The Challenge of The Karaman Sea (Eastern Mediterranean) Through The Defense Expenditure Equation of Türkiye, Egypt And Greece

An Introduction to the Unique Geopolitics has difficulty managing in terms of its market

of the Islands Sea and the Karaman Sea size.

The volume of trade ships entering and leaving

STATES ARE AS STRONG AS THEIR POWER the Mediterranean waters through the Strait of

at sea. History has never given land empires a Gibraltar, the Suez Canal and the Turkish Straits

chance in the struggle between land empires is one-third of the world’s maritime trade today.

and sea empires. Therefore, the race for power On the transit route of 30% of the world’s oil

takes place in the seas. The Islands Sea and the transportation, the Mediterranean is also a basin

Karaman Sea, which constitutes the critical legs where 31% of the world’s tourism activities occur

of this power race, are also a vital struggle area (Ruffie, Gros, & Tourret, October 2018).

between Türkiye and Greece. Since it is not Due to the excessive demands of Greece and

applicable in semi-enclosed seas, Greece, with the Southern Cyprus Administration (GCA)

its imposing attitude over the 1982 Law of the in the Islands Sea and the Karaman Sea, located

Sea Convention (UNCLOS), to which Türkiye in the east of this critical maritime geography,

is not a party, has now brought the tensions to wide areas of discussion have emerged in terms

an uncontrollable point. In this complicated of maritime jurisdiction areas. In recent years,

process, Greece also put the European Union especially in the Karaman Sea, the struggle

(EU) in a difficult position, which it forced to for attractive areas of interest over energy has

support itself. Türkiye, which lost its enthusiasm begun, but it should not be forgotten that the

and interest in EU membership due to the losses wars in these seas were always fought for the

caused by unlimited abuse, is a state that the EU dominance of trade routes. Beyond the heap

World Maritime Trade Routes Density Map. (MarineTraffic, 2020)

on world maritime trade, the Karaman Sea is a The Geopolitical Break in the Defense

sea route where 35% of the European Union’s Industry in the Islands Sea and Karaman

(EU) natural gas requirement and 50% of its Sea Caused by the Unstoppable Rise of

oil requirement are met (Tziarras, 2019Tziarras (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). To "Türkiye"

summarize, this waterway, which is almost

an artery for Europe, is a geography where Instead of forcing its limits in the armament

Europe, which requires energy flow continuity, equation, a state’s consent to the limitations

has to risk war if necessary. set by the imperialists means it renounces its

The equitable sharing of the Islands Sea that geopolitical power. Türkiye, which has attached

resembles a ball of straits with a land surface itself to NATO, has experienced exactly this and

of 23,000 square kilometers, which is the sum has broken away from its geopolitical reality.

of thousands of islands, and a sea surface In the recent period when Türkiye was trying

area of 214,000 square kilometers, has not yet to break away from NATO, as it produced

been completed between Türkiye and Greece. domestic and national weapons by pushing its

With a situation similar to a spontaneous and borders, it became independent and realized

unsigned "modus vivendi", that is, a temporary its real geopolitical power. If we put the subject

peace is maintained over six nautical miles of on the table from an analytical point of view,

mutual territorial waters, which both sides are Table 1, which takes a picture of Türkiye’s arms

not satisfied with, even though it is not signed. imports and sales between 1950-2021, mirrors

the information that will make it easier for to maintain imperialist-controlled tensions

us to understand Türkiye’s relationship with over the Islands Sea, Karaman Sea and Cyprus;

imperialism. and the PKK and FETO terrorist organizations,

Between 1950 and 2000, Türkiye spent an which are kept alive with unimaginable secret

average of 850 million TIVs of its national income or direct global support and used to wear down

annually to purchase weapons from abroad and Türkiye. The West, led by the USA, set up a fertile

could sell only 173 thousand TIVs annually in the environment for arms sales and left Türkiye no

same period. Türkiye, which had no weapons to choice but to buy the older generation weapons of

sell, spent huge sums of money buying weapons the imperialists at inflated prices until the 2000s.

from the imperialists. Several major factors When we examine Table 2, in the first 21 years

forced Türkiye to purchase arms between the of these 51 years, Türkiye was 80-85% dependent

years 1950-2000: Soviet Russia, which was made on the USA. In the next 30 years, despite efforts

hostile and provoked through the North Atlantic to diversify the states on which it was dependent

Alliance (NATO); Greece, which is armed and on purchasing weapons, it could only reduce its

encouraged to pursue a re-expansionist policy dependence on the USA to the band of 42-70%.

Table 1. Türkiye’s Weapons Imports-Exports and Rates Between 1950-1921

Source: Export Values, 2022.

It can be said that Türkiye, which moved to sell high-tech weapons by selling weapons

away from Atatürk’s philosophy of fighting abroad for 52.2 million TIVs annually. The USA

against imperialism and was made to believe wanted to intervene in this situation without delay.

that it became westernized with NATO, was As a matter of fact, with the 2007-2008 Ergenekon,

transformed into one of the world’s leading arms 2008-2009 Poyrazköy / Assassination of Admirals

buyers in the half-century between 1950-2000, / Cage Action Plan, 2010-2011 Sledgehammer,

without being able to sell weapons. Between 1991 2012-2013 Espionage and Prostitution conspiracy

and 2000, when the need to fight the Kardak cases, many officers who were determined to fight

Crisis and the PKK reached the highest level, imperialism and worked hard to break Türkiye’s

Türkiye broke a record and reached an annual dependence on the West for weapons were

average of 1.756 billion TIVs in arms imports, arrested in the Turkish Armed Forces.

and 66 percent of this import came from the The Fethullahist Terrorist Organization

USA. The remaining 34 percent is made from (FETO), which greatly increased its effectiveness

other Western states, primarily Germany. For in the Turkish Armed Forces along with many

imperialism, this was gratifying. Türkiye had state institutions in the five years between 2011

been made dependent on Western weapons for 50 and 2016, increased the TAF’s foreign arms

years; therefore - on its own initiative - Türkiye purchases, which had fallen to 617 million TIVs

fell into geopolitical blindness. Since it could not annually, to 1.073 billion TIVs annually. They

realize its real geopolitical power, it started to also pioneered the transfer of 61 percent of

perceive imperialist impositions as a necessity of high defense spending to US arms companies.

its foreign policy. In this period, the national defense industry,

which FETO slowed down, started to bear its first fruits by making an annual export of 210.6

After the US-backed failed coup million TIVs, thanks to the sales agreements of

attempt on 15 July 2016, all state the previous period, despite the strong US-led

institutions, particularly the Turkish impediments. While trying to regress the Turkish

Armed Forces, began the process of national defense industry using FETO’s elements

clearing FETO quickly. within the state, there was an unsuccessful coup

attempt by the US-backed FETO on 15 July

Nevertheless, between 2001 and 2010, a 2016, and then, all state institutions, particularly

national upheaval in Türkiye affected the arms the Turkish Armed Forces, began the process of

imports and sales. In the ten years from 2001 to clearing FETO quickly.

2010, when US imperialism first felt that Türkiye In the 2017-2019 period, which is the first

would take a hit over the arms market, Türkiye’s three years after the liquidation of FETO, Türkiye’s

imports fell sharply from $1.756 billion to $617 average annual defense expenditure fell from

million annually (Table 1). The difference was met $1,073 million to $143 million, a sharp decline

through the national defense industry instead of compared to the 2011-2016 period controlled by

purchasing weapons from abroad. Additionally, FETO. On the other hand, because FETO, which

Türkiye has gained a state identity that has started controlled the previous period, undermined arms

Table 2. US Share in Türkiye’s Arms Purchases annual defense exports climbed to an annual

Between 1950-1921 average of 306.5 million TIVs. To summarize, for

the first time, export exceeded imports. Moreover, the overshoot rate was 68%. In 2020 and 2021, a large part of the defense needs of the TAF was met by the national defense industry, and the financing of a small part that could not be met was easily made through foreign sales2. Preliminary performance evaluations for 2022 show that the Turkish defense industry is in a much brighter year than 2020 to 2021. As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, the share of the USA in Türkiye’s arms imports, which has decreased to a very low level of 183 million TIVs annually in the last two years, fell to 16% in 2020 and 9% in 20213. It has gone down to a low level, which is unbelievable for the USA. To make an analogy, "The bird escaped from the cage and came back as an eagle." Alternatively, as a more accurate analogy, "The USA could not prevent the bird in its cage from escaping, and this bird began to fly high as an eagle." This phenomenon, which

Source: Export Values, 2022. seems irreversible, is one of the important signs

that Türkiye intends to break the submissive ties

sales agreements, arms sales abroad decreased it has established with the West in the past and

from an annual average of 210.6 million TIVs that it wants to approach Asia to integrate without

to an annual average of 56.3 million TIVs in the compromising its geopolitical freedom.

2017-2019 period. Nevertheless, we should say F-16 Block 70 and modernization kits, which

that during the 2017-2019 period, which was are the last arms sales that the Turkish Armed

the period of overcoming the trauma of FETO, Forces can make to Türkiye through the field of

defense expenditures were made using domestic "fighter aircraft", where progress is relatively slow

rather than foreign resources. From 2017 through compared to other fields, is the last trump card

2019, the share of the USA in defense imports that the USA can use to control Türkiye through

decreased to 35% in 2017, 25% in 2018 and 17% the defense industry. The USA, after using this

in 2019 (Table 2). trump card, calculates that Türkiye’s war power

In the period between 2020-2021, when the will be destroyed by a war that may arise from the

trauma of FETO was overcome, a first in Türkiye’s tensions over the Islands Sea and Karaman Sea,

history was experienced. In these two years, annual and thus it will be made dependent on itself as in

defense imports averaged 183 million TIVs, while the old days.

*The Peak Period of FETÖ Control in Turkish Armed Forces 59

The prototype of the Turkish Fighter developed by TAI was shared for the first time on 23 November 2022. Turkish Fighter is planned to leave the hangar next year. (Turkish Defence News, 2022Turkish Defence News (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)

At this point, in a parenthesis, we should industry by the USA and the UK. This

say that with the two seismic surveys and four initiative can be perceived as the sabotage of

drilling vessels that the Turkish Petroleum the Turkish defense industry, which has made

Corporation added to its inventory between a leap. Turkish national capabilities should be

2012 and 2022, Türkiye has broken its challenged for 100 percent locality in national

dependence on imperialism in energy fighter jet mass production; For advanced

exploration and extraction capabilities, just fighter jet requirements expected to be felt by

like in the defense industry. the 2030s, Russian and Chinese options should

Having recovered from its dependence be considered as a priority. In fact, in order

on U.S. weapons, Türkiye has also begun to facilitate the development of fast-growing

to embrace its geopolitical power in the Turkish national defense industry, the issue of

defense of the “Blue Homeland”4. Acting in whether to buy F-16/F-35 or aircraft engines

accordance with this purpose, Türkiye has from the United States, which has declared

made great progress in the critical “Turkish Türkiye an enemy with CAATSA6 sanctions,

Fighter (TF) Project”, which it plans to start should be carefully considered. Türkiye’s

mass production as of 2030.5 The engines option of a trade retaliation that “prohibits

to be used in the prototypes of the TF were the purchase of military equipment from the

quickly presented to the Turkish defense United States” is an issue worth discussing.

Turkish-Greek Relations in the Islands Ottoman Empire abolished the maritime trade

Sea and the Karaman Sea That Cannot privileges it had granted to France and gave the

Establish Their Balance privilege of maritime trade in Ottoman waters to

the Greeks. Thanks to this last-minute privilege Historical Foundations of Turkish-Greek granted by the Ottoman Empire, the Greeks quickly Relations became sailors instead of defending the Turkish

Shortly after the Turks dominated Anatolia, the "Blue Homeland" against imperialism together

Catholic world, which conquered and settled the with the Turks. Since their rebellion in 1821,

Sea of Islands and Karaman, prospered between they have turned into a hybrid state supported by

the 11th and 14th centuries by plundering the imperialism and have begun to seize the Turkish

coasts where Muslim Turks and Orthodox "Blue Homeland" piece by piece through massacres

Greeks lived together. The Greeks, who could not and wars. Tens of thousands of Istanbul and Izmir

resist Catholic plunder because they were quite boatmen, who could not remain insensitive to the

regressive in seafaring, came under the protection massacres of Turks and Jews in Tripoli7, the entire

of the Turks, who responded to Catholic plunder Peloponnese and the Sea of Islands in 1821 and

by becoming sailors, who became stronger as they 1822, had enlisted themselves as galleonists8 in the

became sailors, and who drove Catholics from the Ottoman Navy, which was trying to suppress the

"Blue Homeland" to the Western Mediterranean at Greek rebellion.

the cost of hundreds of thousands of martyrs. With a resolution taken by the Greek Parliament

on 24 February 1994, the Greeks declared 19 May 1919 as the (so-called) "Pontic Genocide

The Greeks, who were Ottoman Remembrance Day" with the claim that "the Pontic

nationals from the 14th century Greeks living on the Black Sea coast during the

onwards, used the Turks as a defensive First World War and the War of Independence

wall against the predatory West until were subjected to systematic genocide by the

Ottoman Turks". It is time to confront the Greeks,

the beginning of the 19th century. who formalized this baseless claim to distort

The Greeks, who were Ottoman nationals from history with real history. Türkiye should erect a

the 14th century onwards, used the Turks as a huge "Commemoration Monument of the Turks

defensive wall against the predatory West until the Massacred by the Greeks" on one of the "Islands,

beginning of the 19th century. This great mistake Islets and Rocks Whose Sovereignty Has Not Been

of the Ottoman State, which did not go out to Transferred by Treaties" (EGEAYDAAK) with a

the oceans and closed itself to the Mediterranean ceremony on 6 April and organize commemorative

and Red Sea basins, resulted in the confrontation events in front of this monument on 6 April every

of imperialism and its buffers, which carried year.

the power they gained from the oceans to the The Ottoman State, which had to accept the

Mediterranean, with the attacks of the Turkish independence of Greece in 1830, tried to gain time

"Blue Homeland" since the 18th century. with variable balance policies through the conflicts

After the Napoleonic attacks on Egypt, the of interest of the imperialists among themselves.

recognize Lausanne against Türkiye. Türkiye accepted the "real" situation in Lausanne and pursued a policy based on "good neighborliness", but Greece, despite its unjust and extreme gains even in Lausanne, has not given up on its "expansionist ideals" (Megali Idea). Greece, which has been displaying piecemeal behavior since 193610 to recognize the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923, a peace treaty that determines the conditions that ended the Turkish-Greek War, openly challenges Türkiye with this attitude.11 Türkiye, on the other hand, despite having lost land, is in favor of preserving the Lausanne balance and sharing the seas peacefully and fairly

The US’s military presence in Greece. (BRIQ , 2022BRIQ (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) within the framework of this balance.

The first wave, in which Greece unilaterally

The Ottoman State, which was lost in the balance increased its territorial waters from 3 nautical miles to

games, could not prepare a qualified naval force due 6 nautical miles in 1936, has now turned into a tsunami

to foreign dependence and a debt spiral. It was eroded threatening the entire Turkish "Blue Homeland".

between Tsarist Russia and Greece, the buffers of Türkiye, which does not want to be under this tsunami,

imperialism, and first reduced to the status of a semi- is kept under control with artificial imperial tensions

colony. At the end of World War I, it lost its entire that smell of the "Megali Idea" and inconclusive

"Blue Homeland", including the Turkish Straits. diplomatic struggles that have been going on for years

After the War of Independence was won on land, in vain. When we look at the examples in human

the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), history, it is impossible to avoid wars that come to the

which went to Lausanne without a navy9, was forced door at stages when diplomacy cannot give results.

to leave most of the Boğazönü Islands and Saruhan To put it in its most succinct form, the Lausanne

Islands, which were on the Blue Homeland and were Treaty of 1923, which was based on "3 nautical miles

subject to Greek occupation, on the condition that of territorial waters", "the demilitarization of the

they would be demilitarized in the 1923 Lausanne Boğazönü, Saruhan and Menteşe Islands", and "the

Peace Treaty. In addition, the Italian-occupied acceptance of the belonging of formations with a very

Menteşe Islands in Lausanne were left to the Italians. small surface area that are not handed over by name"

Italy, one of the losers of World War II, signed the to Türkiye, is the brake on a possible Turkish-Greek

Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 and left the Menteşe Islands war. It is understood that Greece, which has exhausted

to Greece instead of Türkiye – on the condition of all its diplomatic opportunities to erode these main

demilitarization – in violation of the Lausanne Peace factors that are the conditions of Lausanne’s peace,

Treaty of 1923. While Türkiye should be the aggrieved is not yet aware that happy peace days can end by

party due to the loss of the vast majority of the Aegean attacking the Turkish "Blue Homeland" for 201 years,

Islands with the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923, on ignoring Lausanne for 86 years and challenging

the contrary, Greece adopted an attitude that did not Türkiye militarily for 67 years.

The main reason underlying this lack of vision in Aside from finding a solution, Greece’s capacity to

Greece stems from the belief that Türkiye’s "defensive" cope with this trauma is an issue worth examining

stance, which it had taken up until 2005 due to the fear realistically and impartially if the 67-year tense

of not being able to cope with imperialism, continues. period, in which the problems deepened, turns into

Indeed, Türkiye, which did not gain power at sea until war.

1952, had to act with a defense strategy based on its

coasts. From its entry into NATO in 1952 until the early Greece’s Capacity to Face Military Tensions

2000s, it accepted being an ideal and easy-to-control That Might Evolve and Turn into a War

proxy of US imperialism. Starting from the beginning

of the 21st century, Türkiye, which started to develop Territorial waters, the exclusive economic zone

its domestic and national defense industry by jumping (EEZ), strict demilitarization issues in some islands,

over the resistance mechanisms of US imperialism, and Cyprus issues in the Islands Sea and Karaman Sea,

let down its guard for a short time with the dream of which is the subject of many academic studies, are the

becoming an EU member until 2004. However, after main tension issues. At this point, it would be useful to

2005 it started to focus on an independent defense evaluate the capacity of Greece to face a Turkish-Greek

industry infrastructure again, realizing that the EU War, which may be caused by increasing these tensions,

deceived it. by making comparisons.

According to "Global Fire Power", which presents a comparison model of the armed forces in the world According to "Global Fire Power", using more than 50 parameters, in 2022, the Turkish which presents a comparison Armed Forces are 2.3 times stronger than the Greek

model of the armed forces in Armed Forces (Comparison of Greece and Türkiye

the world using more than 50 Military Strengths, 2022). If qualitative scoring such

parameters, the Turkish Armed as the level of operational readiness training could be

Forces are 2.3 times stronger than made, it would be possible to see that the superiority

the Greek Armed Forces. of the Turkish Armed Forces over the Greek Armed

Forces reached up to 5 times.

Greece, which has started to see Türkiye as an When we examine the arms purchases made

effective power in Libya in recent years12 and has by Türkiye and Greece from abroad in the last five

almost zeroed its dependence on the West in defense years, although Türkiye meets most of its defense

expenditures, has realized that it cannot solve the crisis needs from domestic production, according to Gre-

alone. With the thought that the USA and EU13 will not ece, which does not have a defense industry, it spent

allow a stronger Turkish presence in the Karaman Sea, 4.75 times (approximately five times) more than

Greece’s behavior against Lausanne and illegal sea area abroad. Türkiye, which has reduced its purchase

demands continue in line with the suggestions of the of weapons from the USA, has brought Italy, Spain

West. Greece is a state stuck between the imperialist and Russia to the fore in the list of countries from

interests of the USA and the EU, the ambition of the which it purchases weapons and defense materials.

"Megali Idea" 14 that it cannot give up, and the Turkish Greece continued its dependence on the USA and

defense capabilities that have become independent. France to purchase weapons and defense materials.

Table 3. Turkish-Greek Weapons Purchases and Sales for the 2017-2021 Period

Source: Export Values, 2022.

The fact that warplanes are the largest purchases also puts the exploitation mechanisms in Greece

of defense materials by both Türkiye and Greece into action – ruthlessly. Greece has had difficulty

shows that warplanes are the most sensitive and finding a budget for defense expenditures in the

deficient area of defense of both states. The fact last five years. The increase in the Turkish-Greek

that so many current examinations of the F-16, tension, even turning it into a war, forced the Gre-

Rafale and F-35 aircraft are so intense these days ek people to purchase more American and French

is mainly due to this sensitivity. weapons. The imperialist pressures of the USA and

When we look at Table 3 regarding Turkish and France, which target Greece rather than Türkiye,

Greek armament performance, Greece does not will cause the Greek people to pay more taxes for

have the potential to enter an arms race with Tür- their defense expenditures for the next five years.

kiye. This is because almost all categorical ratios on Possible Effects of USA and Israel on Turkisharmament seem to be between 2.73 and 41.73 times Greek Tension in favor of Türkiye. To continue the tension poli-

cies of Greece, which cannot give up on its ideals, it At the peak of imperialism, the USA was based

is to seek the help of imperialism to be even more in Alexandroupoli, thinking that Türkiye might

buffered and hybridized.15 Naturally, such a quest want to seize Western Thrace due to the settled

Turkish population in a possible Turkish-Greek Possible Effects of France on Turkish-Greek

War. It also adopted a radical base policy under the Tension

guise of reinforcement of the weak Greek Armed

Forces. However, when the world is moving towards Recently, in parallel with the discovery of new

multipolarity, it is highly unlikely that the USA, energy sources in the Karaman Sea, economic-

which does not want to wear out its armed forces, based cooperation models of some countries

will be directly involved in a Turkish-Greek War. in the region have been tried to be developed.

Instead, the United States, Britain and France plan For these economic-based cooperation models

to establish a high-level military presence in Cypriot to be functional, they must have a strong

waters, forcing Türkiye to shift some of its power to image and even present a strong image with

Greece in the Karaman Sea is an option with a higher military demonstrations attended by many

probability. states. In this atmosphere, some weak military

demonstrations, contributed by the USA, some EU countries, Israel and Egypt, which feared the

In these games played through Turkish geopolitical dominance in the Karaman

the sale of weapons, apart from Sea, became an annual routine. On the other

the USA, the world’s leading arms hand, while these weak military exercises could

dealer, France, also plays the not create a serious psychological impact on

public opinion in Türkiye, which was declared leading role. a rival, it gave morale to the Greek and Greek Cypriot public. With this motivation, Greece and

By adjusting its presence in the Karaman Sea to the Greek Cypriot Administration, determined

the level of tension, the United States can continue to to maintain tensions over geopolitics and

control maritime trade routes through the "surprise geoenergy, act with the motive of armament by

effect", which is the most important weapon of war. forcing their conditions. In these games played

On the other hand, the escalation of the tensions through the sale of weapons, apart from the

between Türkiye and Greece are the facts that will USA, the world’s leading arms dealer, France,

trigger the arms needs of both Greece and Türkiye. also plays the leading role.

The USA offered to Greece, which has economic France is more present in the Karaman Sea

difficulties, to sell 4 Multi-Purpose Surface Warships than before, with the belief that the USA has

(MMSC), a modernization package for Hydra relatively withdrawn from the Mediterranean,

(MEKO-200 HN) class frigates16 and 20 F-35 fighter thus creating a great power vacuum to be filled.

jets. It also offered to sell 40 F-16 Block 70 and 79 The effort underlying the demonstration-based

F-16 Block 40/50 modernization kits to Türkiye at French military effort aims to establish a French

the same time (M5 Dergi, 2022M5 Dergi (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) (SavunmaSanayiST, hegemony under the name of "Pax Mediterranea"

2022). Imperialism always benefits from tensions, in this geography. However, this ambitious effort

so it is necessary to look for imperialism in the by France has not yielded any results so far

background of all tensions. (Jabbour, 2021Jabbour (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

The last demonstration, which was held to keep this power fluctuation in the east of the Mediterranean

the Turkish-Greek tensions fresh through the Greek is temporary, and underestimate the power of the

public, triggering the arms sales, was held between Turkish Armed Forces with arrogance. However,

24 September and 1 October 2022, in the form of compared to the French Army, the fourth strongest

a Greek-French bilateral exercise under the name armed force in the world, the Turkish Armed Forces

ARGO-22 (Athens News Agency, 2022Athens News Agency (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.), located in is only 34.57% underpowered in quantity. Moreover,

the north of the Islands Sea. It was exhibited in a Türkiye is completely independent of France in terms

small area between the islands of Bozbaba and İskiri. of defense materials, as it does not use the weapons of

The ARGO-22 Dual Exercise17, resembling tactical the French, who are among the leading arms dealers

training rather than an exercise in its most minimal in the world. To summarize, France does not have an

and most economical way (Özsaraç, Doğu Akdeniz’de armed force that can crush Türkiye.

Savaş Senaryoları, 2022), has achieved its purpose

by causing a holiday joy in the Greek public and Possible Effects of Egypt on Turkish-Greek

convinced the Greek citizens to pay high taxes for 24 Tension

Rafale fighter jets and 3 (+1 optional) prototypes FDI

the Belharra type frigates that France wants to sell to The former president of Egypt, Mohammed

Greece. Morsi, abolished the natural gas delivery agreement

Competing with Türkiye’s geopolitical power, between Egypt and Israel in April 2012 and

extending to North Africa, even to the sub-Saharan annulled the EEZ agreement signed with the Greek

SAHEL, and believing that it can balance it with its Cypriot Administration in 2003 in March 2013.

economic power, this time France, intends to use The choice of the Morsi administration was to

the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum as a carrot establish the Levant Cooperation, of which Türkiye

that can be extended to Türkiye because the carrot would be a part. However, General Sisi, who came

for entry into the European Union is not as effective to power with the coup, re-enforced the previous

as before.18 In addition, France is acting cautiously agreements. It should be considered that Egypt

as it thinks that Türkiye will be the most important does not have a clear Karaman Sea policy and has

market for natural gas in the Karaman Sea (Segantini, become fragile with power changes. We should also

2022). note that with the onset of the General Sisi period,

As can be understood from the roles it wants to give Egypt entered into a formidable armament effort.

Türkiye such as "balancing Russia and China in the To summarize, Egypt is a silent giant in the

Central Asian Turkic world", "assuming the security of Karaman Sea, which does not show its teeth for now,

the Black Sea", "supporting the stabilization of Libya", but cannot resist the wishes of the West today. The

and "providing humanitarian aid to Syria", France is Turkish Armed Forces are quantitatively weaker

approaching Türkiye with an imperialist mentality than the Egyptian Armed Forces by 4.7% (Global

that might bite (Segantini, 2022Segantini (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). From the current Firepower, 2022). The main reason that Egypt,

policies of France, it is understood that Türkiye, which does not have a national defense industry,

which has successfully made its defense industry has the strongest armed forces in the Karaman Sea

independent, cannot adequately perceive (or ignore) is because of the excessive purchase of weapons

its new defense capabilities, act with the thought that since 2015. As seen in Table 4, this excess is four

Table 4. Turkish-Egyptian Arms Purchases and Sales for the 2015-2021 Period

Source: Export Values, 2022.

times that of Türkiye. It is understood that the is closed to Turkish merchant ships, it may have a

aim of these astronomical military expenditures dangerous effect against Türkiye. This geopolitical

of Egypt, which used most of it for the navy and power is not to be taken lightly.

air force, was to balance Türkiye in the Karaman Both Türkiye and Egypt have to extend a hand

Sea. Egypt has started to make its impact felt in the of friendship to each other. It is especially worth

region with the defense expenditures it has made noting that Egypt needs Turkish friendship because

for the last seven years and has not slowed down. Egypt’s dependence on the West in defense evokes

Egypt, which has participated in many exercises Türkiye’s situation in the 1990s. Egypt, located on

with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration one of the busiest waterways in the world, will want

(GCA) in recent years, is a powerful state that to meet its defense needs with domestic and national

should be considered in a possible Turkish-Greek resources, as Türkiye did, as soon as it realizes that

War. In addition, it should not be forgotten that being connected to the West is a weakness. The day

in the event of such a war, even if Greece does not Egypt decides to seek its interests in Asia instead of

participate in the war on its side, if the Suez Canal the West, Türkiye will be a model country.

Non-Combat Options 1988 Athens Consensus

International Court of Justice (ICJ) Greece always chooses the winter months to

escalate tensions because tourism, which intensifies in

It is not only Türkiye and Greece that have the summer months, is vital for the country’s economy.

maritime jurisdiction disputes worldwide. About Türkiye and Greece, with the Athens Agreement,

180 of 420 disputes have been brought to the signed on 27 May 1988, guaranteed each other not to

International Court of Justice in the Hague. It conduct military exercises in the Islands (Agean) Sea

should be accepted that it is an ideal solution for between 1 July and 1 September. On 1 July 2006, this

Türkiye and Greece to bring all their disputes to period was extended to cover the period from 15 June

the International Court of Justice in the Hague. to 15 September. Türkiye has made a great contribution

However, based on the previous decisions of the to Greek tourism by following this moratorium so far.

Court of Justice, Greece, which understands that However, it is illogical to prioritize Greek tourism

the court will most likely make decisions in favor revenue when so many problems have been waiting

of Türkiye, does not want to take the disputes to for a solution for 67 years. It is clear that it will be in

the Hague. Waiting patiently for a period when the favor of Türkiye to cancel this moratorium rather than

conjuncture will change in its favor legally, Greece pause military activities during the summer months

is making efforts to postpone the option of the and to carry the tensions experienced in the winter in

International Court of Justice as much as possible the Islands Sea to the summer months.

without neglecting to take measures per the existing 1936 Montreux Straits Convention case law. It would be incompatible with realism to

think that Greece could abandon this asymmetrical The term of the Montreux Straits Convention, a 20-

behavior that avoids the application of international year contract, expired on 9 November 1956. However,

law. since none of the signatory states took a step towards

Although the exclusive economic area in the annulment of the convention, it has remained valid until

Islands Sea is shown as 89,000 square kilometers today. To 17% of all merchant ships in the world as DWT,

in the current "Blue Homeland" maps, the fair Greeks, who own 30.25% of crude oil and petroleum

situation for Türkiye is that an economic area products tankers, benefit from the special transit regime

equal to half of the sea and land total is requested provided for merchant ships by the 1936 Montreux

from the International Court of Justice. If Greece Convention. To summarize, the state that uses the

continues to resist going to the International Court Turkish Straits and the Sea of Marmara most, which is a

of Justice, Türkiye should begin to unilaterally and Turkish inland sea, is Greece. For example, Greek-owned

boldly implement the requirements of its interests. tankers carry most of the oil transported through the

In other words, Türkiye must abandon its policy of Turkish Straits. At least 49% of the oil that Greece uses in

silence to a situation similar to the current "modus its own country has come through the Turkish Straits for

vivendi". Adopt the option of unilaterally declaring the last 20 years. This rate was 91% in 2020 (IEA, 2022IEA (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

an exclusive economic zone based on the westward To create a solution to Turkish-Greek tensions that favors

extension of the midline to include a marine area Türkiye, the geopolitical power of the Turkish Straits,

of 118,500 square kilometers (half of the combined which has contributed to the prosperity of Greece for

sea area and land area – about 55% of the sea) in the decades, should be activated. It is the right time to open

Islands Sea. the 1936 Montreux Convention for discussion.

Conclusion large number of islands in the Islands Sea, together

with 3 miles of territorial waters, unilaterally declaring Tensions in the Islands and Karaman Sea that are and implementing the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) evolving into war have not been resolved through so that at least 55% of the entire remaining sea area diplomacy to date. The easiest way to solve all the belongs to Türkiye. This should be discussed in the problems under discussion is for Türkiye and Greece Grand National Assembly of Türkiye and, if necessary, to go to the International Court of Justice by mutual

agreement and respect the court’s decision. If Greece, submitted to a public vote.

which has blocked this road until now, continues to For the Karaman Sea, the Grand National

flee from the International Court of Justice, Türkiye Assembly of Türkiye should discuss a law that

must operate unilateral decision mechanisms, provides a conference invitation to the 10 riparian

considering war. states, ignoring the demands of Greece and the Greek

When considering the Islands Sea, the 1923 Cypriot Administration in case of failure of the

Lausanne Peace Treaty is a very strong text in conference solution, and declaring and applying the

international law, which cannot be violated unilaterally borders of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the

by both states. The clauses of peace treaties do not Karaman Sea. If necessary, it should be submitted to

become obsolete until a new war. The only way to a public vote.

change, other than war, is by mutual consent. Atatürk’s In this process, with the cancellation of the

Türkiye, which wanted to get rid of the restrictions of 1988 Athens Agreement and the 1936 Montreux

Lausanne regarding the Turkish Straits, solved this Convention, the issues of whether to continue the

problem with the conference held in Montreux in 1936 voluntary contributions made through the Turkish

and convinced all the signatory states of Lausanne, geography to the tourism and maritime trade areas,

including Greece, to a new convention. There is only which are the most important income items of Greece,

one peaceful option for Greece, which wants to get should be opened to a comprehensive discussion by

rid of the provisions of Lausanne’s "3 nautical miles the public.

territorial waters", "demilitarization of islands far Thanks to the development of its national defense

from the Greek mainland but very close to the Turkish industry, Turkish dependence on weapons from

mainland", and "return to Türkiye of formations whose the imperialist states trying to interfere with our

sovereignty has not been transferred to Greece" to geopolitical power in the Karaman Sea has largely

request "a conference". Any situation to the contrary disappeared. This momentum should not be missed,

means risking a war. and a trade embargo should be applied to Western

Therefore, after Greece was suggested to apply for weapons, including purchases of warplanes and

a conference to the signatory states of the Treaty of engines. Mandatory weapons requirements must be

Lausanne for its demands beyond Lausanne, with met through Asian options such as Russia, China, and

full consideration of the balance of Lausanne, a law Iran.19

should be outlined which: Asia’s coping with imperialist pressures depends

- Does not recognize the territorial waters and on Asian control of interconnected maritime trade

airspace of Greece greater than 3 nautical miles routes, starting from the Kerch Strait in the Black

- Protects the Islands, Islets and Rocks Sea, through the Turkish Straits, the Suez Canal, the

(EGEAYDAAK) whose sovereignty has not been Babülmandep Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of

transferred by treaties, by name and practices, Malacca, and the Bering Strait. For this purpose, a new

- Takes into account the imbalances caused by the defense structure should be considered based on the

control of these trade routes from the sea by the Asian 7. The genocide of Turks and Jews in the Peloponnese from 1821 to

1822 is a lesser-known issue to the Turkish public because of a lack of

states, which are not the buffer of the West. Of course, academic interest (Örenç, 2020Örenç (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

for a defense structure that will protect Asia from 8. The massacres suffering the Turks spread starting from Tripolis on

the seas against imperialism, Türkiye, Russia, China, 6 April 1821 and were not limited to the Peloponnese, but took place

in Samos, Chios and Ipsara Islands, and even on the coasts of Anatolia

Iran, and even Egypt must show their will together (Büyüktuğrul, 1982; Tezel, 1973; Özsaraç & Özyiğit, Osmanlı’nın Kalbi,

if they can break away from the West. It is possible Tersane-i Amire/Tersane, 2022).

9. During the Lausanne negotiations, the Ottoman Navy, which

for Asia to get rid of imperialism by giving a breath was weak, backward in technology, neglected and worn out due to war

to the sea trade routes around it. The maritimization wounds, was interned in the docks and piers of the "Tersâne-i Âmire" in

of Asia in cooperation and its giantization in the the Golden Horn under the control of the Allied Powers who had been

occupying Istanbul since 1918. Two gunboats with very low firepower,

oceans should be prioritized. Otherwise, Western named Preveza and Isareis, which escaped to support the logistical

imperialism, which can directly or indirectly use its transportation of the War of Independence over the Black Sea and came

under the command of the Government of the Turkish Grand National

power in the seas, including the Karaman Sea, will not Assembly, could not cross the Turkish Straits controlled by the Allied

end its attempts to shape Asian maps with soft or hard Navy under the conditions of 1923. Even if they passed, it would be

power instruments through its theories of reshaping impossible for them to overcome the powerful Greek Navy (Özsaraç &

Özyiğit, Osmanlı’nın Kalbi, Tersane-i Amire/Tersane, 2022)

the world. 10. Following the Montreux Convention on the Straits, the Greek

Parliament unilaterally increased the width of the territorial waters from 3 nautical miles to 6 nautical miles with Law No. 230 adopted on

Notes 17 September 1936. Along with the relatively friendly environment in

bilateral relations, Türkiye did not object to this initiative of Greece due to

1. TIV (Trend Indicator Value); Developed by the Stockholm the increasing threat of Italy in the Mediterranean. Although the Italian

International Peace International Research Institute for the purpose of presence in the Islands Sea ended in 1947, Türkiye remained silent on this

comparing military capacity rather than financial value, under the name unilateral application of Greek territorial waters. After a while, it made

of “trend indicator value”. It is a standard international valuation unit a very serious mistake and increased the width of the territorial waters

applied in the analysis of arms sales. of Türkiye to 6 nautical miles with the law numbered 476 dated 15 May

2. Zachary Paikin and Caroline Rose believe that Türkiye, the third 1964. Moreover, with the Territorial Waters Law No. 2674 dated 20 May

most arms importing state in the world in the 1990s, has succeeded 1982, the width of the territorial waters of 6 nautical miles in the Islands

in being 14th in world arms exports today despite limited economic Sea has been confirmed. Although Türkiye has made a double mistake,

conditions. They point out that although it was once the most popular they are not incorrigible mistakes.

customer in the arms market, it has reduced its arms imports by 59% 11. Greek scholars claim that the Turkish-Greek problems started in

from 2011 to the present (Paikin & Rose, 2021Paikin & Rose (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). the 1970s (Grigoriadis, 2021Grigoriadis (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)

3. The remaining 91% of arms and defense equipment purchases were 12. In 2020, the world’s first large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle

from Italy and Russia (Export Values, 2022Export Values (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). battle between Bayraktar TB2, a SİHA (Armed Unmanned Aerial

4. Many Greek academics believe that a group of high-ranking Vehicle) used by Turkish operators, and Chinese-made Wing Loong II

soldiers have been putting forward and developing the "Blue Homeland" drones used by United Arab Emirates citizen (UAE) operators, resulted

doctrine since 2006, provoking the Turkish government and Turkish in victory (Defense World, 2022Defense World (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)

public opinion and persuading them to act outside the basic principles of 13. In the language of literature used by the EU, it has become quite

international law in the Eastern Mediterranean (Grigoriadis, 2021Grigoriadis (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). common to refer to Russia as the "enemy" and Türkiye as the "enemy’s

5. The first prototype of the Turkish Fighter (TF), which continues its partner" (Tanchum, 2022)

production activities within the body of TAI, is planned to exit the hangar 14. Greece’s ambition to snatch economic space through Crete and

on 18 March 2023 with the engines running and start ground tests. By the Rhodes has reached insanity with a map ordered for a fee from University

end of 2026, 3 TF Block 0 prototypes will be produced and the first flights of Seville professors Juan Luis Suarez de Vivero and Juan Carlos Mateos.

will be made. It is aimed to deliver TF Block I fighter jets to the Turkish On this map, Greece is trying to use the island of Meis, which is 330

Air Force by 2029. 10 F-110 engines are to be procured from the United nautical miles (580 kilometers) away from its mainland, but only 1.25

States for the prototypes of these aircraft. For the Block I aircraft, Rolls- nautical miles (2 kilometers) from the shores of Kaş and on which only

Royce engines are to be purchased from the UK and then the domestic 500 Greeks live, as leverage. This attempt to steal a sea area of 40,000

engines developed by the Kale Group will be used (Milli Muharip Uçak’ın square kilometers from the Blue Homeland was another issue that

Motoru Türkiye’de, 2022). brought the tension to a peak.

6. Due to Türkiye’s purchase of the S-400 air defense system from 15. It can also be called a "proxy", an increasingly commonly used

Russia, the USA has included Türkiye as of 6 April 2021 in the scope of term recently.

the "Combating Adversaries of the United States through Sanctions Act 16. The $6.9 billion MMSC shipbuilding project and the $2.5 billion

(CAATSA)" to impose sanctions on China, Russia, Iran and North Korea Hydra-class ship modernization project were presented to the US Congress as

(ABD’nin Türkiye’ye yönelik CAATSA yaptırımları yürürlüğe girdi, 2021ABD’nin Türkiye’ye yönelik CAATSA yaptırımları yürürlüğe girdi (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). a package by the US Department of State on 10 December 2021 (Azman, 2021Azman (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)

17. Although it was stated in the press that the entire Greek Navy M5 Dergi. (2022, August 7). F-16 Block 70 tedariğinde Lockheed

would participate, one frigate, 2 LST (tank landing craft), one submarine, Martin ile OFFSET anlaşması imzalanacak. Retrieved from Öne

a small number of aircraft/helicopters from Greece and the FS Tonnerre Çıkan: https://m5dergi.com/savunma-haberleri/f-16-blo

ck-70-tedariginde-lockheed-martin-ile-offset-anlasmasi-imzala

helicopter amphibious ship from France participated in the ARGO-22 nacak/

exercise on land for six days. It spent only one day at sea (News Beezer, MarineTraffic. (2020). Density Maps. Retrieved from https://www.

2022) marinetraffic.com/blog/singapore-top-shipping-centre-for-eigh

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