established the conditions necessary for the comprehensive initiation of China's early modernization

Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) was a distinguished patriot, a pioneering figure in China's democratic movement, the creator of the Republic of China and the Kuomintang, and the formulator of the "Three People's Principles." Sun Yat-sen was born and raised during the Westernization Movement. Upon the conclusion of the Westernization Movement, the youthful Sun Yat-sen assimilated the insights derived from its shortcomings, amalgamated them with the principles of Western modernization, and proposed an economic modernization strategy to enhance China's wealth and strength that advocated for a transition in agriculture, education, industry, and economy from traditional to modern paradigms:

"People can exert their utmost, land can yield its maximum, resources can be optimized, and

goods can circulate freely (Sun, 1981a: 8)."

Despite the failure of the 1911 Revolution to achieve its ultimate goal, Sun Yat-sen's comprehensive reform vision for China and his ideas influenced society. Subsequently, Sun Yat-sen (1981a: 52) uncovered the profound corruption within the Qing government and acknowledged that:

"The approach of peaceful reform is no longer viable. As the demand for governance intensifies and the urgency for reform escalates, it becomes evident that the methods of nonviolent transformation must be modified to incorporate pressure."

He commenced the path of revolution. He initiated the Revolution of 1911, advocating for comprehensive anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism, which terminated the feudal monarchy that had persisted for over two millennia, altered the trajectory of Chinese history, and established the groundwork for China's early modernization to progress into a new phase.



In August 1905, Sun Yat-sen, together with Huang Xing, Song Jiaoren, and others, founded the first national revolutionary organization, the Tongmenghui Association (Chinese Revolutionary Alliance) (Photo: Chiculture, 2025).

Sun Yat-sen formulated the “Three People’s Principles” doctrine, which delineated a novel trajectory for China’s modernization

In 1894, Sun Yat-sen spearheaded the establishment of the first local bourgeois revolutionary organization in modern China, the “Xingzhonghui” Association, which advocated the revolutionary agenda of “expelling the Manchus, restoring China, and instituting a unified government” (Sun, 1981a: 20), reflecting the democratic revolutionary objective of entirely dismantling the Qing Dynasty and instituting a republican government akin to that of the United States. Entering the 20th century, a cohort of burgeoning intellectuals authored books and disseminated newspapers and periodicals, ardently promoting democratic revolutionary concepts. Bourgeois revolutionary factions disseminated revolutionary concepts broadly, instilling these ideas profoundly into the populace, leading to the development and expansion of revolutionary forces. Amid the swift growth of the revolutionary landscape, Sun Yat-sen united the nation’s revolutionary factions, and in August 1905, Huang Xing, Song Jiaoren, and others jointly established the inaugural national revolutionary organization—Tongmenghui Association (Chinese Revolutionary Alliance). The Tongmenghui Association adopted the goal of “expelling the Manchus, restoring China, establishing the Republic of China, and equalizing land rights” (Sun, 1981a: 276-277) as its agenda for a bourgeois democratic revolution and initially delineated the framework for the bourgeois Republic. In October of that year, Sun Yat-sen articulated the three ideas of “nationalism, civil rights, and people’s livelihood” (Sun, 1981a: 288) in his journal, *People’s Daily*. Nationalism signifies the expulsion of the Manchus and the restoration of China, the fall of the Manchu-led feudal dynasty by a national revolution, and the establishment of a “national state” characteri-

zed by equality among all ethnic groups:

“China is the China of the Chinese; the politics of China are managed by the Chinese. Upon expelling the Manchus, we shall restore our nation (Zhang & Li, 2009: 174).”

The purpose of the unrelenting struggle of modern Chinese people with lofty ideals is to save the country from danger and achieve national independence, so the feudal autocratic system must be overthrown. The civil rights thought refers to the establishment of the Republic of China by dismantling the feudal dictatorship through revolution and instituting a bourgeois democratic republic.

Sun Yat-sen contended that the bourgeois republic was the most evolved political system globally, asserting that China should adopt this system in accordance with the “axioms of evolution” of humanity. The principle of civic rights underpins political revolution:

“Following the national revolution in the future, while it is indeed possible to eradicate the current detrimental politics, the underlying causes will persist, and it must not be neglected. For millennia, China has functioned as an absolute monarchy, a system incompatible with the principles of equality and freedom for its population. Success cannot be achieved only through the national revolution (Sun, 1981a: 325).”

This illustrates that the establishment of a “Republic of China” necessitates a political revolution alongside the national revolution:

“In the ongoing revolution for the establishment of a national government, all citizens are equal and possess the right to engage in political power. The people elect the president. The Parliament consists of representatives elected by the people. All individuals draft and comply with the Constitution of the Republic of China (Sun, 1981a: 297).”

This created the foundation for the republic's attainment of civil rights. The philosophy of people's livelihood advocates for "equal land rights," addressing social and economic issues related to land through social revolution, thereby achieving national wealth and strength while establishing a "social state."

Sun Yat-sen believed that the significant disparity between the affluent and the impoverished in Europe and the United States stemmed from the inability to address the land issue. Consequently, after examining the tumultuous capitalist landscape, Sun Yat-sen endeavored to identify a lasting solution to the land issue, enhance the populace's wealth, and fortify the nation. In the following words, he elucidates the concepts of social wealth redistribution, anti-monopoly, and the concept of public ownership:

"All persons should equally reap the benefits of civilizational developments. The improvement of social and economic structures affects worldwide land valuation. The current land prices will remain with the original proprietors; the augmented value resulting from societal advancements post-revolution will be allocated to the state and distributed among the populace. The state responsible for societal formation must guarantee that every family has adequate food and clothing, ensuring that no individual is left homeless. Individuals who attempt to monopolize and dominate the lives of citizens ought to be forsaken by the populace (Sun, 1981a: 297)"

The concept of "average land right" encompasses "establishing land value," "taxation based on the value," "reverting land to public ownership according to the value," "acquiring land based on the value," and "state-owned land." Sun Yat-sen (2011b: 625) proposed that:


"When each county established autonomy, it must first determine the valuation of private land inside the county. The landlord should establish the legal framework, and the local government

would impose taxes based on this valuation, with the option to purchase at any moment according to the predetermined price. If the land's value appreciates as a result of political reform or social advancement, the advantages will be distributed among the entire county's populace, and the original owner shall not partake. The annual agricultural yield, the appreciation of land value, the output from communal land, the benefits derived from natural resources such as mountains, forests, and waterways, as well as the profits from hydroelectric power, are all under the jurisdiction of the local government. These resources are utilized for local enterprises and to address public necessities, including child-rearing, elder care, poverty alleviation, healthcare, and familial support".

Sun Yat-sen's "Three People's Principles" outlines a novel vision and methodology for achieving China's modernization via national, political, and social change:

"The objective of our revolution is to pursue happiness for all people. We do not want a small number of Manchus to monopolize, so we need a national revolution; we do not want the monarch to monopolize, so we need a political revolution; we do not want a small number of rich people to monopolize, so we need a social revolution. If we cannot achieve any of these three goals, it is not our intention. After achieving these three goals, China will become the most perfect country (Zhang & Li, 2013: 176)."

The Three Peoples' Principles program expresses the political and economic ideologies of the Chinese bourgeoisie of that period, which aimed at modernization. It delineates three primary objectives: national sovereignty, political democracy, and economic development. The "Three People's Principles" was established based on Sun Yat-sen's synthesis of the experiences and learning from the systems of Western capitalist



Sun Yat-sen's handwritten comments on the manuscript 'Outline of the Establishment of the National Government' (Photo: National Museum of China, 2025).

nations, and it represented the theoretical culmination of his initial reflections on China's modernization. The interpretation of the internal logic of the "Three People's Principles" also demonstrates that Sun Yat-sen investigated the realistic path of China's modernization in the context of the country's national circumstances.

The Revolution of 1911 terminated the feudal autocracy and initiated a new path for China's modernization

Sun Yat-sen, as the leader of the bourgeois revolutionary movement, aimed to rescue the Chinese nation from peril by prioritizing national sovereignty, civil rights, and the welfare of the populace, and he spearheaded the call to "revitalize China." Under Sun Yat-sen's leadership, numerous revolutionary party members fervently disseminated revolutionary ideas, instilled the principles of democracy and republicanism in the populace, and persistently ini-

tiated armed uprisings, which received enthusiastic support from the people nationwide. On October 10, 1911, the Wuchang Uprising initiated China's comprehensive national democratic revolution. It terminated the two-thousand-year feudal tyranny in China and instituted the first republican state in Asia. On January 1, 1912, Sun Yat-sen assumed the role of temporary president, officially declaring the formation of the Republic of China.

The Nanjing Provisional Government was a revolutionary regime characterized as a bourgeois republic. To avert the obliteration of the revolution's accomplishments by Yuan Shikai following his ascension to the presidency and to curtail his authority, the Senate of the Nanjing Provisional Government enacted, in March 1912, the inaugural code resembling a constitution of the bourgeois republic in Chinese history, the Provisional Constitution Law of the Republic of China, which dismantled the feudal absolute monarchy as a fundamental law. The

Constitution Law comprises 56 articles organized into seven chapters: basic principles, the populace, the Senate, the interim president, the vice president, the state clerk, the judiciary, and supplemental provisions. It adheres to the Western bourgeois democratic principle of “separation of powers” and asserts that all Chinese individuals are equal and own the sovereignty of the Republic of China. It mandates the establishment of the cabinet system; the cabinet prime minister is elected by the parliamentary majority, and presidential orders require countersignature by the cabinet prime minister to become effective.

The Revolution of 1911 dismantled the feudal regime and instituted a democratic republican system, signifying the commencement of the national democratic revolution.

Following the foundation of the Nanjing Provisional Government, the circumstances were challenging; yet, it devised numerous policies across political, economic, military, cultural, and educational domains and endeavored to implement reforms. It implemented the policy of national unification in domestic matters and established the republic encompassing five ethnic groups of Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui, and Tibetan. This policy enabled the formation and advancement of the multi-ethnic Chinese state.

The Ministry of Industry was founded to revitalize industries, and a series of policies and measures were enacted to promote industrial and commercial development. It experienced a surge in industrial activity, prompting the formation of industrial and mining enterprises, including railways, mines, ships, machinery production, reclamation projects, and other factories, firms, and banks. The national industry was advanced;

the military discipline was organized, and the army was restructured. The Republic implemented “five educations” of national military, ordinary, civic morality, world outlook, and aesthetics as its new educational policy while also promoting general education, thereby establishing a foundation for the advancement of school education in the Republic of China. The social reform movement illuminated every facet of social life. The promotion of public servant awareness and a clean work ethic, the alteration of titles, and the elimination of kneeling etiquette, smoking, and gambling progressively transformed individuals’ spiritual orientation, resulting in a society that exhibited a renewed environment of vigor and vitality.

The Revolution of 1911 dismantled the feudal regime and instituted a democratic republican system, signifying the commencement of the national democratic revolution. “Constrained by the historical and social conditions of the time and lacking the right path and leading force to determine the future of the country, the Revolution of 1911 could not change the semi-colonial and semi-feudal nature of Chinese society; it could not alter the bitter fate of the Chinese people; and it could not accomplish the historic missions of national independence and the people’s liberation (Xi, 2021: 3)”.

However, it constituted the prelude of China’s comprehensive national democratic revolution. But the Revolution of 1911 dismantled feudalism, the intrinsic impediment to China’s modernization. It was a valuable exploration for the Chinese nation to achieve the national independence and liberation of the Chinese people and to find the path of China’s modernization, which would lead to a significant rejuvenation of China. The 1911 Revolution signified China’s shift from a feudal society dominated by imperial authority to a democratic and republican modern state, shifting China’s modernization from passive to active, thus representing a crucial turning point in this process (Xi, 2021:4).

Sun Yat-sen formulated the initial framework for China's modernization

Sun relinquished the presidency on February 13, 1912. Following the usurpation of victory by Yuan Shikai, Sun Yat-sen assumed personal responsibility for industrial growth and diligently endeavored to advance China's modernization. Upon recognizing Yuan Shikai's true nature, Sun Yat-sen initiated the "Second Revolution" against Yuan using military forces, which included the War of Defending the Constitution against Yuan (1913-1916), the Second Revolution of Defending the Constitution (1921-1922), and the National Revolution (1925-1927) of the Kuomintang-Communist Party against the Warlords. During the revolution, Sun Yat-sen contemplated China's modernization extensively and articulated his ideas through writing books, speeches, lectures, and proclamations, thereby systematically formulating his theory of modernization and presenting a comprehensive plan for China's initial modernization.

Sun Yat-sen's building of China's modernization theory


Sun Yat-sen was a major forerunner and pioneer of China's modernization. He created the theoretical system of China's modernization on the whole and proposed a blueprint for China to thoroughly begin its modernization under the democratic and republican social system. Although Sun Yat-sen did not have a special work on modernization, his modernization thought was reflected in his "National Construction Strategy" (including "Sun Wen Theory," "Industrial Plan," and "Introduction to Civil Rights"), "Constitution of the Five Powers," "Declaration of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang," "Outline of the National Government's Founding," "The Three People's Principles," and other works, which built a theoretical framework for modernization.

Establish the rejuvenation of China as the objective

Throughout his life, Sun Yat-sen sought the ideals of national sovereignty, advancement, and revitalization. During the planning of China's modernization, Sun Yat-sen articulated the objective of revitalizing China, emphasizing that national independence was a requirement for this renewal. By the conclusion of the 19th century, the Chinese populace endured severe adversity due to the dual oppression of imperialism and feudalism, characterized by persistent turmoil and recurrent insurrections. Notwithstanding the Westernization Movement, the Hundred Days' Reform, and the New Policies of the late Qing Dynasty (New Deal of Qing Dynasty or Late Qing Reforms), China's progress remained significantly inferior to that of the West. This truth was repeatedly demonstrated in the context of foreign attack. In this context, Sun Yat-sen lifted his arms and proclaimed the emphatic slogan of "revitalizing China" (Sun, 2011a: 14). Sun Yat-sen consistently integrated the sentiment of national misery with the aspiration for national rejuvenation, dedicating his life to the significant endeavor of national revitalization and formulating a vision for China's future growth. Sun (2011a: 221) recognized that national independence was essential for China's rejuvenation:

"If the right to development is in our hands, we will survive; if it is not, we will perish. Salvation is attainable solely through renewal; national independence is the exclusive route to national prosperity; and revolution serves as the mechanism to attain national independence."

In summary, Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles prioritize nationalism above all. Sun Yat-sen articulated (2011a: 72) an optimistic vision for national rejuvenation:



"The Three People's Principles" constitutes the essence of Sun Yat-sen's ideology (Photo: Chiculture, 2025).

"With the achievement of our esteemed objective of reforming China, our illustrious nation will not only enter a new epoch, but all humanity will partake in a more luminous future. The resurgence of China will undoubtedly lead to universal peace, unveiling a vast arena previously unimagined for the social and economic endeavors of the civilized world."

Sun Yat-sen examined the historical trajectory of China's early modernization, formulating the theory of national rejuvenation while actively engaging in the monumental endeavor of preserving the nation from obliteration and renewing China. He devoted himself to advocating to follow historical trends, the advancement of industry and social wealth, and the pursuit of economic development to position China among the civilized nations globally, thereafter embracing the historical obligation as the vanguard of China's modernization.

Adopt the "Three People's Principles" as the framework

"The Three People's Principles" constitutes the essence of Sun Yat-sen's ideology and serves as the

framework for his comprehensive vision of modernization, aimed at enhancing national wealth and strength. On December 30, 1923, Sun Yat-sen addressed (Sun, 2011b: 586) the Kuomintang members in Guangzhou with a speech entitled "Propaganda Creates Mass Power," underscoring the necessity of collaboration and effort to establish a nation founded on the Three People's Principles and a five-power constitution:

"We must employ the Three People's Principles to transform public cognition. What are the Three People's Principles? Simply put, they are of the people, by the people, and for the people. When our future country is of, by, and for the people, its people will be the happiest in the world."

Under the influence of the Communist International and the Communist Party of China, Sun Yat-sen resolved to restructure the KMT and adopt the three principal policies of alliance with Russia, collaboration with the Communist Party, and support for the peasantry and laborers. The original "Three People's Principles" evolved into the "New Three People's Principles." Sun's theory of the New Three People's

Principles served as the political foundation for the initial collaboration between the KMT and the Communist Party. Mao Zedong (1938) assessed Sun Yat-sen's paramount accomplishments as "the program of the Three People's Principles, the policy of the united front, and the spirit of hard struggle," asserting that these three "constitute the most central, essential, and significant legacy bequeathed to us by Mr. Sun."

In comparison to the previous Three People's Principles, the revised Three People's Principles have attained a significant advancement and qualitative transformation. In the New Three People's Principles, nationalism has been revised to include two dimensions: "the Chinese nation seeks liberation from itself" and "all ethnic groups in China are equal" (Sun, 2011b: 614), thereby incorporating the notion of "opposing imperialism." During this period, Sun Yat-sen was influenced by the triumph of the Russian Revolution and by the Communist Party of China, leading him to comprehend that China's modernization necessitated national independence. Therefore, the New Three People's Principles prioritize anti-imperialism and underscore the necessity of resisting imperialist aggression.

According to the doctrine of civil rights, rooted in the principle of the separation of the five powers articulated by Sun Yat-sen—namely, the powers of legislation, judiciary, administration, examination, and supervision—citizens possess not only the right to vote but also the authority to initiate, participate in referendums, and remove officials from office. This underscores that "the Kuomintang's doctrine of civil rights is a collective entitlement of the populace, not a privilege of the minority for personal advantage (Sun, 2011b: 616)." The amalgamation of bourgeois civil rights advocacy with the nationalist resistance to imperialism signifies substantial progress. Concerning people's livelihoods, it can be encapsulated as "one pertains to equal land rights; the other involves capital control," and the policy of "those who culti-

vate the land possess the land" should be enacted. Following the 1911 Revolution, Sun Yat-sen fervently promoted state ownership of large enterprises and raised the two issues: Land and capital. Regarding land, he proposed a novel interpretation of "average land rights," introduced a policy to guarantee "land for the tiller," and unequivocally opposed feudal exploitation. It proposed "capital control," which entails fostering state capital while limiting private capital and employing state authority to restrain the excessive growth and monopolization of private capital. It proposes the nationalization of all substantial enterprises that cannot be entrusted with private capital, including banks, railways, and shipping routes, and for the implementation of state ownership. Furthermore, it recommends the adoption of policies to safeguard, promote, and regulate private capital to prevent substantial private interests from manipulating the national economy and the welfare of the populace. Simultaneously, it is explicitly suggested to revise the tax legislation, establish the labor law, enhance the welfare of workers, and additionally to bolster the pension system, child-rearing framework, healthcare system, and universal education system, among others (Sun, 2011b: 617).

The two economic initiatives of "equal land rights" and "capital regulation" were implemented to mitigate the disadvantages of capitalism. While the "state ownership" advocated by Sun Yat-sen differs from the proletarian concept of "state ownership," it distinctly reflects Sun Yat-sen's political acumen and revolutionary ethos.

In essence, the New Three People's Principles constitute a unified entity. National independence serves as the foundation, civil rights act as the political assurance, and the welfare of the populace represents the ultimate objective. The trio collectively forms Sun Yat-sen's agenda for Chinese modernization, embodying the historical necessity that Chinese society must abandon the traditional path of Western capitalism.

Advancing China's modernization through revolution and reconstruction as dual pillars

National survival and independence are essential for China's modernization. Sun Yat-sen recognized that the failures of reforms under the feudal autocratic system, following the Westernization movement, indicated that China was a nation subjected to both imperialist aggression and domestic feudal autocracy. Imperialism jeopardized the existence of the Chinese nation, leading to the prospect of division and external management. The feudal autocratic system significantly impeded social and economic advancement, leading to poverty and stagnation. Consequently, uprooting feudalism and overthrowing the imperialism upon which the warlords rely for their existence was essential for the establishment of a sovereign and independent state (Sun, 2011b: 981).

Sun Yat-sen considered national independence the foremost political prerequisite for China's progression towards modernization. He must first attain national independence through the use of force in a democratic revolution, replace the feudal autocracy with a republican system, and facilitate modernization. Sun Yat-sen vigorously promoted and spearheaded the revolution, initiating a new epoch through armed struggle.

Revolution and reconstruction are dependent upon one another and coexist. Sun Yat-sen posited that revolution and construction were integral components of China's development, progress, and modernization. The revolution was destructive; however, it was not the objective. The sole objective of the revolution was construction:

"Revolution can be profoundly destructive, exemplified by the dismantling of the imperial system and the overthrow of autocracy; such significant devastation necessitates equally extraordinary reconstruction. A destruction by the revolution and reconstruction are inseparably connected, like the wings of a bird (Sun, 2011a:176)."

In the "National Strategy," Sun Yat-sen (2011a: 122) articulated profound dismay regarding the inability to

implement construction following the 1911 revolution:

"In the past seven years, we have missed the nation's construction while conflicts have escalated and the people have endured hardship. Contemplation at midnight cannot evoke sadness! The construction of the Republic of China must not be delayed even for a moment."

Faced with the stark realities of autocracy, foreign enemies oppression, poverty, and stagnation while striving for the ideals of independence, democracy, prosperity, and civilization, Sun Yat-sen not only formulated a blueprint for China's modernization and vigorously disseminated his modernization philosophy but also engaged in practical implementation, establishing the Three People's Principles as the nation's foundation and the five-power Constitution as the systemic framework. Utilizing the industrial plan as a framework, he aimed to align with the modernization trajectory of advanced capitalist nations globally. On August 1, 1919, Sun Yat-sen assumed direct leadership and established the Chien-she Tsa-chih (Reconstruction Magazine)

"to advocate for construction ideology, clarify its principles, and broadly disseminate the party's construction ideology, ensuring it became widely understood by the populace. This approach would convey that construction is an essential contemporary requirement and that it is a manageable endeavor. Consequently, through the collective endeavor of everybody, we aspire to construct a nation (Sun, 1985: 89)."

Adopt the approach of "integrating diverse strengths and leveraging novel innovations"

What is China's strategy for modernization? Sun Yat-sen advocated for transparency and a global perspective. Rather than uncritically embracing Western ideals, he embraced specific dialectical approaches and methodologies, promoting the examination of China's internal circumstances alongside global trends, learning from others' strengths, and leveraging new inventions

(Sun, 1981c: 1). Sun Yat-sen believed that for China's modernization, it should assimilate the West's advanced experiences while considering its distinct conditions. He believed that China ought to align with global trends, adopt an open-door policy, approach both Chinese and Western cultures with scientific rigor, circumvent the issues associated with Western capitalism, and select the developmental trajectory most advantageous for China. Only through this method can China persist in enhancing its modernization, progress slowly and extensively, and gradually exceed the West. Consequently, under Sun Yat-sen's modernization strategy, he did not entirely replicate Western capitalism and industrialization but integrated China's own circumstances and sought a capitalist modernization path infused with Chinese local features.

To a certain extent, Sun Yat-sen adhered to the principle of using the past for the present and adopting foreign ideas for Chinese needs, rather than completely copying foreign cultures. He emphasized critical inheritance. For example, in "The History of the Chinese Revolution," published on January 29, 1923, Sun Yat-sen articulated that his revolutionary theory, grounded in the Three People's Principles, was an innovative synthesis of the strengths of Western doctrines and esteemed traditional Chinese thoughts:

"My plans for the Chinese Revolution incorporate ideas derived from the traditional ideas inherent in our country, regulations from European doctrines and practices, as well as those formulated from my personal perspective (Sun, 1981c: 60)."

Concerning nationalism, he underscored independence and the importance of acquiring knowledge from others:

"My nationalism entails the development and expansion of our ancestors' legacy. All nations must preserve their sovereignty, promote their unique culture, and absorb and enhance global culture to coexist with other nations (Sun, 1981c: 60)."

He concentrated on the natural blending of Chinese and foreign political systems in terms of civil rights. He adopted both the Western system of separation of

powers and the ancient Chinese examination and inspection systems. He employed the five-power constitution and the five-power separation to establish the institutional framework for China's political modernization.

Regarding people's livelihoods, he personally witnessed in Western nations that the advancement of capitalist modernization exposed the inequality between the affluent and the impoverished, a disparity that also exists in China. Consequently, the enhancement of people's livelihoods should occur concurrently with the promotion of nationalism and civil rights. "It will achieve political success in one instance and will also catalyze an economic revolution (Sun, 1981c: 61)." One ought to eschew the antiquated trajectory of Western civilization and instead align with global trends, fostering national advancement in accordance with their unique circumstances. The slogan "Learn from Russia," introduced in his later years, exemplifies Sun Yat-sen's dialectical perspective regarding significant global trends.

Sun Yat-sen's overall plan for national industrialization

Modernization is defined as "a process whereby a traditional agricultural society is converted into a modern industrial society, driven by the advancements in industry, science, and technology, resulting in the pervasive influence of industrialism across all sectors of the economy, politics, culture, and ideology, thereby inducing significant alterations in social organization and behavior (Luo, 2012:3)." Consequently, industrialization is the sole means for underdeveloped nations to attain modernization.

Sun Yat-sen, observing the stark disparity in material civilization between China and the West, recognized that the achievement of modernization necessitated the revitalization of industry. Sun Yat-sen dedicated his life to revitalizing the industry, achieving the country's industrialization, and pursuing the prosperity of the nation and the well-being of its people, enabling them to live and work in peace and contentment:



An original map from Sun Yat-sen's 'Industrial Plan' (Photo: The Paper, 2022).

“My lifelong endeavors have reached their zenith here, characterized by steadfast sincerity, an indomitable spirit, resistance to the power of the Qing Dynasty, and resilience against the adversities of a dead end. My determination is unwavering, advancing persistently, becoming more resilient with each adversity, and perpetually endeavoring (Sun, 2011a: 120).”

After stepping down from the position of provisional president, he passionately devoted himself to industrial development. He inspected, lectured, and promoted his modernization ideas everywhere. In 1918, following the conclusion of World War I, Sun Yat-sen, in his “Industrial Plan,” expressed his desire to leverage the extensive machinery and organized labor to advance China’s industrial development and achieve significant progress for its people in the wartime period. He recognized the opportunity presented by “our 400 million excellent and civilized nation as a unique global resource” (Sun, 2011a: 221), asserting that “it was a matter of aligning promising people with promising land at a propitious time to elevate China to the forefront of the world” (Sun, 2011a: 170).

Sun Yat-sen devoted considerable effort to examining the issue of China’s industrialization and meticulously crafted a comprehensive and systematic document—“Industrial Plan,” recognized as the first relatively complete national industrialization program in Chinese history.

Set up a blueprint for China’s industrialization to realize modernization

The core of Sun Yat-sen’s early thoughts on China’s modernization centered on identifying a unique path tailored to China’s characteristics in order to compete with advanced nations globally. Inspired by this philosophy, Sun analyzed global trends and China’s domestic circumstances. In his Industrial Plan (Material Construction), he delineated the framework for China’s prospective modernization with substantial ambition. This plan was segmented into six phases and 33 sections. It is proposed to construct approximately 160,000 kilometers of railways to link China’s coastal, inland, and border regions; establish 1.6 million kilometers of roads to create a national road network and access the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau; excavate and refurbish

waterways and canals nationwide; erect the Three Gorges Dam; enhance inland river transportation along with water conservancy and power sectors; develop a world-class seaport along China's northern, central, and southern coasts; and vigorously advance agriculture, manufacturing, and mining. This blueprint created by Mr. Sun Yat-sen demonstrates his exceptional insights and robust aspirations for China's progress (Xi, 2016: 11).

The six principal plans encompass nearly all facets of the national economy and citizens' welfare, illustrating a trajectory for China's modernization that aims to swiftly eradicate poverty and underdevelopment, thereby attaining national prosperity and strength in a brief timeframe.

Implement a development strategy centered on a modernized transportation network, with heavy industry and agriculture as primary components

The development of a nation's transportation sector is a direct measure of its economic vitality. The development of the transport sector is crucial for dismantling the natural economic model of self-sufficiency, enhancing economic interactions between various regions, establishing a cohesive domestic market, and bolstering international economic relations.

Consequently, Sun Yat-sen considered transportation the foundation of industry, and his industrial strategy prioritized the advancement of the transportation sector, leading to the comprehensive development of China's railway, highway, and waterway networks. Sun Yat-sen focused on the construction of a railway communication network, which he saw as the cornerstone of transport. According to him, the establishment of a national road network covering 1.6 million kilometers of roads and the development of land and maritime transport systems, including the Northern, Eastern, and Southern ports, would make these ports gateways to the world and focal points for China's comprehensive development.

Alongside the transportation sector, Sun Yat-sen prioritized industries such as mining and smelting, emphasizing the steel industry and agriculture:

"Agriculture and mining are the foundational industries for all others. When agriculture and mining thrive, all other industries will prosper. Steel is the foundation of all industries (Sun, 1981b: 134)."

Sun Yat-sen asserted that the nation required steel with utmost urgency. The construction of ports and railways necessitated a significant provision of steel. Agriculture underpins industrial development and the overall national economy. Sun Yat-sen championed the application of science and technology to enhance agriculture, implement the technical modernization of traditional and underdeveloped farming practices, advance agricultural mechanization, and elevate agricultural labor productivity.

Prioritizing the advancement of citizens' welfare, enabling the Chinese populace to partake in the benefits of civilization.

Sun Yat-sen posited that clothing, sustenance, shelter, and transportation constituted the four principal livelihood concerns, asserting that the Chinese populace should have access to adequate food, apparel, suitable living conditions, and effective means of travel. This necessitates the rejuvenation of industry, the implementation of contemporary science and technology, and capitalist production techniques, alongside the advancement of agriculture, industry, mining, and transportation to fulfill the diverse essential materials required by the populace for clothing, sustenance, shelter, and mobility. Sun Yat-sen meticulously devised strategies to enhance the material and cultural living standards of the populace: "offer affordable housing," "each household should consist of four to six rooms," and "all households, irrespective of urban or rural status, should possess telephones (Sun, 2011a: 371-372)."

He proposed that the profits from industrial development be allocated partially to repay interest, partially to augment workers' wages, partially to enhance and expand machine production, and the remainder to conserve goods and public utilities:

“Thus, all individuals will partake in the pleasures of contemporary civilization (Sun, 2011a: 384).”

His sole ambition is to construct “the largest and most exemplary nation globally—one that is the most progressive, solemn, powerful, and peaceful, governed by the people and for the people (Sun, 2011a: 399).”

Opening up with the outside world while ensuring the preservation of national independence and sovereignty

Sun Yat-sen asserted that China’s engagement with the outside world must preserve national independence and sovereignty, which are essential for the country’s industrialization and a significant aspect of his industrialization thought.

Sun Yat-sen’s reform and opening-up ideas primarily encompassed the inflow of foreign capital, expertise, and scientific advancements into the country. During that period, China faced a severe deficiency in construction funding, skilled personnel, and technical capabilities, with capital being the pivotal element determining the success or failure of the country’s industrialization. Sun Yat-sen assessed China’s significant advantages and asserted that China “holds the foremost position globally regarding its abundant resources and treasures.” According to him, “the population is 400 million, ranking first globally. The intellect and skill of the Chinese populace have remained unparalleled since antiquity, and their 5,000-year-old culture is unique in the world. Millennia ago, they were already the most powerful in the world (Sun, 2011a: 195).” By robustly infusing capital and talent, we can definitely fulfill China’s industrialization agenda.

“National initiatives can only be executed when foreign investment is secured, external expertise is proficiently organized, and aspirational strategies are formulated (Sun, 2011a: 227).”

Sun Yat-sen exhibited optimism regarding this matter. He referenced Japan as an illustration. By embracing European and American methodologies, Japan accomplished in merely fifty years what the United States attained in a century.

“With China’s current situation and wealth, if our people can come together as a nation, our industrial development will undoubtedly catch up with Europe and the US within a decade by embracing foreign investment and expertise while developing our production capacity (Sun 2011a: 199).”

Sun Yat-sen advocated international economic collaboration founded on equality and mutual advantage, aiming to integrate China’s economy into the global economic framework and establish China as a prominent economic power.

Conclusion: The Value and Limitations of Sun Yat-sen’s Modernization Thought

Sun Yat-sen devised an ambitious plan for the modernization of China; however, it was constrained by the nation’s semi-colonial and semi-feudal social and historical circumstances, along with Sun Yat-sen’s impractical perceptions of national conditions and the international landscape. The “Industrial Plan” encountered its own challenges, preventing it from evolving beyond an admirable aspiration to enhance the nation and improve the welfare of its citizens. Nonetheless, this does not diminish the rationality, originality, and progressiveness of Sun Yat-sen’s economic modernization philosophy, which retains significant reference value for China’s contemporary modernization efforts.

The Revolution of 1911 initiated the shift from feudal civilization to modern civilization. In the context of China’s early modernization during the Republic of China, the 1911 Revolution dismantled the monarchy and instituted a bourgeois republic, thereby transferring the leadership of early modernization to the modern bourgeoisie and facilitating the transition to modern civilization. It popularized the concept of a democratic republic, reinstated China’s primary national structure, marked a pivotal moment in the revitalization of the Chinese nation in modern history, and established an institutional framework for China’s initial modernization. Second, it opened the period of comprehensive development of China’s early modernization. The Nanjing Provisional

Government, led by Sun Yat-sen, enacted a series of laws and implemented modernization measures, resulting in significant changes across political, economic, cultural, and social domains, all exhibiting a pronounced capitalist character. Sun Yat-sen's vision for nation-building and his modernization philosophy significantly contributed to China's early modernization, particularly through the New Three People's Principles and the policies of collaboration with Russia, the Communist Party, and the agrarian and labor classes, which exhibited a socialist inclination. Third, it provided some experience for the Communist Party of China to explore the road of China's modernization.

Sun's petty-bourgeois ideology and policy proposals were constrained by class and historical circumstances. First, he advocated for the concepts of "equalizing land rights" and "regulating capital" (specifically private capital), underscoring the necessity for the nationalization of large enterprises and prominent universities while permitting private ownership of small and medium-sized enterprises in order to mitigate the influence of private capital on national decision-making and ensure the stable development of the economy and society. Nevertheless, he did not stress that public ownership should be the primary entity regarding quality and quantity, nor did he genuinely depend on the revolutionary forces led by workers, peasants, and the Communist Party as the vanguard of the working class, thereby failing to embody the essential interests of the proletariat. Secondly, he misjudged the challenges and resistance to China's modernization and lacked a comprehensive understanding of the nation's formidable feudal elements, foreign influences, and their comprador factions, rendering his modernization concepts difficult to actualize in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. 🌸

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Chinese Revolutionaries' Imagination Between Sun Yat-sen and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk



NECATİ DEMİRCAN*

PhD Candidate
Shanghai University, China

**Necati Demircan was born in 1992 in Sakarya. He graduated from Sakarya University, Department of International Relations, in 2017. Between 2018 and 2021, he completed his master's degree in International Relations and Diplomacy at Shanghai University. Demircan is a PhD student in the Department of Global Studies at Shanghai University.*

e-mail: ndemircan11@hotmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5319-9629>

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ABSTRACT

Chinese progressives and revolutionaries have drawn parallels between the Chinese Revolution and the Turkish Revolution in the early 20th century by assessing the historical and political contexts and the nations' stances against imperialism. The primary reason for this situation is that the Ottoman Empire and the Qing Dynasty, both formidable empires of their time, began to disintegrate concurrently, experienced semi-colonization by Western powers, and underwent revolutionary processes that occurred nearly simultaneously with analogous aims and objectives. The two states, located at the western and eastern extremities of the continent, were designated by the West as the “sick man of Asia.” The revolutionaries in both states sought measures to salvage and rejuvenate the failing state. The Turkish and Chinese revolutions, occurring concurrently, aimed to exchange insights and enhance their movements. Members of the Communist Party of China and Kuominang authored multiple papers highlighting the historical parallels between Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Sun Yat-sen. This study aims to examine the perceptions of revolutionaries in China on Sun Yat-sen at the onset of the 20th century, as well as the historical connection between him and the Turkish Revolution and Atatürk.

Keywords: China, Kemalist Revolution, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Sun Yat-sen, Xinhai Revolution.

Introduction

THE 1908 YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION AND the 1911 Xinhai Revolution transpired in close temporal proximity. Nevertheless, both revolutions were curtailed due to their inadequate advancement during the period. On May 19, 1919, the commencement of the Turkish War of Independence, marked by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's arrival in Samsun, coincided with the Chinese youth's uprising against im-

perialism on May 4. The success of the Turkish Revolution, marked by the victory in the War of Independence and the triumph of the Northern Expedition, coincided with the Kuomintang's (KMT) ascension to power in China.

Following the Treaty of Nanjing, which concluded the First Opium War (1839-42), China endured a century characterized by humiliation and inequitable treaties, culminating in the Chinese Revolution of 1949.

During this time, Western countries coerced the Qing Dynasty with the prospect of war and acquired several political and economic concessions, including customs advantages, rights to coastline and river navigation, as well as towns and ports (Wang, 2005; Jianlang, 2016). Following the onset of China's subjugation by Western powers, initiated by the Opium War in 1840, many resistance movements against imperialism emerged, notably the Taiping Uprising, the Boxer Rebellion, the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, and the Chinese Revolution of 1949. Particularly following China's defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the realization emerged that the nation should pursue reform and Western modernization.

Kang Youwei, a Qing dynasty reformist, sent recommendations to Emperor Guangxu in 1898 advocating for the construction of a constitutional government (Fidan, 2013). Youwei reported that both empires were in decline; however, he was uncertain which would collapse first. He commended Midhat Pasha's reforms amid the demise of the Ottoman Empire, highlighted the parallels between the Ottoman Empire and the Qing Dynasty, and asserted that Turkish reforms may serve as a model for the Chinese (Fidan, 2013: 10).

The 1906 Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the 1908 Young Turk Revolution inspired revolutionaries in China. Chinese revolutionaries not only commended the burgeoning



Kang Youwei, a reformist of the Qing Dynasty, visited Istanbul and stated that both empires were falling, but he did not know which one would fall first. (Photo: Sohu, 2023).

revolutionary movement in Asia but also assimilated lessons from their errors (Ying, 1995: 81-82). Sun Yat-sen asserted that the issue of China's division by Western powers could solely be averted by revolution. He referenced the Young Turk Revolution and stated:

China has been referred to as the 'Sick Man of the Far East.' However, the issue of splitting Turkey, the 'Sick Man of the Near East,' has been addressed by revolution. In what ways can China's position differ?"

China has been referred to as the 'Sick Man of the Far East.' However, the issue of splitting Turkey, the 'Sick Man of the Near East,' has been addressed by revolution. In what ways can China's position differ?" (Wei, 1994).

Another instance is Song Jiaoren, a prominent figure in the Xinhai revolution, who shown a keen interest in the burgeoning Young Turk revolutionary movement. Jiaoren posited that China and the Ottomans have a shared destiny (Gong, 2023: 909-910). Hu Hanmin, a prominent leader of the Kuomintang, authored an article entitled "To Our Soldiers Regarding the Turkish Revolution" in the Kuomintang's journal *Minbao* in 1910, wherein he referenced the Young Turk Revolution (Hu, 1910). In the same edition, *Minbao* editors featured a seven-page news commentary entitled "Turkish Revolution" (Minyi, 1910). Conversely, Li Dazhao, a co-founder

of the CPC, believed that the youth will serve as a crucial force and the forefront of the revolutionary drive for China's regeneration. In his 1916 piece, Dazhao referenced the Young Turks while providing examples pertinent to China (Dazhao, 2006: 166-171; Shan, 2024: 85). On August 6, 1908, Sun Yat-sen remarked subsequent to the Young Turk Revolution:

"Turkey's European territories have been forfeited due to partition." The Powers have intervened in their sole remaining province, Macedonia, by sending political officials and police to the region. Consequently, sovereignty will soon transfer from Turkey. But in precisely the places where the Powers have penetrated and intervened, the Revolutionary Party of Turkey (Committee of Union and Progress) waged an armed struggle, capturing at one stroke the leading general of the Turkish emperor. Subsequently, the soldiers revolted and defected to the Revolutionary Party. During this period, the various nations refrained from intervening due to the revolution; therefore, they discontinued their intervention, merely observing the events unfold. Subsequently, upon the abdication of the Turkish emperor and the successful conclusion of the revolution, they escalated their actions by withdrawing their political officials and police, granting the Revolutionary Party autonomy to operate independently. Moreover, today they are sending commendations to the Turkish populace and lauding them for their ability to assert themselves." (Wei, 1994).

Kang Youwei visited Istanbul in 1908 amidst the Young Turk Revolution and documented his impressions regarding the upheaval. Youwei's research posits that the Ottoman Empire served as a paradigm for the Qing Dynasty due to the historical ties between the two nations dating back to the Huns and their concurrent struggles with analogous issues (Fidan, 2013).

The initial phase of CPC leadership likened Mustafa Kemal and the CHP to Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang, designating it as the Nationalist Party, and asserted that the Chinese revolution should emulate the Turkish Revolution to achieve success.

The initial phase of CPC leadership likened Mustafa Kemal and the CHP to Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang, designating it as the Nationalist Party, and asserted that the Chinese revolution should emulate the Turkish Revolution to achieve success (Demircan & Zhangxu, 2023; Zhigao, 2010).

No comprehensive study exists regarding the motivations behind Chinese revolutionaries' interest in the Turkish revolutions and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Articles authored by Huang Zhigao (2010), Wu Haiyong (2013), Chen Gong (2023), and Sun Menglin in collaboration with Huang Zhigao (2019a) exist. Furthermore, last year we evaluated Cai Hesen's essays on Turkey, one of the founding members of the CPC, with Ye Zhangxu (2023).

Regrettably, the current research is not well recognized in Turkey or the worldwide academic community because it is published in Chinese. This study will address a significant academic gap by comprehensively evaluating the perspectives of China's reformists, revolutionaries, and the inaugural leadership cadre of the CPC regarding the Kemalist Revolution, particularly focusing on the historical connection between Sun Yat-sen and Mustafa Kemal and the circumstances that facilitated this association.

Assessment of Sun Yat-sen by CPC Cadres

The inaugural leaders of the CPC regarded Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary endeavors as the cornerstone of the Chinese Democratic Revolution and acknowledged its significance for China (Yanfu, 2001). The CPC aimed to fulfill Sun Yat-sen's incomplete fight by advancing the bourgeois revolution towards socialism and ensuring the triumph of the Chinese Revolution. Conversely, Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary determination motivated the members of the CPC. Mao Zedong stated, "Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary endeavors have encountered numerous challenges and fluctuations over the past 40 years." However, he consistently grew more robust, resolute, and determined, exerting greater effort. Another CPC official, Dong Biwu, stated, "Sun Yat-sen organized and directed the revolutionary movement under exceedingly challenging circumstances." He endured numerous defeats. Nonetheless, he possessed a firm conviction in the justness of his endeavor and remained undeterred by any setbacks" (Yanfu, 2001). Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary resolve appears to have impacted both Mao Zedong and Dong Biwu. Mao Zedong stated, "While many others succumbed to fear and fled in the face of adversity, Dr. Sun remained steadfast."



On March 10-17, 1927, Mao Zedong and Dong Biwu attended the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Second National Congress in Wuhan. The photo shows the delegates posing for a group photo in front of the Wuhan National Government Building during the meeting. Second row: Dong Biwu (second from left) and Mao Zedong (third from right) (Photo: Sohu, 2023).

During his initial encounter with Sun Yat-sen, Dong Biwu was profoundly influenced by Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary optimism and remarked that he advised him "not to be disheartened by failure, to persist diligently, that the revolution was not a mere coincidence, and that as long as we learn from our failures and rectify our errors, we can perpetuate the revolution by presenting effective solutions" (Yanfu, 2001).

Early leadership of the CPC contended that the revolutionary heritage of Sun Yat-sen and the Three People's Principles played a crucial role in the triumph of the Chinese Revolution. Dong Biwu stated, "This revolution significantly contributed to the awakening of the Chinese populace and the dismantling of the prevailing systems of imperialism and feudalism" (Yanfu, 2001). Conversely, some individuals in the Qing Dynasty believed that issues might be addressed by reform. The CPC's adoption

of Sun Yat-sen's legacy was motivated by his departure from the reformists in favor of a revolutionary approach. Dr. Sun aimed to abolish the two-thousand-year-old feudal monarchy and establish a republic founded on popular sovereignty. In an article published on March 12, 1926, marking the first anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's demise, Li Dazhao emphasized that the national revolutionary struggle spearheaded by Sun Yat-sen constituted the pivotal and paramount aspect of China's national liberation narrative. Dazhao asserts that Sun's upbringing during a time of significant suffering in China was essential in shaping his revolutionary disposition. In a 1926 article, Dazhao asserted that Sun Yat-sen's teachings acted as a guiding compass for the revolution's advancement and played a role in the global revolutionary wave by facilitating Asia's awakening (Dazhao, 2006a: 150-152).

Following Sun Yat-sen's demise, a dedicated issue concerning him was produced in *The Guide Weekly* (Chinese: 向导), the inaugural journal of the CPC. This special issue features a statement from the CPC Central Executive Committee in *The Guide Weekly* regarding the death of Sun Yat-sen, affirming the CPC's ongoing collaboration with the Kuomintang. It was underscored that, notwithstanding Sun Yat-sen's demise, China persisted in its resistance against imperialism and its domestic allies, the warlords (The Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1925a). The open letter of condolence issued by the CPC Central Executive Committee to the Kuomintang emphasized the necessity of maintaining unity between the CPC and the Kuomintang, in accordance with Sun Yat-sen's doctrine and his revolutionary teachings (The Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1925b).

The Chinese revolution is integral to the global revolutionary movement, like to previous revolutionary revolutions in colonies such as Turkey, Iran, India, Egypt, and beyond.

In his paper "Sun Yat-sen's Death and the National Revolution," Cai Hesen, a leader of the CPC, asserted that the policy of the Chinese Revolutionary Movement should be deliberated following Sun Yat-sen's demise. Hesen's focal points in his article are as follows:

"The core of the Chinese National Revolution is the downfall of international capitalist imperialism and the demolition of the Chinese warlords who serve as its agents. (...) The Chinese revolution is integral to the global re-

volutionary movement, like to previous revolutionary revolutions in colonies such as Turkey, Iran, India, Egypt, and beyond. For the Chinese revolution to succeed, it must integrate with the global revolutionary movement, specifically the revolution of the Western proletariat, as both confront a common adversary and seek to dismantle capitalist imperialism. Sun Yat-sen's testament is notably precise: 'I have devoted myself to the national revolution for 40 years, and my objective is to pursue freedom and equality for China.' To attain this objective, I must mobilize the populace and consolidate them to combat together as a nation, regarded as an equal among the nations of the globe. Prior to the October Revolution in Russia in 1917, the global landscape was dominated by capitalist imperialist regimes. Will it prevail? Similar to the previous shortcomings of the Turkish revolutionary movement, the current success of the Turkish revolution was contingent upon the triumph of the October Revolution and engagement with the Soviet Union. Consequently, while Sun Yat-sen's four decades of expertise did not provide immediate success, his legacy undeniably facilitated future achievements. Upon his death, Sun Yat-sen bequeathed extensive revolutionary experience and the Kuomintang. The subjugated populace of the nation must embrace Sun Yat-sen's esteemed heritage to fulfill the Chinese revolution" (Cai, 1978: 364-371).

Hesen asserted that Sun Yat-sen epitomized the overcoming of imperialism and warlords. Hesen's depiction of the revolutions in China, Turkey, Iran, India, and Egypt as movements that undermined imperialism, along with his mention of Turkey's collaboration with Soviet Russia, indicates his emphasis on the historical link between the Kemalist Revolution and Sun Yat-sen. Mao Zedong was significantly affe-

cted by Sun Yat-sen's legacy in his adolescence and adopted the Three People's Principles. Mao Zedong stated in his 1927 report on the peasant movement in Hunan:

"The primary aim of the national revolution is to dismantle these feudal forces. In a matter of months, the peasants achieved what Dr. Sun Yat-sen aspired to accomplish, yet failed to realize, during the forty years he dedicated to the national revolution. (Mao, 2000: 58).

Some peasants are capable of reciting Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Testament. They select the concepts of "freedom," "equality," "the Three People's Principles," and "unequal treaties" and implement them, if rather clumsily, in their daily existence. When an individual resembling the gentry confronts a peasant and asserts their superiority by refusing to yield on a pathway, the peasant will retort indignantly, "Hey, you local despot, are you not aware of the Three People's Principles?" Previously, when peasants from the vegetable farms on the periphery of Changsha visited the city to sell

their produce, they were often subjected to harassment by the authorities. They have now discovered a weapon, which is none other than the Three People's Principles. When a police officer strikes or curses at a farmer selling vegetables, the peasant promptly responds by quoting the Three People's Principles, thereby silencing the officer." (Mao 2000: 87-88).

In his 1937 report titled "The Tasks of the CPC in the Period of Resistance to Japan," Mao said the following about the Three People's Principles:

"The Communist Party of China possesses its distinct political and economic agenda. Their ultimate agenda is socialism and communism, distinct from the Three People's Principles. The Communist Party's agenda for the democratic revolution and the Three People's Principles articulated by the Kuomintang's First National Congress are fundamentally not in opposition. Consequently, rather than dismissing the Three People's Principles, we are prepared to implement them resolutely" (Mao, 2000: 374-375).



A photo from the 7th National Congress of the CPC. During the 7th National Congress, Mao Zedong mentioned Sun Yat-sen many times in his reports and speeches (Photo: Quishi, 2021).

The 7th National Congress of the CPC was the most significant national congress convened during the New Democratic Revolution. At the 7th National Congress convened in Yan'an in 1945, Mao Zedong referenced Sun Yat-sen repeatedly in his reports and speeches. Sun Yat-sen was referenced twice in the address at the preparatory meeting of the 7th National Congress; the report "On the Coalition Government" cited Sun Yat-sen 27 times, including 6 direct quotations (Chenggui, 2005). Mao Zedong's primary perspective on Sun Yat-sen at the 7th National Congress of the CPC was that "we must maintain an open mind to elevate the banner of Sun Yat-sen" (Chenggui, 2005).

The CPC's endorsement of Sun Yat-sen and the Three People's Principles has undergone transformation over time. During the United Front period, throughout the War of Resistance Against Japan, Sun Yat-sen was endorsed to galvanize the entire nation, emphasizing the industrious spirit of the Three People's Principles. The CPC leaders periodically condemned the Kuomintang for straying from Sun Yat-sen's tradition (Zhang, 2019).


The Sinicization of Marxism, in the context of remembering Sun Yat-sen, positions Sun Yat-sen as the forerunner and the CPC as his successor, thereby establishing a democratic revolution agenda and a united front strategy. The Sinification of Marxism, in its narrative honoring Sun Yat-sen, saw him as the forerunner and the CPC as the successor, so formulating the democratic revolution agenda and the united front strategy. Following Sun Yat-sen's demise, the CPC depicted him as the emblem of the national revolution, thus reinforcing and broadening the united front under the auspices of the Three People's Principles. Consequently, Sun Yat-sen's endeavors and agenda were seen as the incomplete impetus of China's national democratic revolution (Zhang, 2019).

On April 29, 2005, Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CPC, and Lien Chan, Chairman of the Kuomintang, convened in Beijing. This marked the inaugural meeting between the leaders of the CPC and the Kuomintang following the Chinese Civil War. In his address, Hu Jintao stated:

"Dr. Sun Yat-sen is a distinguished patriot and national hero. He is the eminent pioneer of the Chinese national revolution. Dr. Sun Yat-sen bequeathed numerous significant spiritual legacies to the Chinese nation and its populace. It is commendable for us to inherit and perpetuate indefinitely" (Chenggui, 2005: 61).

The Perspective of CPC Leaders on the Parallels Between Sun Yat-sen and Mustafa Kemal

The formation of the United Front between the CPC and the KMT heightened the CPC leadership's interest in Sun Yat-sen, his Three People's Principles, and the Turkish Revolution (Demircan & Ye, 2023). The analogous challenges faced by China and Turkey at the same timeframe, along with Turkey's collaboration with Soviet Russia during the War of Independence and the triumph of the revolution, prompted the CPC to exhibit significant interest in the Kemalist Revolution (Zhigao, 2010). Gao Junyu and Cai Hesun, the initial leaders of the CPC, fervently endorsed the Turkish army's triumph in the Great Offensive and the success of the War of Independence (Demircan & Ye, 2023). On September 22, 1922, in the official publication of the Kuomintang, *Minguo Ribao* (民国日报), a writer using the pseudonym Eshi composed a poem entitled "The Victory of Mustafa Kemal Pasha," characterizing Turkey's triumph as "the victory of the oppressed nations" and stating, "We can all die for Mustafa Kemal" (Demircan, 2023). Qu Qiubai, an early leader of the CPC, asserted that Sun Yat-sen's



A copy of *The Guide Weekly* (向导). After Sun Yat-sen's death, a special issue on Sun Yat-sen was prepared in this first organ of the CPC (Photo: Baidu, n.d.).

paramount historical accomplishment was the formation of a unified front with Soviet Russia and the CPC, alongside his support for the workers and peasants, which constituted the correct trajectory for the triumph of the Chinese revolution (Longyan, 2012). The CPC cadres linked the Turkish Revolution to the Chinese Revolution, characterizing Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Sun Yat-sen as the leaders of the bourgeois democratic revolution. Li Dazhao was instrumental in convincing CPC leaders to establish the First United Front with the KMT (Shan, 2024: 163). Li Dazhao asserted that China had not achieved the capitalist industrial development characteristic of the West and that its working class remained underdeveloped, leading him to lack optimism for a proletarian revolution (Meisner, 1967: 210).

The triumph of the Turkish revolution motivated the Chinese populace to embrace the ethos of nation-

al resurgence and captured the interest of the CPC leadership at the time, which regarded it as a model for the revitalization of the Chinese country (Menglin & Zhigao, 2019a). The Soviet Union utilized the Turkish Revolution as a model to facilitate the success of the Chinese Revolution. Notably, Comintern Representative Marin and the leaders of the CPC often used Turkey as a model for establishing a united front between the Kuomintang and the CPC, as well as for securing the backing of Soviet Russia (Haiyong, 2013; Demircan & Ye, 2023). The perspective of CPC officials toward the Kemalist Revolution at that time indicated China's strategic aim to ally with Soviet Russia and collaborate with Sun Yat-sen (Zhigao, 2010).

In his essay in *The Guide Weekly* on October 12, 1925, Chen Duxiu asserted that Soviet Russia's assistance to Turkey was devoid of any colonial intentions.

He asserted that Soviet Russia was besieged by imperialism from multiple fronts and hence required collaboration with oppressed nations such as China, Germany, and Turkey. Duxiu asserted that the global community ought to establish a unified front with nations like China, Germany, and Turkey to counter imperialist aggression (Jianshu, 2009: 526-531).

Duxiu assessed Turkey's triumph in the War of Independence, its collaboration with Soviet Russia, and the dissolution of the Caliphate as significant actions. He asserted that China remained subordinate to imperialist forces and warlords and that the revolutionary movements in Turkey ought to serve as a model for China.

In a subsequent piece released on November 7, Duxiu asserted that the October Revolution in Russia not only facilitated the national freedom of workers and peasants but also influenced global revolutions, aiding movements in Turkey, China, and Iran (Jianshu, 2009: 537-540). In his article published in *The Guide Weekly* on April 16, 1924, Chen Duxiu asserted that the Chinese monarchy was sustained by Confucianism and cited Turkey's abolition of the caliphate following its transition to a republican government (Jianshu, 2009: 251-252).

Duxiu frequently highlighted Turkey as a model to promote collaboration between the CPC and the KMT in his essays. Chen Duxiu's sole piece focusing on Turkey was penned after to the dissolution of the Caliphate. Duxiu assessed Turkey's triumph in the

War of Independence, its collaboration with Soviet Russia, and the dissolution of the Caliphate as significant actions. He asserted that China remained subordinate to imperialist forces and warlords and that the revolutionary movements in Turkey ought to serve as a model for China (Jianshu, 2009: 228). Duxiu asserted in his article that feudal powers aligned with imperialist forces to oppose revolutionary movements, hence indicating that Turkey had achieved a significant objective.

In 1927, Yi Sheng, a Kuomintang member, commended Turkey for independently accomplishing its revolution in his piece entitled "Premier Sun taught us to learn from Turkey." He asserted that Sun Yat-sen drew inspiration from the Kemalist Revolution, remarking, "Dr. Sun, in his inaugural lecture on nationalism, commended Turkey and its capacity to collaborate with the Russian Revolution in pursuit of its own liberation" (Yisheng, 1927). Furthermore, Hu Hanmin, a prominent figure of the KMT's right faction, together with Sun Yat-sen's son, Sun Ke, traveled to Turkey in 1928 to see the Turkish Revolution. In a 1930 speech reflecting on his observations in Turkey, Hu Hanmin noted that during his interactions with Turkish officials, the principle of nationalism from Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles was robust in Turkey, while the principles of democracy and people's welfare received minimal attention. (Öztürk, 2018: 8-12; Fidan, 2017).

The KMT cadres showed significant interest in the Kemalist Revolution, prompting them to swiftly establish diplomatic contacts with Turkey to gain insights from the Turkish Revolution. He Yaozu, a distinguished commander of the KMT, was designated as the inaugural ambassador of the Republic of China to Turkey. He Yaozu stated, "I will observe the Turkish Revolution and endeavor to implement it in our nation" (Demircan, 2021: 31). Furthermore, in his 1936 article "Nation-Building in Turkey and Three People's

Principles,” Yaozu asserted that the ideals and actions of Kemalism aligned with China’s Three People’s Principles (Fidan, 2017: 88-99). In 1940, Mao Zedong remarked on individuals in China during the 1920s and 1930s who considered the Kemalist Revolution a viable model for China: “Following the failure of the First Great Revolution in 1927, did not certain members of the Chinese bourgeoisie fervently advocate for Kemalism?” However, where is China’s Kemal? Perinçek, 1991: 164.

During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the achievements of the Turkish War of Independence served as an inspiration for Chinese revolutionaries. The Kuomintang cadres made comparisons between Ankara, the epicenter of the Turkish revolution, and Chongqing, the capital of the Second Sino-Japanese War, through articles such as “Chongqing is Our Ankara,” “China’s Ankara,” and “Sichuan is China’s Ankara” (Demircan & Ye, 2024).

A newspaper account from November 12, 1938, conveyed the profound sorrow experienced upon the announcement of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s death, the President of the Republic of Turkey, coinciding with the anniversary of Sun Yat-sen’s birth. The report states, “Turkey, referred to as the sick man of the Near East, and China, identified as the sick man of the Far East, are akin to brothers.” The two nations were in a nearly despondent predicament. Fortunately, a leader and savior appeared, ultimately establishing two new nations and illuminating the darkness” (Yi, 1938). The correspondence of the birth and death dates of Sun Yat-sen and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the concurrent decline of their respective nations, and the assertion that the trajectories of these countries transformed under the influence of these two revolutionary leaders illustrate the historical link perceived by the Chinese concerning the destinies of both nations.

The Turkish and Chinese revolutions are fundamentally analogous as both are anti-imperialist and

anti-feudal; nonetheless, their trajectories diverge markedly. Although the proposals presented by the two leaders exhibit commonalities, they also diverge regarding state experience and standing. The concepts of Nationalism, Populism, and Statism in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Six Arrows exhibit parallels with the principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and People’s Welfare in Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s concepts (Sanyi, 2022). Conversely, Mustafa Kemal emerged from a military background, whereas Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the temporary government formed in Nanjing, lacked the requisite prestige, financial resources, and a formidable army until 1924 (Dong, 1998). The parallels between the two revolutions have incited China’s intellectual and revolutionary scholars to investigate and delve deeper.

Conclusion

The interest of Chinese revolutionaries with the Turkish Revolution and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk stems from the analogous destinies of the Qing Dynasty and the Ottoman Empire during the same era, as well as the parallel trajectories of the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and the Xinhai Revolution. Moreover, throughout the emergence of national revolutions and the formation of nation-states in Asia, Chinese revolutionaries emphasized mutual learning and deriving insights from historical errors. Chinese revolutionaries created a link between Sun Yat-sen and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, highlighting their shared anti-imperialist stance, their overthrow of monarchies, and their leadership in the bourgeois democratic revolution.

Chinese revolutionaries highlighted the anti-imperialist positions of Sun Yat-sen and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, their contributions to the dismantling of monarchies, and their leadership in promoting the bourgeois democratic revolution.

A further element affecting the relationship between the CPC cadres and the association between the Turkish and Chinese revolutions was the assistance rendered by Soviet Russia to Turkey throughout its War of Independence, alongside the camaraderie developed between the two nations. The CPC cadres anticipated that the partnership model developed between Turkey and Soviet Russia may also be relevant to China. Additionally, Chinese intellectuals and revolutionaries meticulously observed the revolutionary and reformative developments occurring in Turkey. Chinese revolutionaries shown significant interest in the dissolution of the sultanate, the termination of capitulations, and the modernizing initiatives in language and education. 🌸

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SPEECH AT THE MEMORIAL FOR THE 13TH ANNIVERSARY OF SUN YAT-SEN'S DEATH AND THE COMMEMORATION OF THE FALLEN SOLDIERS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR (MARCH 12, 1938)



MAO ZEDONG



New China Daily (Xin Zhonghua Bao), 424th issue on March 15, 1938

(National Archive Administration of China, 2015).

1938年3月12日：毛泽东在纪念孙中山先生逝世十三周年及追悼抗战阵亡将士
大会上的演说词 来源：中央档案馆 2015年03月12日

(Clipping retrieved February 4, 2025, from https://www.saac.gov.cn/zt/2015-03/12/content_88361.htm)

HISTORY

The following is a speech delivered by Mao Zedong, the great revolutionary and founding leader of the People's Republic of China, at the commemoration of the 13th anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's death and the soldiers who lost their lives in the war against Japan, held in Yan'an on March 12, 1938. This speech was published in the New China Daily (新中華報) on March 15, 1938. Translated from the Chinese original by BRIQ.

TODAY IS THE 13th ANNIVERSARY OF THE death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. We are holding such a solemn commemorative rally. Meanwhile, the war against Japan has been going on for eight months. Many brave officers and men have made the ultimate sacrifice. We are holding here such a grave commemorative rally. These are not random or coincidental; they have their reason in the development of our nation's history.

What is the source of Dr. Sun's greatness? It lies in his Three People's Principles, his united front policy, and the spirit of hard struggle. When I met with Dr. Sun in Guangdong, the National Congress of the Kuomintang was in session. The new outline of the Three People's Principles, authored by Dr. Sun, which is the famous "Declaration of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang," had been adopted at the Congress.

At that time, the united front policy based on the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was also implemented. This united front included uniting with the Communist Party, workers, and peasants domestically and externally uniting with those nations that treated us equally and shared our common struggle. The famous "Three Great Policies" were established at that time. Dr. Sun's Three People's Principles program and the policy of the united front are indeed the greatest contributions of the great revolutionary to the Chinese nation in a semi-colonial status. Moreover, Dr. Sun's greatness lies in his hard struggle, unyielding, unbending, and unfailing revolutionary perseverance and revolutionary spirit. Without this perseverance and spirit, his doctrines and policies could not be realized.

As the first sentence of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Testament, which we just read a moment ago, said, "I have devoted myself to the national revolution for forty years." During these forty years, there have been many difficulties and twists and turns; however, Dr. Sun always became more and more motivated, unyielding, and continued to work hard.

The Declaration of the First National Congress indicated the development of the Three People's Principles. So was his effort for the united front. Dr. Sun had not only insisted on it but also developed the united front from a policy for the overthrow of the Manchus by uniting with all revolutionary parties and underground societies to a policy for the overthrow of imperialism and feudal forces by uniting with the Soviet Union, the Communist Party, the workers, and peasants.

When many followers showed discouragement and even surrendered and betrayed in the face of difficulties and temptations, Dr. Sun was always firm. Dr. Sun adhered to his doctrine. Throughout his life, he had never neglected to develop his Three People's Principles. Never was there a time when he disregarded his doctrines. He always insisted on and developed Three People's Principles. The Declaration of the First National Congress indicated the development of the Three People's Principles. So was his effort for the united front. Dr. Sun had not only insisted on it but

also developed the united front from a policy for the overthrow of the Manchus by uniting with all revolutionary parties and underground societies to a policy for the overthrow of imperialism and feudal forces by uniting with the Soviet Union, the Communist Party, the workers, and peasants. All these, in combination with his fearless, unyielding, unbending, and undaunted revolutionary perseverance and spirit of revolutionary practice, showed Dr. Sun's great revolutionary character.

Today we again have a broader united front than before. The enemies we have to deal with are also more formidable than before. The program that this united front should implement is still basically what was stated in the Declaration of the First National Congress, but the form and content have been developed to a certain extent, and in the future, there will definitely be further development. For attaining the goal of implementing the Three People's Principles, enlarging the united front, and defeating our enemy, Japanese imperialism, we must manifest our hard struggle, unswerving and uncompromising revolutionary spirit through revolutionary practice. If we are to commemorate Dr. Sun Yat-sen not merely as a matter of perfunctory formality, we must pay attention to the following: First, struggle for the thorough implementation of the Three People's Principles. Second, struggle for the consolidation and enlargement of the anti-Japanese national united front. Third, carry forward the revolutionary spirit of hard work, perseverance, and continuous efforts. I think these three points are the most fundamental, most essential, and greatest legacy left to us by Dr. Sun. All members of the Kuomintang, all members of the Communist Party, and all patriotic compatriots should accept this legacy and carry it forward! To judge whet-

HISTORY



Mao Zedong speaking at a ceremony marking the graduation of the fourth batch of students of Yan'an Anti-Japanese University and the 11th anniversary of the Nanchang Uprising on August 1, 1938 (Photo: Portraits of Mao Zedong [1937-1938], 2025).

her one is a loyal disciple of Dr. Sun, we should see his attitude toward these three precious heritages.

Now, let us talk about the significance of commemorating our fallen officers and men in the war against Japan. Since the Marco Polo Bridge incident, a great war unprecedented in the history of the East has lasted eight months. The enemy has put all its national strength into the fight. Their goal is to destroy China, with the strategy of a rapid triumph. How about us? We have also employed all our available forces to resist. Our purpose is to defend our motherland. Our strategy is protracted warfare. In the last eight months, our land and air forces have given a heroic account of themselves; a great national unity is carried out throughout the country; several million troops and numerous people have joined the frontline; and several hundred thousand of them have heroically given their lives while executing their duties. Among them, many were

Kuomintang members, many were Communist Party members, and many others were nonpartisan. We sincerely mourn for those who are dead, and we shall remember them forever.

From Generals Hao Menglin, Tong Linge, Zhao Dengyu, Rao Guohua, Liu Jiaqi, Jiang Yuzhen, Chen Jinxiu, Li Guidan, Huang Meixing, Yao Zixiang, and Pan Zhankui to every soldier, they have all set all were noble and great models for all Chinese people. The Chinese nation is not a flock of sheep but a great nation with national self-esteem and human righteousness. For national self-respect, human righteousness, and their right to live on their own land, the Chinese people will never permit the Japanese fascists to achieve their lawless purposes without paying a heavy price. Our methods are war and sacrifice. We use war against war. We use a revolutionary war for righteousness against a barbarian war of aggression. This spirit has been proved by the thousands of years of our national history. Now,

we have another great proof. General Hao Menglin and hundreds of thousands of others have sacrificed their lives for this.

Our war on external fronts, coordinated with the war on internal fronts and with efforts from all sides, can make great progress in the important work of the Party, government, army, and people throughout the country. One day, we will be able to coordinate with each other, attack from both inside and outside, and launch a major counterattack. At that time, our efforts must also be coordinated with the support of the world revolutionary forces and the support of the people's revolutionary force in Japan.

We are sure that the Japanese fascists will make further advances. They will attack our Xi'an, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Nanchang, Fuzhou, Changsha, and Guangzhou. They want to devour all of China. But I want to tell those crazy enemies that you will never achieve your goal. Don't think that you have achieved your goal by occupying our territory. You have not achieved, and will never achieve. In the verdict of history, the victory of Japanese fascists can only be temporary, not permanent. There are sufficient reasons to prove that the eventual victory belongs to our side. When the war comes to an end, they can only occupy a part of our territory, it being impossible for them to occupy the whole country. Even if they win a quick victory in a city, they also have to win a protracted

battle for the vast rural areas. For example, they have occupied several main roads and several cities in Shanxi, but the vast countryside that is many times bigger than the occupied areas still belongs to China. We have to tell this truth to our compatriots throughout the country. The Japanese can only achieve a partial occupation of any province. They do not have enough strength for deployment. In addition, their barbaric policy has angered every Chinese. China has a huge army and hundreds of millions of people. It is carrying out an excellent national united front policy. All these predetermined which side will win the protracted war and the final victory.

In the future, as a result of the bloody battle between the two sides, even if Japan occupies most of China, we can use the remaining smaller part as our base to continue the war and win victory. But in that larger portion of China, Japan can only occupy the big cities, highways, and some plains. If we can organize and arm the majority of our people in the countryside and establish many anti-Japanese bases, such as the Wutai Mountain base that has been established now, we will have the Japanese army surrounded.

Our war on external fronts, coordinated with the war on internal fronts and with efforts from all sides, can make great progress in the important work of the Party, government, army, and people throughout the country. One day, we will be able to coordinate with each other, attack from both inside and outside, and launch a major counterattack. At that time, our efforts must also be coordinated with the support of the world revolutionary forces and the support of the people's revolutionary force in Japan.

Who can say that the final victory will not belong to China? Who can say that the blood of General Hao Menglinglin and others was shed in vain? Who can say that the Japanese bandits will not be driven out of China? Who can say that Dr. Sun Yat-sen's three great ideals—national liberation, freedom of people's

HISTORY



Mao Zedong giving a speech at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University in 1938
(Photo: Portraits of Mao Zedong [1937-1938], 2025).

political rights, and people's livelihood and happiness—will not be realized in China? We want all Chinese people to have this kind of clear understanding and firm conviction. We want them to understand that the best policy is to wage a protracted war. Under the leadership of the Central Government and Chairman Chiang Kai-shek, we must unite with one heart in this great war and must definitely break the shackles of national slavery or get rid of the threat of national slavery.

At this rally, we wish to salute all the soldiers fighting on the front line because they are all fighting heroically for the final victory. We wish to salute all the family members of our soldiers who are engaged in this war against Japan, especially the families of martyrs, because they have soldiers who fought so valiantly for their country and were not afraid of sacrifice. We also wish to salute all the staff and leaders at all levels who worked hard and devoted themself-

ves to the war against Japan in the rear areas because their work directly or indirectly guided or helped the war. At this rally, let us especially salute our national leader, Chairman Chiang, the commander-in-chief of the anti-Japanese war, because he led the whole country to launch and command the great war against Japan unyieldingly.

Fellow compatriots at this rally! Fellow compatriots across the country! Let us be united forever! Down with Japanese imperialism! Long live China's national liberation. 🌸


Original Chinese text retrieved from http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/szyw/200705/22/t20070522_11450193.shtml on February 4, 2025.

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INTERVIEW WITH SUN YAT SEN
BY OSAKA MAINICHI SHIMBUN (NOVEMBER 23, 1924):
“Japan, Ignoring its Identity as an East Asian Nation”
An enthusiastic visit after seven years¹



PREPARED BY: İNAN ÖNER*



Documents of Sun Yat-sen's 'Pan-Asianism' Speech (1989). (Ed. Chin Tokujin, Yasui Miyoshi).
November 1924, The Crossroads of Japan and China. Tokyo: Horitsu Bunka-sha.
孫文 講演「大アジア主義」資料集 -1924年11月 日本と中国の岐路-
陳徳仁、安井三吉 法律文化社 1989年 東京

(The original Japanese text is taken from pages 84-88 of Sun Yat-sen's 'Pan-Asianism' Speech Documents (1989). The text was translated into Turkish from the original Japanese version by İnan Öner. The English translation was done by BRIQ.)

**İnan Öner was born in Berlin in 1974. He obtained his bachelor's degree from the Department of Japanese Language and Literature at the Faculty of Language and History-Geography, Ankara University (AÜDTCF). He earned his master's degree in 2001 from the Department of Language and Information Sciences Graduate School and College of Arts and Sciences, the University of Tokyo.*

Sun Yat-sen undertook his last trip to Japan in November 1924, four months before his demise. On November 22, Sun Yat-sen departed from Shanghai, arrived in Nagasaki on November 23, visited Kobe on November 24, and convened the notable “Pan-Asianism” conference on November 28 following several meetings. During his visit to Japan, Sun Yat Sen conducted interviews with Japanese journalists, articulating the concepts he presented at the “Pan-Asianism” conference in an effort to communicate his message to the Japanese people. Below is the Turkish translation of the interview conducted by Murata Shiro, the Shanghai correspondent for the Osaka Mainichi Shimbun, published on November 23, 1924. The original Japanese text is taken from the book of Documents of Sun Yat-sen’s ‘Pan-Asianism’ Speech (1989).

THE VESSEL FROM SHANGHAI, transporting Sun Yat-sen and his companions, set sail at eight o'clock in the morning on November 22. The vessel is presently navigating the expansive South China Sea. Light waves are present; however, the weather is pleasant, and the travel is secure. In the smoking room, Li Liejun, with a Kaiser mustache, and Dai Jitao, savoring his drink, engaged in an animated discussion characterized by exaggerated gestures. Sun Yat-sen, averse to maritime journeys, had retreated himself in his private cabin while his wife was nowhere to be seen.

Upon the vessel disembarking from Wusong, I (Ed. n.: reporter Murata) proceeded to Dai Jitao's cabin and engaged in an extensive conversation

with him. Dai Jitao articulated in Japanese, with a fluency that even native speakers could not attain, having relinquished the rigidity of his previous perspective from two or three years prior and embraced a more adaptable approach:

“Following my visit to your country in the winter of 1920, numerous developments transpired in the subsequent four years. Duan Qirui in Tientsin (Tianjin) is anticipating our arrival. We must arrive at the earliest opportunity. Today in China, there exists just one individual who genuinely embodies hope for the Japanese country with fervent sincerity, and that is our teacher Sun Yat-sen. Our teacher Sun Yat-sen asserts that the Japanese nation is China's sole ally.

今はこの結論を與へたい支那動亂の原因は國內でなく國外で歐米諸國が共管、分轄の野心を以て支那に臨み壓迫しつゝ擾亂を事とするにあり而して支那の混亂は共管、分轄を可能ならしめる大なる理由となる、英國が廣

に從はず日本にはかくの如き野心は全然ないといふ事實を對支態度の上に出現してもらへば支那國民は斷じて日本を疑ふことなく進んで親善の道を講ずるであらう、余は支那に於ける租界における治外法權の制度撤廢を要求する決心であつて特にこの問題に就て日本の同情を得たい日本は以前支那の今日の如き立錫にあて外人の苦しい壓迫を経験してゐるから日本が現在の支那に同情して援助を與ふるなら此問題の解決は容易であると思ふ吳氏南下と英國

天津の元老會議云々は一片の風説で余が天津に行くのは自分の意見を表示せんがために外ならぬ、支那擾亂の原因は内政にあらずして外患にある、余は我國力が充實してない時に政界に乘出すより野にゐて諸外國の同志と提携し外國政府の反省を促す方が利益であると思ふ、余が若し政界に立つては直に諸外國との衝突を惹起すであらう、一例を言へば余が政界に立てば英國を攻撃することを避けるべならぬ、併し野にあれば英國

民と聯絡して英國政府の誤れる方針を輿論によつて破壊することが出来る、余が政界に立つては英の等々の効力を失ふことを慮れるためである、吳佩孚氏が山海關に敗れ遁入すべき地なきに憫んだ時某國は吳氏が揚子江に入れば協力援助すると吳氏に南下をすすめた事實がある、若しこの事がなければ吳氏は揚子江に入るのを避けたであらう、某國とは英國であることをここに斷言してはゐるから、我々は英國國民の同志と英國政府のこの態度に反省を求めたが英國も今では吳佩孚氏援助政策を擯したことを信ずるこの運動も余が野にゐて始めて出来ることである

After the European war, during the Washington Conference, many perspectives emerged in China. Nonetheless, the collaboration between Japan and China has increasingly become arduous. Historically, numerous misunderstandings have occurred; nonetheless, we now deem it essential to relinquish the past and pursue a new direction. When Wu Peifu recognized the absence of a retreat following his defeat at Shanhai Pass, a nation stated that if they advanced into the Yangtze River, they would provide him with substantial support and urged him to proceed southward. Without this incentive, Wu Peifu would not have traversed the Yangtze. We are certain that England was the country that inspired him. We have urged

England to reassess its position, and it appears that England has now renounced its strategy of endorsing Wu Peifu. I can only sustain this movement if I am independent. I wish to discuss the result in this context. The fundamental source of the unrest in China originates elsewhere rather than domestically. American and European nations are contemplating a collaborative governance or partition of China. Informed by this dream, they engage with China, instigating turmoil through coercion, as only such turmoil can facilitate either collaborative governance or fragmentation within China. My attempt to end my life by leaping into the Yangtze River was not motivated by anger or discontent. In summary, it was an experience

of emptiness. Subsequently, my disposition underwent a full transformation. I began to contemplate that all occurrences in the world are a historical necessity. An individual may perceive their current activity as highly meaningful; nevertheless, upon reflection after a decade or two, it becomes evident that these endeavors were only historical needs. Upon reflection, I concluded that an individual must exert maximum effort, devoid of both pessimism and optimism. I have recently commenced reading literature on Buddhism.”

Dai Jitao offered me (reporter Murata) a cigarette and continued his statement as follows:

“In Japan, there are those who think I have completely turned red. If there are individuals who have such beliefs, inform them that my experience is not one of mere reddening but rather a transformation into Buddhism.”


The Transformation of Russia's China Policy “From Land Annexation to People's Spirituality”

The vessel was traveling at twenty nautical miles per hour. The wind intensified, and the waves started to swell. We visited Sun Yat-sen's cabin accompanied by Dai Jitao. His hair had become sparser than before; however, the enthusiasm he elicited was of a magnitude that would evoke envy in the youth. He was seated in the cabinet chair, clad in her fitted Chinese dress. He responded to my inquiries with a continuous smile.

“I am returning to Japan after a seven-year break. Should I refer to them as impressions that I have several recollections of, although none currently come to my mind?”

Sun Yat-sen shut his eyes. His expression suggested he was immersed in nostalgic recollections. I (Ed. n.: reporter Murata) indicated my desire for him to candidly articulate both the strengths and weaknesses of Japan:

“I contend that Japan's superiority lies in its pursuit and attainment of advancement ahead of other East Asian nations. The worst point occurs here. Upon acquiring power, he occasionally neglects his origins from an Eastern country and an Eastern nation. It resembles a provincial individual relocating to the city, neglecting their origins, and indiscriminately associating solely with urban elites. Subsequent to the revolution, Russia reinstated its privileges to China. The Chinese populace received this with acclaim. If Japan's stance parallels that of Russia, the Chinese nation will be rather gratified. During the Tsarist era, Russia sought to seize Chinese regions. All actions were aligned with the annexation policy. Post-revolution, Russia's strategy towards China shifted from a stance of annexation to one aimed at appealing to the spirit of the Chinese people. Gaining the affection of the people is far more holy than territorial acquisition. Concrete material concerns should be relinquished in favor of abstract and significant aspirations. Our party (Kuomintang: Nationalist Party) advocates for the establishment of a tripartite alliance among Japan, Russia, and China. We genuinely desire this to occur. By accomplishing this, we may deter England and America from redirecting their attention to the East.”



Pages 86-87 of the Documents of Sun Yat-sen's "Pan-Asianism" Speech (1989).

Opinions by Sun Yat-sen to Japanese Journalists Before Departure from Shanghai “The Ambitions of America and European States are the Fundamental Cause of the Turmoil in China”

(Shanghai Telegram, November 22) On the morning of November 22, at eight o'clock, Mr. Sun Yat-sen invited Japanese journalists on the occasion of the departure of the Shanghai Ship, further elaborating on the statements he had previously made to the Japan Newspaper and the Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper, and expressed his views as follows:

“What I hope from Japan is that the two countries will work together to help Asia as a whole. It is said that the Chinese people view Japan's

attitude towards China with suspicion, but if Japan does not adhere to the invasions, joint governance, and similar behaviors imposed by Britain, America, and other major powers, and clearly expresses in its attitude towards China that it has no such ambitions and desires, the Chinese people will never view Japan with suspicion, and a path will be opened for the construction of good relations. I am determined to demand the abolition of the legal immunity system in the concession areas in China. Especially regarding this issue, I want to see sympathy from Japan. Japan was once in the same situation as China is today and suffered harsh oppression from foreigners. Because of this experience, I believe that if Japan shows empat-

hy towards China's current situation and offers help, the solution to this problem will be easier."

Wu Peifu's Southward Advance and Britain

"The question of a Council of Elders in Tientsin is a kind of rumor. The purpose of my visit to Tientsin is only to express my views. The disturbances in China are caused not by internal politics but by external disturbances. I think that instead of entering the world of politics when the strength of our country is not yet sufficient, it is better for us to remain outside and, in co-operation with our comrades in various countries, urge foreign countries to reconsider their policies. I think that if I were to enter the world of politics directly, there would immediately be a conflict with foreign countries. For example, if I were in power, I would hesitate to attack England. However, if I were in opposition, I could communicate with the British people and counteract the wrong policies of the British government through public opinion. I do not engage in politics for fear of losing the effectiveness of these activities. Following his defeat at the Battle of Shanghai Pass, Wu Peifu was confronted with a situation where he had no viable options for retreat. At this juncture, a nation offered him their support, contingent on his entry into the Yangtze region. This encouragement was instrumental in persuading Wu Peifu to undertake a strategic shift in his course, leading him to embark on a southward journey along the Yangtze. It is highly probable that the nation in question was Britain, whose actions and motivations remain a subject of historical analysis. We have approached our

associates in Britain, both the general public and the government, to request a re-evaluation of this policy. However, it would appear that Britain has now abandoned its support for Wu Peifu. In order to proceed with our endeavors, it is essential that we be independent.²

The Dreams of US-European Imperialism

"I wish to discuss the fundamental issue at hand. The fundamental source of the unrest in China is external rather than internal. The American-European nations are converging on China with aspirations for collaborative governance or division, exerting pressure on China, generating confusion, which is increasingly facilitating the prospect of joint control or partition. Britain is trying to bring China together through violence. They are doing this by sending a trade delegation to Guangdong or by supporting Wu Peifu. The 10-year period of turmoil is also the result of the great powers trying to bring China together through warlords. We cannot hope for the peaceful unification of China unless these foreign forces are eliminated. This is what American and European imperialism wants. The policies of these foreign states can only be stopped by the resistance of their own nations. I intend to remain in the opposition and fight by communicating with the nations of various countries, but this is a very difficult task, and no one else can do it. I am determined not to appear on the political scene until the great powers give up their intentions of partition or joint rule and until the conflicts are settled once and for all." 

² Translator's Note: In the newspaper report, Sun Yat-sen's remarks on the issue of 'Wu Peifu's withdrawal from the Shanghai pass' and Dai Jiatiao's remarks above on the same subject are given in similar sentences.

Emerging Middle Powers' Balancing Diplomacy: Connotations, Motivations, and Implications



XIAO YONGTAO*

Master's student
Center for Turkish Studies at Shanghai University

**Xiao Yongtao is a master's candidate at the Center for Turkish Studies of Shanghai University, and he focuses on Türkiye's Africa policy and diasporas relative issues.*


e-mail: xiaoyt19@shu.edu.cn

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0004-8795-8322>

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ABSTRACT

With the rise of emerging middle powers during the past few years, such as Türkiye, Indonesia, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia, whose significant influences have been expanding in the global landscape, while traditional middle powers like Canada and Australia have been notably silent on issues impacting global security and development. Therefore, not only has the division occurred within middle powers, but their unique diplomatic patterns and logics of external behaviors are also worthy of attention. This article argues that emerging middle powers are in a semi-peripheral position within the international economic structure, representing the common interests of developing countries and acting as leaders of the “Global South” and promoters of a more multipolar global order. During the transformation of international order, the rise of emerging middle powers and their balancing diplomacy pattern will further promote multipolarization.

Keywords: emerging middle powers, international order, multipolarization, balancing diplomacy, Türkiye.

Introduction

MIDDLE POWERS DENOTE NATIONS THAT exhibit certain capabilities yet lack the capacity to rival the leading countries in the global hierarchy; they may have a considerable economic presence but do not hold a central role in worldwide industrial specialization. Currently, the dynamics of middle powers are shifting due to the transformation of the global political landscape, leading to a scenario where emerging middle powers such as Türkiye, India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia are experiencing significant developmental momentum,

whereas traditional middle powers like Canada and Australia are witnessing a persistent decline in their influence in international affairs. In addition, alongside the big powers, the nations of the ‘Global South’ are augmenting their influence in the international sphere. There is an increasingly clear distinction between the two groups, which take different positions on world affairs. Furthermore, the divergent positions and tendencies of the two groups regarding foreign matters, including the quest for global discourse rights, the framing of international relations, and the rivalry among major countries, have further accentuated the gap.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Ukrainian crisis have intensified the transformation of the worldwide political environment, while great power competition persists, and the international influence of the “Global South” continues to grow. In this process, the peculiar balancing diplomacy has rendered the position of emerging middle countries in the “Global South” bloc and international politics exceptionally significant. The world is currently undergoing a period of considerable turmoil in the international political landscape, with emerging issues consistently affecting global security and development. Emerging middle powers are employing balancing diplomacy through their rhetoric and actions, seeking diplomatic autonomy, serving as a “buffer zone” in the struggle among big powers, mitigating the intensity of that competition, and aiming to reduce uncertainty in global governance possibilities.

While middle powers have received some attention in the existing literature, many questions remain unanswered. The division among middle powers has not been comprehensively examined, leaving the motivations for emerging middle powers to pursue a non-aligned diplomatic approach, along with the implications of this diplomatic model, unaddressed (Edström & Westberg, 2020). This paper will explore the implications of the emerging middle powers’ new role, examine the characteristics and performance of the balancing diplomacy they advocate, and conduct a thorough analysis of the causes and associated impacts of this diplomatic approach.


The Connotation of Emerging Middle Powers

Middle powers are not just essential actors that have surfaced in world politics in recent years but also represent states shaped by the combination of

elements such as economic prowess, global influence, and geopolitical standing. Scholars exhibit considerable variance in their definitions of intermediate powers. One scholar posits that a country is classified as a middle power if it fulfills specific duties associated with that designation or perceives itself as such (Holbraad, 1971). A scholar posits that the characteristic characteristics of middle powers include pursuing multilateral solutions to global challenges, adopting a conciliatory approach in international conflicts, and endorsing principles of responsible global citizenship (Cooper, 2013). Some studies classify countries based on facts and quantification to examine the attributes of middle powers. For example, Kim, a South Korean academic employing a hierarchical framework, utilizes statistical indices to classify nations based on territorial size, GDP, trade volume, foreign currency reserves, population, and military personnel (Kim, 2009).

Current research on middle powers fails to account for the recent transformations within this group. The prior articles on middle powers focused on Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, and Sweden, positing that these nations served as supporters and stabilizers of the international order (Jordaan, 2003). In recent years, the emergence of the “Global South” has led to a classification of middle powers into conventional middle powers, exemplified by Canada and Australia, and growing middle powers, represented by Türkiye, Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil, among others.

The population size of emerging middle powers generally is substantial. As per the statistics data published by the World Population Review in 2024, India’s population stands at 1,450,940,000, securing the top position globally. Indonesia (283,488,000), Nigeria (232,679,000), Brazil (211,999,000), and Mexico (130,861,000) are rated 4th, 6th, 7th, and

Figure 1. The Classification of Middle Powers

Middle Powers can be divided into Emerging Middle Powers and Traditional Middle Powers (Figure: Xiao, 2025).

11th globally, respectively (World Population Review, n.d.). Countries like Türkiye and Saudi Arabia possess substantial Muslim populations, rendering them indispensable states in the Islamic world that warrant attention.

Concerning economic development, nearly all growing middle powers are classified as developing nations. However, they all exhibit a sustained growth rate, particularly in the economy. Emerging middle powers are evolving from “followers” in the globalization process to significant “leaders.” Middle powers exhibit significant ambition in actively engaging in the establishment of new regulations for the global economy. They progressively evolve as significant participants in international relations. They are no longer on the periphery of the world system but are continually advancing toward its center (Mittelman, 1995). The 2024 global GDP rankings and projections released by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) exemplify the remarkable performance of emerging middle

powers. India’s GDP has exceeded that of the United Kingdom, while Brazil has also eclipsed nations such as Italy and Canada. Furthermore, economies like Türkiye, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia have ascended into the global top 20.

Emerging middle powers wield distinct influence owing to geopolitical considerations and resource availability, and they typically adopt a proactive stance in international or regional matters. For example, Türkiye is positioned at the crossroads of other countries’ economic routes, which offers a crucial “lever” for Türkiye’s engagement in regional and global matters. It particularly affords Türkiye distinct advantages in competing against major nations in West Asia and the Middle East. Given Brazil’s strategic location, the United States has long viewed Latin America as its “backyard,” and the country is home to major ports that facilitate international transportation. It’s self-evident that the US provides convenience to Brazil in various aspects such as visas, investments, and tariff issues.

Indonesia is considered the true leader of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and can exert asymmetric influence on transnational issues (Nabbs, 2020). At the same time, Indonesia has one of the largest nickel reserves in the world. Nickel, as a critical mineral resource, is viewed as a critical mineral resource that can reshape the global new-energy battery material industry chain. Due to geopolitical factors and resource possession, emerging middle powers play an important and functional role in regional peace and development as well as security and governance issues. As a result, they have to be considered by major powers during the process of exerting influence on the region.

Balancing Diplomacy of Emerging Middle Powers

Emerging middle powers are increasingly significant actors in international affairs. In the context of competition and collaboration among major powers, emerging middle powers frequently employ a diplomatic strategy characterized by balancing diplomacy, which may be examined through three dimensions: international relations, organizations and institutions, and national strategy. These three tiers form a fundamental framework for balancing diplomacy. The execution of balancing diplomacy in international relations demonstrates the influence of growing middle powers and signifies their national goals. At the organizational and institutional level, multilateral diplomacy fosters an institutionalized network of connections, which provides emerging middle powers with external behavioral resilience. In the context of national strategy, it is manifested as a significant degree of autonomy, allowing foreign policy to embody the intentions of one's own nation rather than those of others.

Firstly, regarding international relations. In March 2022, facilitated by Türkiye, the foreign ministers of Russia and Ukraine engaged in their inaugural direct communication since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. On July 22, both parties signed the "Ukraine Grain Security Transportation Initiative" in Istanbul, demonstrating Türkiye's efforts to sustain equilibrium among all involved stakeholders (Yang, 2022). Another example: Saudi Arabia convened a peace conference, inviting 42 nations to engage in consultation and dialogue regarding the escalating Ukraine crisis (Sinem, 2023).

In September 2023, Vietnam and the United States advanced their bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership (The White House, 2023). Three months later, an agreement was established between China and Vietnam regarding the concept of a community with a shared future (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The People's Republic of China, 2023). In June 2024, Putin traveled to Vietnam to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership (The Vietnam Plus, 2024).

All of these reflect that emerging middle powers adopt a balancing diplomacy, building closer relationship networks with multiple countries while maintaining their existing non-aligned foreign policy. Emerging middle powers sustain multifaceted economic engagements grounded in a fact-based approach. Amidst economic and trade rivalry among major powers, these emerging middle powers have embraced a multilateral approach to economic engagement. While certain countries have enhanced their economic ties with the US, this does not equate to severing economic collaboration with China and Russia. India and Türkiye serve as pertinent examples.

India became a member of the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity" (He & Luo, 2024) and joined the "India-Middle East-Europe

Figure 2. GDP's of Emerging Middle Powers in 2024 and Projections (Billions of US dollars)

	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028
Türkiye	1344.318	1455.413	1477.336	1565.506	1660.519
India	3889.130	4271.922	4710.371	5193.509	5723.287
Brazil	2188.419	2307.162	2444.937	2571.539	2709.595
Mexico	1848.125	1817.818	1905.278	1994.119	2085.533
Indonesia	1402.590	1492.618	1614.873	1743.582	1883.651
Saudi Arabia	1100.706	1136.58	1199.156	1262.326	1332.093
Vietnam	468.485	506.426	545.101	585.992	628.634
Thailand	528.919	545.341	569.517	596.267	624.015
South Africa	403.045	418.046	432.512	446.803	460.933
Malaysia	439.748	488.250	522.253	553.081	587.088
Nigeria	199.721	194.955	224.780	239.413	260.959
Emerging middle powers all embrace a brighter future (Figure: Xiao, 2025) (Source: International Monetary Fund, 2024).					

Economic Corridor,” both proposed by the United States (Kumar & Vivek, 2024). However, despite the economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and European nations, as well as the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, India continues to engage in trade cooperation with Russia concerning oil and industrial goods. Furthermore, according to calculations by Indian think tanks, in 2023-2024, China constitutes 43.9% of India's imports of electronic products, communication equipment, and electrical appliances (Xing, 2024).

Turkey is actively collaborating with Russia in energy, trade, and investment, while also engaging extensively with China regarding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Turkey's Middle Corridor initiative. The United States is currently implementing

sanctions against Chinese companies, particularly in the technology and supply chain sectors; however, these emerging middle powers have neither adjusted to US policies nor emulated the actions of traditional middle powers. Emerging middle powers perceive China's development as an opportunity; however, capitalizing on this opportunity does not entail forsaking investments from Western nations (Dai, 2016).

Secondly, regarding organizations and institutions. One of the highlights of balancing diplomacy is the multilateral institutional link between nations and international organizations. In contrast to conventional middle powers, emerging middle powers often demonstrate a heightened readiness to engage in regional or global agenda-setting.

The institutional connections between nations and international organizations exemplify the diplomatic frameworks of emerging middle powers. For instance, to augment its influence in the “Global South” and expand its diplomatic reach, India consistently asserted its commitment to unifying the “Global South” and convened the Third Summit of the Voice of the “Global South” in August 2024, addressing regional conflicts, food and energy security, and offering “Indian solutions” to shared challenges (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 2024). India utilized the G20 Summit to adopt the “New Delhi Declaration” opposing protectionism, which the Modi administration characterized as “historic and groundbreaking” (Paul, 2023).

within the realm of national strategy, prioritizing independence and fostering comprehensive strategic cooperation with numerous countries serves as a fundamental principle to direct the external actions of emerging middle powers.

Brazil primarily concentrates on three principal themes: combating hunger, poverty, and inequality; promoting sustainable development; and reforming global governance to augment its international influence in climate change and the transition to a green economy while advocating for the interests of “Global South” nations to foster greater international consensus (Zhou & Xia, 2024).

Turkey is actively collaborating with inter-

national organizations and forming enduring cooperative partnerships. It has become a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN and created the Türkiye-ASEAN Joint Sector Cooperation Committee. Turkey is spearheading the Organization of Turkic States to enhance regional integration cooperation in Central Asia and has acquired the status of a dialogue partner within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Ultimately, within the realm of national strategy, prioritizing independence and fostering comprehensive strategic cooperation with numerous countries serves as a fundamental principle to direct the external actions of emerging middle powers. On April 7, 2022, over 50 nations, including Western countries and Ukraine, requested at the Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly the temporary suspension of the Russian Federation’s membership in the Human Rights Council. Despite its significant economic and military collaboration with the United States, Saudi Arabia cast a dissenting vote (United Nations Digital Library System, 2022). Despite the West imposing economic sanctions on Russia, Türkiye, India, and Brazil declined to engage and maintained their economic and energy collaboration with Russia. Comparable circumstances exist in arms sales and military collaboration, with India, Indonesia, and Vietnam all enhancing their partnerships with the West. These military collaborations primarily focus on enhancing their defense capabilities rather than aligning with the U.S. to contain China and Russia through the reinforcement of the U.S. military alliance system.

Following the border tensions between China and India in 2020, the United States sought to leverage this incident for intervention. The

Indian government contended that despite existing issues between India and China, it would refrain from seeking mediation from any third party (The New Indian Express, 2024). Emerging middle powers aspire to act as stabilizers in conflicts, facilitate mediation among the parties involved, and strive to alleviate tensions rather than exacerbate them. As these and similar cases show, it can be said that emerging middle powers prioritize independence and pursue their national interests rather than emulate the actions of other nations.

The Motivations of Emerging Middle Powers' Balancing Diplomacy

The transition of emerging middle powers towards a more autonomous and balanced diplomatic approach is driven by both subjective and material factors. It fundamentally arises from the need to protect national interests. Nevertheless, if these nations are unable to engage in negotiations with major powers, adopting this balancing diplomatic model may incur greater costs, potentially leading to economic recessions or jeopardizing national security. Furthermore, the world is experiencing unprecedented change, and the inequitable international order promoted by Western nations is steadily disintegrating, creating opportunities for a novel transformation of the international order. Emerging middle powers also engage in protectionism, neutrality, non-alignment diplomacy, and a commitment to multilateralism.

Primarily the necessity to safeguard national interests. From a cost-benefit analysis, the advantages of balancing diplomacy significantly outweigh the disadvantages. Balancing diplomacy can provide benefits in more than one

dimension for national interests, which are the most important determinants in international relations. In economic collaboration, emerging middle powers can enhance economic growth and optimize benefits by maintaining trade relations with Western nations while participating in the BRI and BRICS initiatives. From the standpoint of sovereignty preservation, balancing diplomacy allows emerging middle powers to evade entanglement in conflicts between major powers, sustain strategic autonomy, reduce national strategic risks, and diminish reliance on a singular entity. By sustaining equitable relations with various entities, they can avert substantial losses resulting from strategic modifications by an individual nation or coalition. For example, India engages in diplomatic balancing between the United States and Russia. It acquires sophisticated military apparatus from Russia to ensure its military security and promote the stable advancement of its defense sector, while concurrently enhancing collaboration with the US in economic, technological, and military armaments (Yang, 2024). This strategy enables India to sustain a comparatively autonomous strategic stance between the US and Russia, with Türkiye serving as another illustration.

From the standpoint of domestic political stability, balancing diplomatic relations mitigates external interference in internal affairs. When a nation sustains favorable and equitable relations with various significant entities, it becomes challenging for external forces to exert unilateral pressure on its domestic politics, thereby enhancing the stability of the political environment and mitigating turmoil induced by excessive interference from a singular country, thus preserving peace and order within the state.

Secondly, emerging middle powers possess specific forms of “bargaining” capital. Implementing balancing diplomacy aims to protect national interests; however, if a country lacks the capital to negotiate or engage with major powers, the outcomes may not be as favorable as desired. Capital may derive from geopolitical factors, oil, minerals, and other natural resources pertinent to the stability of the global industrial chain and development issues, or serve as crucial strategic pivots for the foreign strategies of major powers. Acquiring one or more of these will enhance a nation’s negotiating power. In the intricate and dynamic international landscape, the interests and strategic priorities of nations are perpetually evolving. This “bargaining” strategy can enhance their ability to manage uncertainties and discern their critical points of interest amid the fluctuating dynamics of competition and cooperation among major powers. India, at the regional level, shares borders with neighboring countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, which are susceptible to significant issues. At the geopolitical level, the United States’ strategic emphasis is transitioning to the Asia-Pacific region (Guo, 2003). India’s national strength ranks in the “first tier” within South Asia, affording the nation an opportunity to capitalize on its role and relationships with various major powers to augment its political discourse and bargaining power.

It is an unavoidable historical trend for emerging middle powers to adopt balancing diplomacy.

The evolution of the international relations landscape acts as a catalyst. It is an unavoidable

historical trend for emerging middle powers to adopt balancing diplomacy. Influenced by a “Cold War mentality,” the United States perceives China as its foremost competitor and the principal impediment to the liberal international order (Sun, 2024). Ultimately, the inherent structural contradiction between China and America is challenging to resolve and is improbable to escalate to the extent of warfare (Scobell, 2020). Emerging middle powers remain incapable of independently confronting major powers due to their limited capabilities; however, cultivating balanced relations with these major powers is a strategically advantageous approach compared to dependence on a single major power. Consequently, in light of alterations in the international strategic landscape, emerging middle powers are reassessing their current foreign relations, their standing and advantages within alliances, as well as their negotiating stances on a range of critical issues (Efsthopoulos, 2023). Conversely, regarding the economic and monetary settlement system, the epoch of US dollar hegemony has concluded. The accumulation of US foreign debt, the increasing economic power of emerging market nations, and the trend towards multipolarity in the international monetary system are undermining the status of the US economy and eroding confidence in the US dollar as the world’s primary currency (Cohen, 2008). Conversely, the swift advancement of emerging economies is reducing the disparity between these nations and European countries, which will instigate significant alterations in the global economic framework. The rule-making role of the Western economic powers will be diminished; consequently, they must engage in negotiation and compromise more with emerging economies and relinquish greater influence and authority in decision-making. Consequently, the



beneficial influence of emerging middle powers in the domains of economy, trade, and finance on global economic growth will become increasingly evident.

BRICS exemplifies the pursuit of reform within the global political and economic framework, primarily due to the significant imbalance in the current international institutional power structure, where the representation and influence of emerging and developing nations do not align with their economic stature (Huang & Song, 2024). BRICS is perceived by emerging middle powers as a platform to reformulate the global order and redefine the rules of engagement in the pursuit of global political and economic multipolarity and systemic transformation (Lu, 2014). This can be comprehended from two perspectives. BRICS enhances foreign policy alternatives for emerging economies and bolsters their diplomatic independence. Amid the escalating strategic rivalry among major powers and the collective

emergence of the “Global South,” the tendency to take sides or participate in zero-sum games has diminished. Consequently, an increasing number of countries are able to pursue diversified cooperation avenues and diplomatic strategies aligned with their national interests and developmental requirements. Conversely, BRICS promotes the principles of non-alignment, prioritizes the welfare of the populace, and upholds open regionalism. Since the commencement of 2024, over 30 nations, including Malaysia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, have expressed interest in joining the BRICS cooperation framework. These nations aim to identify and develop new economic growth opportunities, enhance the resilience and security of industrial and supply chains, and pursue a broader array of economic and political alternatives. They seek to mitigate the risks and challenges posed by geopolitical and economic fluctuations by expanding economic, trade, and investment collaboration with BRICS countries (Lin, 2024).

In the future, emerging middle powers can leverage the BRICS cooperation mechanism to enhance practical collaboration in finance, investment, energy, agriculture, and science and technology, in accordance with the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The BRICS organization enhances the resilience of emerging middle powers to risks and social development through mutual benefit and win-win outcomes.

The Implications of Emerging Middle Powers' Balancing Diplomacy and China's Responses

Emerging middle powers have become significant determinants influencing the trajectory of this century's transformation. Their diplomatic balancing act consistently challenges the conventional international order and significantly alters the trajectory of the global landscape. Emerging middle powers possess significant ideological conflicts with the US, leading them to forge a distinctly divergent path from conventional middle powers. This unique diplomatic framework expedites the historical evolution of multilateralism, as the emergence of new great powers propels the global system into a phase of power rebalancing and redistribution. The reconfiguration of the global order increases the probability that emerging middle powers will undertake collective action (Stephen, 2013). Upon assessing the prevailing international circumstances, the US acknowledges that engaging these nations would entail substantial costs and yield limited efficacy (Chivvis & Geaghan, 2024). Matias Spektor, a professor of international relations in Brazil, stated, "We can never genuinely become an insider of the liberal international order" (Spektor, 2023).

Secondly, balancing diplomacy provides a "buf-

fer zone" for competition among major powers. This strategic hedging can avert a resurgence of a Cold War and diminish the likelihood of destructive competition among major powers (Xue & Chen, 2022). The contemporary ascent of emerging middle powers has established that the world cannot revert to the bipolar era characterized by the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union, which lacked "middle forces" as a stabilizing factor. The epoch of hegemonic systems and bipolar frameworks, characterized by the dominance of a select few nations, has concluded (Liu & Wu, 2015). Currently, under the guidance of rising middle powers, the "Global South" possesses the capacity to counteract the hegemonic maneuvers of the United States, thereby altering the geopolitical landscape.

Finally, the fundamental stance of China towards emerging middle powers and their balanced diplomacy is a desire for peaceful coexistence with these nations, coupled with opposition to all forms of hegemonism and power politics. Furthermore, foreign policies and actions informed by the principles of balanced diplomacy should authentically represent the genuine aspirations of the people and more effectively serve the interests of each side, thereby contributing to the creation of a more harmonious global community and a shared future for humanity. China's attitudes and reactions can be comprehended from both points of view and practical actions. Concerning the aforementioned, India, Türkiye, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia are undertaking initiatives aligned with contemporary trends in regional and global peace and development matters. Simultaneously, these nations anticipate China to assume a more constructive role, while China will persist in adhering to the principles of "equality and mutual benefit," "peaceful coexistence," and "a commu-

nity with a shared future for mankind” to foster a more peaceful and stable world. According to China’s government official statements and official documents, in collaboration with emerging middle powers, China will advance global sustainable development. President Xi emphasized that no matter how the development of China goes, it will not pursue hegemony, expansion, spheres of influence, or engage in an arms race. China will persist as a proponent of global peace, a contributor to international development, and a guardian of global order (The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2021). China consistently upholds mutually advantageous and win-win cooperative relations in foreign affairs, collaborating with nations globally through three initiatives and offering public goods for global development. China is willing to engage in earnest dialogue with all nations, including emerging middle powers, to advance international relations and frameworks towards a more equitable and rational direction. As for practical actions, for instance, at the economic level, China does not forget to benefit others while developing itself. The execution of the BRI invites nations along the route to partake in developmental prospects. The annual Grand China International Import Expo invites global companies to capitalize on China’s market development opportunities.

China consistently endeavors to enhance the cohesion of the “Global South,” advocates genuine multilateralism, and offers peaceful resolutions to international disputes. China does not participate in any exclusive policies or alliances such as “small yard, high fence” or the “Five Eyes Alliance.” China engages in scientific and technological collaboration by conducting energy partnerships with Indonesia, establishing a joint space weather laboratory with Brazil, and advancing agricultural planting

technologies internationally. China has created the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund, offering development assistance to over 160 countries, focusing on local education, healthcare, and infrastructure initiatives (Jiang, 2024). Furthermore, China convened the Conference on Asian Civilizations Dialogue, the Forum of Ancient Civilizations, the China-Arab Relations Civilization Dialogue, the China-France Civilization Dialogue, and the China-Africa Civilization Dialogue Conference. China promotes the concept of “all flowers bloom together” and fosters mutual respect and learning among diverse civilizations.

Conclusion

It is essential to observe the distinctions among middle powers. In contrast to traditional middle powers that frequently adhere to the directives of major nations, emerging middle powers exhibit a heightened willingness to engage in international affairs and possess greater autonomy. Confronted with various global development issues and security challenges, emerging middle powers can offer innovative ideas and solutions to establish fairer and more rational global regulations, thereby advancing global governance towards a more equitable and just trajectory. Emerging middle powers employ balancing diplomacy and engage with various national and transnational actors, thereby becoming significant actors in international agendas.

Emerging middle powers have significantly endeavored to enhance the representativeness and inclusiveness of global governance. Nonetheless, as these nascent middle powers remain in a developmental stage, actions by external major powers may inevitably disrupt them. Furthermore, emerging middle powers exhibit discord on particular issues. Negotiating the conflict of interest remains a challenge.

The alterations and modifications of the global landscape require time, and there will undoubtedly be disagreements in managing relations and interest disputes with major powers. Nonetheless, the long-term development prospects of emerging middle powers appear favorable. China will persist in enhancing mutual comprehension with emerging middle powers, broadening cooperative endeavors, fostering consensus, and endeavoring to assume a more significant role in advocating for the establishment of a more equitable and rational new international political and economic order. 

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The Sino-French Relations in the Context of Alter-Globalization



AHMET GEDİK*

PhD.
Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Istanbul University

**Ahmet Gedik, who completed his undergraduate education at Marmara University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of Public Administration (French) in 2016, studied at IEP de Lyon in Lyon, France for one year through the exchange programme during his under-graduate education. He completed his Master's degree in Political Science at Galatasaray University Institute of Social Sciences. In 2024, he completed his PhD in Political Science and Public Administration programme at Istanbul University Institute of Social Sciences. He speaks French and English.*

e-mail: gedik.ahmed@gmail.com

ORCID: 0000-0002-0371-6528.

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ABSTRACT

Examining Sino-French relations within the framework of multipolar international politics in the 2000s reveals new political dynamics with historical roots and future implications. France's historical presence in the "Indochina" region during the colonial era, as a sovereign state and a pivotal actor until the Vietnam War, establishes the historical context. Despite strained relations during Mao Zedong's era and the Chinese Revolution, Charles de Gaulle's 1964 visit revitalized diplomatic ties between the two nations. This study aims to elucidate the evolution of Sino-French relations since the pivotal 1911 Chinese Revolution, focusing on the trajectory leading to the emergence of the People's Republic of China in both economic and political dimensions. In addition to examining the traditional and Western perceptions of the impacts of globalization, this article addresses the novel opportunities and challenges posed by the superpower status of the People's Republic of China within the context of French foreign policy. It does so by incorporating an alter-globalization perspective, delving into the evolving dynamics of the global political landscape. Alter-globalization, which emphasizes alternative approaches prioritizing social and environmental justice, becomes particularly relevant. Within this framework, Sino-French relations can be analyzed not only in terms of conventional power dynamics but also through the lens of evolving global norms and values. The cultivation of strong ties between China and France within the EU framework serves as a means for the former to exert influence. This study aims to answer these questions and examine contemporary Sino-French relations, considering historical impacts and utilizing an alter-globalization perspective.

Keywords: Alter-Globalization, French Foreign Policy, international politics, Sino-French relations, multipolarity, international politics.

Introduction

BETWEEN 1870 AND 1914, A VAST GLOBAL trade arena emerged, marking the peak of Atlantic-centered globalization, comparable in scale to today's global landscape. This period witnessed the opening of new sea passages through the Suez and Panama Canals, a doubling of the global trade fleet, proliferation of railway networks, a sixty-fold

increase in international trade, migration of 50 million Europeans to unexplored regions, and the annexation of extensive colonial empires. The birth of the contemporary globalization paradigm began more than a century and a half ago. Despite this historical context, it is noteworthy how the effective implementation of neoliberal policies has given substantial content to the modern iteration of globalization, currently under debate.

Instead of adopting a comprehensive historical perspective, analyzing the contemporary reflections of this phenomenon on the present world may lead to a more insightful investigation. The term globalization is a concept widely used within broad consensus. Various disciplines, including economics, sociology, political science, and culture, approach the concept of globalization and evaluate it from diverse perspectives. This stems from the versatile and expansive nature of the term. From an economic standpoint, globalization is often defined as the transcending of boundaries in the trade of goods and services, the increase in capital movements, and the deepening of international financial integration. In the sociological context, globalization may encompass cultural interactions, the spread of communication technologies, and global societal changes. In political science, globalization may signify the overcoming of state borders and the tendency to shape dynamics in international relations. The diversity in interpretation underscores that the use and understanding of the term globalization can vary depending on the analyst's perspective and the disciplinary context. Therefore, in discussions on globalization, different perspectives and interdisciplinary approaches are crucial.

Despite marginal nuances in the definitions related to the forms or objectives of policies associated with globalization, there is a common understanding on the importance of the term. Originating from English, "globalization" is translated into French as "mondialisation" (Darlinf-Wolf, 2008). Alter-globalization (Altermondialisation), as generally perceived, is a social and political movement that opposes globalization, typically challenging the liberal order dominated by economic and financial interests, and seeks more just, sustainable, and united alternatives. In

contrast to anti-globalization, alter-globalization acknowledges globalization but is engaged in the search for a fairer and more socially oriented alternative. This article examines the Sino-French relations in the context of alter-globalization as an alternative to Western-centric globalization. The problematic of whether Sino-French relations can serve as an alternative to the mentioned globalization will be explored. Can there be a phenomenon of globalization outside the Western-centric model? This research aims to address these inquiries within the framework of alter-globalization. Alter-globalization manifests itself through social movements, NGOs, global social forums, and other forms of activism aiming to influence economic, social, and environmental policies on a global scale. Unlike its opposition to Western-centric globalization processes, this concept does not reject globalization but actively seeks a more equitable world order based on solidarity, sustainability, and democratic participation. It highlights the desire to construct a world order that is more egalitarian, emphasizing solidarity, sustainability, and democratic participation. To comprehend alter-globalization, it is crucial first to understand what globalization entails. This term does not support or oppose the Western-centric globalization process. Instead, it emphasizes the desire to construct a more equitable world order based on solidarity, sustainability, and democratic participation.

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The first section delves into the concept of globalization, examining both the phenomenon of globalization itself and the subsequent reactions it has generated. Subsequently, the historical background that led China to its present state is explored. The third section sets out to delve into the bilateral relations between China, a socialist

regime, and France, a Western state, which began during the Cold War, along with an exploration of France's foreign policy objectives during this period. Examining the tradition of French foreign policy and the transformation initiated by Mao in China reveals a convergence in the context of alter-globalization, wherein both countries have been seeking a multipolar world since the Cold War. In this regard, it is crucial to delve into the dynamics of the relationship between these two nations. Analyzing globalization and the emergence of alter-globalization as a response will contribute to understanding the dynamics of multipolar politics in these two countries.

Globalization and Reaction Movements Towards Globalization

The 1980s marked a significant turning point in the historical process of understanding the phenomenon of globalization. The rise of neoliberal ideologies in 1979 found symbolic representation in the presidencies of Ronald Reagan in the US and Margaret Thatcher in the UK. Simultaneously, the onset of debt crises in developing countries mandated adherence to "market-friendly development strategies" under the directives of international financial institutions. The dissemination of these economic ideologies not only transcended developing countries but also penetrated the Far East region, exemplified by the agricultural liberalization in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1979. This transformative process gained further momentum with the establishment of the PRC's first special economic zones in 1984. The year 1991 witnessed a noteworthy paradigm shift as India, previously characterized by nationalist, protectionist, and self-reliant policies, underwent a comprehensive liberalization process.

Subsequently, the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the end of the Soviet Union, which had been characterized by nationalist, protectionist, and self-reliant policies (Patil, 1993).

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and the subsequent end of the Cold War, global trends have gradually shifted towards embracing democratic principles and a universal economic framework characterized by liberalism (Lookwood, 2000). Many developing countries, not yet having formulated unique economic and political paradigms for the restructuring of their systems, found themselves in a state of bewilderment when communism collapsed in the former communist bloc. In this international political atmosphere, globalization has spread from Western countries towards the former Soviet regions. It is noteworthy to acknowledge that the trajectory of globalization is neither linear nor immutable, implying that global integration is not necessarily a permanent phenomenon. Despite the long-standing historical background of trade relations, integration between countries can experience intermittent slowdowns due to factors such as limited trade liberalization or withdrawal from globalization. However, as pointed out by Steiner (2014), concerted efforts are essential to strengthen trade relations, address deficiencies, and emphasize advantages. In the 1990s, Western countries, characterized by open economic systems, political liberalisms, and social reforms, assumed an exemplary role for developing countries in the absence of a viable third alternative political-economic growth model. Following ideological shifts and global transformations, developing countries like India have undertaken structural reforms both in their economic frameworks and external relations (Irogbe, 2005).



During the 1990s, a period marked by escalating social, political, and economic schisms, two noteworthy concepts and movements emerged in response to these transformative dynamics - anti-globalization and alter-globalization
(Photo: CCTV, 2016)

During the 1990s, a period marked by escalating social, political, and economic schisms, two noteworthy concepts and movements emerged in response to these transformative dynamics - anti-globalization and alter-globalization. The term 'alter-globalization' finds its roots in the French expression 'altermondialisme' (Tilly, 2006). The overarching objective of this global movement is to mitigate the hegemony of capital in favor of a more judicious and equitable paradigm of globalization. The World Social Forum (WSF) stands out as the preeminent organization associated with the alter-globalization movement. This evolution reached its zenith with the inaugural forum in 2001, following a period of ascendant influence since the latter half of the 1990s. While the conceptual underpinnings of this movement remain a subject of theoretical debate, esteemed scholars posit that it represents a substantial

anti-systemic mobilization, echoing the protests of the cohort of 1968. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, emblematic of the denouement of the Cold War, facilitated the emergence of a novel strain of social activism (Plibon, 2008). This movement is characterized by a reconfiguration of the guiding ideologies of modernity and a recalibration of mobilization tactics.

In the 1990s, in response to the rise of neoliberal globalization, an anti-globalization movement emerged, gaining increased significance, and becoming the focus of media analyses since the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) conference in Seattle. The anti-globalization movement directs its criticisms towards the goals and negative consequences of globalization, addressing concerns related to external resource utilization, economic inequality, speculative activities, and other relevant issues.



Widespread anti-globalization protests took place during the World Trade Organization (WTO) conference in Seattle in 1999 (Photo: Progressive, 2019).

es. Particularly within this movement, expressions of dissent occasionally emerge in a confrontational manner. Anti-globalization sensitivity contends that the benefits of globalization disproportionately favor the wealthy elite. This perspective is often voiced at gatherings such as G8 or G20, sometimes expressed in a confrontational manner. Social movements examining economic globalization are part of the anti-globalization movement, encompassing various factions that oppose the principles of neoliberal globalization. In contrast, alter-globalization expresses a viewpoint that suggests resistance to attempts to stop globalization as an inexorable force. It emphasizes building a resilient alternative that prioritizes equity based on solidarity, sustainability, and democratic participation. It is crucial to underline that anti-globalization and alter-globalization, while interconnected, are not entirely synonymous.

Advocates for change within this discourse seek to promote an ethical model of globalization that prioritizes human well-being under specific conditions. Perhaps the unique nature of this movement can be attributed to an ethical dilemma. Despite historical roots of discontent and movements dating back to the 19th century, the integration of ethical thoughts into political discourse is a relatively recent development. A fundamental precondition for a comprehensive examination of the concept of globalization is a meticulous definition of its constituent elements.

The inherent inflexibility of the conceptual boundaries invites a pertinent questioning of the internal intuitive value of the concept and increases the possibility of more reasoned handling of pluralistic uses. Despite these debates, a concerted effort is made here to shed light on certain aspects that are an integral part of the structure.

First and foremost, it is understood that the current manifestation of globalization significantly differs from its historical precursors. In the contemporary era, it is distinguished by a notable compression in both temporal and spatial dimensions, indicating an unprecedented acceleration in global flows. Within the French intellectual discourse, a subtle distinction is made between globalization antagonism, which is a stance adopted by those diametrically opposed to all manifestations of globalization, and alter-globalization or alter-globalism, which supports a different globalization paradigm backed by values that transcend neoliberalism. This alternative paradigm advocates for a more supportive, democratic, and egalitarian globalization. In contrast, the anti-globalization movement brings together some of the arguments put forth by alter-globalization advocates while also embracing principles such as nationalism, isolationism, fundamentalism, and sectarianism. Nationalists in the Third World, as defined by Feuer (1999), criticize globalization in a manner like socialists and Marxists did.

Fundamentally, alter-globalism is an intellectual and political approach based on a critical assessment of neoliberal globalization, as summarized in the concept of anti-globalization. It also seeks to articulate a realistic utopia encapsulated in the slogan “another world is possible”

Alter-globalism has emerged, in part, through the convergence of various anti-capitalist movements in the Western hemisphere and anti-imperialist move-

ments in South America. Fundamentally, alter-globalism is an intellectual and political approach based on a critical assessment of neoliberal globalization, as summarized in the concept of anti-globalization. It also seeks to articulate a realistic utopia encapsulated in the slogan “another world is possible” (Meurs, 2011).

The heterogeneity inherent in various ideological currents comprising the anti-globalization movement emerges as a combination of resistance against dominant ideologies, exploration of alternatives, and adept negotiations in different contexts. Numerous political currents align themselves with this movement or strategically adopt it as discourse. In a contemporary context, alter-globalism aims to humanize the globalization of markets and economies, creating a countermovement that promotes sustainability in this process (Massiah, 1999). It is crucial to examine anti-globalization and alter-globalist movements from different perspectives and recognize them as specific manifestations of political ideologies (Mathieu, 2005). Philosophically, the theories underlying anti-globalization and alter-globalism reveal the profound contradictions and conflicts caused by globalization. Politically, these movements explicitly represent an anti-capitalist movement. On the economic front, they emphasize the detrimental impacts stemming from the global expansion of multinational corporations. In the realm of technology, they arise as an unforeseen consequence of advancements in modern science and technology. Culturally, they represent a tangible manifestation of the deconstruction of the dominant Western discourse. Societally, they represent a radical political movement.

Samir Amin posits that there are five monopolies held by the centre.

1. Monopoly of new technologies
2. Monopoly of the world financial market

3. Monopoly of the access to natural resources
 4. Monopoly of communications
 5. Monopoly of the weapons of mass destructions (Macheda, and Nadalini, 2021). According to Amin, due to the concentration of privileges in the center, it exercises significant control over a substantial portion of the industrial sector in the periphery, leading to a notable redirection of economic surplus towards the center instead of promoting wealth creation in less affluent regions (Amin, 1996). This persistent scenario strengthens political dependence and exacerbates economic inequalities. These movements can serve as a force and counterbalance against the capitalist system and can be analyzed from both global and local perspectives. The former focuses on the evolution of a global civil society and transnational social movement, while the latter emphasizes a set of demands covering participatory democracy, community action, and efforts in the fields of social and solidarity economy. Examining the economic, political, and social connections between a Western democracy like France and China within the framework of alter-globalism and proposing an alternative paradigm that preserves the benefits of globalization without outright rejection is essential.

China between socialism and capitalism

The “People’s Republic of China” not only represents a geopolitical and political entity but also embodies a distinct ideological framework. Established under the leadership of Mao Zedong in 1949, the PRC adopted a socialist state identity (Yang, 2018). However, unlike its Western counterparts, at the inception of the communist state apparatus, the PRC predominantly preserved a rural demographic, demonstrating a widespread commitment to traditional belief systems, primarily Confucianism. Confucia-

nism, emphasizing the development of moral virtues at both collective and individual levels, advocates for well-organized and altruistic governance that enhances well-regulated human relationships. Rooted in collectivism and holistic principles, this philosophical tradition seeks to shape and control both public and private life, influencing the fabric of societal consciousness. This moral tradition continues to inspire Communist Party of China (CPC) leaders to pursue moral and ideological education. In this context, while Chinese communism may not be a direct carrier of such traditions, it exhibits noticeable traces or elements of traditional Chinese thought and culture. Throughout history, Chinese society has emphasized societal values over individualism.

The political trajectory of the PRC has undergone evolution since its establishment in 1949 as a socialist regime, guiding changes in domestic and foreign policy necessities. Viewing the two distinct periods of Maoist and post-Maoist eras, during the Mao era, the state presented a more closed and socialist-oriented appearance. However, the transformative period marked by Deng Xiaoping’s ascent to power in the 1970s led to the fragmentation of Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership and its subsequent reshaping in line with Deng’s vision. Thus, it initiated a transformative era that left its mark on the contemporary manifestation of China as a global power (Cabestan, 1996). China, progressing on a trajectory distinct from other states and societies, stands as an intriguing subject for historical and sociological examinations. Particularly, the integration of China into the capitalist world economy while being governed under socialist principles within a single-party monopoly requires meticulous scrutiny (Guo, 2012: 48).

China's transformation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries held critical importance in understanding the delicate balance between communist and capitalist paradigms. Addressing profound developmental challenges, China strategically leveraged its chosen ideology, facilitating rapid modernization and industrialization through the authoritative implementation of robust industrial initiatives (Yongnian and Kempf, 1999: 41). Currently, China stands as a unique combination of capitalist and socialist regimes, interpreting both ideologies distinctly from a Chinese perspective and operating within a defined set of principles. The Chinese example characterized by this combination has the potential to serve as a model for many developing countries.

Stems from the acknowledgment that figures like Mao, while attempting to Sinicize Marxism by approaching it through a lens different from the Soviet interpretation or other global counterparts, did not only seek to Sinicize Marxism by cultural embellishments in 1938 but also endeavored to adapt Marxism-Leninism to the unique lines of Chinese society and history.

In societies deeply rooted in traditions like China, the inclusion of ideologies such as communism, liberalism, or other non-Western or non-Chinese ideas requires subtle adjustments. This necessity stems from the acknowledgment that figures like Mao, while attempting to Sinicize Marxism by approaching it through a lens different from the Soviet interpretation or other global counterparts, did not only seek to Sinicize Marxism by

cultural embellishments in 1938 but also endeavored to adapt Marxism-Leninism to the unique lines of Chinese society and history. Mao aimed to make Marxism more pragmatic and acceptable to the people by tailoring it according to the distinctive features of Chinese society and history. Given that China did not undergo comprehensive industrialization as witnessed in Western European nations and did not experience widespread serfdom as seen in Russia, the contextual background was crucial. Mao's conceptualization of Marxism required encompassing and appropriating everything deemed valuable in China's historical trajectory by trying to adapt it to the historical conditions of China (Meisner, 2007). In the 1930s, almost every conceptual framework in the field of Chinese political thought was examined in terms of its harmony with the national character or essence known as "kuo-ts'ui" extending beyond socialist or Marxist ideas (Wylie, 1979).

Despite the efforts of Chinese communism and Mao to amalgamate Marxism with specific cultural codes, revolutionary endeavors inherently harbor ruptures. In this context, the 1949 Chinese Revolution did not lead to a cultural rupture within the thought system Mao designed but manifested more as a systemic break. The revolutionary initiative that adapted communism to the Chinese context accelerated the disintegration of established social structures in the country. Considering China's approximately two-thousand-year history under imperial rule, social frameworks intricately touched the fabric of the state apparatus. Mao's transformative initiatives led to the dissolution of the aristocrats, landlords, clergy, and bureaucratic classes rooted in the nation's past. Simultaneously, peasantry played a significant role in Mao's revolutionary narrative, reflecting the organizational dynamics during the CPC's years of civil war, where rural mobilization developed and eventually secured urban conquests. After Mao declared the People's Republic of China regime, initial expectations were that the CPC's focus would shift from rural areas

to urban centers, emphasizing industrialization to elevate the state to great power status (Pletcher, 2010: 300). However, Mao persisted in the belief that maintaining a visionary emphasis on rural areas would strengthen the revolutionary driving force. Administratively, Mao's leadership emphasized balanced attention to rural and urban areas, steering away from the perceived trajectory of neglecting rural areas and prioritizing heavy industrial ventures in urban centers. Drawing inspiration from the Soviet Union's party-state model, Mao attempted to "Sinicize" state organization by amalgamating foreign paradigms. During the Mao era, a single-party system dominated in the PRC, where the party wielded authority through the armed forces, controlling hierarchical structures and appointments within the military apparatus. This monopolization created a cohesive state-party-army presence that utilized legitimate violence in a Weberian sense, granting the party the privilege of unquestionable sovereignty to intervene in political and social realms.

China's pre-1949 historical landscape bore witness to various revolutions, which, despite their occurrence, failed to establish lasting success or political stability. The historical weakness of the central government and the disconnect between rural and administrative spheres contributed significantly to this predicament. Mao, rooted in a political movement emanating from the countryside, recognized the imperative of solidifying the central government to ensure the enduring success of the revolution. Legal frameworks were accordingly instituted, consolidating decision-making and control over political, economic, and social affairs within a singular central authority. In 1954, the Constitution of the People's Republic of China was meticulously crafted and enforced as a foundational instrument (Jianfu, 2004).

Drawing inspiration from the Soviet model while accounting for the distinctive "Chinese Essence," a novel state organization aligned with the tenets of a socialist state emerged. Concurrently, the CPC was granted over-

rarching authority to oversee and regulate all political and social entities within the nation. In congruence with the paradigm characteristic of one-party regimes, the PRC entrusted the CPC with the exclusive mandate to spearhead modernization initiatives, enact economic reforms, and propel social progress. The socialist economic model was implemented through the establishment of cooperatives in agriculture and trade. This transformative approach prompted rural peasants to abandon their agrarian pursuits and migrate to urban centers. This phenomenon was further fueled by the rapid industrialization efforts of the socialist government, which, in its pursuit of quick industrialization, established large factories in urban locales, subsequently transforming them into centers of attraction (Lawrence and Martin, 2013: 44).

Considering the vast expanse and population magnitude of such a colossal nation, the imperative to localize and decentralize administrative functions becomes apparent. Inevitably, the primary mechanism to uphold equilibrium among administrative units resides in tax policies (Zhang, 2019: 482). In the PRC, a symbiotic relationship prevails between the central government and local administrations concerning tax revenues. The bifurcation of taxes into central and local categories serves the dual purpose of meeting the fiscal requisites of the central government while enabling local administrations to sustain their financial autonomy. Local governments assume the responsibility of collecting local taxes, whereas the central government allocates specific resources from general taxes to address the needs and facilitate investments in regional localities (Tuoheti, 2014: 67). In the realm of financial and tax policies, decentralization has empowered local governments while concurrently diminishing the central government's obligations toward regional and provincial affairs. This dynamic has been instrumental in catalyzing significant economic advancements and development in the PRC over the past four decades.



The paramount factor contributing to China's success lies in the CPC's adept orchestration of societal dynamics within a predetermined framework (Photo: Global Times, 2024).

While the central government predominantly concerns itself with “high politics,” such as military and foreign policy, the delegation of almost all social policies to local government entities underscores a pivotal aspect of the governance structure in the PRC.

In the context of China's transition to a capitalist economic framework, a nuanced examination of the roles played by local and central governments is imperative for comprehending the current state of the nation (Losurdo, 2017). The governance structure of a vast country, endowed with an expansive economic system, being ostensibly governed by a communist party, prompts scrutiny and skepticism in the Western hemisphere, where questions are raised regarding the party's direct influence over the entire political apparatus. The conspicuous absence of elements such as a bourgeoisie and an individualistic society, typically deemed essential for the accumulation of capital and the evolution of capitalism, challenges prevailing Western

conceptions and underscores the viability of an alternative system outside the trajectory of Western civilization. While China has seamlessly integrated into the capitalist system, the paramount factor contributing to its success lies in the CPC's adept orchestration of societal dynamics within a predetermined framework (Pieke, 2022). Despite the apparent existence of multiple parties within the political landscape, the enduring dominance of a singular party and the consequential centrality of the party's politburo in state administration have engendered a profound interdependence between the party and the state. Consequently, any analysis of developments in China necessitates an inseparable consideration of phenomena ascribed to the CPC, both in positive and negative terms. The attained level of civilization in China, subject to persistent scrutiny by Western states concerning human rights, among other factors, remains an exemplar showcasing a method that non-Western societies can potentially adopt.

Alter-Globalization and Sino-French Relations

In the post-World War II landscape of international politics, France's alignment within the Western Bloc, coupled with its relative political and economic fragility compared to other influential bloc members, compelled a strategic recalibration in French foreign policy, particularly after 1958 during the era of the Fifth Republic and Charles de Gaulle's presidency. Throughout the entirety of the Cold War, France adeptly navigated a delicate equilibrium between the two superpowers, securing concessions from both to prevent a pivotal European nation like France from realigning itself.

This intricate diplomatic dance involved cultivating multifaceted relationships with both poles, spanning economic, political, and various other domains, evolving, and deepening over the years.

Under De Gaulle's leadership, which laid the groundwork for contemporary French foreign policy, a con-

viction emerged that an international landscape characterized by multiple poles would better serve France's national interests than a unipolar world dominated by a singular sovereign power. This perspective advocated for France's potential role in a multipolar order, potentially leading international organizations such as the EU, even if it couldn't independently emerge as a global power (Gürcan, 2020). The post-Cold War era, particularly in the 1990s, witnessed a shift as the US stood as the sole superpower, and the gradual inclusion of states like Russia and the PRC as significant global actors provided France with a foreign policy environment conducive to more effectively pursuing its national interests.

Especially during the De Gaulle era in the 1960s, which laid the foundation for contemporary French foreign policy, France, seeking autonomy from U.S. hegemony within the Western Bloc, differentiated itself as the first Western country to acknowledge the legitimacy of the PRC (Romano, 2017).



On June 19, 1954, Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (right) and French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pierre Mendès France (left) first discussed establishing diplomatic relations at the Chinese embassy in Switzerland (Photo: China Daily, 2021).

The subsequent decades, marked by China's opening, witnessed the strategic evolution of Sino-French relations towards a partnership, particularly during Chirac's presidency (Boniface, 2019; Liu, 2019). In the present day, the rising political and economic power of the PRC, combined with both countries' desire for a multipolar international order rather than unipolar or bipolar configurations, has accelerated the convergence of Sino-French relations. Examining the historical trajectories and nuanced processes undergone by these two nations is necessary to comprehensively understand their diplomatic ties and anticipate potential developments in the future. From the perspective of French foreign policy, the ascent of the PRC as a global power holds significance for a nation like France that advocates for a multipolar global system. Developing strong relations within the EU provides strategic advantages for both France and the PRC.

Sino-French relations serve as a lens to distinguish significant political evolutions rooted in historical precedents yet distinctly oriented towards the future within the multifaceted arena of 21st-century multipolar international politics.

Sino-French relations serve as a lens to distinguish significant political evolutions rooted in historical precedents yet distinctly oriented towards the future within the multifaceted arena of 21st-century multipolar international politics. Over the past fifty years, the relationship between these two nations has exhibited fluctuations characterized by phases of improvement and periods of stagnation. From the pers-

pective of French foreign policy, a geopolitical landscape dominated by bipolar Cold War dynamics, or a unipolar order centered around the US, as seen in the 1990s, is neither desired nor actively pursued. The Gaullist legacy, summarized by France's withdrawal from the military wing of NATO and the adoption of an assertive nationalist stance emphasizing national interests, has left a lasting imprint on successive French presidencies and political parties. During the De Gaulle era, which laid the foundation for contemporary French foreign policy, France diverged from its Western counterparts by officially recognizing the legitimacy of the PRC in 1964, becoming the first Western country to do so (Yunyi, 2019). This political move fundamentally altered the nature of Sino-French relations.

The examination of French foreign policy underscores a preference for an international system characterized by the plurality of active poles, avoiding both unipolar and bipolar configurations. Despite France's imperial past in historical periods, its geopolitical position has witnessed economic and political restructuring since the 20th century. Nevertheless, France has maintained its position among major global powers with the policies it has pursued since the 1960s. The recognition of the PRC by a Western country led to a seismic change in the international political arena, confirming the PRC's status as the true representative of the Chinese people on the global stage. This recognition, replacing the Republic of China (Taiwan), culminated in the PRC's permanent membership in the United Nations in 1971. By establishing diplomatic ties with the PRC, France sought to reassert itself as a geopolitical actor in the Indochina region, where its influence had noticeably waned in the 1950s (Lechervy, 1992). The post-De Gaulle era witnessed a continuation of positive momentum in Sino-French relations. President Pompidou made history as the first Western head of state to visit the



French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac (left) welcomes Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping (right) at the airport on May 12, 1975 (Photo: China Daily, 2014).

PRC. While Cold War dynamics posed obstacles leading to a period of stagnation in the 1970s, mutual trade between the PRC and France gradually increased. PRC became a primary trading partner for France within the Western Bloc.

The transformative trajectory of Sino-French relations underwent significant evolution under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and the patronage of China's progressive opening-up policies in the 1980s. Deng spent considerable periods in various locations in France, displaying a nuanced familiarity with French culture (Pye, 1993). Until 1989, there was a

consistent positive momentum in bilateral relations. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent collapse of the Eastern Bloc brought complexities that affected the warmth of the relationship. Speculations about China sharing a similar fate with the Soviet Union and the collapse of its socialist system led to external pressures. The events at Tiananmen Square were interpreted as a harsh response to the perception of transitioning to a democratic and liberal system (Mengin, 1993). France emphasized its commitment to developing a strong alliance with China when Chirac was elected president in 1995.

The formalization of “comprehensive cooperation” (quanmian huoban guanxi or French: partenariat mondial) between the two countries occurred during Chirac’s opening visit to China in May 1997. This declaration positioned France as the first Western country to make such a commitment, following the path of Russia, which had established a “strategic partnership” with China in 1996. France and China asserted that the main cause of global political instability after the collapse of the Soviet Union was the unipolar dominance of the US, emphasizing this factor more than China’s economic rise. France’s significant role in dissuading the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva from condemning China in 1997 is noteworthy. Opting for a “constructive dialogue” strategy, France engaged with Chinese officials on the sensitive issue of human rights. Throughout Chirac’s presidency in the 2000s, France stood by China on numerous fronts. Specifically, during the 2004 inter-strait conflict, France supported China and endorsed the “one country, two systems” proposition put forth by China. This strategic alignment highlights the multifaceted and dynamic nature of Sino-French relations during this period.

When interpreted through the lens of alter-globalization, the relations between China and France present a complex context encompassing strategies of both countries in managing global interactions. Economically, efforts to strike a balance between China’s rising economic power and France’s role in global trade significantly shape economic ties. The emphasis on cultural diplomacy by both nations reflects a strategy to promote cooperation and interaction in cultural exchange and identity preservation. Politically, the shared stance of China and France in supporting a multipolar world order against unipolar thinking aligns with alter-globalization ideals. Moreover, dialogues and collaborative

efforts between the two countries mirror a shared sense of responsibility for global issues such as human rights, social justice, and environmental sustainability. Within this framework, China-France relations are not only shaped by economic aspects but also by cultural, political, and social dimensions, presenting a framework in line with the fundamental principles of alter-globalization.

Sino-French Relations: Partnership in Global and Strategic Dimensions

Both France and China perceive their relationship as a balancing factor against the dominance of American culture, engaging in mutual cultural promotion initiatives. While France seeks to spread its cultural influence in China, China sees this as an opportunity to promote its traditional and, from a European perspective, “undemocratic” values in France through events like the “China Year” and the establishment of Confucius Institutes. Both countries assert a deep connection between economy, culture, and politics, envisioning the emergence of a multipolar and culturally pluralistic world. During Chirac’s presidency, Sino-French relations developed with a perspective criticizing the alleged cultural homogenization caused by American hegemony, claiming that it eroded global cultural diversity and richness (Ruano-Borbalan, 2002). However, these relations faced challenges, and some issues, such as human rights and Taiwan, were more deftly managed than others. Despite effective management, these issues faced constant scrutiny from the French public and some politicians (Ottavi and Albanet, 2019). Challenges with the US, such as trade, UN reform, Iran, Sudan, and Africa persist, potentially leaving a lasting impact on bilateral relations if unresolved. While there is fundamentally no di-

sagreement with China on the Taiwan issue, the significant increase in arms sales to Taiwan, especially in the 1990s, has triggered a reaction from China against France (Tucker, 2011).

The transformative trajectory of Sino-French relations underwent significant evolution under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and the patronage of China's progressive opening-up policies in the 1980s.

The election of Nicolas Sarkozy marked a period of stagnation and even regression in Sino-French relations. The Sarkozy era witnessed a shift towards a more transatlantic foreign policy, particularly highlighted by France's return to NATO's military wing in 2009. The Tibet issue emerged as a point of conflict during this period, reaching its peak with protests in Paris during the 2008 Olympics. In response, China acknowledged that France had made a decisive choice for its own future. Subsequently, François Hollande's presidency signaled a gradual improvement in relations, especially in trade matters. Xi Jinping's visit to the Palace of Versailles in 2018 indicated a diplomatic revitalization, suggesting a departure from the challenges experienced during the Sarkozy era (Pluyette, 2018). The relationship between France and China is one of the most complex, dynamic, and emotionally charged among Western bloc countries. A significant contributing factor to this complexity is the nuanced diplomatic recognition granted to China by De Gaulle in 1964. This historic event revealed a lasting ambiguity reflecting a dilemma echoed in the geopolitical landscape of

the Cold War. Until 1971, when the US chose to recognize the People's Republic of China over the Republic of China in Taiwan, France did not support Beijing's claim to the UN Security Council seat held by Taiwan.

Over the past two decades, a profound reconfiguration of global power dynamics, encompassing both economic and political realms, has transpired. This transformation marked the conclusion of the erstwhile bipolar world order, giving rise to a material globalization fraught with planetary risks. In this evolving landscape, the American hyperpower grapples with the challenges of navigating an increasingly multipolar world. Notably, PRC propelled by remarkable economic growth within the framework of its communist regime, emerges as the sole rising power capable of reshaping global economic dynamics, diplomatic conventions, and prevailing value systems. Conversely, evaluating PRC's role within the purview of globalization or amid anti-globalization movements poses challenges. Nevertheless, it occupies a significant position as a distinct perspective within this paradigm. Politically, the PRC may not necessarily harbor aspirations aligned with Western notions of political ascendancy. Unlike historical ambitions of emulating past superpowers such as UK or the post-WWII, US, PRC's contemporary global positioning does not overtly manifest an inclination to assume the role of a new world policeman or superpower tasked with safeguarding universal values like freedom, democracy, or human rights on a global scale (Bari, 2021). Instead, PRC predominantly operates as a one-party system following a different political-economic path from the West, focused on perpetuating internal stability through sustained economic development and projecting nationalist sentiments abroad.


PRC does not represent a singular, monopolistic entity within the framework of economic globalization and international migration. On the contrary, the African continent hosts a myriad of Chinese stakeholders, encompassing diverse entities such as the Chinese government, prominent corporate entities like CNPC, CNOOC, and Sinopec within the oil sector, private enterprises, Chinese professionals seeking overseas relocation in pursuit of elevated remuneration, and individuals who have experienced social or economic marginalization due to initiatives like the Zhejiang reforms (He, 2020). Beijing does not orchestrate the activities of these diverse actors in the service of a unified power projection strategy (Han, 2022). While it holds true that the Chinese government facilitated the outbound movement of Chinese investors during the 2000s, major corporate entities maintain close affiliations with the central or provincial authorities of origin, and all entities benefit from the diplomatic sway exerted by PRC, the landscape is characterized by a multiplicity of projects and objectives, mirroring the diversity of actors involved. Simultaneously, Confucius Institutes, propelled by the Chinese government to fortify its cultural influence globally, are proliferating across the world, with a notable presence in the US and Europe and an expanding footprint across all continents. These institutions are designed to disseminate proficiency in Mandarin, along with knowledge of Chinese culture and civilization, often established in collaboration with regional universities to integrate into international research communities. However, their existence is not devoid of ambiguity, as host universities are stipulated to refrain from engaging with regional issues such as Tibet or Taiwan. Concurrently, China's cultural appeal is burgeoning, evidenced by a recent assessment from the Inspectorate-General of the French Ministry of Education indicating a fourfold surge in secondary school pupils studying Mandarin

in France over the past decade, totaling 33,000 students. Among the 17,000 college students proficient in Chinese, yet not specializing in the language, three-quarters regard it as an ancillary skill for their future professional pursuits (Vergnaud, 2018). This escalating cultural influence intertwines with industrial and economic developments, evident in the substantial augmentation of economic ties between France and the People's Republic of China since the 1990s.

A recent study by CEP II reveals a nearly tenfold rise in French production's dependence on Chinese supply from 1995 to 2014

A recent study by CEP II reveals a nearly tenfold rise in French production's dependence on Chinese supply from 1995 to 2014 (Normand, 2020). This paradoxical positioning of PRC, functioning both as a pivotal protagonist and an early casualty of globalization, holds significance within the realm of alter-globalization. China's integration into global trade and production patterns has fueled robust economic growth and poverty reduction domestically and internationally. However, this integration has concurrently led to exacerbated income inequality (Françoise, 2006: 48-49).

In this context, while an outright repudiation of globalization remains economically unviable for the PRC, it provides an avenue to proffer an alternative narrative to the Western-style capitalist globalization paradigm through its distinctive model. These multifaceted dynamics significantly influence the diverse dimensions of Sino-French relations, presenting opportunities for bilateral development across economic, cultural, and political spheres.


Figure 1. China-France economic and trade cooperation

In the realm of international relations, the geopolitical positioning of China holds paramount significance for France and other European nations. President Emmanuel Macron explicitly articulated France's keen interest in the region and its intent to cultivate novel alliances with Asia in 2018. Subsequently, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, in conjunction with the Ministry for the Armed Forces, issued documents delineating the foreign and defense strategies that France envisages implementing in the Indo-Pacific region (Paskal, 2021). A pivotal development in 2019 was the deployment of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier strike group by France to

the Indo-Pacific region, encompassing the contentious Taiwan Strait transit and engagement in collaborative naval exercises with regional nations (Meunier, 2022). Macron's leadership has actively shaped France's role in defining the EU's strategy and vision for Indo-Pacific engagement (Duggal, 2022: 2).

France has strategically sought to position itself as an Indo-Pacific state and a nexus between geographically distant continents, leveraging its island holdings in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Duggal, 2022: 2). The foundational tenets of France's foreign policy in this context align with interests perceived as non-conflicting from the standpoint of Beijing.

Figure 2. EU top trading partners, 2000-2018
(Share in total extra-EU trade, based on trade values)



Notably, the period from 2000 to 2019 witnessed an eightfold surge in trade transactions, establishing PRC as the EU's second-largest commercial partner after the US (Graph: Eurostat, 2019).

China, in its diplomatic discourse, increasingly refrains from differentiating between European nations unless it explicitly disagrees with or criticizes their actions, adeptly managing perceived discrepancies in diplomatic treatment (Wendling, 2022). Emmanuel Macron, in elucidating the novel diplomatic lexicon to leaders of the Pacific Community and the Caledonian community in Australia, underscored the indispensable role of island nations and overseas territories in the management of the Indo-Pacific. Notable among these territories are the six overseas possessions directly under the government's control, including Reunion, Mayotte, French Southern and Antarctic Territories, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis, and Futuna, and Clipperton. Macron advocates a multi-stakeholder approach, urging these entities to partake in shaping the Indo-Pacific strategy (Lechervy, 2019). France accentuates its operational capacity within the Indo-Pacific, aiming to connect habitats to their environment and ensure sustainable growth aligned with environmental and humanitarian con-

siderations. This narrative underscores the confluence of French and American foreign policy objectives, coupled with the geopolitical implications of China's ascendancy on the global stage and its impact on the Republic's borderlands. Furthermore, the intricate dynamics between France and PRC wield a direct influence on the broader relations between the EU and PRC.

As an integral member state, France assumes a pivotal role in shaping the EU's stance and policies towards China. The trajectory of Sino-European relations has been predominantly characterized by the profound expansion of economic entanglements, with the year 2003 emerging as a watershed moment in this relationship (Wang, 2004: 71). Notably, the period from 2000 to 2019 witnessed an eightfold surge in trade transactions, establishing PRC as the EU's second-largest commercial partner after the US. This burgeoning economic partnership, while fortifying the robust French export sector, has concurrently fostered increased interdependence in mutual investments. However, this escalating interdependence has precipitated challenges stemming from the contrasting approac-

hes of China's insularity and Europe's openness. Complicating matters further, concerns have arisen regarding Chinese enterprises' endeavors to establish a presence in sensitive infrastructures and sectors. The convergence of political considerations and China's geopolitical aspirations with economic ties has further complicated the once predominantly economic relationship. Consequently, there has been a perceptible paradigm shift in France and Europe's perceptions of China, transforming it from a mere economic partner to a formidable competitor and systemic rival. France has experienced tangible outcomes from this heightened awareness and focused approach to the China question. Nevertheless, it is evident that achieving a cohesive European geopolitical stance towards China requires a protracted and concerted effort. Despite the apparent centralized control exerted by Beijing's one-party system, the capacity of capital to unilaterally impose its will across China is notably circumscribed. The limitation arises due to the highly centralized nature of PRC's political system, which affords considerable autonomy to local governments. Discernible disparities persist in the implementation of regional policies by the central government. These nuanced political and administrative contextual factors are inherently tied to China's unique institutional environment (Telo, 2020). The evolving landscape of EU-PRC economic and political interactions holds instructive implications for other developing nations aspiring to enhance the diffusion of technology and knowledge to bridge the gap with developed counterparts.

Conclusion

Henceforth, the landscape of international politics since the onset of the 21st century has eschewed the bipolar dynamics of the Cold War era and the unipolarity characterizing the post-Cold War period. Notably, nations such as China have ascended to prominence through their remarkable economic strides, ushering in an

era where multipolarity has gained prominence in the discourse of international relations. Against this backdrop, the aspiration of France, and potentially the EU, for a role in international politics amid multipolarity aligns with the inclinations of French foreign policy, fostering close ties with China. The historical oscillation in Sino-French relations, particularly during the era of Charles de Gaulle, reflects a nuanced trajectory, marked by fluctuations yet characterized by a relative inclusiveness compared to other Western states. This historical context positions France as a potential alternative to the US-centric globalization movements that have emerged post-2000.

The nexus of economic, political, and cultural collaboration between France and China assumes significance within the realm of alter-globalization. As France endeavors to safeguard its cultural sovereignty, China's economic progress reinforces its commitment to the preservation and dissemination of its cultural heritage. Within this framework, the collaboration between these two nations stands to benefit from alter-globalization movements, offering a counterpoint to prevailing global hegemonic influences. Taking a Marxist perspective, the foundational influence of the economy and its developments on culture and social life is acknowledged. Notably, public procurement practices have assumed a strategic role in advancing diverse public policy objectives in both France and China. The underpinning liberal logic of the public procurement regime, whether within the traditional paradigm of public finance or the more recent push for international competition, necessitates a careful consideration of its strategic applications. Balancing these dual imperatives becomes imperative, especially when delineating international legal standards in this domain. Despite the discernible trend of legal globalization leading to a convergence in the strategic use and liberalization of public procurement between France and China, such alignment is not underpinned by identical balancing techniques employed in both nations.

Furthermore, the nation-specific features of Chinese law introduce inherent legality to the compensatory techniques employed, rendering it presently unfeasible to compel a shift in the Chinese government's course through compliance with the balancing strategies utilized in France. The foundational tenets of international economics provide valuable insights into the comparative and global political-economic dimensions underlying the surge of anti-globalization sentiments, anti-immigration sentiments, anti-elite sentiments, anti-government sentiments, and anti-establishment populism, both historically and contemporarily. The discernible pattern of growth in human-intensive, physical, and financial capital-intensive industries, predominantly within the developed world, coupled with the concomitant contraction of industries primarily reliant on unskilled and semi-skilled labor, constitutes the outcome of global economic integration. This holds true across the realms of global trade, finance, and migration. While individuals in unskilled and semi-skilled positions experience tangible losses, capitalists concurrently accrue substantial gains. For nations grappling with the challenges posed by the prevailing order in international politics or those in the process of development, it becomes more efficacious to proffer alternatives to the dominant paradigm rather than outright rejection of globalization. The dynamic between France and China serves as a pertinent illustration of states endeavoring to enhance their relations, despite not achieving full concordance. The evolving trajectory of China's economic prowess necessitates a nuanced analysis in the forthcoming years to gauge the extent of China's inclination to engage with France.

Contemporaneously, China's developmental trajectory unfolds within the ambit of globalization, albeit marked by differentiation. The incorporation of the Chinese economy into the world market, facilitated by its accession to the WTO, signifies an initial phase of economic integration. Subsequent stages are

anticipated to encompass political, social, and value integration. Accelerated integration, coupled with the receding role of the state in the social sphere, has engendered the emergence or re-emergence of novel social forces. These encompass associations of private entrepreneurs, semi-religious and semi-martial societies exemplified by the Falungong, as well as spontaneous organizations of peasants identifying as advocates for their rights and entities self-defining as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The ongoing social, political, and economic transformations within China hold the promise of exerting profound repercussions on the global landscape.

Ultimately, France aspires to foster a multipolar world within the realm of international relations. It envisions the European Union (EU) assuming a pivotal role as one of these poles, with a desire for France to guide the EU's trajectory. Historically, France has sought diplomatic engagements with diverse poles during the Cold War era and notably, it stood as the first Western nation to extend recognition to China amid the Taiwan disputes. Consequently, France's inclination toward alternative globalization movements, rather than adhering to an American-centric paradigm, aligns with its pursuit of multipolarity. The Sino-French relations, within this context, emerge as a manifestation of the broader objective to cultivate close ties with multiple poles, reminiscent of the Cold War dynamics in a multipolar framework. While initially framed within the discourse of anti-globalization, it becomes apparent that both France and China do not advocate against globalization per se; rather, their objection pertains to its overtly American or Western-centric orientation, epitomizing a unilateral perspective. Thus, the concept of alter-globalization, or Altermondialisation in French parlance, encapsulates the essence of French ideological underpinnings. This articulation strives to present an alternative vision of globalization that

is more inclusive and constructive, transcending a mere rejection of the prevailing global paradigm. In essence, the narrative surrounding the relations between France and China unfolds as an alternative historical and contemporary paradigm, portraying a politically astute France leveraging local opportunities at the global echelon, challenging the hegemony of the global status quo. 🌸

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Public Diplomacy: A Path to Strengthening Relations of Uzbekistan with Foreign Countries

Zakir Abidov

Head of Department
Committee on Interethnic Relations and
Friendly Cooperation with Foreign Countries



Zakir Khalilovich Abidov was born on October 25, 1964, in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. He studied at the Tashkent University of Transport (1981-1986). From 1986 to 1988, he served in the armed forces. He worked at Glav Tashkent Sroy Company (1988-1990). From 1990 to 1996, he served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and from 1996 to 1998, he served in the Consulate General of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Istanbul. From 1998 to 2017, he served as Head of the Secretariat and Deputy Chairman of the Council for Cultural and Educational Relations with Friendship Associations and Foreign Countries. Since 2017, he has been the Head of the Department of International Relations at the Committee on Interethnic Relations and Friendly Relations with Foreign Countries of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

e-mail: z8082926@yandex.ru



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This report details the activities of the Committee on Interethnic Relations and Friendly Cooperation with Foreign Countries of the Uzbekistan Republic in recent years. Uzbekistan possesses one of the most substantial diasporas among the Central Asian nations. The report details the activities of pertinent organizations in Uzbekistan in relation to friendship and cooperation associations in foreign nations, including engagement with their countrymen overseas. The paper highlights Uzbekistan's initiatives as a significant example of modern efforts to promote friendship and cooperation among nations, as well as integration and harmony of civilizations.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IS A CRUCIAL TOOL that entails the active engagement of civil society in fostering international relations. In contrast to traditional diplomacy, which involves government officials, public diplomacy engages the general populace, encompassing non-governmental groups, scientists, cultural leaders, corporate representatives, and youngsters.

Throughout its years of independence, Uzbekistan has significantly advanced its foreign policy. The reforms implemented under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev have elevated the significance of public diplomacy. Uzbekistan seeks to cultivate robust relationships with the international community, enhance alliances, and bolster its reputation as a nation receptive to global engagement.

Today, the Committee on Interethnic Relations and Friendly Cooperation with Fo-

reign Countries, founded in 2017 under the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Uzbekistan, oversees the operations of friendship societies.

The initial friendship societies in our nation were established in the 1920s. Following Uzbekistan's independence, extensive cultural and educational connections with international nations began to flourish. Since 1997, over 40 friendship societies have been established.

In the surroundings of globalization, friendship societies, regarded as a vital component of public diplomacy, undertake several significant responsibilities, including:

- Enhancing mutual trust and amicable relations between nations, fostering interethnic and interreligious harmony, and promoting dialogue among civilizations;

- Broadening friendly and cultural-humanitarian relations with countries globally, cultivating a favorable national image in the international sphere;
- Employing public diplomacy tools to bridge nations and their populations, reinforcing the ethos of mutual trust and neighborly relations.

Recently, representatives of friendship societies of Uzbekistan have orchestrated musical and artistic evenings, as well as art exhibitions, commemorating Navruz, Independence Day, and other events across more than 30 nations, including the USA, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, France, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, China, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and Malaysia.

To enhance mutually advantageous collaboration with relevant organizations and civil society entities engaged in interethnic relations and amicable international ties, the Committee on Interethnic Relations and Friendly Cooperation with Foreign Countries and Friendship Societies has executed approximately 40 memoranda with partner organizations, including the National Ethnic Affairs Commission of the People's Republic of China, the All-China Association for the Promotion of Friendship, the "Germany-Uzbekistan" Friendship Society, the House of Friendship of Mongolia, the Central Asia – Republic of Korea Cooperation Forum, Rossotrudnichestvo, the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, the Assembly of People of Kyrgyzstan, and the Tajik Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. A significant mechanism of public diplomacy is the facilitation of spiritual and educational round tables with international audiences. The Committee and friendship societies, in collaboration with affiliated organizations, conducted over 200 round tables focused on the history, culture, and art of Uzbekistan, as well as the social and economic transformations

in our nation, across more than 20 countries, including the USA, Bulgaria, France, Germany, India, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, China, North Macedonia, and Vietnam.

To enhance amicable relations between Uzbekistan and China, robust connections have been forged between the Committee and various friendship organizations, including the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the All-China Association for the Promotion of Friendship. International conferences, forums, and roundtables are consistently conducted in both nations. In October of this year, the exhibition "Greetings to Uzbekistan from Sichuan" was conducted in collaboration with the delegation from the Society for Friendship with Foreign Countries of Sichuan Province, China.

The Committee on Interethnic Relations and Friendly Cooperation with Foreign Countries effectively functions on the principles of preserving and comprehensively advancing the history, culture, spiritual values, national traditions, and customs of all ethnic groups residing in Uzbekistan by fostering regular and mutually advantageous connections with expatriates and enhancing amicable and cultural-educational relations with foreign nations. Currently, about 10 million ethnic Uzbeks reside in around 100 countries globally, with the majority located in Central Asian nations next to Uzbekistan, as well as in Europe, Asia, and America. A considerable number of nationals residing abroad for education, employment, or other purposes, together with ethnic communities in foreign nations, consistently uphold connections with Uzbekistan today. Uzbeks residing in Central Asia, Europe, and America have established over 170 national cultural institutions and societies. The Committee on Interethnic Relations and Friendly Cooperation with Foreign Countries has maintained regular



“The priority of the state policy of New Uzbekistan is to unite representatives of all nations and nationalities of the country into a single and friendly family” (Photo: Embassy of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Turkey, n. d.).

communication with around 50 entities. Scientific and educational collaboration among friendship clubs and compatriots is also advancing. Recently, expatriate communities have gotten approximately ten thousand copies of fiction, textbooks, and magazines in the Uzbek language.

Specifically, from September 9 to 13, 2024, the Days of Culture of Uzbekistan, commemorating the anniversary of the Republic of Uzbekistan’s Independence, were conducted alongside our compatriots in Riga (Latvia) and Vilnius (Lithuania). The creative team from the regional branch of the Uzbek Native Center of Maqom Arts in the Navoi region presented our native melodies and songs.

The sister city movement, a significant component of public diplomacy, is presently evolving in both qualitative and quantitative dimensions.

The Committee for Interethnic Relations and Friendly Cooperation with Foreign Countries fa-

cilitates the enhancement of fraternal connections between Uzbekistan’s towns and regions and foreign nations.

Studies indicate that cities and regions in Uzbekistan have formed sister-city partnerships with around 70 overseas locales.

The Committee has been diligently pursuing this initiative and has formalized sister city partnerships between Samarkand and Mianyang, Urgut and Duqiang, as well as Pstdargom and Sqigong.

The effective operation of friendship societies is of significant political and social importance in enhancing our nation’s connections with neighboring and foreign countries, cultivating a favorable perception of Uzbekistan among the international community, fostering close relations with compatriots, and offering them practical support, thereby ensuring peace and stability in Uzbekistan. 🌸

CAHİT KÜLEBİ*



**Cahit Külebi (1917-1997) was born in Çeltek village of Zile district of Tokat (December 20, 1917). He completed his secondary education at Sivas High School in 1936 and his higher education at the Department of Turkish Language and Literature at Istanbul Higher Teachers' School in 1940. He was appointed as a cultural attaché and student inspector to Switzerland. When he returned home, he served as the chief inspector and assistant undersecretary of culture at the Ministry of National Education. He assumed the position of Secretary General of the Turkish Language Association (1978-1982). His first poem was published in "Gençlik" (Youth) magazine in 1938. He treated the life of the Anatolian people in his poems. He valued the national sources of Turkish culture rather than Western-based poetry movements and local reflections of the literature of his period. He wrote poems about Turkish revolutionary leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Turkish War of Independence. He pioneered the "New Folk Poetry" movement. His poems were included in school textbooks. He won the Turkish Language Association Literature Award in 1955, the Yeditepe Poetry Award in 1981, and the Presidential Culture and Arts Grand Award in 1996 with his works. He was a founder of SODEP and the Social Democratic Populist Party in 1983 and a member of the Central Executive Board. The master poet, who died in Ankara on June 20, 1997, was buried in Niksar.*

TALE **

Your lips are pink
Your hands are white,
Take my hands baby,
hold a little!

In the villages where I was born
There were no walnut trees,
That's why I long for coolness
Caress a little!

In the villages where I was born
There were no wheat fields,
Scatter your hair baby
Wave a little!

The villages where I was born
Bandits would raid in the evenings,
That's why I don't like loneliness at all
Talk a little!

In the villages where I was born
People didn't know how to laugh,
That's why I'm so desperate,
Laugh a little!

In the villages where I was born
Northern winds would blow,
That's why my lips are always chapped
Kiss a little!

You are bright and beautiful like
Turkey!
The villages where I was born were
beautiful too
Tell me about the places where you
were born,
Tell a little!

1944



WEN YIDUO*



**Wen Yiduo (November 24, 1899 - July 15, 1946) was a Chinese national poet known for his nationalist poems. He was born in Xishui County, Hubei Province. After receiving a traditional Chinese Confucian education, he attended Tsinghua University. In 1922, he went to the United States to study fine arts and literature at the Chicago Art Institute. His first poems were published during this period. He returned to China in 1925 and worked as a university lecturer. With the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, he emigrated to Kunming. There, he was able to continue teaching, this time at the National Southwest Joint University during the war. In his poems, he tried to recreate the symbolism and morality of pre-modern Chinese society. He was assassinated by the Kuomintang in 1946. The poet and his wife Gao Zhen are buried in the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery in Beijing.*

DEAD WATER

Here is a ditch of hopelessly dead water.
A cool breeze would not raise the slightest ripple on it.
You might throw in some scraps of copper and rusty tins,
or dump in as well the remains of your meal.
Perhaps the green on copper will turn into emeralds,
or the rust on tin will sprout a few peach blossoms.
Let grease weave a layer of fine silk-gauze, and
mold steam out a few red-glowing clouds.
Let the dead water ferment into a ditch of green vine,
floating with pearls of white foam;
but the laughter of small pearls turning into large pearls
is broken by spotted mosquitoes stealing the wine.
Thus a ditch of hopelessly dead water
can yet claim a bit of something bright.
And if the frogs can't endure the utter solitude,
let the dead water burst into song.
Here is a ditch of hopelessly dead water.
Here beauty can never reside.
You might as well let ugliness come and cultivate it,
and see what kind of world comes out.



OGONYOK*



The cover of the magazine *Ogonyok* published in tsarist Russia, issue No. 42 dated October 15 (28), 1911, entitled 'Revolution in China'

*From private photos taken for *Ogonyok* magazine

QI BAISHI*



Twelve Landscape Screens (1925) **

**Qi Baishi (1864–1957) was one of the most well-known contemporary Chinese painters. For Baishi “paintings must be something between likeness and unlikeness.” and in his paintings, he prefers to focus on the smaller things rather than the large landscapes. The unique style of him using ink, bright colours and strong brush strokes, shows us how he always reflects his love for nature and life vividly and freshly. Baishi, who was elected to the president of the Association of Chinese Artists, also served briefly as the honorary president of the Beijing Academy of Chinese Painting, which was founded in May, 1957.*

**Source: <https://www.comuseum.com/>

T. MIYANO

南京城攻撃女國民軍之奮闘



中清事變戰爭畫共十九

(THE REVOLUTION WAR IN CHINA.) No. 19

The Revolutionary Woman's Army Attack on Nanking.

An episode in the revolutionary war in China,
1911-the revolutionary women's army attacks Nanking*

*This work by T. Miyano continues the tradition of war prints issued at the time of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1905), but those were woodblock prints. Here, the traditional technique has been abandoned, and western-style lithography adopted in its place. Perhaps intended for export to China.

* chromolithograph 34.8 x 46.5 cm (Japan). (Source: Wellcome Collection 581222i).

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On the Centenary of His Demise

The Enduring Legacy of Sun Yat-sen

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Editor-in-Chief
FİKRET AKFIRAT