The Geopolitics of Separatist Movements in Eurasia

The struggle for global hegemony, cy left by one power was occupied by another

experienced in various dimensions in different within a hegemonic struggle (Khaldun, 1990Khaldun (1990). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).1

periods, has often led to a shift of power or con- Having observed the developments of the 1 20th

trol from a state or groups of states in a certain century, Kennedy put forth a similar view, argu-

region to other states in another region. This ing that, as a result of competition, one power

shift is predicated upon a change of control in tended to give place to another (Kennedy, 1989Kennedy (1989). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

terms of production networks and trade routes. According to Abu Lughod, in the 17th century,

The countries controlling production networks the Central Asian–Anatolian–Mediterranean

and trade routes have also acquired leadership trajectory abandoned its centricity within the

within the world system. In the context of the world system to the West, and Central Asia was

struggle for global hegemony, the end of the rendered stagnant; as such, the East’s regression

14th century witnessed a power shift towards paved the way for the rise of the West (Abu-

the West. In the 15th and 16th centuries, due to Lughod, 1989: 338).2

its power over the seas and maritime trade, the In the 20th century, as dynamism in the

West emerged as the world center of attraction, world economy shifted to Asia (Dicken, 1998:

while Asia entered into a process of inertia. This 68; Hoge Jr., 2004), a new structure involving

rise and fall were similar to Ibn Khaldun’s de- numerous power centers came to the fore; that is,

pictions back in the 14th century, when a vacan- the US-UK in the Western hemisphere, Germa-

1 Regarded by some sociologists as the pioneer of sociology and the founder of the philosophy of history, Ibn Khaldun’s

(1332–1404) reflections on the rise and fall of societies and states shed light on the studies of many academics who developed theories on this subject in the 20th century. Also, for the process, see Gills & Frank, 1996a; Frank, 1978.

2 Also see Frank, 1990.

(Cohen, 1973Cohen (1973). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.; Cohen, 1992Cohen (1992). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). With the dissolu- In the last quarter of the 20th tion of the USSR, the governments in Moscow century, with the emergence of encountered difficulties in controlling Russia’s Eurasian areas of geopolitical

competition, a new process began own geographical area, which became adjacent

in military-political-economic rivalry to the US’s regional geopolitical subunit field.

over geographical areas with Moscow’s “Nearby Abroad” thus became “Near-

strategic resources. by Abroad” of the US, being incorporated into

Washington’s area of interest due to the race for

ny in Europe, the Russian Federation in West- newly opened markets. This development paved

ern Asia, and China in Eastern Asia (Schaffer, the way for a process of profound geopolitical

1998; Pant, 2004; Achcar, 2004; “Russia/China/ competition.

India Axis”, 2005: 8). In the Cold War era follow- In the last quarter of the 20th century, with

ing World War II, as the hegemonic power with the emergence of Eurasian areas of geopolit-

access to the most significant financial profits in ical competition, a new process began in mili-

certain regions, the United States, along with its tary-political-economic rivalry over geograph-

main allies (e.g. the UK and Israel), tried to de- ical areas with strategic resources. In the Cold

velop new policies to secure hegemony. A 1992 War era, geopolitical discussions largely focused

Pentagon report points to alternative power on the competition between the US and the

centers as risk factors, and in an anxious tone, Soviet Union as they sought to control world

urges that preventing the emergence of potential strategic resources (Mamadough, 2000; Taylor,

future global rivals should be a major focus for 1993: 330; Tuathail, Dalby & Routledge, 1998;

US strategy (Tyler, 1992; New York Times, 1992). O’Sullivan, 1986).3

Thus, especially in regions that offered prospec- In the first quarter of the 21st century, new

tive economic alternatives with energy resources developments in Eurasia led to an increase in ge-

and energy transfer routes, the US committed opolitical competition in this region. States aim-

destructive acts, explicitly or implicitly suppor ing to be part of this competition for controlling

ing the provoking of separatist groups. the region’s geopolitical areas embarked on an

intense quest to find the most effective methods

Various Dimensions of to achieve their goals. Seizing these processes of

Geopolitical Competition political uncertainty, especially pronounced in

At the onset of the 20th century, Western impe- Eurasia, some separatist leaders took action to

rialists paid close attention to the relationship gain international support.

between region and politics (Hudson, 1977Hudson (1977). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Although some define Eurasia as consisting

During the Cold War, a new structure emerged only of certain Central Asian and neighboring

predicated upon the US-USSR struggle for con- countries, there are also studies that treat the

trol over strategic world resources and regions. whole region between China and Ukraine-Ro-

In this era, major regions controlled by these two mania-Hungary as part of Eurasia (Abu-Lughod,

states indicated the presence of two basic units 1989: 343–345; Hambly, 1969: xi; Adshead,

3 For a different approach to the relationship between geography and politics, see O’Loughlin, 2000.

1993: 3). These assessments define the Eurasian In the wake of the Cold War, and after the

region in terms of its function in world histo- September 11 attacks in 2001, the US started to

ry. Considering its role within the world system, face difficulties in gaining control over natural

Gills and Frank (1996b: 86) discussed Eurasia gas and petroleum reserves in the nascent re-

in tandem with the regions of China, India, and gions of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. It thus

the Persian and Roman Empires. In fact, taking engaged in efforts to prevent its exclusion from

into account its historical role within the world transportation of resources around the Caspian

system, Eurasia may well be recognized as the basin (i.e. to the West via Russia, to the East via

region surrounded by China, India, the Russian China, to the South via Iran).⁵ Following this

Federation, and Turkey. goal, the US embarked on a strategy that put its

Prior to his visit to South Asia in March mark on the last quarter of the 20th century, at-

2000, then US president Bill Clinton declared tempting to seize control over certain regions of

that the region would possess the world’s largest Eurasia by manipulating separatist, ethnic, and

economic potential in the coming 50 years (L.A. religious movements. In tackling geopolitical

Times, 2000).⁴ As oppressive actions justified on problems, Washington’s governance approach is

the grounds of such concepts as democracy and known to resort to “controlled” instability as a

human rights were being imposed on countries tool for overcoming obstacles in the way of its

such as China, J. K. Galbraith (1999: 15) made hegemony. For this purpose, the US employs

the following statement: “China does not have a direct (military, etc.) or indirect (manipulating

Western style democracy, yet it can sustain ba- separatist groups, etc.) interventions, using in-

sic needs for over one billion people”. Zbigniew ternal instabilities as legitimizing pretexts when

Brzezinski (1997a: 23), the National Security needed (Escobar, 2002Escobar (2002). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).⁶

Advisor for then US President Jimmy Carter In the post–Cold War era, uncertainties in

(1977–1981), regarded countries such as Rus- social and international systems have been re-

sia and China as threats to US hegemony. Back garded by separatist–ethnic group leaders as op-

then, Russia and China were often indicated as portunities to provide social mobilization and,

potential rivals in Eurasia (Achcar, 1998: 103). if possible, to find their own countries via pro-

curing international support. In certain areas, central hegemonic states that are substantially

In certain areas, central hegemonic dominant within the international system can

states that are substantially overlook redefinitions of national boundaries in dominant within the international line with their own interests, unless a separatist system can overlook redefinitions

of national boundaries in line movement threatens stability. Here, the essential

with their own interests, unless goal is to seize control over present (or prospec-

a separatist movement threatens tive) markets or engaging in efforts to obtain a

stability. share of them.

4 The former foreign secretary James Baker also characterizes this area as the world’s most dynamic region.

5 For the subject of alternative pipelines, see., Amirahmadi, 2000; Miles, 1999.

6 Vidal posits that the September 11 attack can be regarded as the onset of such a legitimization process. See Vidal, 2002.

History reveals that, when an unstable envi- ld’s most important buyers of arms; they pro-

ronment generated by separatist-ethnic conflicts cure their defense tools and services primarily

and rifts induced by such movements threatens from Western markets (Anderson & Rashidian,

the economic and strategic interests of hegemo- 1991: 55–71; Smith, 1990: 13–15; Wright, 2003).

nic states and their allies on national or interna- In the coming years, Middle Eastern countries

tional levels, these states watch for an occasion are expected to spend billions of dollars on ar-

to directly or indirectly interfere. Regardless of maments. This fact reveals the extent of their

whether or not such an intervention has the po- contribution to Western defense industries and

tential to contribute to desired goals, such inter- thereby economies, which have been lurching

vention would become inevitable (Touval, 1992: since the end of the Cold War (MEED, 1995a:

272; Daalder, 1996). In turn, separatist and eth- 12; MEED, 1995b: 5).⁸

nic movements generally welcome external state With the end of the Cold War and the di-

interventions, based on economic and political sappearance of the Soviet Union as a rival, an grounds they reckoned on beforehand. Thus, important obstacle was removed for the US to using the increasing opportunities for commuintervene in Iraq. Thus, the US, with the supnication, they try to attract the attention of goport of some social, regional and international vernmental and nongovernmental organizations allies, succeeded in preserving its hegemony by to garner their prospective support (Premdas, backing separatist-ethnic groups and creating a 1991: 13). Kurdish area in northern Iraq. During this en- Following the dissolution of the Soviet Uniterprise, Washington attempted to shape the reon in 1991, obstacles to US hegemony in the gion according to its economic, military and geregion diminished and Washington sought to ostrategic calculations. However, local, regional exclude other states competing for hegemony.

Frank and Jaber (1991: 46) indicate that inter- and international factors obstructed the structu-

ventions in the Middle East by the US and its re desired by the US.

allies were oriented towards preserving US hege-

mony in regions with rich petroleum resources. The Conundrum of Separatism

As this region held the world’s most important The rise of separatist and ethnic movements at

petroleum deposits, the revenues of regional the end of the 20th century revealed how crises

states had also major significance for Western in social, regional and international systems pro-

countries (MEED, 1985: 39).⁷ vide a suitable environment for separatist lead-

Accordingly, controlling t 7 his region has ers to organize internal and external support for

been a necessity for preserving US global hege- their own interests (Heraklides, 1992: 40–42). In

mony. Moreover, certain petroleum-producing the wake of the Cold War, some states and or-

Middle Eastern countries constitute the wor- ganizations showed an unprecedented interest

7 Germany’s exports to Iran and Saudi Arabia reached an annual amount of $3 billion (see MEED, 1984: 62). Between 1980

and 1984, France’s weapons sales to Iraq reached $5 billion (see İsmael, 1986: 194). During the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq, Iraq spent $178 billion on weaponry, while Iran spent $81 billion. The US and UK were the main sellers to Iraq (see Gibson, 1990: 8–9).

8 In the wake of the Gulf War, in 1993, the US’s biggest arms deals were with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia ordered

$9.5 billion worth of warplanes from the McDonnel Douglass company, while Kuwait made a $2.2 billion deal with the General Dynamics firm to buy battle tanks (see Johar & Bahgat, 1995:180).

in defending the human rights of minorities. In the first quarter of the 21st century, Eurasia,

These states and organizations, in turn, devoted geopolitically prioritized by the West, has been the

strong efforts to assessing the opportunities that region where separatist-ethnic movements have

these issues could offer them within the Eurasian been exploited most intensely. The Western world,

region (Malek, 1989Malek (1989). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). As at the end of the Gulf exhibiting solidarity among prominent states, has

War, developments in this region brought many continued to directly or indirectly intervene in

separatist-ethnic movements to international separatist-ethnic activities, according to its own

attention (Gunter, 1993: 313; Freedman, 1991: interests.9

201–202; Bölükbaşı, 1991; The Times, 1991; In- Touval 9 (1992: 272) states that internation-

ternational Herald Tribune, 1991; Sunday Times, al powers withdrew from taking important steps 1991; Newsweek, 1991). United Nations Securito find solutions to certain conflicts that seem to ty Council Resolution 688 (adopted on April 5, clash with their interests. Anthony Lake (1994), 1991), intended to contribute to international the national security advisor to Bill Clinton, peace and security, also paved the way for intermade the following statement regarding interventions in the internal affairs of states that seventions in Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda: riously violated human rights (Moynihan, 1993: “Let’s be clear. Preserving peace is not the center 67–68). Leaders of ethnic-separatist movements,

regarding this development as an opportunity, of the US foreign policy or defense policy. The

raised their demands for preserving their cultur- main mission of our military forces is not to or-

al, linguistic and ethnic identities, and pushed for ganize peace operations but to win wars” (Lake,

autonomy or the building of federations. 1994).

Between 1991 and 1995, Washington preferred to stand off from the conflict in Yugoslavia, In the first quarter of the 21st leaving involvement to European countries. In century, Eurasia, geopolitically the middle of 1995, the Clinton administration prioritized by the West, has been decided to intervene in developments in Balkans, the region where separatist-ethnic

movements have been exploited due to concerns that nonintervention would

most intensely. shake NATO’s efficiency and prestige in the

broader European region (Art, 1998/1999: 108–

When a separatist-ethnic movement arose 109; Holbrooke, 1998: 356–360). Thus, it might

in a “peripheral” country, certain core countries be said that NATO operated to detain Russia, to

tried to act as intermediaries to find solutions, keep the US in Europe and to bring Germany un-

or alternatively to impose their own solutions. der control. Similarly, the presence of natural gas

Inequalities in economic and military power can resources in the East Timor Sea attracted the in-

facilitate the imposition of certain outcomes in fa- terest of Western and Australian companies, lead-

vor of core states. This situation has formed with- ing to the formation of a UN peacekeeping force

in a framework of local, regional or great-pow- to keeping the provoked instability under control.

er competition or cooperation (Nagel, 1993: This move ultimately resulted in the recognition

103,108,110; Entessar, 1984). of East Timor’s independence by the UN (Nel-

9 Regarding the US attitude to the Yugoslavian conflict, the US Secretary of State of the period stated that for the first time

since 1930, the US deliberately withdrew from a crisis in the Balkans due to its changing interests. (see Binder, 1992see Binder (1992). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

son, 1991; Glassman, 2003: 272; Anderson, 2006: itary support and help us become an autonomous

63–67; Schofield, 2005: 262–277; Cotton, 2005; region. Then, we shall become your loyal friend

Pietsch, 2010; Dickens, 2001). in the Middle East” (Shareef, 2014: 138).

Separatist-ethnic movements such as the Explicit or implicit support to separatist

IRA (Irish Republican Army) in the Northern movements was, moreover, linked to certain con-

Ireland region of the United Kingdom and ETA ditions, rendering some separatist movements

(Euskadi ta Askatasuna—Basque Homeland and rather vulnerable to negative developments with-

Liberty) in Spain did not receive any toleration in their regions (Smith, 1981: 198–199). The US

from Western developed countries. For these re- regarded some groups as threats to the regional

gions, London and Madrid’s demands were pri- order deemed important for controlling energy

oritized. Conversely, in the Middle East, Western resources vital to Western markets’ stability. The

imperialist centers continued to use separatist threats coming from these groups were also com-

groups as “pawns” to take advantage of regional bated via regional cooperation (Freedman, 1991:

and international developments (Hiltermann, 205, 208). Yet in the past,

1992: 620–622).10 its hegemonic status notwithstanding, the US

failed to obtain Turkey’s support in realizing its plans for Iraq (Hashim, 1995: 47–49; Reich, 1991Reich (1991). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). In the wake of the Gulf War, the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq was encouraged to destabilize the Baghdad government. Nonetheless, to keep it from falling under Iran’s regional influence, the US preferred a centralist Iraqi state over a disintegrated one (Frank & Jaber, 1991: 59–61; Gurr, 1993: 22, fn. 20; Muzaffar, 1993: 77–96). While separatist-ethnic Kurdish nationalism threatened the territorial integrity of states in the region, this was also accompanied by these states’ diplomatic and military interventions. Turkey, in this sense, militarily intervened in northern The terrorist attact against the police station in the

Lukiang Town of Sinciang Uygur Autonomous Region Iraq and Syria. Wary of their future effect, Iran,

organized by separatist movements in 2013 (Xinhua). too, become involved in regional developments. Ankara continued meeting with Iraqi and Syri-

The US is also known to support groups such an representatives, whenever it saw this as fitting

as the YPG (People Protection Troops) organi- Turkey’s interests (Azadi, 1992Azadi (1992). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.; Milliyet, 1994Milliyet (1994). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

cally connected with the PKK in Syria (Reuters, Likewise, the US considers the Xinjiang Uy-

2019). Similar developments had also occurred ghur Autonomous Region (Eastern Turkistan)

in the past. For instance, in 1962, Mullah Mustafa significant as it has geopolitical goals there. Xin-

Barzani gave the following statement to the New jiang is China’s most important gateway to Paki-

York Times: “First let the US provide us with mil- stan and thus to the Indian Ocean. In the 1970s,

10 According to the PKK leader Ocalan, the war between Iran and Iraq provided a suitable environment for social and national movements in the region (see Ocalan, 1992: 296. Also see Olson, 1992see Binder (1992). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

the US-UK front favored India against Pakistan, Free Asia (an extension of Radio of Free Europe

providing it with nuclear-weapons technology; or RFE, which was founded to produce propa-

after that, the intimacy between Pakistan and ganda against the Soviet Union), and human

China began. The US, then, reckoned that Chi- rights organization such as the London-based

na’s access to the Indian Ocean could be prevent- Amnesty International and the US-based Hu-

ed via Xinjiang’s detachment or by perpetuating man Rights Watch, are also known to support

the conflict there. separatists by disseminating information (Deba-

ta, 2010: 55–73; Millward, 2004: 22–28).

The US is known to directly or To prevent China from becoming an alter-

indirectly support separatist native economic power center, the US and the

demands in Xinjiang, to provoke the West in general are involved in activities to in-

Uyghurs and to support the “East duce disorder in Xinjiang area. They have also

Turkistan Government in Exile” and sought to support social provocations to disrupt

the “Uyghur American Association” relations between Beijing and Hong Kong (a

based in the US. The National trade center transferred from the UK to Chi-

Endowment for Democracy, na), so that the latter can continue acting as the founded in 1983 under President operation center of UK-based Western capital. Ronald Reagan to extend US-style

democracy, and supported by the By creating disorder in the area, the US and its

US Congress, is known to help the allies also aimed to prevent transfer of under-

Uyghur Human Rights Project. ground resources in the Caspian region to West-

ern markets via Russia. This transfer takes place

The rapprochement between China and via the pipeline through Chechnya in northern

Pakistan (Malik, 2011: 3–5) served to balance Caucasia (Brzezinski, 1997b: 140). Accordingly,

India as an ally of the US and the UK. It should Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997c: 57) had stated that

also be considered that, for China, the Xinjiang the US should support the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan

region is an important corridor for accessing en- pipeline for its own interests.

ergy resources, especially in the Caspian basin As Washington aims to control energy re-

(Van Wie Davis, 2008: 9). The 935-km pipeline sources via the pipeline through Azerbaijan,

between Kazakhstan and the Xinjiang Autono- Turkey and Georgia, the completion of NATO’s

mous Region was completed in December 2005 expansion into Georgia and Azerbaijan would

(Raballand & Genté, 2008: 16). The US is known also ensure the military protection of energy re-

to directly or indirectly support separatist de- sources. Another containment policy against the

mands in Xinjiang, to provoke the Uyghurs and Russian Federation was also on the agenda. In

to support the “East Turkistan Government in the first quarter of the 20th century, the UK feared

Exile” and the “Uyghur American Association” Bolshevik Russia’s influence being extended to

based in the US. The National Endowment for the south and intended to build a barrier against

Democracy, founded in 1983 under President this. Halford Mackinder raised concerns about

Ronald Reagan to extend US-style democracy, the British Empire’s future and sought measures

and supported by the US Congress, is known to to protect it (Blouet, 2004: 328). To this end, he

help the Uyghur Human Rights Project. Radio prepared a report stressing the importance of the

Map showing the infrastructure pipeline, railway and transportation corridor of China and Central Asian regions.

Khazar-Caucasian region as a barrier (O’Hara & This statement seemed to be in line with Wash-

Heffernan, 2006: 66). India was also regarded ington’s regional plans and was quite similar to

by London as part of this barrier against Russia the efforts of Mackinder over 110 years ago to

(O’Hara & Heffernan, 2006: 67). preserve British imperialism.

In his book entitled Diplomacy, the former It was predicted that the expanded NATO

US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (1994: and the European Union would serve similar ge-

814) pointed out that Mackinder designated opolitical needs to those of the US (Brzezinski,

Russia as Eurasia’s geopolitical hearth. The pol- 1997c: 53). The participation of Ukraine in these

icy advocated by Brzezinski and Kissinger for organizations was expected to fulfill this goal.

creating buffer states around Russia to limit its However, Moscow succeeded in preventing both

activities was put into practice in the last quar- of these enterprises. Nireiver, Georgia was seen

ter of the 20th century (Lieven, 1999: 309). Gra- by the US as a country that could play a comple-

ham Fuller (1994: 130), a former vice president mentary role on the Turkey-Azerbaijan line. Af-

of the US National Information Council and an ter President Shevardnadze gave a statement to

official at RAND Research Foundation, defined the Financial Times, which indicated Georgia’s

the Khazar-Black Sea line as Russia’s economic wish to enter NATO, the Russian Foreign Min-

area of influence, and indicated that preventing istry declared on October 26, 1999 that NATO’s

Russia’s expansion was a national interest for expansion into Caucasia would not contribute to

the US. In his work Strategic Depth, Prof. A. stability in the European-Atlantic region (Rus-

Davutoglu wrote the following: “A cooperation sian Federation/Chechnya, 1999).

among Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Core states do not have the full power to en-

Turkmenistan against Russia regarding the Cas- gage in regional operations and shape regional

pian Sea, must be one of the bases of Turkey’s developments in their interests without securing

Middle East policy” (Davudoğlu, 2001: 181). the cooperation of regional powers. In the past,

when needed, Iran and Turkey were able to play Different parts of the world with different

significant roles to protect US regional interests historical experiences to the West have varying

(e.g. purging anti-Western Islamic movements approaches in terms of human rights. For exam-

in the region). Washington continues its region- ple, African thought stresses social harmony and

al and international efforts to diminish Iran’s maintenance of order (Okere, 1984: 145–146),12

regional influence. As Steinbach (1980: 27) in- while the advance of industrial capitalism 12 in

dicates, there is a direct correlation between some Western societies usually produced an in-

dividualist conception. The traditional Chinese regional instability and international interests. approach prioritizes common rights and respon- When targeted states adopt an oppressive orisibilities. However, for a certain period of time, entation against separatist movements’ violent a particular understanding aiming at the salvaacts, the question of human rights violations is tion of humankind that saw the Western-based often brought up, and is usually used as a pretext arguments as extensions of imperialist plans for international actors to directly or indirectly was also effective, alongside traditional notions

participate in developments.11 (“Notes on the Human”, 1979: 17–18).13 Due to

its own historical experiences, China generally

Imposition of “Human Rights” supports human rights campaigns if they are in

and “Democracy” opposition to imperialism, hegemony, colonial-

Regarding international interventions, the most ism and racism (Kim, 1979: 161, 484–486, 493).

important arguments used by the US-led coali- In Islamic thought, based on obeying divine au-

tion center on the concepts of human rights and thority, social responsibility precedes individu-

democracy. In supporting uprisings in the Arab alist quests (Said, 1979: 63–66; Khadduri, 1946:

region, this coalition claimed to be advancing hu- 78–79).

man rights and emancipating people from author- As Habermas posited, the West’s own un-

itarian regimes (Nixon, 2011Nixon (2011). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). As Anthony Lake, derstanding of human rights, which it propa-

the US National Security Council Director, stated gates according to its own liberal internation-

in 1995: “We are fighting for democracy because alism, is “neither the only, nor the best answer”

the wider its pool, the more security and well-be- (Habermas & Rehg, 1998: 169). Yet according

ing we will have” (Ikenberry, 1999: 60). By con- to liberals, liberal regimes are the best forms to

trast, Brzezinski had indicated that there should preserve human rights and to serve citizens’ in-

be no rush to democratize the Middle East, as an terests. While Fukuyama (1992) asserts that lib-

election in Saudi Arabia could result in victory for eral states are the best forms in political and civil

Usame Bin Ladin (Brzezinski, 2004: 16). respects, Kissinger (2001: 252) opines that the

11 From the 1970s onwards, the US clearly declared that it intended to maintain its influence in the Gulf region. According to the Carter Doctrine, while the petroleum industry had to be secured, the region also had to be protected from Soviet influence by safeguarding moderate states there. The factor of petroleum makes the US’s struggle to reign in the region inevitable (see Gowan, 1991: 47–48). According to Jahar and Bahgat, as the largest petroleum consumer, the US has explicit interests in pr curing petroleum from the Gulf region. Therefore, Washington will not allow any challenge that might threaten US interests in the region (See Johar & Bahgat, 1995: 174. Table 2. Also see Khashan & Harik, 1992: 154see Binder (1992). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). 12 In the Banjul Agreement of June 1981, The Organization of African Union (OAU) prioritized definitions such as national solidarity, independence and harmonious development of the family. 13 When reminded of the then US President Clinton’s remarks that concerning human rights, China was on the wrong side of history, Zemin (the then President of the Peoples Republic of China) indicated that different countries had different historical and cultural traditions as well as varying levels of economic development. Thus he posited that propositions regarding human rights should be in line with countries’ own conditions (see www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec97/china).

best and most reasonable option for the world “justice” and “order”. Governments straining to

lies in an economic and political structure simi- meet demands for basic needs can attempt to re-

lar to the US style. Yet both of these approaches press social reactions by resorting to violence. In

ignore the peculiarity of economic and social such instances, the question of human rights is

conditions in other countries. This understand- put into discussion. Apart from being used as a

ing may lead to the conclusion that liberal de- critique of practices that might be performed by

mocracies should make every effort to construct security units, such as violence, arbitrary detain-

a world order where liberalism is applied every- ment or torture (so that certain individual rights

where. This approach, in turn, is obviously open are not violated), the notion of human rights also

to a dangerous interpretation of “liberal impe- involves the right to freely express and mobilize

rialism”, meaning that to establish liberal insti- for political views, opposition to exploitation,

tutions, every method, including power, may be the right to freedom of movement and the right

seen as just (Miller, 2000Miller (2000). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). to found associations or unions (Halliday, 1991;

Many people working on human rights, Beitz, 1979; O’Neil, 1991). Actors disagree over

especially in wealthy developed Western coun- how to define each of these rights. Nevertheless,

tries, tend to disregard alternative opinions on despite these difficulties, the formulation of cer-

universal principles.14 Discussions on liberties tain social and international norms is needed,

and requirements for human rights can only based on a consensus that everyone has inviola-

flourish in cases of mutual agreement (Frost, ble rights (Linklater, 1990: 201).

1999: 55; Shue, 1996: 35). If parties try to impose their own propositions at the very onset of these If in the wake of a struggle for discussions, the process will be harder. minority rights, a successful

The restricted definitions and practices outcome may boost ethnic group

of human rights pursued by developed West- rights at the expense of individual

ern countries (i.e. prioritizing certain political rights, but the latter can find

rights rather than basic economic needs) justly themselves in a new repressive

provoke doubts in developing peripheral coun- environment.

tries (Habermas, 1998: 169). Questions arise

regarding what lies behind such definitions Many separatist movements have succeed-

and practices. Efforts to internationalize liber- ed in attracting the attention of governments and

al capitalism result in economic predicaments, nongovernmental organizations by arguing that

malfunctions in democracy and an increase in the human rights of their own ethnic groups are

human rights violations (Timur, 1999: 243–244). being violated. Leaders of these separatist move-

Governments that fail to provide basic so- ments have claimed to have different identities,

cial, economic and political rights to their cit- and therefore to have suffered discriminatory

izens inevitably find themselves in a dead end. and unjust policies inflicted by central author-

Rising economic, social and political demands ities. To obtain concessions, these figures even

may complicate the provision of balance between demanded embargos against their governments.

14 Bessis makes the following statement: “It is high time Westerns comprehend that others too can share universal principles without necessarily wishing to resemble them in every aspect” (see Bessis, 2000: 34).

In different periods, countries such as Turkey, their own definition (Rady, 1993: 720–722). It is

Iran, the Russian Federation and China have also the case that these interests usually vary de-

faced such impositions. When issues such as pendent on parties’ perceptions, and that human

embargos or aid are brought up, concepts such rights are defined differently in different times

as democracy and human rights are employed as and places. These discussions entail questions

justifications. Yet according to Conteh-Morgan about order and justice, because for stability to

(1990: 25), the US external aid program has nei- exist, there must be a balance between the two.

ther fostered human rights nor helped strength- What are the criteria of justice? What do we

en democracy. understand by this term? As much as we can

Rather than adopting a concessionary atti- be willing to comply with rules, these must be

tude, the government of a certain country may agreed upon and open to constant renegotiation

pursue repressive policies which might com- and redefinition when needed. An order where a

plicate existing disagreements. Some separa- single understanding has the monopoly on judg-

tist movements are quite content when central ing others cannot be accepted. No culture can be

governments respond to violence with violence. essentially right or wrong as every system has an

After all, these instances bring up claims of hu- inherent basic logic. Each culture possesses at

man rights violations and attract the attention of least some truths, yet no culture can be claimed

international organizations. to include all truths.

The United Nations General Assembly ac- In an environment where disagreements

cepted a resolution in December 1992 regard- and oppressive practices continue, achieving

ing the rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic economic development becomes increasingly

minority groups. According to its first article, difficult. For economic development to be se-

states are responsible for protecting minorities’ cured, it is evident that the necessary infrastruc-

national/ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic ture should be put in place, which in turn entails

identities in their own regions (Newland, 1993: human rights and basic needs as an inseparable

92–93). Yet, this article does not discuss the rights whole (Vincent, 1986: 86). In an environment

of the individual. If in the wake of a struggle for where international rules are generally arranged

minority rights, a successful outcome may boost in line with core states’ interests, organizations

ethnic group rights at the expense of individu- (e.g. Amnesty International) controlled by these

al rights, but the latter can find themselves in a states continue to impose their understanding of

new repressive environment. Minority rights may human rights on non-Western countries.

clash with individuals’ rights in certain situations. Securing a minority group’s rights via granting Conclusion it autonomy also means preventing individuals

from freely deciding on their futures independent Long-term socioeconomic and political unrest

of their ethnic identities. In this way, individuals has either resulted in the emergence of organ-

cannot escape from being imprisoned in yet an- ized violence or in protest activities seeking to

other undesired environment. influence central authorities’ policies and alter

In some cases, governments do not comply certain legal laws and practices, as in the case

with international organizations’ definitions of of many separatist-ethnic movements. Rawls

human rights, finding them contradictory with (1973: 364–368, 371–377) states that, when pos-

sibilities to rectify an unfair practice via legal received the support of the US and its designat-

means die out, certain civil disobedience activ- ed allies (Premdas, 1991: 19–20). Amnesty In-

ities may be justified. By comparison, Habermas ternational has closely collaborated with the UK

(1985: 100) posits that states can expect their cit- Foreign and Commonwealth Office over human

izens to comply with existing laws as long as they rights violations in developing countries (Chris-

are worth following. Such approaches are usu- tiansen & Dowding, 1994: 15). For instance,

ally forefronted in the case of non-Western so- the institution’s reports about human rights vi-

cial movements, and frequently when provoked olations in China were submitted to the British

events turn violent, international interventions Government and later used by former Prime

are enabled. Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990) as an

Those states (e.g. China, the Russian Feder- element of leverage against the Beijing Govern-

ation) that are economically and politically in a ment (Christiansen & Dowding, 1994: 20–21).

position to oppose core states’ decisions have the Separatist movements, on their part, have tried

capacity to resist any decision against their in- to abuse such institutions to garner support for

terests. But states that are economically depend- their own activities and have placed a priority on

ent (due to markets) on traditional hegemonic fostering their relations with them to act against

centers (i.e. the US and its designated allies) find their central governments.

it difficult to do so. In an international environment where

socioeconomic and political consensus is low, hegemonic powers and their allies also reduce prospects of compromise with separatist movements, while trying to satisfy their demands or impositions. We are in a process which entails efforts to prioritize elements that can facilitate people’s access to their basic needs. This process also has the potential to establish an alternative social and international system. Unless a just restructuring of national and international economic and political systems is ensured, social, economic and political inequalities in different The universal declaration of human rights 10 December 1948. parts of the world will continue to threaten regional and international stability.

By influencing national and internation- In order to maintain their military activi-

al public opinion, institutions such as Amnes- ties in Eurasia, the US and its allies will try to

ty International have engaged in impositions, preserve their competitive power in political and

particularly on non-Western governments, for economic realms. To this end, they will develop

“them to respect human rights to avoid econom- distinct relations with Berlin, Moscow, Beijing,

ic and military embargo”. Yet such institutions New Delhi and Tokyo while concomitantly try-

have only succeeded to the extent that they have ing to prevent cooperation amongst them. The

Em in G ür s es , T he G eop olitic s o f S ep a r a tis t Mo v em ents in E ur a s ia

future of Eurasia will directly depend on issues University.

Beitz, C. R. (1979). Political Theory and International to be prioritized by regional countries. Relations. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

Competing powers or actors have either op- Bessis, S. (2000). İnsan Hakları ve Tarihi. İDEA Politika,

posed various demands or tried to adapt to new 2000/07.

developments in case of failure. In the current Beşikçi, İ. (1990). Devletlerarası Sömürge Kürdistan.

Bonn: Revşen Yay.

process, the competing powers and capacities Binder, D. (1992, May 27). The Yugoslav Crisis: Why

of social and international actors will decide the US Is Bearing Down on Belgrade. New York

Times. whether the demands of separatist movements, Blouet, B. W. (2004). The Imperial Vision of Halford

operating on a new level, will succeed or fail. Mackinder. The Geographical Journal, 170(4),

Efforts to reconfigure the Eurasian region 322–329.

are also accompanied by high costs. These costs Bölükbaşı, S. (1991). Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad and

the Regionalization of Turkey’s Kurdish

are predicted to be laid upon non-Western Secessionism. Journal of South Asian and Middle

countries. Yet given the emerging social reac- Eastern Studies, 14(4), 15–36.

Brzezinski, Z. (1997a). The Grand Chessboard. New tions, here too, difficulties are expected. Moreo- York: Basic Books.

ver, given the efforts of the US and its designated Brzezinski, Z. (1997b). The Grand Chessboard:

allies to preserve their status, the rising compe- American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives.

Washington DC: Basic Books. tition in Eurasia will most probably have a dis- Brzezinski, Z. (1997c). A Geostrategy for Eurasia.

tressing quality. Foreign Affairs, 76(5), 50–64. Brzezinski, Z. (2004).

Where do we go from here? Military Technology,

References 28(1).

Christiansen, L. & Dowding, K. (1994). Pluralism or Abu-Lughod, J. L. (1989). Before European Hegemony: State Autonomy? The Case of Amnesty International The World System A.D. 1250–1350. New York: (British Section): The Insider/Outsider Group. Oxford University Press. Political Studies, 42(1), 15–24.

Achcar, G. (1998). The Strategic Triad: The United Cohen, S. (1973). Geography and Politics in a World

States, Russia and China. New Left Review. 1(228). Divided (2nd ed.). NewYork: Oxford University

Achcar, G. (2004). US Imperial Strategy in the Middle Press.

East. Monthly Review, 55(9), 23–36. Cohen, S. (1992). Global Geopolitical Changes in

Adshead, S. A. M. (1993). Central Asia in World History. The Post Cold War Era. Annals of the Association of

London: Macmillan. American Geographers, 81(4), 551–580.

Amirahmadi, H. (2000). Pipeline Politics in the Conteh-Morgan, E. (1990). American Foreign Aid and

Caspian Region. In H. Amirahmadi (Ed.), The Global Power Projection. Brookfield: Gower Pub.

Caspian Region at the Crossroad, Challenges of a New Cotton, J. (2005). East Timor in 2004: It Is All about Oil.

Frontier of Energy and Development (163–172). Asian Survey, 45(1), 186–190.

London: Macmillan. Daalder, I.H. (1996). The United States and Military

Anderson, E. V. & Rashidian, K. H. (1991). Iraq and the Intervention in Internal Conflict. In M. E. Brown

Continuing Middle East Crisis. London: Pinter Publs. (Ed.), International Dimentions of Ethnic Conflict

Anderson, T. (2006). Timor Leste: The Second (461–488). Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Australian Intervention. Journal of Australian Davudoğlu, A. (2001). Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin

Political Economy, (58), 62–93. Uluslararası Konumu. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları.

Art, R. J. (1998/1999). Geopolitics Updated: The Debata, M. R. (2010). International Response to Uyghur

Strategy of Selective Engagement. International Separatism in Xinjiang. Himalayan and Central

Security, 23(3), 79–113. Asian Studies, 14(4), 55–78.

Azadi. 22–28 November 1992. Dicken, P. (1998). Global Shift: Transforming the Global

Baker to Talk About U.S.-Asian Relations. (1996, Economy (3rd Edition). New York: The Guilford

February 9). Baker Institute Report. Austin: Rice Press.

Dickens, D. (2001). The United Nations in East London: Routledge.

Timor: Intervention at the Military Operational Habermas, J. (1985). Civil Disobedience: Litmus Test

level. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 23(2), 213–232. for the Democratic Constitutional State. Berkeley

Entessar, N. (1984). The Kurds in Post–Revolutionary Journal of Sociology, 30, 95–116.

Iran and Iraq. Third World Quarterly, 6(4), 911–933. Habermas, J. & Rehg, W. (1998). Remarks on

Escobar, P. (2002, December 4). The U.S. and Eurasia: Legitimation through Human Rights. Philosophy &

Theatrical Militarism. Asia Times Online. Social Criticism, 24(2–3), 157–171.

Frank, A. G. (1978). World Accumulation, 1492–1789. Haldun, İ. (1990). Mukaddime (ı–ıı) (Z. K. Ugan,

NewYork: Monthly Review Press. Trans.). İstanbul: MEB Yayınları.

Frank, A. G. (1990). A Theoretical Introduction to 5,000 Halliday, F. (1991). International Relations: Is there a

Years of World System History. Review, 13(2), New Agenda? Millennium, 20(1), 57–72.

155–248. Hambly, G. (1969). Central Asia. London: Weidenfeld &

Frank, A. G. & Jaber, S. (1991). The Gulf War and the Nicholson.

New World Order. Notebooks for Study and Research, Hashim, A. (1995). The Crisis of the Iranian State

(14). (Adelphi Paper, 296, IISS). Oxford: Oxford Univ.

Freedman, L. (1991). The Gulf War and The New World Press.

Order. Survival, 33(3), 195–209. Heraklides, A. (1992, Spring). The International

Frost, R. (1999). The Basic Right to Justification: Dimension of Minority Separatism: An Attempt at

Toward a Constructivist Conception of Human Unravelling a Pandora Box. Paradigms, 6(1), 33–51.

Rights. Constellation, 6(1), 35–60. Hiltermann, J. R. (1992, May 11). Iraqi Kurds: Still

Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Pawns in the Great Game. The Nation.

Man. New York: The Free Press. Hoge Jr., J. F. (2004, July/August). A Global Power Shift

Fuller, G. E. (1994). Central Asia and American in the Making. Foreign Affairs.

National Interests. In H. Malik (Ed.), Central Asia: Holbrooke, R. (1998). To End a War. NewYork: Random

Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects (129– House.

141). London: Macmillan. Hudson, B. (1977). The New Geography and the New

Galbraith, J. K. (1999, Summer). The Crisis of Imperialism: 1870–1918. Antipode, 9(2),12–19.

Globalization. Dissent. Ikenberry, G. J. (1999, Spring). Why Export

Gibson, A. (1990, September 1). Profit, Power and Democracy? The Wilson Quarterly, 23, 56–65.

Poverty. Socialist Worker. International Herald Tribune. (1991, May 14). Gills, B. K. & Frank, A. G. (1996a). World System İsmael, T. Y. (1986). International Relations of the Cycles, Crisis, and Hegemonic Shifts, 1700 BC to Contemporary Middle East. Syracusa: Syracusa Univ. 1700 AD. In A. G. Frank & B. K. Gills (Eds.), The Press. World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?

(143–199). New York: Routledge. Johar, H. & Bahgat, G. (1995). Oil and democracy:

The American dilemma in the Persian Gulf region. Gills, B. K. & Frank, A. G. (1996b). The Cumulation of Comparative Strategy, 14(2), 173–183. Accumulation. In A. G. Frank & B. K. Gills

(Eds.), The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Kennedy, P. (1989). The Rise and Fall of the Great

Thousand? (81–114). New York: Routledge. Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from

1500 to 2000. London: Fontana Press. Glassman, J. F. (2003, September). Structural Power,

Agency and National Liberation: The Case of Khadduri, M. (1946). Human Rights in Islam. The

East Timor. Transactions of the Institute of British Annals of the American Academy of Political and

Geographers, 28(3), 264–280. Social Science, 243, 77–81.

Gowan, P. (1991). The Gulf War, Iraq and Western Khashan, H. & Harik, J. (1992). The Plight of the Kurds.

Liberalism. New Left Review, 1(187), 21–70. Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 23(2), 147–158.

Gunter, M. M. (1993). A de facto Kurdish State in Kim, S. S. (1979). China, the United Nations and World

Northern Iraq. Third World Quarterly, 14(2), 295– Order. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

319. Kissinger, H. (1994). Diplomacy. New York: Touchstone.

Gurr, T. R. (1993). The Internationalization of Kissinger, H. (2001). Does America Need A Foreign

Communal Conflicts Since 1945: Which Groups, Policy: Toward a Diplomacy of the 21st Century.

Where, and How. In M. I. Midlarsky (Ed.), The New York: Simon&Schuster.

Internationalization of Communal Strife (3– 26). L.A. Times. (2000, March 19).

Lake, A. (1994, 2 February). The Limits of Strategy to Geo-Economics: The Heartland and

Peacekeeping. New York Times. British Imperialism before and after Mackinder.

Lieven, A. (1999). Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Geopolitics, 11(1), 54–73.

Power. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. O’Loughlin, J. (2000). Geography as Space and

Linklater, A. (1990). Men and Citizens in the Theory of Geography as Place: The Divide Between Political

International Relations (2nd ed.). London: Science and Political Geography Continues.

MacMillan. Geopolitics, 5(3), 126–137.

Malek, M. H. (1989). Kurdistan in the Middle East O’Sullivan, P. (1986). Geopolitics. London: Croom

Conflict. New Left Review, 1(175), 79–95. Helm.

Malik, M. (2011). China and India: Great Power Rivals. Okere, B. O. (1984). The Protection of Human Rights in

California: First Forum Press Book (Lynne Rienner Africa and the African Charter on Human and

Publisher). Peoples’ Rights: A Comparative Analysis with

the European and American System. Human Rights Mamadough, V. (2000). Reclaiming Geopolitics: Quarterly, 6(2), 141–159. Geographers Strike Back. In N. Kliot & D. Newman

(Eds.), Geopolitics at the End of the Twentieth Olson, R. (1992). The Kurdish Question in the

Century: The Changing World Political Map (118– Aftermath of the Gulf War: Geopolitical and

133). London: Frank Cass. geostrategic changes in the Middle East. Third World

Quarterly, 13(3), 475–499. Middle East Economic Digest (MEED). (1985, March 8). O’Neill, O. (1991). Transnational Justice. In D. Held

Middle East Economic Digest. (1995a, March 31). (Ed.), Political Theory Today (276–304). Cambridge:

39(13). Polity Press.

Middle East Economic Digest. (1995b, April 7). 39(14). Öcalan, A. (1992). Seçme Yazılar, Vol.1. İstanbul: Melsa Yay.

Middle East Economic Digest. (1984, March). West Pant, H. V. (2004). The Moscow-Beijing-Delhi Strategic

Germany (Special Report). Triangle: An Idea Whose Time May Never Come.

Miles, C. (1999, Fall). The Caspian Debate Continues: Security Dialogue, 35(3), 311–328.

Why Not Iran? Journal of International Affairs, Pietsch, S. (2010). Australian imperialism and East

326–346. Timor. Marxist Interventions, (2), 7–38.

Miller, D. (2000, March 24). The Good, the Poor and Premdas, R.P. (1991). The Internationalization of Ethnic

the Ugly: John Rawls and How Liberals Should Treat Conflict: Some Theoretical Explorations. In K.M. De

Non–Liberal Regimes. Times Literary Supplement. Silva & R.J. May (Eds.), Internationalization of Ethnic

Milliyet. (1994, August 23). Conflict, London: Pinter Pub.

Millward, J. (2004). Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Raballand, G. & Genté, R. (2008). Oil in the Caspian

Critical Assessment (Policy Studies 6), Washington Basin: facts and figures. In B. Najman, R. Pomfret &

DC: East West Centre. G. Raballand (Eds.), The Economics and Politics of Oil

Moynihan, D.P. (1993).Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in in the Caspian Basin, The redistribution of oil

International Politics. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. revenues in Azerbaijan and Central Asia (9–29).

Order. Penang: Just World Trust. Rady, M. (1993). Minority Rights and Self–

determination in Contemporary Eastern Europe. The Nagel, J. (1993). Ethnic Nationalism: Ideology and the Slavonic and East European Review, 71(4), 717–728. World Order. International Journal of Comparative

Univ. Press. Nelson, E. (1991, December 18–24). Down under East

Timor’s blood and oil. In These Times. Reich, B. (1991). The United States in the Middle East.

Current Affairs, 9(552), 7–42. Newland, K. (1993). Ethnic Conflict and Refugees.

Survival, 35(1), 81–101. Reuters. (2019, Kasım 19). Erdogan Says Turkey Aware

That U.S. Support for Kurdish YPG Will Not End Newsweek. (1991, April 19). Immediately. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.

Nixon, R. (2011, April 14). U.S. Groups Helped Nurture com/article/us–syria–security–turkey– usa/erdogan–

Arab Uprisings. The New York Times. says–turkey–aware–that–u–s–support–for–kurdish–

Notes on the Human Rights Question. (1979, ypg–will–not–end– immediately–idUSKBN1XT165.

November 9). Beijing Review, 22(45), 17–20. Russian Federation/Chechnya. (1999, October 27).

O’Hara, S. & Heffernan, M. (2006). From Geo- Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) News.

Said, A. A. (1979). Precept and Practice of Human Rights the Pentagon’s Plan: Prevent the Re– Emergence of a

in Islam. Universal Human Rights, 1(1), 63–79. New Rival.

Schaffer, M. B. (1998). Speculations about Geopolitics The Sunday Times. (1991, April 21).

in the late 21st Century. Futures, 30(5), 443– 452. The Times. (1991, June 18).

Schofield, C. (2005). A “Fair Go” for East Timor? Timur, T. (1999). Küreselleşme, İnsan Hakları ve

Sharing the Resources of the Timor Sea. Türk Demokrasisi. Kuçuradi ve Peker (Ed.), Elli

Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27(2), 255–280. Yıllık Deneyimlerin Işığında Türkiye’de ve Dünya’da

Shareef, M. (2014). The United States, Iraq and the İnsan Hakları içinde. Ankara: Türkiye Felsefe

Kurds: Shock, Awe and Aftermath. London: Kurumu Yayınları.

Routledge. Touval, S. (1992). Gaining Entry to Mediation in

Shue, H. (1996). Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence Communal Strife. In M. I. Midlarsky (Ed.), The

and US Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton Internationalization of Communal Strife (255–273).

University Press. London: Routledge.

Smith, A. D. (1981). States and Homelands: The Social Tuathail, G. O., Dalby, S. & Routledge, P. (Eds.). (1998).

and Geopolitical Implications of National Territory. The Geopolitics Reader. London: Routledge.

Millennium, 10(3), 187–202. Tyler, P.E. (1992, March 8). U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for

Smith, J. (1990, September). Oil on Troubled Waters. Insuring No Rivals Develop. The New York Times.

Socialist Worker Review, 134. Van Wie Davis, E. (2008). Uyghur Muslim Ethnic

Steinbach, U. (1980). Sources of Third World Conflict Separatism in Xinjiang, China. Asia–Pacific Center

(Adelphi Paper, No.167, 22). Annual Conference– for Security Studies.

IISS, Stresa, Italy. Vidal, G. (2002, October 27). The Enemy Within. The

Taylor, R. J. (1993). Political Geography. Essex: Observer.

Longmann. Vincent, R. J. (1986). Human Rights and International

Russia/China/India Axis. (2005, Jan 10). The New Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

American. Wright, G. (2003, June 4). Wolfowitz: “Iraq War Was

The New York Times. (1992, March 8). Excerpts from About Oil”. The Guardian.