Reflections of Türkiye-Greece Tension in the Sea of Islands on the Eastern Mediterranean Regional Security Complex

Elif Erkeç

Abstract

This study examines how Türkiye has made the problem in the Sea of Islands a security issue in its recent foreign policy, the policies of Türkiye and Greece towards the Eastern Mediterranean region, the attitudes of non-regional actors towards the parties, and the reflections of the tension between the two countries in the region with the Copenhagen School’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) approach and process tracking method, which has an important place in security studies. Since they are perceived as a threat to the sovereignty of Türkiye, these issues are a problem of belonging and armament of the islands in the Sea of Islands, whose status has not been determined by international agreements. Greece’s efforts to expand its territorial waters are based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which Türkiye is not a party. Greek policies shaped within the framework of the Seville map, and the effect of foreign actors, have created regional complex formations studied by excluding Türkiye. It is considered unacceptable for Türkiye to remain silent in the face of threats against it, to accept the demands dictated to it, and to compromise its national interests. Increasing uncertainty in the region, polarization, and the race for regional militarization bring the risk of open conflict. This situation creates a serious security threat in the Eastern Mediterranean Region Security Complex.

Keywords

Eastern MediterraneanIslands IssueMilitarizationRegional Security Complex TheorySecurity Hazard

Full Text

Introduction conflict in the maritime jurisdiction, the problem

of who owns the islets and reefs whose status quo is

DISPUTES BETWEEN TÜRKIYE AND GREECE unclear, and Greece’s arming of the islands whose

in the “Sea of Islands” on the continental shelf, legal status has not been decided yet. According to

territorial waters, and the sovereignty of the Greece, the only reason for the problem is Türkiye’s

unassigned islands show their impact at the refusal to accept Greece’s maritime jurisdiction

regional and international levels. Although the and occupy the Greek continental shelf. Greece,

problem is experienced in the Sea of Islands, which wants to receive a share of the energy

it is also related to the Eastern Mediterranean resources discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean

region. For this reason, the question “Is the island and take an active role in an energy corridor that

problem between the two countries only related to can be created, aims to solve the continental shelf

the security of the two countries, or could it cause problem by squeezing Türkiye into a narrow

a serious problem for regional security as well?” maritime jurisdiction area. However, a solution

is the main focus of this study. The approach of formed in line with the demands of Greece means

Türkiye and Greece to the problem in the Sea of that Türkiye renounces its territorial waters

Islands further deepens this problem. border of 104 thousand square kilometers along

According to Türkiye, the problem is the the Sea of Islands and the Eastern Mediterranean.

This would leave Türkiye with only 41 thousand Mediterranean. In this study, the background of

square kilometers of maritime jurisdiction in the the issue in the Sea of Islands between Türkiye and

Sea of Islands and Eastern Mediterranean (Çetin, Greece and the arguments put forward by Türkiye

2020; Kadan, 2020). and Greece will be discussed by addressing the

Greece’s increasing relations with Israel and variable geopolitical dynamics of the Eastern

other countries in the region, the increasing Mediterranean region and the attitudes of non-

presence of the European Union (EU) and the regional actors. Solutions will be suggested by

United States of America (USA) in the region and applying the process follow-up method within the

the reflection of pragmatic alliances formed on framework of the RSCT.

the economic ground in the military field through

military exercises and similar initiatives has left Regionalism and Regional Security

Türkiye geopolitically besieged and exacerbated Complex Theory

the perception of threat. This situation caused

Türkiye’s foreign policy to turn into the diplomacy Regions and regionalism are interconnected norms

of deterrence. The fact that both sides look at the in terms of international relations, intertwined to

problems from different perspectives has led to better explain world regional politics by narrowing

the inability to produce constructive solutions borders. Traditionally, regions and regionalism has

with concrete steps despite the calls for dialogue. been developed by groups, states, and empires that

This situation further increases the tension in the shape history under the influence of historical,

region. Although the problem in the Sea of Islands political, economic, military, and geographical

occurs at the regional level, it directly affects the factors. Some significant developments in history

Eastern Mediterranean Regional Complex and - wars, alliances, treaties, and trade routes - have

brings with it the risks of active conflict. While contributed to this development, as have these

Türkiye stated that Greece is ignoring calls for actors in history. Understanding the international

dialogue and taking more provocative actions system and its subsystems and analyzing the

instead of a solution-oriented attitude, Greece regions as a unit is one of the most complicated

emphasizes that Türkiye threatens them with war. things in international relations. For this reason,

In fact, in the letter sent by Greece to the United the necessity of examining the world by dividing it

Nations (UN), the EU, and the North Atlantic into regions and subsystems has emerged.

Treaty Organization (NATO), Greece stated that Many theories have influenced studies about

President Erdoğan stated warlike rhetoric Greece regions, regionalization, and regional security. In

with these words “We may come suddenly one the field of old regionalization theory, attempts

night” (Haber Global, 2022). have been made to explain the regionalization

An active conflict situation between the two process with theories such as functionalism, neo-

countries has the power to affect the whole region. functionalism, regional economic integration,

At this point, actors such as the Atlantic system, and neo-realism (Breslin & Higgott, 2000, p.

the UN, and the EU may suffer from this conflict. 334). According to the old regionalism, regions

This situation will lead to a security crisis that were necessarily created to cope with the global

is exceedingly difficult to repair in the Eastern challenges posed by the bipolar Cold War conditions

(Hettne, 2002, p. 326). According to Buzan, security complexes (Stivachtis, 2021).

regions are regional security complexes combined In the early 1990s, the Copenhagen School

with mutual security issues (Buzan, 1983). In defined the security complex as “A group of states

this respect, ensuring security is the primary whose security perceptions and security concerns

concept of new regionalism, which emerged as the cannot be considered independently of each other”.

third wave of regionalization after the Cold War, After adopting the securitization concept in 1995,

representing a much more dimensional form of it defined “The securitization and desecuritization

integration. It connects national and international processes as units that cannot be considered

factors, political and economic factors, and state independently of each other”. The RSCT is partially

and non-state actors by building regional theory borrowed from security theory. It is argued that the

into the discipline of international relations more dependence on security in the complexes stems from

successfully (Gürcan, 2010, pp. 21–22; Kelly, 2007, the securitization of neighboring states (Buzan &

p. 198; Vayrynen, 2003, p. 27). Waever, 2003, p. 44). According to the Copenhagen

school, which also studies desecuritization along with securitization theory, the main goal is not to securitize an issue but to desecuritize it (Buzan, The Regional Security Complex Wæver ve Wilde, 1998:1). While securitization is Theory, developed by the the legitimate measure taken when there is a threat Copenhagen School, is one of to the reference object, desecuritization is the loss

several new theories associated with of its securitization status or the politicization of

the new regionalism. an issue (Hansen, 2012, p. 526).

According to Buzan, security is a relational

The Regional Security Complex Theory, phenomenon, with the national security of all

developed by the Copenhagen School, is one of states in the system interconnected by a network

several new theories associated with the new of interdependence. Security and insecurity

regionalism. This theory was developed by Barry are associated with proximity, as political and

Buzan (Buzan, 1983, 1991; Grabowski, 2020). The military threats are more intense at close ranges

concept was later conceptually expanded by Barry than at long distances (Söderbaum & Shaw,

Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde (Buzan et 2003). When it comes to regional security, the

al., 1998) and then Barry Buzan and Ole Waever region, shaped by mutual dependence, power

(Buzan & Waever, 2003). The regional security distribution, history, perceptions of friendship

complex is based on variables and regional and hostility, fear, and regional dynamics, creates

dynamics such as intense conflict-cooperation a more intense and high-level diplomacy between

dynamics, the concepts of friendship and enmity, the states. According to Buzan, the concepts

interdependence, geographical and historical of friendship and enmity cannot be connected

proximity, geopolitical rivalry, and fear factor in only to the balance of power because there are

which two or more states are mutually affected. It issues such as ideology, region, ethnic lines, and

also discusses whether ethnocultural and religious historical precedent that can affect these feelings

ties can be determining factors in determining (Buzan, 2007).

2022 Blue Homeland exercise of the Turkish Naval Forces Command. (Turkish Naval Forces Command, 2022)

Another essential factor is fear. Regional can be changed by states that interact or do not

Security Complex Theory, both old and new, want to interact with each other. Complexes

emphasizes geography first. It is based on the can be structured in diverse ways, depending

basic idea that threats have the most significant on the distribution of power among states

impact in geographically neighboring areas. and the degree of friendship and enmity

Therefore, states fear the intentions and between them (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 53).

powers of neighboring states. The main level of Depending on the degree of friendship and

security analysis is the regional level (Buzan & enmity, complexes can be divided into three

Waever, 2003, p. 3). Due to the fear factor, the types: conflict formation, security order, and

states in the regions are highly interconnected. security community. When problems cannot

In regional security, there is higher security be resolved under appropriate conditions, it

dependency between states. For this reason, creates an environment of conflict. Therefore,

it is necessary to analyze the entire region as in conflict complexes, states perceive each

a unit to understand the security problems other as possible threats and do not respect

(Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 41). each other as sovereign entities (Frazier &

A complex is formed between at least two Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010). In the security order,

sovereign states interacting with each other. the potential risk of conflict and fear of war

The borders of the complex are formed based continues. However, these conflicts can be

on the states’ security policies. These borders overcome with diplomatic solutions. The

rivalry perceptual is intense rather than the Geographic, Geostrategic and

hostility perceptual between states. The level of Geopolitical Elements Defining the

cooperation between states in these complexes Eastern Mediterranean

is relatively high. In security communities,

however, states do not expect such conflicts The Eastern Mediterranean is a region drawn

to arise. If a problem arises, solutions to east of the line between Cape Bon in Tunisia

problems are developed within the framework and Cape Lilibeo at the tip of Sicily Island.

of mutually determined rules and diplomacy It is surrounded by the coasts of Albania,

Cyprus (TRNC), Türkiye and Tunisia (Yaycı,

The Eastern Mediterranean region, which has 2020, p. 12). The United Kingdom, which has

a rich accumulation in line with the historical, the status of a guarantor country like Greece

cultural, economic, geographical, and political and Türkiye in Cyprus, also has a coast in the

elements it contains, has had a central (superior) Eastern Mediterranean because the Akrotiri and

function on East-West trade, transportation, Dhekelia bases are sovereign territories (Kansu,

migration, and energy transmission routes 2019, p. 60, 2020). The Eastern Mediterranean

throughout history. The Eastern Mediterranean region is at a critical point at the junction of the

carried the wealth of the East to the West continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa, due to its

(Özekin, 2020, p. 11). It is important to geographical and geostrategic location as well as

reevaluate the region, which has such strategic its political and economic characteristics.

importance, and the developments in today’s The Eastern Mediterranean basin appears

conjuncture. This study will examine the to function as a gateway that opens from

reflections on the problem between Türkiye Mesopotamia and Central Asia via Türkiye and

and Greece on the Eastern Mediterranean Syria to the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian

security complex in terms of geographical Gulf via the Suez Canal (Kütükçü & Kaya, 2016,

proximity, power distributions, friendship, band p. 88). The Eastern Mediterranean basin is in a

hostility perceptual, fear factor, and regional geostrategic position regarding Middle Eastern

conjuncture. According to the RSCT, complexes and European connections. It is connected to

are categorized as conflict, security order, and the Marmara Sea by the Dardanelles Strait and

security community. It is seen that the Eastern to the Red Sea by the Suez Canal, containing

Mediterranean security complex continues to the Adriatic Sea, the Ionian Sea, and the Aegean

turn into a conflict complex due to the unresolved Sea. It is located on the trade routes connecting

problems between Türkiye and Greece. At this the east and west of the world. In this way, it is

point, factors such as geographical proximity, a critical position in the logistics of energy and

hostility, fear, and threat perception impact the commercial goods from the Middle East, India,

formation of the complex. and the Pacific oceans to Europe (Duman,

Eastern Mediterranean. (Map General Directorate, 2023)

2021; Ozan, 2019; Şemşek, n.d.; Yaycı, liquefied natural gas pass through the Suez

2012). In addition, the fact that the island of Canal (New Zealand Embassy in Cairo, 2021;

Cyprus, which has strategic importance in United Nations Conference on Trade and

maritime transit transport, is in the Eastern Development, 2021).

Mediterranean region increases the region’s With the increasing need for energy after

importance even more. the industrial revolutions, fierce competition

In the Mediterranean region, which covers for hydrocarbons has led to the redistribution

only 1% of the world’s seas, 15% of global of world energy resources starting from the

maritime transport occurs (WWF, 2021). The end of the 19th century. In this race, keeping

Eastern Mediterranean acts as a locomotive oil-rich geographies such as the Middle East

in the Mediterranean region, where an under control and delivering the oil in the

enormous international maritime trade and region to the world market has become the

energy flow takes place (Gürcan, 2021). The primary motivation of the great European

grounding of the cargo ship The Evergreen powers (Gibson, 2019). During the Second

due to a sandstorm on 24 March 2021 in the World War, the Eastern Mediterranean

Suez Canal, which joins the Indian Ocean and attracted the attention of the Axis powers

the Red Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean, with its geographical proximity to the Middle

once again emphasized that the Suez Canal East, North Africa, and the Caucasus oil. The

is of critical importance for global shipping Eastern Mediterranean played a vital role in

and supply lines. Approximately 12% of global defending NATO’s southern flank throughout

trade and 30% of global container traffic, the Cold War.

an estimated 7-10% of world oil, and 8% of In the last 20 years, the hydrocarbon reserves

discovered in the region have significantly the Cyprus problem would create a basis for

changed the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy reconciliation. Contrary to this, the situation

geopolitics. Since the second half of the further deepened existing problems. While it

2000s, the discoveries made by the countries is expected to contribute to the formation of

that are neighbors in the Mediterranean and the regional security complex and encourage

some international oil companies offered the economic partnerships, regional cooperation

Eastern Mediterranean region the opportunity has begun to evolve into political and military

to become a potential energy production alliances.

center and energy corridor (Özekin, 2020). The existence of hydrocarbon resources

under the seabed has led the countries in The rapidly increasing uncertainty

the region to declare their continental shelf in the region and the regional

an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and to militarization race bring the risk of

accelerate exploration and drilling operations open conflict.

in these zones. On the one hand, regional and

non-regional states’ involvement in sharing The rapidly increasing uncertainty in

resources and maritime areas has further the region and the regional militarization

intensified the competition and conflicts race bring the risk of open conflict. The

in the region. On the other hand, energy developments that led to the further increase

discoveries have brought about considerable of insecurity and instability in the region

changes in the region’s geopolitics and created are as follows: conflict over the energy

a fragile foundation that endangers the resources discovered in the region, maritime

countries’ security in the region, especially delimitation disputes, the Cyprus issue, the

Türkiye (Gürcan, 2019; Gürcan, 2021). island problem between Türkiye and Greece,

the war in Syria, the Israeli-Lebanese border

Geopolitical Dynamics in the Eastern conflicts, the intensification of regional

Mediterranean conflicts, the rapid militarization of the

region, regional political uncertainties, and

It is still unclear whether the energy Türkiye’s new foreign policy under the Justice

resources discovered in the Eastern and Development Party (AKP) in response

Mediterranean are a great opportunity or a big to the perception of regional encirclement

threat to the region’s countries and regional towards Türkiye (Bilgin, 2012; Işeri & Bartan,

security. While initially discovered energy 2019; Paikin & Rose, 2021; Stergiou, 2019;

sources were expected to encourage regional Tagliapietra, 2013; Tziarras, 2019). However,

cooperation, they can also exacerbate regional some countries try to create the perception

conflicts. It was expected that the energy that Türkiye is implementing an expansionist

resources on issues such as the determination policy, and Ankara is trying to control the

of exclusive economic zones among the trade routes on the Black Sea and Suvesh

riparian states of the Mediterranean and Canal with the Blue Homeland Doctrine.

EEZ claims of Greece and Greek Cypriot Administration (BRIQ , 2023)

Four dynamic elements play a key role in it should not be forgotten that these energy

today’s Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics, resources, initially seen as an opportunity to

shaping the regional security complex that has solve political conflicts and regional problems,

come to the fore (Tziarras, 2021, p. 5). The first have deepened the controversy rather than

of these is the energy resources discovered in contributed to regional stability.

the region. Recent hydrocarbon discoveries in The second is geopolitical antagonisms and

the Eastern Mediterranean are one of the main new balances of power (Tziarras, 2021, pp. 6–7).

drivers of this region’s shifting geopolitical and Energy became another point of contestation

security dynamics. This situation can also create between traditional and contemporary

a driving force for regional economies. Many geopolitical rivals in the Eastern Mediterranean,

experts have discussed this issue extensively especially between Türkiye and countries such

(Adamides & Christou, 2015; Gürel et al., 2013; as Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and Egypt. In addition,

Proedrou, 2012; Tziarras, 2016, 2018). The Türkiye’s historical problems with Cyprus and

energy resources discovered so far are in small Greece and deteriorating relationships with

quantities and are not game-changing on a other countries in the region have aggravated

global scale. Nevertheless, the Mediterranean’s geopolitical antagonisms. Türkiye’s problems

hydrocarbon reserves are considerable. However, with the region’s countries and fluctuations

in cyclical relations, the convergence of other including Europe, with the LNG method and to

regional countries due to their common continue its military and intelligence activities

economic and energy interests, and their in the region (Kedikli & Çalağan, 2017). The EU

exclusionary initiatives against Türkiye from countries are developing solutions on how to

regional cooperation have triggered regional overcome the energy crisis. The EU’s interest has

dynamics. Trying to exclude Türkiye from once again turned to the Eastern Mediterranean.

regional cooperation and the reflection of The UK takes an active role in the region with

this pragmatic alliance shaped on economic its guarantor status on the island of Cyprus,

grounds in the military field through military its military bases where it collects military

exercises has intensified Türkiye’s perception intelligence, and the British BP company. China

of geopolitical siege and threat (Akbayır & has also developed a strong interest in the

Savaş, 2021; Özekin, 2020; Yılmaz, 2020). This Eastern Mediterranean as part of its ambitious

situation causes the deterrence diplomacy in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Gürcan, 2021).

Türkiye’s foreign policy to increase, making The fourth is the new human security

the political situation enter a vicious circle by imperative associated with the region’s

escalating regional tensions further. geopolitics and balance of power, which goes

beyond traditional security concerns. The global powers, who found nation-states to be

China has developed a anti-democratic, supported the destruction

of nation-states in the Middle East and North strong interest in the Eastern Africa and the establishment of small new

Mediterranean as part of states based on sects, ethnic origins, and

its ambitious Belt and Road micro-nationalism. This way, these new states

Initiative. can be more easily governed from the outside

(Özdemir, 2020; Tziarras, 2021). Libya, Iraq, and

The third is the increasing interest of foreign Syria were divided by foreign intervention. After

powers in the region. The investments of French, the overthrow of the dictatorial governments in

Italian, American, and Qatari companies in the the region, local power wars based on sects and

natural gas reserves located on the continental ethnic origin began. With the emergence of ISIS

shelves of Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt have brought brutality in the vacuum created by the powerful

regional issues to the international level. The states of the region and the world taking sides

military presence of the American, Russian, instead of putting out the fire, there was a

British, and French navies in the region causes significant humanitarian crisis (Gürcan, 2020;

a multidimensional and global problem in Karbuz, 2021). The events and their reflections

Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics (Demiryol, in the Middle East region have caused major

2020; Lika, 2020). The USA, which has become social, economic, security, and humanitarian

the world’s largest natural gas producer with concerns in several Arab countries, particularly

shale gas production, wants to export its Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria

energy resources to many parts of the world, (Acer, 2019; Kansu, 2020).

1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea. (Law Encyclopedia, 2019)

In addition, a new humanitarian crisis occurred chronic problems cause the relations between

when the Taliban took control of Afghanistan. the regional states, Türkiye and Greece, to be

Human security challenges related to national strained from time to time and the possibility

security have become the center of international of conflict to arise. Regarding the security

discussions and cooperation efforts since the complex, some fundamental issues need to be

mid-2010s. The Eastern Mediterranean region examined to understand the causes of tension

also suffers from this human security problem. and the possibility of conflict. These are

Problems such as conflicts, wars, political geographical conditions of the regional security

instability, unresolved political and diplomatic complex, historical perception of friend-enemy,

problems, terrorism, regional armament, and sovereignty status of the region, geopolitical fear,

refugee crises threaten regional security. and threat factors. Under this title, the Türkiye-

Greece tension in the Sea of Islands is discussed

Türkiye-Greece Tension and its from a geographical point of view.

Regional Reflections About 1800 pieces of land are in the Sea of

Islands (Mansel, 2004, p. 3). Only twenty-four

As mentioned above, the region should be of them are bigger than one hundred square

examined as a single system in regional security kilometers. In total, about a hundred of them

theory. The region is a historical, cultural, and have been inhabited. In terms of examining these

economic transition point. Cultural differences, islands, we can analyze them in three groups:

religious differences, historical conflicts, and a) On 24 April 1830, with the independence

of Greece from the Ottoman Empire, the islands It states that coastal states have rights in waters

whose sovereignty was transferred to the Greek up to 200 miles deep, and everything on the sea

side, and seabed belongs to the coastal state (Gökdemir

b) Islands transferred to Greece in return for Işık, 2009). The 1958 Geneva Convention was

non-militarization (non-military status) with the replaced by the 1982 UNCLOS. Türkiye has not

Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923 and the Treaty signed either treaty. The most crucial principle

of Paris in 1947, in determining the boundaries of the continental

c) Islands, islets, and rocks whose sovereignty shelf in the Law of the Sea is the necessity of

is not determined by international treaties (Fuat, determining the rights equally and neutrally.

2013, p. 53). An equitable solution in the Sea of Islands,

Islands’ issues have not been determined by based on the closeness of the islands to the

international agreements and have remained continent, does not seem possible now because

uncertain. In addition to their military most of the islands are closer to the Türkiye’s land

importance, the energy reserves discovered border than Greece’s land. The states in the 1982

in the Mediterranean and the Sea of Islands UNCLOS, of which Greece is a party, have agreed

increase their importance. On the islands whose “to limit their territorial waters to 12 miles”

status was not determined after the Treaty of (Ertuğrul, 2017b). Based on this convention,

Lausanne, Greece claims that Türkiye renounced Greece wants to extend its territorial waters to 12

its sovereign rights in all the unnamed islands miles, claiming that its islands have a continental

based on Article 16 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty shelf and EEZ rights. However, Greece’s extension

(Ferudun, 2009, p. 86). Türkiye states that the of its territorial waters to 12 miles is an attack on

islands’ sovereignty has not been transferred and Türkiye’s sovereign rights in a semi-enclosed sea

that it has full rights in the islands. Türkiye has like the Sea of Islands. According to international

not given up its claims on these islands. While law, both states must agree on mutual territorial

Greece also claims that the 1932 Italian-Turkish waters borders. No state can cut off the exclusive

Agreement is an international treaty, it says that economic zone from which the other state reaches

the Turkish side renounced all the islands in the the open sea. The right to access the high seas is

Menteşe Region. Türkiye, on the other hand, protected in the 1958 Geneva Convention and

states that it is not an internationally binding 1982 UNCLOS (Mengi, 2008).

agreement in terms of registration, signature, and

entry into force (Ferudun, 2009, p. 60). The Process of the Türkiye-Greece

Uncertainty about the status of islands and Conflict

rocks in the Sea of Islands raises sovereignty

disputes over the boundaries of the continental According to the Lausanne Peace Treaty,

shelf and EEZ. The concept of the continental shelf Türkiye has sovereignty over the islands up to

first emerged as a legal concept in a declaration three miles off Anatolia (İnce, 2013, p. 121). As

by United States President Truman in 1945 mentioned in the previous section, regarding

(Ertuğrul, 2017a, p. 42). Continental shelf status the sovereignty of islands, islets, and rocks

was determined in the 1958 Geneva Convention. of the unnamed islands, status quos have not

Sea areas according to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (Turkish General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration, 2015)

been determined in this treaty with the “Law six nautical miles for certain seas, considering

on the Determination of the Border of the all the features and situations related to those

Greek Territorial Seas” dated 17 September seas and complying with the principle of

1936 and numbered 230. Greece declared that equity. Article 2 – Territorial seas are limited

it had increased territorial waters from 3 miles by agreement between Türkiye and States with

to 6 miles, violating international law (Özman, adjacent or reciprocal coasts. This agreement

1988). In response to this, Türkiye increased its can be made by the principle of equality and

territorial waters to six miles with the “Territorial by considering all relevant characteristics and

Waters Law” dated 1964 and no 476 (Kanunlar, situations of the region. Article 3 – The width of

1964, p. 49). With Greece’s signing of the 1982 the territorial sea is measured from the baselines

UNCLOS and the 12-mile claims coming to the to be determined by the President. Article 4 –

agenda, Türkiye renewed its view on territorial The waters on the land side of the main lines and

waters with the “Territorial Waters Law No. the gulf waters are Turkish inland. Permanent

2674” dated 20 May 1982. According to the law: port facilities are considered part of the coast,

“Article 1 – Turkish territorial waters are and the landward waters of the most exposed of

included in the country of Türkiye. The width these facilities and the outer ports are included

of Turkish territorial waters is six nautical miles. in the inland waters” (İncekaş, 2021; Karasuları

The President of the Republic is authorized to Kanunu, 1982, p. 338).

determine the width of territorial seas over On 1 June 1995, the Greek Parliament

approved the UNCLOS. As we mentioned above, Subsequently, the crisis known as the “Kardak

based on the phrase “The maximum territorial Crisis” emerged. On 25 December 1995, the

water of a country is 12 miles” in the contract, Turkish ship “Figen Akat” landed on the Kardak

after announcing that it would increase the rocks near the island of Kalimnia (Berberakis,

territorial waters border of the Sea of Islands to 2021). The Greek Coast Guard offered assistance

12 miles later, the Turkish Parliament issued a on this rock, one of the undetermined cliffs, and

declaration on 8 June 1995 (Yücel, 2010, p. 91). the ship requested assistance from the Turkish

As stated in the declaration: Coast Guard, stating that the rock was in Turkish

territorial waters. After mutual information, the ship was brought to Turkish ports by 2 Greek

While Türkiye is trying to maintain trailers due to the diplomatic efforts between

the balance in Lausanne in a the countries on 28 December. However, on

peaceful way, Greece is displaying 25 January 1996, a nationalist Greek Priest in

an aggressive stance to expand its Kalymnos planted the Greek flag on the rocks.

dominance over the sea. On 30 January, this situation brought mutual

military moves that would bring the risk of

“Greece has finally put forward its willingness military conflict to the next level. With the

to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles by engagement of US President Bill Clinton on 31

taking advantage of some provisions of the Law January, the formula “No flags, No ships, No

of the Sea Convention, mainly determined for troops” was applied. According to this formula,

the high seas and oceans. If this happens, Greece all flags, ships and soldiers will be withdrawn

will have placed about 72 percent of the Aegean (Berberakis, 2021; Koulizakou, 2017).

Sea under its sovereignty. It is unthinkable for The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

Türkiye - a peninsula- to accept such a situation Republic of Türkiye has divided the problems

that will lead to access to the open seas and experienced in the Sea of Islands with Greece

oceans through Greek territorial waters. Türkiye into five headings: “a) Maritime jurisdiction,

has vital interests in the Aegean. The Turkish including the territorial sea and the continental

Grand National Assembly hopes that the Greek shelf and the delimitation of these areas, b) The

Government will not decide to extend the demilitarized status of the East Aegean Islands

territorial seas in the Aegean beyond 6 miles in within the framework of the 1923 Treaty of

a way that would upset the balance established Lausanne, the 1947 Paris Treaty, and other

with Lausanne. In the event of such a possibility, relevant international documents, c) Legal

it has decided to give the Government of the status of some geographical formations, d)

Republic of Türkiye all powers, including those Greece’s claiming that its national airspace is 10

deemed necessary in military terms, to protect nautical miles wide in violation of international

and defend the vital interests of our country, law and abuse of Flight Information Area (FIR)

and to announce this situation to the Greek and responsibility e) Search and Rescue Activities

world public opinion with friendly feelings” (SAR)” (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri

(Tezkereler ve Önergeler, 1995, p. 136). Başkanlığı, n.d.).

The Seville Map.(BRIQ , 2023)

Recent Developments Affecting the Crisis a discriminatory and exclusionary policy

through the provocative actions, statements,

While Türkiye is trying to maintain the regional trade, economic, military, and

balance in Lausanne in a peaceful way, energy cooperation it continues to engage

Greece is displaying an aggressive stance to in (Akbayır & Savaş, 2021; Özekin, 2020;

expand its dominance over the sea. Worried Yılmaz, 2020).

about Türkiye becoming an international The mutual EEZ borders in the Eastern

power in the short term and aware of the Mediterranean have yet to be determined

increasing power of Türkiye not only in the fully according to international public

Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean but also opinion. There is a dominance that Greece

in the common seas, Greece continues its is trying to impose in the region through

provocative actions with the support of the both the islands and the GCA, of which

USA and some EU countries (Çaylak, 2022; it is the guarantor. Within the framework

Milliyet, 2022; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of this dominant area, the first problem

of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Greece works to in the Eastern Mediterranean emerged

create international public opinion on issues in 2003 with the agreement of the Greek

such as the status quo of the islands, the Cypriot Administration to determine the

ownership of the islands, the armament of the maritime areas with Egypt (Kökyay, 2021).

islands, and the Cyprus problem. It pursues Although countries sign an agreement to

establish mutual EEZ borders with bilateral map as a legal document.” However, Greece

agreements in the Eastern Mediterranean, continues to maintain its claims on this map

this may not be accepted by all countries to create international public opinion (BBC

in the region (Acer, 2021, p. 21). The News Türkçe, 2020; Çetin, 2020; Önder &

understanding of regional security tells Kılıç, 2021, p. 60).

us that the region should be analyzed as On the map that defends the Greek theses,

a unit. A situation that not every country there is the proposition that the Greek islands

accepts in the region harms mutual trust and have a continental shelf and can form an EEZ.

cooperation. In terms of the countries in the Based on this, Greece has determined the

region, Türkiye has officially objected to the maritime borders of Çoban, Kaşot, Rhodes,

maritime border agreements between the and Meis islands, starting from the island of

Egypt-Greek Cypriot Administration (2003), Crete. The island of Meis, 2 km from Anatolia

Greek Cypriot Administration of Cyprus- and 580 km from the Greek mainland, was

Lebanon (2007), Israel-Greece (2010) and accepted as the middle line (Türkeş, 2021, p.

Egypt-Greece (2020). Greece-Syria and 24). By accepting this line as a coast, Greece

Egypt objected to the (2019) agreement is trying to confine Türkiye to a narrow area

signed between Türkiye and Libya (Acer, in the Eastern Mediterranean. This map is

2021, p. 21). intended to usurp Türkiye’s 104 thousand

square kilometers of sea area and to make

Seville Map Türkiye content with only 41 thousand square

kilometers (Çetin, 2020; Kadan, 2020).

The Seville Map, allegedly prepared by Accepting Meis Island as a midline harms

Professor Juan Luis Suarez de Vivero from the equality and equity in the region. First, the

University of Seville in 2001 at the request of internationally accepted understanding is

the EU, for the settlement of the EEZ dispute “The continent dominates the sea area”.

in the Eastern Mediterranean between International law has not seen any contrary

Türkiye, Greece and Cyprus, was prepared decision (Türkeş, 2021, p. 99). Secondly,

to form the basis of its claims on the subject. according to the decisions of the International

This map, which has the characteristics of Court of Justice, the islands on the opposite

the second Treaty of Sevres, means nothing side are those that are close to the mainland

to Türkiye (Gürdeniz & Yaycı, 2020; Önder & of the other state, not the state they are

Kılıç, 2021, p. 58). EU officials declared that affiliated with (Kütükçü & Kaya, 2016, p.

the EU did not prepare the Seville map, and it 87). When a middle line is drawn between

was stated by the US Embassy in Ankara that Türkiye and Greece in the Sea of Islands, the

the Sevilla map is a document without legal islands claiming to form a continental shelf

status. “Maritime jurisdiction areas must stay on the side close to Türkiye. The claim

be decided upon by agreement between the that these islands have a continental shelf is

relevant states following international law. In incompatible with the norms of international

addition, the EU does not consider the Sevilla law (Türkeş, 2021).

The map of Turkish Blue Homeland.(Yaycı, C., 2020)

Islands on the “reverse line” cannot have a (Türkeş, 2021, p. 99). A statement saying that the

continental shelf other than territorial waters and Seville map usurped Türkiye’s rights came from

cannot create any restrictions (Gökdemir Işık, Michael Tanchum, a professor at the University of

2009; Mengi, 2008; Özman, 1988). The decision of Navarra in Spain, whose expertise is in the Middle

the International Court of Arbitration on Channel East and North Africa. In his article for Foreign

Islands such as Jersey, Guernsey, and Alderney Policy magazine, he stated that Türkiye was right

between England and France is an example of this to oppose the Seville map “Since Türkiye has

(Sali, 2022, p. 50; Delimitation of the Continental not signed the UNCLOS, it cannot file a lawsuit

Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great against Greece and Southern Cyprus. For this

Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French reason, it cannot base its claims on legal grounds.”

Republic (UK, France), 1977). Third, this map (BBC, 2020; Tanchum, 2020).

hinders Türkiye’s right to access the high seas.

According to the International Law of the Sea, the Blue Homeland Doctrine

right of access to the high seas of countries cannot

be denied. The Seville map and Greece theses Cem Gürdeniz, inspired by Atatürk’s com-

imprison Türkiye in the Antalya and Iskenderun mand, “I order you not to attack, but to die”

ports and block them from reaching the high seas during the Dardanelles War, argued that the

defense of the homeland should begin in the threat to Türkiye, which claims to be an energy

Blue Homeland. The term “Blue Homeland” transmission hub. At the same time, preventing

was used for the first time in the “Black Sea Türkiye from reaching the high seas and requ-

and Maritime Security” symposium on 14 June iring the permission of Greece, even for the

2006. This concept, created by Cem Gürdeniz, Navy at the Iskenderun Port to go as far as the

has been defined as a recipe that Türkiye will Dardanelles, is a national security issue and is

take and examine in case of any geopolitical unacceptable for Türkiye.

problem. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sta- The goal of the Greek Ministry of Foreign

ted, “We will protect the Blue Homeland with Affairs, which started with the status quo for-

the same determination as we tore up the Sèv- med in the 1923 Lausanne and 1947 Paris agre-

res agreement, which aimed to destroy our ho- ements by sending their representatives abroad

meland a century ago.” and lobbying against Türkiye, is to create in-

ternational public opinion in Greece’s favor. Being a party to the 1982 UNCLOS, Greece

“There is no issue on Sea of is trying to impose an agreement on Türkiye

Islands. There are only Greece’s that Türkiye is not a party to, in reference to

demands” the article “States can extend their territorial

waters up to 12 miles.” The Greek Ministry of

At the symposium on the Eastern Mediterra- Foreign Affairs, sharing a series of images on

nean held in 2020, Erdoğan called on Istanbul the maps it published, claimed that Türkiye’s

and Marmara University and instructed that demands upset the status quo, disregarded In-

a map which is against the Seville Map. The ternational Law and the International Law of

map, published as a book with the title “Blue the Sea and that Türkiye endangered peace and

Homeland “One Map, One Doctrine” and Tür- security in the region with “Blue Homeland

kiye’s National Pact in the Seas”, was prepared Doctrine”, “Türkiye-Libya Agreement”, “Geog-

by Rear Admiral Cihat Yaycı and published by raphical formations with disputed affiliation”,

Istanbul University. This study is shown as a “The non-military status of the islands”, and

reflection of Türkiye’s policy towards its ma- “Regions licensed by TPAO.” (Dnews, 2022;

rine areas. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Euronews, 2022).

emphasized that Türkiye’s official thesis ref- However, it is asserted that the Blue Home-

lects the Blue Homeland Doctrine, with the- land map was prepared based on principles

se words: “We continue to protect our rights such as “equity,” “supremacy of geography,”

and interests in our seas, with a strong will and “proportionality”, and “not blocking the pas-

unwavering belief, with the awareness of how sage to the high seas.” Beyond Greece’s claims,

important it is to defend the Blue Homeland” it has been prepared only to protect Türkiye’s

(Gürdeniz & Yaycı, 2020; Yaycı, 2022). national interests and its sovereignty in land

Plans for the Middle East’s petroleum and and sea areas, to officially explain Türkiye’s ar-

Eastern Mediterranean gas to bypass Türkiye guments against Greek arguments (Gürdeniz,

and move to Europe via Greece pose a major 2020; Gürdeniz & Yaycı, 2020; Yaycı, 2022).

US-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement signing ceremony. (US Embassy in Greece, 2021)

According to the Blue Homeland doctrine, Islands. There are only Greece’s demands”

a) In regions less than 400 nautical miles, the (Yaycı, 2022, p. 295). These demands cannot

continental shelf of the mainland is taken as be given concession or accepted following

the basis, not the islands. b) The sovereignty Blue Homeland Doctrine. Regarding un-

status of Islands, Islets, and Rocks whose so- derstanding Regional Security, mutual ag-

vereignty has not been transferred to Greece reement is essential for developing security.

should be determined. c) No further expan- Accepting the facts demanded by Greece and

sion of the “6 miles” maritime jurisdiction in any concession will create a serious national

any region should be allowed. d) It is stated security problem for Türkiye and a vital se-

that because of the armament of the islands curity vulnerability in the regional security

ceded to Greece, provided that they have a complex.

non-military status, the transfer of sovere-

ignty rights has disappeared. e) Although Activities of Non-Regional Actors and the

Greece has 6 miles of maritime sovereignty, Cracks in Regional Security

its claim of 10 miles of airspace is against in-

ternational law and is unacceptable (Yaycı, As mentioned previously, many state and

2022, p. 295). regional and non-regional actors take

Yaycı claims, “There is no issue on Sea of part and sometimes even take sides in

the relations between Türkiye and Greece The US claims that it removed Türkiye

in the Sea of Islands and the Eastern from the F-35 program due to the purchase

Mediterranean. This state of involvement of the Russian S-400 air defense platform.

and taking sides not only increases the However, the possibility of selling the

tension in the region from time to time F-35 to Greece is being discussed in the

but also damages the establishment of the US Senate. While this shows that the USA

ground for reconciliation. This situation is not a party to the deterioration of the

leads to the increase of problems rather security status quo “for the moment,” it

than contributing to solving the problems is obvious that the USA carries big sticks

encountered in developing regional peace. to Türkiye (CNN Türk, 2022; Noi, 2022;

Reuters, 2022). In addition, the USA, which deployed to the Greek Islands by arguing

The contradictory USA policies in the the threat of Russia, increases the possibility

Eastern Mediterranean increase the of militarization and active conflict in the

risk of regional conflict. region, leading to an escalation of tension

under the umbrella of deterrence of the threat factor.

The USA, which wants to continue its While the contradictory USA policies in

military and intelligence operations in the Eastern Mediterranean increase the risk

the region and to sell its natural gas to of regional conflict, it is observed that the

Europe via the LNG method, intervened EU’s position in the region supports the Gre-

in the tension between the two countries ek thesis, based on the EU’s Türkiye report

with a provocative approach rather than published in 2021. EU officials stated that

soothing. The Mutual Defense Cooperation the Seville map was not prepared by them.

Agreement (MDCA) was signed between They claim that the problem between the two

Greece and the USA. US Central Command countries regarding the determination of the

(CENTCOM) has between 60,000 and maritime jurisdiction area and the use of re-

70,000 soldiers in 21 countries in the sources can be resolved through goodwill, di-

region. These are a clear demonstration of alogue, and negotiation by establishing good

its interest in the region. On the other hand, neighborly relations according to internatio-

the USA claims it has implemented a policy nal law. Despite this, in the “Türkiye 2021 Re-

of restraining regional powers that could port” published by the EU, they defined the

maintain their influence, seek dominance, tension experienced in the disputed areas in

or threaten the status quo (Yegin, 2022). At the second half of 2020 as Türkiye’s “provoca-

the same time, it tolerates and even supports tive” actions (European Commission, 2021,

Greece’s arming of the non-military islands. p. 2). They stated that the drilling activities

The USA established a military base in conducted by Türkiye in the disputed areas

Dedeağaç (Alexandroupoli), 45 km from were seen as “unauthorized drilling activi-

the Greek border with Türkiye. ties” (European Commission, 2021, p. 6).

They declared that the continental shelf ag- Russia will continue to use the energy trump

reement signed between Türkiye and Libya card against the pressure and sanctions

“must be annulled, claiming that the rights imposed on it (BBC News, 2022). For this

of the third states have been usurped” (Euro- reason, the EU, searching for an alternative

pean Commission, 2021, p. 7). Rather than to Russian gas, wants to establish different

acting as an impartial mediator, the EU has energy routes and expand the supply chain.

taken a bilateral stance by dictating Gree- At this point, the importance of the Eastern

ce’s arguments to Türkiye. The background Mediterranean comes to the fore even more.

of this attitude of the EU lies in the desire to Although the EU tried to draw a route

make the Mediterranean Sea and the Sea of that could be created through Greece and

Islands an EU sea. Encouraged by this desi- Southern Cyprus by excluding Türkiye from

re, Greece continues to arm the islands with the region, Russia displayed an attitude by

non-military status in the Sea of Islands (Du- putting Türkiye at the forefront in the region.

rul, 2022). The softening in Türkiye’s Syria policy, the

In today’s conjuncture, with the Syrian attempt to establish stability by declaring

Civil War, the Russia-Ukraine War, the oil a ceasefire while supporting the opposing

monopoly of OPEC+ countries, Nigerian sides in Libya, the hosting of the Ukraine-

instability, and Israel’s desire to transport Russian War peace meetings in Istanbul, and

the gas extracted from the “Leviathan” the developments in Türkiye’s balance policy

gas field to the EU, the EU’s interest in the have enabled constructive steps to be taken

Eastern Mediterranean has increased. To in relations between Russia and Türkiye.

end the EU’s dependence on Russian Gas, In addition, the silence of the EU and the

it is obvious that they do not want a state USA on the armament of the islands, and the

they do not want within their union to take EU military operation IRINI exercise under

over control in the Eastern Mediterranean. the umbrella of the Common Security and

This demonstrates the importance of friend- Defense Policy (CSDP) to control the arms

enemy identification in the regional security embargo against Libya, has alienated Türkiye

complex. from the countries it is currently allied

On the other hand, Russia uses its energy (EUNAVFOR MED, 2022). At the same time,

reserves, its most significant strategic trump this situation was also affected by the fact

card, as a shield against the heavy sanctions that FETO terrorist organization members

imposed on it with the Ukraine war. The took refuge in countries such as the USA

energy crisis that arose when Russia cut off and Greece after the coup attempt on 15 July

gas flow to Europe via “North Stream 1”, one 2016.

of the main pipelines from which it supplies It is obvious that Russia will always want

gas to Europe, clearly reflects this. Although to hold the strategic natural gas trump card

it was stated by EU Commission President in a multipolar world. Therefore, Russia will

Ursula von der Leyen that “Russian President be willing to support Türkiye as an energy

Vladimir Putin uses energy as a weapon,” transfer center in this position (Teslova,

2022). Putin’s recent statements that it supports the Greek actions that caused the

“President Erdogan is a strong leader and tension in the region to increase with the theses

Türkiye is a reliable partner” shows Russia’s it developed on the map of Seville. This support,

support for Türkiye. In addition, Putin stated especially led by France, was also operationally

that “They offered Türkiye to establish a gas reflected in the military field. The command and

center in Türkiye for European consumers” administration of the IRINI operation, which

and added that “Türkiye accepted this offer was launched in 2016 to ensure the security of

in line with its interests” (SABAH, 2022b). the arms embargo imposed on Libya because of

the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)

Conclusion and to ensure a permanent ceasefire, alternates

between Italy and Greece at 6-month intervals.

According to the understanding of the Regional However, because of the EEZ agreement Türkiye

Security Complex, it is reasonable for Türkiye signed with Libya’s National Government,

to perceive Greece’s theses and the international instead of inspecting the ships in the region, the

public opinion that has formed as a threat Naval Mission only inspected Turkish ships, as

and to follow a political and diplomatic path Deputy Foreign Minister David Schenker said.

towards these threats. At the same time, factors On the other hand, it aims to change the region’s

such as the historical turmoil, uncertainty, and status quo ignoring the support of countries such

hydrocarbon reserves of geostrategic importance as Egypt and the UAE to the pro-Haftar rebels

discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean (Euronews, n.d.). This is the most important

between Türkiye and Greece have led the two example of the EU’s ignoring the principle of

countries to adopt a different security approach neutrality approach to the problems in the

to protect their interests. However, when we International Law of the Sea and demanding

look at it with the understanding of Buzan and stability for the interests of the union instead of

the Copenhagen School, the Seville map and the the principle of mutual agreement.

Greek theses based on it show that they follow a The Eastmed Pipeline trial of the countries

policy of escalation rather than appeasement in in the region and its disruption with the Libya

the region. While the contradictory US policies Agreement show that Greece and its supporters

in the Eastern Mediterranean increase the risk have a fait accompli in regional security.

of regional conflict, the EU’s position supports As a result of the Türkiye-Libya maritime

the Greek thesis based on the Türkiye report authorization agreement, it was understood that

published in 2021. the Eastmed project could not be implemented

It can enable the EU to look at the problems in practice. Countries such as Israel and Egypt

within itself from a distinct perspective and started negotiations instead of excluding

the problem of the islands between Greece and Türkiye from the Eastern Mediterranean

Türkiye from a distinct perspective (Channel regional complex. The resumption of mutual

Islands Brussels Office, n.d.). Although the map ambassador appointments with Israel in 2022 is

of Seville is not accepted as a document with a key step for normalizing relations between the

legal validity by the European Commission, two countries.

Greece’s desire to extend its territorial waters Akbayır, M., & Savaş, C. İ. (2021). Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi

Kuramı’nda Yalıtıcı Kavramı: Doğu Akdeniz ve Türkiye Üzerine

from 6 to 12 miles continues. The Greek Ta Nea Bir Değerlendirme. Akdeniz Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler

Fakültesi Dergisi, 21(2), 226–244. https://doi.org/10.25294/ Newspaper claimed in October 2022 that the auiibfd.882382

government could issue the decree directly and BBC. (2020, September 22). Sevilla Haritası nedir?: Yunanistan’ın tezini

dayandırdığı, ABD’nin “Hukuki önemi yok” dediği harita. https://

notify the UN without the obligation to agree www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-54244760

with Türkiye. Greece stated that preparations BBC News. (2022, September 5). Rusya sevkiyatı kesti, Avrupa’da gaz

fiyatları yüzde 30 arttı: AB enerji bakanları Cuma günü olağanüstü

were made for this (Mega, 2022). According toplanacak.

BBC News Türkçe. (2020, September 22). Sevilla Haritası nedir?: to the 1995 Turkish Grand National Assembly Yunanistan’ın tezini dayandırdığı, ABD’nin “Hukuki önemi yok”

declaration, this situation is a cause of war. It is dediği harita. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-54244760

Berberakis, S. (2021, February 1). Kardak krizinin 25. yılı: Türkiye ve

a claim that will directly affect regional security Yunanistan nasıl savaşın eşiğine geldi? https://www.bbc.com/turkce/

and stability. The solution to the problem is haberler-dunya-55882481

Bilgin, P. (2012). Türkiye’s ‘geopolitics dogma.’ In S. Guzzini (Ed.),

that before the mutual dialogue, countries The Return of Geopolitics in Europe (First Edition, pp. 151–173).

Cambridge University Press. and international actors who support the Breslin, S., & Higgott, R. (2000). Studying Regions: Learning from the Old,

demands and actions of Greece that will usurp Constructing the New. New Political Economy, 5(3), 333–352. https://

doi.org/10.1080/713687784

Türkiye’s rights in violation of international Buzan, B. (1983). People, States and Fear: The National Secutity Problem

law respect Türkiye based on the principle of in International Relation (1st Edition). The University of North

Carolina Press.

fairness of international law. The only basis Buzan, B. (1991). New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-

First Century. International Affairs, 67(3), 431–451. https://doi. of the problem is that these countries, which org/10.2307/2621945

have alliance ties within NATO, openly take Buzan, B. (2007). Regional Security. In People, States & Fear: An Agenda

for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (2nd

sides in the problem between the two NATO Edition, pp. 157–188). ECPR Press.

members and that the so-called allies in Buzan, B., & Waever, O. (2003). Regions and Powers:The Structure of

International Security (1st Edition, Vol. 91). Cambridge University

regional security act following the interests Press.

Buzan, B., Waever, O., & Wilde, J. de. (1998). Security: A New Framework of the other by excluding one. With the Blue for Analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Homeland Doctrine, Türkiye should pursue Çaylak, M. (2022, September 26). Ege’de ABD Yığınağı Türkiye’nin

Radarında. TRT Haber. https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/

an egalitarian policy in regional security and egede-abd-yiginagi-turkiyenin-radarinda-711531.html

follow international law, not give up on its Çetin, Ş. (2020, September 23). Seville maritime territory map is

illegitimate: Expert. AA. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/seville-

national interests and sovereignty rights, and maritime-territory-map-is-illegitimate-expert/1983193

Channel Islands Brussels Office. (n.d.). The Channel Islands and the recognize its friends and enemies. Türkiye’s European Union. Retrieved October 31, 2022, from https://www.

alliances should be questioned if necessary. channelislands.eu/eu-and-the-channel-islands/

CNN Türk. (2022, August 26). ABD’nin Dedeağaç üssü faaliyete geçiyor. https://www.cnnturk.com/video/dunya/abdnin-dedeagac-ussu-

References faaliyete-geciyor

Demiryol, T. (2020, September 7). Doğal gaz ve Doğu Akdeniz’in

Acer, Y. (2019). Analiz: Doğu Akdeniz’de Deniz Yetki Alanları ve Türkiye- jeopolitiği.

Libya Mutabakatı. In SETA. Dnews. (2022, June 9). Αυτοί είναι οι 16 χάρτες του τουρκικού

Acer, Y. (2021). Uluslararası Yargı Kararları Temelinde Ege ve Doğu αναθεωρητισμού, το ελληνικό ΥΠΕΞ εκθέτει διεθνώς την Τουρκία.

Akdeniz’de Sınırlandırma Sorunları. https://www.dikaiologitika.gr/eidhseis/kosmos/388748/aftoi-einai-oi-

Adamides, C., & Christou, O. (2015). Energy Security and the 16-xartes-tou-tourkikoy-anatheoritismoy-to-elliniko-ypeks-ekthetei-

Transformation of Regional Securitization Relations in the Eastern diethnos-tin-tourkia

Mediterranean. In Societies in Transition (pp. 189–205). Springer Duman, F. (2021). Deniz Jeopolitiğinin Kavramsal ve Teorik Kökenleri. International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13814- Deniz Araştırmaları ve Mavi Strateji Dergisi, 1(1), 75–85. 5_9

Durul, T. (2022, June 17). 5 soruda Yunanistan’ın Doğu Ege adalarını Gürel, A., Mullen, F., & Tzimitras, H. (2013). The Cyprus Hydrocarbons

silahlandırması. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/5-soruda- Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios.

yunanistanin-dogu-ege-adalarini-silahlandirmasi/2615986 Haber Global. (2022, September 11). Erdoğan’ın “Bir Gece Ansızın

Ertuğrul, Ü. E. (2017a). Birleşmiş Milletler Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesine Gelebiliriz” Sözlerinin Ardından Yunanistan Harekete Geçti! https://

Göre Kıyı Devletinin Egemen Hakları. Gazi Üniversitesi Hukuk www.youtube.com/watch?v=oeVDM5LJnyE

Fakültesi Dergisi, XXI(1), 41–81. Hansen, L. (2012). Reconstructing desecuritisation: The normative-

Ertuğrul, Ü. E. (2017b). Birleşmiş Milletler Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesine political in the Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply

Göre Kıyı Devletinin Egemen Hakları. Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli it. Review of International Studies, 38(3), 525–546. https://doi. Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, 21(1), 41–81. org/10.1017/S0260210511000581 EUNAVFOR MED. (2022, 1 October). Operation IRINI. https://www. Hettne, B. (2002). The Europeanisation of Europe: Endogenous and operationirini.eu/ Exogenous Dimensions. Journal of European Integration, 24(4), 325– Euronews. (n.d.). ABD’den AB’ye Libya eleştirisi: Tek yaptığınız Türkiye

ile ilgilenmek, Rusya’ya ses çıkarmıyorsunuz. Retrieved October 31, 340. https://doi.org/10.1080/0703633022000038968

2022, from https://tr.euronews.com/2020/07/16/abd-den-ab-ye- İnce, F. (2013). Lozan Barış Antlaşması ve Ege Adaları. Ankara Üniversitesi

libya-elestirisi-tek-yapt-g-n-z-turkiye-ile-ilgilenmek-rusya-ya-ses-c- Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi, 53, 101–128.

karm-y İncekaş, S. (2021, January 31). Law Of The Territorial Waters. https://av-

Euronews. (2022, June 14). Türkiye’nin “adaları silahlandırmakla” saimincekas.com/en/laws/territorial-waters-law/

suçladığı Yunanistan’dan 16 harita ile cevap. https://tr.euronews. Işeri, E., & Bartan, A. Ç. (2019). Türkiye’s Geostrategic Vision and Energy

com/2022/06/09/turkiye-nin-adalar-silahland-rmakla-suclad-g- Concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean Security Architecture: A View

yunanistan-dan-16-harita-ile-cevap from Ankara. In Z. Tziarras (Ed.), The New Geopolitics of the Eastern

European Commission. (2021). Türkiye 2021 Report. Mediterranean: Trilateral Partnerships and Regional Security (pp.

Ferudun, A. (2009). Ege’de, Türkiye ve Yunanistan Arasındaki Aidiyeti 111–124). PRIO Cyprus Centre.

Tartışmalı Ada, Adacık ve Kayalıklar Sorunu [Yüksek Lisans Tezi]. Kadan, T. (2020, March 8). The End of Seville: the Turkish Tradition of

İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. Tearing up Maps. United World. https://uwidata.com/12995-the-end-

Frazier, D., & Stewart-Ingersoll, R. (2010). Regional powers and security: of-seville-the-turkish-tradition-of-tearing-up-maps/

A framework for understanding order within regional security Kansu, Z. N. (2019). Enerji Ekonomi-Politiği Çerçevesinde Doğu Akdeniz complexes. European Journal of International Relations, 16(4), 731– Doğal Gaz Kaynaklarının Değerlendirilmesi [PhD diss.]. In PQDT - 753. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066109359847 Global. Marmara University. Fuat, İ. (2013). Lozan Barış Antlaşması ve Ege Adaları. Ankara Üniversitesi Kansu, Z. N. (2020). An Assesment of Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi, 13(53), 101–128.

https://doi.org/10.1501/Tite_0000000391 Boundary Delimitation Agreement between Türkiye and Libya. In

Gibson, M. (2019). Britain’s Quest For Oil: The First World War and the Bilim Dergisi Science Journal of Turkish Military Academy Haziran

Peace Conferences. Michigan War Studies Review. (Vol. 30, Issue 1).

Gökdemir Işık, N. (2009). Kıta Sahanlığı, Hukuki Rejimi ve Ege Sorunu Kanunlar, Pub. L. No. 476, 49 (1964). https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/

[Doctoral Dissertation]. DEÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. arsiv/11711.pdf

Grabowski, W. (2020). Application of the Regional Security Complex Karasuları Kanunu, Pub. L. No. 2674, 338 (1982). https://www.mevzuat.

Theory for Security Analysis in the Persian Gulf. Athenaeum Polskie gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/1.5.2674.pdf

Studia Politologiczne, 68(4), 18–31. https://doi.org/10.15804/ Karbuz, S. (2021). Key Challenges Facing the Eastern Mediterranean

athena.2020.68.02 Gas. Insight Türkiye, 23(Winter 2021), 115–138. https://doi.

Gürcan, E. C. (2010). New regionalisms and radical identity formation in org/10.25253/99.2021231.9

Latin America: Towards an “alter-global” paradigm. Journal of Social Kedikli, U., & Çalağan, Ö. (2017). Enerji̇ Alaninda Bi̇r Rekabet Sahasi

Research & Policy, 1(2), 19–33. Olarak Doğu Akdeni̇z’i̇n Önemi̇. International Congress of

Gürcan, E. C. (2019). Political geography of Türkiye’s intervention in Energy, Economy and Security Congress, 120–134. Syria: underlying causes and consequences (2011-2016). Journal of Kelly, R. E. (2007). Security Theory in the “New Regionalism.” Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research, 11(1), 1–10. International Studies Review, 9(2), 197–229. https://doi.org/10.1111/ Gürcan, E. C. (2020). International Security After the Arab Spring: j.1468-2486.2007.00671.x Domestic and International Sources of the Syrian and Libyan Conflicts

(2011-2020). Belt & Road Initiative Quarterly, 1(2), 65–80. Kökyay, F. (2021). Güney Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi’nin Akdeniz Enerji

Gürcan, E. C. (2021). A Neo-Mahanian Reading of Türkiye and China’s Politikası. Liberal Düşünce Dergisi. https://doi.org/10.36484/

Changing Maritime Geopolitics. Belt & Road Initiative Quarterly, liberal.866714

2(1), 23–35. Koulizakou, P. (2017, 31 January). Imia 1996: 21 years since the crisis

Gürdeniz, C. (2020). The Geopolitical Integrity of the Motherland, Blue that “wrote” the blackest pages. https://www.parapolitika.gr/stories/

Homeland, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In H. article/245225/21-chronia-imia-mavres-selides-istorias-pou-

Işıksal (Ed.), Cyprus: Alternative Solution Models. https://www. eginangkrizes-zones/

peterlang.com/document/1111603 Kütükçü, M. A., & Kaya, I. S. (2016). Uluslararası Deniz Hukuku

Gürdeniz, C., & Yaycı, C. (2020, September 11). Mavi Vatan nasıl doğdu? Kapsamında Doğu Akdeniz’deki Petrol ve Doğalgaz Kaynakları ile

Doktrinin mimarları Cem Gürdeniz ve Cihat Yaycı anlatıyor. BBC News Türkiye’nin Hukuki Durumu. Batman Üniversitesi Yaşam Bilimleri

Türkçe. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MiZmZQZ1qiU&t=10s Dergisi 6, 6(2/1), 81–96.

Lika, I. (2020). Fransa’nın Doğu Akdeniz’deki Tehlikeli Oyunu. Stivachtis, Y. A. (2021). A Mediterranean Region? Regional Security

Mansel, A. M. (2004). Ege ve Yunan Tarihi. Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi. Complex Theory Revisited. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations,

Mega, Α. (2022). Η Ελλάδα εξετάζει επέκταση των χωρικών υδάτων 21(3), 416–428. https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2021-21-3-416-

στα 12 ναυτικά μίλια στην Κρήτη. Ta Nea. https://www.tanea. 428

gr/2022/10/10/politics/i-ellada-eksetazei-epektasi-ton-xorikon- Tagliapietra, S. (2013). Towards a New Eastern Mediterranean Energy

ydaton-sta-12-naytika-milia-stin-kriti/ Corridor? Natural Gas Developments between Market Opportunities

Mengi, E. (2008). Ege’deki Türk-Yunan Sorunlarının, Uluslararası Hukuk and Geopolitical Risks. In FEEM Working Paper 12.2013. https://doi.

Bilimler Enstitüsü. Tanchum, M. (2020, August 18). How Did the Eastern Mediterranean

Milliyet. (2022, September 26). Türkiye’nin kısa vadeli uluslararası bir Become the Eye of a Geopolitical Storm? https://foreignpolicy.

güç olmasından endişe edildiğini ve Türkiye’nin sadece Ege ve Doğu com/2020/08/18/eastern-mediterranean-greece-Türkiye-warship-

Akdeniz’de değil ortak denizlerde de güç sahibi olduğunu. https:// geopolitical-showdown/

www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/abdnin-ege-plani-yunanistanin- Tezkereler ve Önergeler, 136 (1995). https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/

provokasyonunun-perde-arkasi-6831105 tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d19/c088/tbmm19088121.pdf New Zealand Embassy in Cairo. (2021). The Importance of the Suez Canal Teslova, E. (2022, 13 October). Putin proposes building natural gas hub to Global Trade. in Türkiye. AA. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/putin- Noi, A. U. (2022, 28 September). ANALYSIS - What is the US plan on proposes-building-natural-gas-hub-in-turkiye/2710604 Cyprus? AA. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-what-is-the- Türkeş, İ. (2021). Doğu Akdeniz’de Uyuşmazlık Teşkil Eden Deniz us-plan-on-cyprus/2696823 Alanlarında Gerçekleştirilen Hidrokarbon ve Doğalgaz Çalışmalarının Önder, E., & Kılıç, M. A. (2021). Doğu Akdeniz Deniz Yetki Alanları Kıbrıs Sorununa Yansıması ile Soruna Getirdiği Yeni Dinamikler. Sorununun Tarihsel Analizi ve Hakkaniyetli Çözüm Önerileri (T. EURO Politika, 11, 86–107. Erdoğan & F. M. Sansar, Eds.).

Ozan, E. (2019). Doğu Akdeniz ve Türkiye’nin Stratejisi. ANKASAM. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Başkanlığı. (n.d.). Başlıca Ege Denizi

Özdemir, M. (2020). The Role of Eastern Mediterranean Energy Sorunları. Retrieved October 18, 2022, from https://www.mfa.gov.tr/

Geopolitics on the Regional Security [Master’s Thesis]. Bahçeşehir baslica-ege-denizi-sorunlari.tr.mfa

University. Tziarras, Z. (2016). Israel-Cyprus-Greece: a ‘Comfortable’ Quasi-Alliance.

Özekin, M. K. (2020). Doğu Akdeniz’de Değişen Enerji Jeopolitiği ve Mediterranean Politics, 21(3), 407–427.

Türkiye. Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi, 16(33), 1–51. Tziarras, Z. (2018). The Eastern Mediterranean: Between Power Struggles

Özman, A. M. (1988). Ege’de Karasuları Sorunu. Ankara University SBF and Regionalist Aspirations.

Journal, 43(3). Tziarras, Z. (2019). The New Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean

Paikin, Z., & Rose, C. (2021). Türkiye and the Eastern Mediterranean: – An Introduction. In Z. Tziarras (Ed.), The New Geopolitics of the

Geopolitical Euopean’s Pathway to Strategic Autonomy? In CEPS Eastern Mediterranean: Trilateral Partnerships and Regional Security

Policy Insights. (pp. 5–10). PRIO Cyprus Centre.

Proedrou, F. (2012). Re-conceptualising the Energy and Security Complex Tziarras, Z. (2021). International Competition and Cooperation in the

in the Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus Review, 24(2), 15–28. New Eastern Mediterranean. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.). Background Note of International Studies. Oxford University Press. https://doi.

on Aegean Dispute. Retrieved 24 October, 2022, from https://www. org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.654

mfa.gov.tr/background-note-on-aegean-dispute.en.mfa Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of

Reuters. (2022, 30 June). Greece proceeds with purchase of 20 Lockheed Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic (UK,

F-35 fighter jets -PM. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ France), (1977). https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XVIII/3-413.pdf

greece-submit-request-purchase-20-lockheed-f-35-fighter-jets-soon- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2021). Review of

sources-2022-06-30/ Maritime Transport 2021.

SABAH. (2022, October 27). Son dakika | Rusya Devlet Başkanı Putin’den Vayrynen, R. (2003). Regionalism: Old and New. International Studies

Türkiye açıklaması: Erdoğan güçlü bir lider. https://www.sabah.com. Review, 5(1), 25–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/1521-9488.501002

tr/gundem/2022/10/27/rusya-devlet-baskani-putinden-turkiye- WWF. (2021). Maritime Traffic.

aciklamasi-erdogan-guclu-bir-lider Yaycı, C. (2012). Doğu Akdeniz’de Deniz Yetki Alanlarının Paylaşılması

Sali, Ö. M. (2022). Deniz Yetki Alanlarının Sınırlandırılmasında Doğu Sorunu ve Türkiye. Bilge Strateji, 4(6), 1–70.

Akdeniz Adaları. Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Diplomasi, 5(1), 38–61. Yaycı, C. (2020). Doğu Akdeniz’in paylaşım mücadelesi ve Türkiye. https://doi.org/10.51763/uid.1093257 Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi. Şemşek, İ. (n.d.). Türkiye’nin Jeopolitik Önemi; Köprü mü, Kanat mı, Yaycı, C. (2022). Mavi Vatan. İstanbul University Press. https://doi. Merkez mi? http://www.johschool.com/Makaleler/1781106008_11org/10.26650/B/SS25.2022.01 Söderbaum, F., & Shaw, T. M. (2003). Introduction: Theories of New Yegin, M. (2022). United States Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Regionalism. In F. Söderbaum & T. M. Shaw (Eds.), Theories of Comparative Southeast European Studies, 70(3), 439–461. https://doi. New Regionalism (pp. 1–21). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi. org/10.1515/soeu-2022-0030 org/10.1057/9781403938794

Stergiou, A. (2019). Geopolitics and Energy Security in the Eastern Yılmaz, T. O. (2020). Doğu Akdeniz’de Türkiye’ye yönelik jeopolitik

Mediterranean: The Formation of new ‘Energy Alliances.’ In Z. kuşatma ve Libya meselesi. Türkiye Günlüğü, 141.

Tziarras (Ed.), The New Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean: Yücel, S. (2010). Ege’de Bitmeyen Sorunun Bir Unsuru Olarak Türk ve

Trilateral Partnerships and Regional Security (pp. 11–30). PRIO Yunan Karasuları ve Ulusal Hava Sahaları. Güvenlik Stratejileri

Cyprus Centre. Dergisi, 6(12), 83–102.

Cite this articleAPA 7

Formatted citationAPA 7

Erkeç, E. (2023). Reflections of Türkiye-Greece tension in the Islands Sea on the Eastern Mediterranean regional security complex. BRIQ Belt & Road Initiative Quarterly, 4(2), 24-48.

ExportRIS BibTeX EndNote

References47

Haber Global (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Hettne (2002). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Stivachtis (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Buzan (1983). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Hansen (2012). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Grabowski (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Buzan & Waever (2003). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Buzan (2007). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Özekin (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
WWF (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Gürcan (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Gibson (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Gürcan (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
BRIQ (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Tziarras (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Kedikli & Çalağan (2017). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Acer (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Kansu (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Mansel (2004). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Ertuğrul (2017b). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Ferudun (2009). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Mengi (2008). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
İnce (2013). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Ertuğrul (2017a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Turkish General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration (2015). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Yücel (2010). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Berberakis (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Koulizakou (2017). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Tezkereler ve Önergeler (1995). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Kökyay (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Acer (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Çetin (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Kadan (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Türkeş (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Yaycı, C. (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
BBC (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Tanchum (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Gürdeniz & Yaycı (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Yaycı (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
US Embassy in Greece (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Yegin (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
European Commission (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
BBC News (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
EUNAVFOR MED (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
SABAH (2022b). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Euronews (n.d.). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.
Mega (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

Licence and copyright

Permissions and reprints

briq@briqjournal.com

[ref-unlisted-1] Haber Global (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-2] Hettne (2002). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-3] Stivachtis (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-4] Buzan (1983). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-5] Hansen (2012). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-6] Grabowski (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-7] Buzan & Waever (2003). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-8] Buzan (2007). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-9] Özekin (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-10] WWF (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-11] Gürcan (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-12] Gibson (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-13] Gürcan (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-14] BRIQ (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-15] Tziarras (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-16] Kedikli & Çalağan (2017). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-17] Acer (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-18] Kansu (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-19] Mansel (2004). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-20] Ertuğrul (2017b). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-21] Ferudun (2009). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-22] Mengi (2008). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-23] İnce (2013). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-24] Ertuğrul (2017a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-25] Turkish General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration (2015). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-26] Yücel (2010). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-27] Berberakis (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-28] Koulizakou (2017). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-29] Tezkereler ve Önergeler (1995). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-30] Kökyay (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-31] Acer (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-32] Çetin (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-33] Kadan (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-34] Türkeş (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-35] Yaycı, C. (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-36] BBC (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-37] Tanchum (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-38] Gürdeniz & Yaycı (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-39] Yaycı (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-40] US Embassy in Greece (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-41] Yegin (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-42] European Commission (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-43] BBC News (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-44] EUNAVFOR MED (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-45] SABAH (2022b). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-46] Euronews (n.d.). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.

[ref-unlisted-47] Mega (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.