The Lost Global Balance - Recent publications on geopolitical change

The Lost Global Balance Recent publications on geopolitical change

DOMINIK PIETZCKER* Macromedia University of Applied Sciences

THE LATEST BOOKS ON GEOPOLITICS, our times. It implies a completely new global

although written from slightly different order, including the redefinition of Western

perspectives, have one idea in common. Their (i.e. American and European) interests, power

starting point is the obvious geostrategic shift and limitations. Western Europe and Northern

from the Atlantic to the Asian hemisphere. America have lost their claim to be, on a global

What does this dramatic power shift from West scale, the most influential socio-economic

to East bear for European states? China’s rise and cultural formation. Today, Asia represents

to hegemonial status is without any doubt the roughly 75 percent of the human population,

greatest political and economic challenge of worldwide. China’s national rise and global

* Since 2012, Dominik Pietzcker, Dr. Phil., is a full-time professor at Macromedia University of Applied Sciences, Hamburg and Berlin Campuses and a member of the Media Faculty. He studied philosophy, history and literature at the University of Freiburg/Br., Trinity College Dublin and in Vienna. From 1996 to 2010, he worked as a creative director for political public institutions (Federal Presidential Office, EU Commission, the German government’s Federal Press Department) and taught at Universitat der Künste (UdK) Berlin and Technische Universitat (TU) Dresden. Since 2014, he is an honorary juror at the Foundation of German Entrepreneurs (Stiftung der Deutschen Wirtschaft, SDW). He lectures at Darwin College, University of Cambridge and is a research fellow at İstinye University, Istanbul. Since 2017 he has held lectures at universities in China, at Zheijang University City College (Hangzhou) and Tongji University (Shanghai). He regularly publishes on intercultural, Sino-German, and socioeconomic topics.

84 How to cite: Pietzcker, D. (2023). The lost global balance Recent publications on geopolitical change.

BRIQ Belt & Road Initiative, 4(2), 84-89.

economic expansion is perceived as a challenge, if eyes of Allison – highly probable (Allison, 2022, p.

not aggression, to historical Western dominance. 47): “The contest between a rising and ruling power

Western supremacy, established after World War often intensifies competition over scarce resources.

II, belongs to the past or is, to say the least, fading (…) The attempt to deny a state imports it judges

away. crucial for survival can provoke war.” As an historical

pattern, the precarious constellation of rising and declining powers can be perceived in the bloody conflicts between Germany and France (1870/1871),

Particularly interesting for the two World Wars (1914–1918; 1939–1945) and

political analysts of today’s in the Asian-Pacific conflict between America and

global tensions is the Japan (1941–1945) (Allison, 2017, p. 244Allison (2017). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Whether

redefinition of Western Europe every hegemonial contest inevitably ends in war or

as a geopolitical player. not, remains an open question. History knows no

ending. But Allison makes his point by underlining

In his latest speech at the 20th National Congress the tensions and potential fields of conflict between

of the Chinese Communist Party, Chinese leader the United States and China: a massive US trade

Xi Jinping addressed a message (Yiu, 2022; Böge, deficit, import taxes, unsolved juridical questions,

2022) towards the delegates, political analysts geostrategic ambitions of both sides in the Asian-

and decision-makers abroad: “The world has Pacific, different understanding of the status of

entered a new period of turbulence and change. Hongkong and Taiwan. To lose hegemonial status is

External attempts to suppress and contain China as hard as to gain it. Although it seems to be clear,

may escalate at any time. We must therefore be that these lines of conflict are solely between the US

more mindful of potential dangers, be prepared and China, Europe cannot stand aloof.

to deal with worst-case scenarios, and be ready to Particularly interesting for political analysts

withstand high winds, choppy waters, and even of today’s global tensions is the redefinition

dangerous storms.” Since Russia’s invasion into of Western Europe as a geopolitical player. In

Ukraine, the “dangerous storm” has already become the end, behind Russia’s war against Ukraine

a sinister reality, reshaping not only the relations of lies an open question. Who will represent the

Western states towards Russia, but also towards the ultimate, the strongest power in Europe? Russia’s

People’s Republic of China (Gujer, 2022Gujer (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Recent invasion was based on the Kremlin’s assumption

publications, both by intellectuals and politicians, of Western-European decadence and weakness,

reflect upon this new stage of globalization and the result of contradictory and competing interests

risks of direct and indirect conflict between the two among European states. Europe seems to be

hegemonial powers, the United States and China. preoccupied with itself and its peculiar problems:

Harvard professor Graham Allison already minority rights, neglection of the educational

published in 2017 his influential study “Destined sector, declining military spendings, questioning

for War”. Allison’s main idea is the potential conflict of state authority, sexual liberation etc. And

between a rising and a declining power, described of course, there is always a political interest to

for the first time by Greek historian Thucydides. distort and exaggerate these tensions between

Although this conflict is not a necessity, it is – in the state and civil society.

The final outcome of the war in Ukraine will concedes, that America has changed over

prove whether Putin’s assumption of Western time. The populist slogan “America first!” only

weakness was accurate or not. A long, cruel reveals the true priorities of American foreign

and devastating conflict in the very heart of policy.

Europe – who might have thought this could Under the Biden administration, the greatest

possibly happen in the 21st century? The geostrategic challenge for the US still is,

very fact that the Ukraine conflict came as a unsurprisingly, China. The hegemonial conflict

surprise conveys a shocking lack of analytical between both powers doesn’t leave Western

competences in European governments and Europe in a neutral position. President Trump’s

political institutions, particularly in Germany. erratic decisions, nationalistic rhetoric and overt

Nevertheless, the European willingness to contempt of European peculiarities have proven

support Ukraine in this war is stronger than that the golden age of Transatlantic relations

expected by the Russian president and his belongs to the past. The alliance demonstrates

close circle. How are these tensions, how is this unanimity, but only as far as European interests

conflict, reflected in recent publications? are in line with America’s self-perception of

Norbert Röttgen, chairman of the influential political and economic dominance – and vice

Foreign Affairs Committee of the German versa. Although an unchallenged hegemon in

parliament, has written “Manifesto in Times the West, America needs allies, too. The US still

of War – Never Helpless Again!” (Röttgen, is, without any doubt, the most ardent supporter

2022). In his book, he describes the dilemma of of Transatlantic interests in Europe. No wonder,

German and European foreign policy between that Polish president Andrzej Duda addressed

political independence and economic cohesion Joe Biden in Warsaw as the representative of

(Röttgen, 2022, p. 122Röttgen (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.): “The systemic conflict the strongest military force (Duda, 2022Duda (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.): “We

with China will not only define the relations thank you for your unique leadership, strong

between the West and China, it will affect all leadership at this juncture (…) and we hope

international relations in the foreseeable future. for a decisive and firm leadership of the United

A new Cold War with China is not in the States in the North Atlantic Alliance, and also

interest of Germany and Europe. Possibilities for the enhancement of Euro–Atlantic ties.”

of cooperation with China should be searched Norbert Röttgen has written his book

for in any field.” Yet, Röttgen favors a revival after the outbreak of war in Ukraine. Russia’s

of Transatlantic relations, both in economy and aggression in Eastern Europe tightens, if

defense. Although America strictly follows its only momentaneously, the relations between

own national interests, often conflicting with European Union, NATO states and the US.

the European understanding of foreign policies, As in times of Cold War, the West has a

it still is the strongest and most potent ally of common enemy. Nevertheless, beyond this

Western European states. Röttgen describes the surface of shared interests, Röttgen clearly sees

possibility of a renaissance and “revitalization” the symptoms of an alienation. The United

of Transatlantic relations in geopolitics and States have their own geostrategic agenda –

economy (Röttgen, 2022, p. 110Röttgen (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). But he also unfortunately, Europe has none. Röttgen strictly

recommends more European independence question whether or not state-owned Chinese

in defense, geostrategy and economy. But it is shipping company COSCO should acquire a

also clear, that Europe’s position in a multipolar part of Hamburg harbour’s infrastructure.

world is rather weak. Josef Braml, German expert on US foreign

policy, sees the Transatlantic relations in a slightly different perspective and more critical

The US are still the light than Norbert Röttgen (Braml, 2022Braml (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). In

geostrategic driving force in his latest book, “The Transatlantic Illusion

Western Europe. But, as Braml - The New World Order and How We Can

claims, the United States have Hold Our Ground”, Braml analyzes a situation

lost their political reliability. where American national interests prevail

over European idiosyncrasies. In Braml’s

Western Europe is far from being the third interpretation, Europe’s geopolitical weakness

global power, apart from the US and China, after World War II hasn’t come to an end, yet.

in the big game for planetarian hegemony. An The US are still the geostrategic driving force

equidistance of Europe between China and the in Western Europe. But, as Braml claims, the

US is completely utopian. Röttgen is adamant United States have lost their political reliability.

on one point: economy and geostrategy are America’s trade war on China is not in line with

intrinsically intertwined. Economic dependence economic interests in Europe, particularly not

– as Russian gas exports for Germany have Germany’s with its export-orientated industry.

proven – comes with the price tag of strategic Europe should develop its own geopolitical

weakness. This decisive mistake, Röttgen writes, strategy, define and claim its own economic

should by all means be avoided when it comes interest, recommends Braml. America is still

to Sino-European relations. Norbert Röttgen a friend, but alienation and diverging interests

recommends the strengthening of Transatlantic have become manifest since the days of Trump

ties, and at the same time the reshaping of administration. In other words, Braml's opts for

a European position of its own right, built more European independence – intellectually,

on military power, economic strength and economically, politically, but also in all questions

a culture of freedom and innovation. These of defense and security (Braml, p. 154). Would

ideas represent the conservative mainstream that be Europe’s tea party? No worries, Braml’s

in Germany. Influential Bavarian politician ideas remain purely hypothetical. “Europe’s

Alexander Dobrindt recommends as well the unity in all economic and financial matters

“strengthening of Transatlantic trade relations” would strengthen its position in the global

(Dobrindt, 2022Dobrindt (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Political reality, in the economic competition” (Braml, p. 155). But

meantime, is much more complex and self- Braml warns to take this idea literally: “An

contradictory. The most recent example of equidistance of Europe between America and

the dilemmas and limitations of Röttgen’s and China” (Braml, p. 108) is for him not an option.

the conservatives’ geopolitical concept are the Europe belongs to the Western hemisphere and

tensions within German government upon the Transatlantic relations remain fundamental.

As long as Europe’s military forces lack both, its economic relations with China; particularly

technical superiority and deterrence, Europe German economy is heavily invested in joint

cannot present itself convincingly as third ventures with Chinese companies. Christian

power block between the United States and Geinitz describes in his book with the alarming

China. Braml therefore opts for a renaissance of title “China’s Grasp for the West – How Beijing

strong French-German friendship. France and Invests in our Economy” (Geinitz, 2022Geinitz (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) the

Germany, argues Braml, have always been the rise of China’s socio-economic system from a

economic driving forces of the European Union, marginalized so-called third world country to

and the accelerator of democratization and the challenger of Western supremacy in the

pluralism. Unfortunately, this view on French- fields of innovation, technology, infrastructure,

German relations is only partial. For the time logistics, digitization and defense. Seen with

being, French president Emanuel Macron and Western eyes, China’s new status comes

German chancellor Olaf Scholz try their best to as a threat to democratic, competitive and

overcome bilateral tensions, misunderstandings capitalistic societies. Geinitz describes in many

and diverging viewpoints on the war in Ukraine examples China’s economic expansionism.

and its consequences for Europe. France To Geinitz, the most significant indicator of

criticizes German particularism when it comes China’s claim to hegemonial status is the Belt

to protect Germany’s own economy; Germany is and Road Initiative, BRI (Geinitz, p. 330):

irritated by Macron’s self-conscious attitude in “German politicians and entrepreneurs have

foreign policy. Braml’s vision of a strong Europe understood, they can neither ride nor tame

lacks a truly unifying and realistic vision that the Chinese dragon.” Therefore, Germany

reflects the interests of all EU member states. and the European Union “need an ambitious

Not even the war in Eastern Europe brought industrial policy to strengthen Europe as an

European states together to agree on a common economic region of innovation, infrastructure,

political strategy. Germany’s reluctance in the social partnership and free trade” (Geinitz, p.

export of arms to Ukraine is openly criticized 331). Like Norbert Röttgen, Christian Geinitz

by Eastern European allies like Poland and the favors the revitalization of “Transatlantic ties,

Baltic states. Finally, Braml’s book reminds including Great Britain” in order to withstand

us that behind the mistrust between Europe influence, dependence and, possibly, dominance

and the US lies a truth deeper than national by China. Röttgen, Braml and Geinitz all agree

peculiarities. Europe is simply too weak to in the perception of European weakness; but

defend its own interests. It will take decades to they dissent on the remedies.

overcome this dependence from US supremacy. Röttgen favours a revival of Transatlantic

Every geopolitical equilibrium is vulnerable friendship. Braml discusses the European

and reflects a dynamic balance of power. The potential of harmonious Franco-German

war in Ukraine, restricted to a single geographic relations. Geinitz warns to underestimate

region on the Eastern outskirts of Europe, China’s expansionism. Realpolitik would paint

already proves to have had a tremendous impact a different picture. In the real political arena,

on geostrategies, both in the US and China. the US administration is more preoccupied with

Europe rethinks – and probably will reshape – the changing situation in Asia as a challenge to

US hegemony than with European peculiarities. References

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