Introduction
The international system is undergoing a multilayered transformation in the first quarter of the twenty-first century, as economic, technological, and geopolitical changes unfold simultaneously. China’s growing weight in global production, trade, finance, and technology ecosystems has also helped make Asia one of the principal centers of the global system. Rather than a linear shift in which one center replaces another, this trend points to a more plural order in which several centers of power exert influence simultaneously. The 55th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Türkiye and the People’s Republic of China (1971-2026Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.-a). Türkiye-Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti ekonomik ilişkileri [Türkiye-People’s Republic of China economic relations]. Retrieved July 27, 2026, from), therefore, provides a meaningful historical threshold for assessing how this systemic change has been reflected in bilateral relations.
The trajectory of relations can be summarized through four turning points. Diplomatic relations were established on August 5, 1971; contacts diversified from the 1980s onward as both countries pursued policies of economic opening; relations were elevated to the level of “strategic cooperation” in 2010; and a memorandum on aligning the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the Middle Corridor was signed in 2015. Following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022, growing political and logistical risks along the Northern Corridor through Russia made the Middle Corridor—running through the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye—more visible (Atlı, 2013Atlı, A. (2013). 12 Mart Muhtırası ve Türkiye’nin Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti’ni tanıması [The March 12 Memorandum and Türkiye’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China]. In S. Esenbel, İ. Togan & A. Atlı (Eds.), Türkiye’de Çin’i düşünmek: Ekonomik, siyasi ve kültürel ilişkilere yeni yaklaşımlar [Thinking about China in Türkiye: New approaches to economic, political, and cultural relations] (pp. 147-169). Boğaziçi University Press.; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2016). 2016 yılı başında dış politikamız [Our foreign policy at the beginning of 2016].; Ülgen & Umarov, 2024Ülgen, S., & Umarov, T. (2024, October 17). Transatlantic policies on China: Is there a role for Türkiye? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.).
The literature on Türkiye-China relations reveals, from different perspectives, the tension between diplomatic rapprochement and economic asymmetry. Existing studies show that the discourse of strategic cooperation has not translated into a balanced partnership in trade and investment, that Türkiye has sought to expand its room for autonomy through relations with China while preserving its ties with Western institutions, and that the complementarity between the Middle Corridor and the BRI remains conditional (Hussain, 2021Hussain, E. (2021). The Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor: Complementarity or competition? Insight Turkey, 23(3), 233-250.; Öniş & Yalikun, 2021Öniş, Z., & Yalikun, M. (2021). Emerging partnership in a post-Western world? The political economy of China-Turkey relations. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 21(4), 507-529.; Tekdal, 2024Tekdal, V. (2024). Greater autonomy through closer relations with China? Revisiting the Turkey-China engagement. OASIS, 39, 103-120.). Nevertheless, few studies evaluate power transition, connectivity, the technological composition of trade, the quality of investment, and the peace-stability relationship within a single analytical model. This fragmentation in the literature makes it difficult to test clearly the conditions under which expanding trade and infrastructure investment generate productive capacity and balanced interdependence.
This article addresses the following question: Does Türkiye remain merely a “transit country” within Eurasian production and logistics networks integrated with China, or is it becoming a “joint production hub” through technology transfer, joint R&D, local value added, and reciprocal investment? The answer is not inferred from isolated indicators such as geographical location or total trade volume. The transit-country position is operationalized as progress in freight volume, transit time, and corridor capacity, accompanied by weak linkages to production, technology, and local sourcing. The joint-production-hub position, by contrast, is operationalized through measurable contributions of foreign direct investment to manufacturing, R&D, local sourcing, and exports to third-country markets.
The study makes an original contribution at three levels. First, it examines the 55-year relationship by combining diplomatic periodization with geoeconomic indicators. Second, rather than treating the Middle Corridor’s geopolitical significance as an automatic economic success, it measures its transit and production functions separately. Third, it develops the “new peace perspective” not as an established theory, but as a conditional analytical framework that brings together the literatures on commercial peace, complex interdependence, and weaponized interdependence. In doing so, it distinguishes official discourse on “common development” from data-based analytical assessment.
Theoretical Framework and Position in the Literature
Power transition theory explains change in the international system not merely through the absolute growth of a single state, but through the different rates at which the relative economic, technological, and military capabilities of major actors develop. According to Gilpin (1981Gilpin, R. (1981). War and change in world politics. Cambridge University Press.), shifts in the distribution of power alter the costs and benefits of existing rules and create pressure for systemic adaptation. China’s rise is significant in this context; however, China’s economic size does not imply that a multipolar order will necessarily be peaceful or China-centered. Power transition generates competition over technological standards, financing, critical inputs, and transportation networks, as well as opportunities for cooperation. This study, therefore, treats China’s rise not as the normative declaration of a “new paradigm,” but as a systemic variable that redistributes options and constraints across Eurasia.
Geoeconomics, the second theoretical component, explains how states use trade, finance, investment, technology, and infrastructure to pursue strategic objectives. In Luttwak’s (1990Luttwak, E. N. (1990). From geopolitics to geo-economics: Logic of conflict, grammar of commerce. The National Interest, 20, 17-23.) account, the logic of competition persists, but the instruments increasingly assume an economic character. Within this framework, a port, railway, or digital network is not merely technical infrastructure; it is also a source of power that shapes market access, costs, standards, and relations of dependence. Connectivity refers to the capacity of these instruments to function together within geographical, institutional, and digital networks. The analysis of corridors must therefore encompass customs harmonization, financing conditions, data sharing, logistics services, and production clusters in addition to the physical route itself.
The interdependence literature explains the dual character of connectivity as a source of both cooperation and vulnerability. According to Keohane and Nye (2012Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2012). Power and interdependence (4th ed.). Pearson.), economic and institutional networks create mutual sensitivity and costs among actors, but those costs may be distributed unevenly. Farrell and Newman (2019Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42-79.) developed the concept of “weaponized interdependence” by showing how actors that control central network nodes can transform advantages in information and access into instruments of coercion. This approach demonstrates why growth in trade volume alone should not be treated as evidence of partnership. In Türkiye-China relations, the trade deficit, technological dependence, and the sectoral distribution of investment shape the distribution of bargaining power as much as they shape the benefits of connectivity.
Although the literature on Türkiye-China relations addresses different dimensions of these theoretical debates, it generally concentrates on a single level of analysis. Atlı (2018Atlı, A. (2018, November 26). Making sense of Turkey’s rapprochement with China. German Marshall Fund of the United States.) and Tekdal (2024Tekdal, V. (2024). Greater autonomy through closer relations with China? Revisiting the Turkey-China engagement. OASIS, 39, 103-120.) examine Ankara’s relations with China in the context of foreign-policy diversification and strategic autonomy. In contrast, Öniş and Yalikun (2021Öniş, Z., & Yalikun, M. (2021). Emerging partnership in a post-Western world? The political economy of China-Turkey relations. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 21(4), 507-529.) emphasize the gap between political rapprochement and asymmetric economic outcomes. Işık and Zou (2019Işık, A. F., & Zou, Z. (2019). China-Turkey security cooperation under the background of the ‘Belt and Road’ and the ‘Middle Corridor’ initiatives. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 13(2), 278-293.) study security cooperation, while Hussain (2021Hussain, E. (2021). The Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor: Complementarity or competition? Insight Turkey, 23(3), 233-250.) analyzes the elements of complementarity and competition in the BRI-Middle Corridor relationship. Duan and Aydın (2024Duan, J., & Aydın, H. (2024). Nation building processes and bilateral relations between China and Türkiye: Comparison of 20th and 21st centuries. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 26(5), 659-680.) demonstrate the effects of the two countries’ historical state- and nation-building processes on bilateral relations. The present study does not reject these contributions; rather, it integrates them around productive capacity, logistical performance, and a conditional mechanism of stability.
The explanatory chain of the theoretical model is constructed as follows: Changes in the global distribution of power intensify states’ efforts to seek influence through economic networks and corridors. At the same time, geoeconomic investments create new connections; they may distribute gains and vulnerabilities unevenly. For Türkiye, if logistical access is supported by production linkages, local value added, export capacity, and bargaining power may increase. If connectivity remains limited to a transit function and one-sided dependence deepens in critical technologies and inputs, economic networks may narrow Türkiye’s strategic room for maneuver. Balanced investment, joint institutions, and positive expectations about future cooperation, by contrast, may contribute to stability by increasing the costs of disagreement.
This model generates three analytical expectations. First, if transport capacity expands while production-oriented investment and technology transfer remain limited, Türkiye will occupy a transit-dominant position. Second, if foreign direct investment generates local sourcing, R&D, skilled employment, and exports to third countries, a transition toward a joint production hub may be identified. Third, if economic relations remain markedly asymmetric, the pacifying effect of connectivity will be constrained; its potential to produce stability will increase as reciprocity, institutionalization, and positive expectations that cooperation will continue grow stronger. The findings are interpreted based on these expectations.
The model also draws a clear distinction among official discourse, policy outputs, and economic outcomes. Expressions such as “strategic cooperation,” “common development,” and “alignment” indicate the parties’ intentions and the political framing they assign to the relationship; they do not, by themselves, constitute evidence of complementarity, local development, or balanced interdependence. Policy outputs are observable steps such as a signed memorandum, an established working group, or allocated financing. Economic outcomes, by contrast, are sought in realized freight volumes, investment, local sourcing, R&D, and export indicators. Distinguishing these three levels prevents normative expectations from being conflated with realized outcomes and places the discourse-implementation gap in Türkiye-China relations at the center of the analysis.
Method, Data Sources, and Analytical Criteria
The study is based on a structured qualitative document analysis covering the period 1971-2026. Document analysis requires written materials produced for different purposes to be systematically selected, evaluated, and interpreted under thematic categories (Bowen, 2009Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. Qualitative Research Journal, 9(2), 27-40.). This design was chosen because it enables the 55-year historical trajectory to be compared with indicators of bilateral trade, investment, and transportation within a common framework. The study does not conduct a statistical test of causality; instead, it assesses the correspondence between theoretical expectations and observed indicators through triangulation across sources.
The source base consists of four groups. The first includes official documents concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations, the 2010 strategic-cooperation decision, the 2015 alignment memorandum, connectivity, and mediation activities. The second comprises the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ bilateral trade series, the World Bank’s Middle Corridor models and project-financing data, and investment announcements by the Investment Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye. The third group consists of peer-reviewed articles and academic books, while the fourth includes data-based reports by research institutions such as the Carnegie Endowment and SWP. Official documents are used to identify actors’ policy objectives and announced figures; academic studies are used to assess those claims critically and comparatively.
The source-selection criteria were direct relevance to the topic, institutional or academic reliability, traceability of the data-production method, and temporal coverage. For trade data, the official Turkish series based on the general trade system was used as the reference; different national series were not combined in a single table due to potential discrepancies with China’s mirror statistics. Future figures for the Middle Corridor were classified not as realized outcomes but as World Bank model projections conditional on investment and efficiency measures. Information on the capacity, employment, and R&D components of the BYD investment was likewise coded as announced targets rather than realized technology transfer.
The analysis was conducted in three stages. First, the documents were coded chronologically into the periods 1971-1989, 1990-2009, 2010- 2021, and 2022-2026. Second, their content was divided into the themes of power transition, geoeconomic connectivity, trade and technological asymmetry, investment and production cooperation, political constraints, and the peace-stability mechanism. Third, the research question was assessed using the criteria in Table 1; wherever possible, official data, international organization reports, and academic interpretations were compared for the same claim. This procedure reduces the risk of presenting official discourse on “common development” as an analytical finding.
During coding, the date, document type, institutional producer, period covered, principal claim, and indicator used were recorded for each document. Quantitative claims were divided into three categories: “realized data,” “announced target,” and “model projection.” For example, the 2023 foreign-trade figures constitute realized data, the BYD facility’s planned capacity of 150,000 vehicles is an announced target, and the projection that the Middle Corridor could reach 11 million tonnes by 2030 is conditional. Where sources differed, a comparable series within the same statistical system was preferred, and alternative figures were not merged. Evidence that challenged the research question was retained alongside supporting findings; for this reason, the corridor’s limited share of China-Europe trade and the lack of technology-transfer data were not excluded.
The method has two limitations. First, regular and comparable open data on the local-sourcing ratios of Chinese investments, firm-level R&D expenditure, and bilateral patent production are limited. The absence of data is therefore interpreted not as evidence that technology transfer has never occurred, but as an indication that the production-hub claim has not yet been verified through transparent indicators. Second, the World Bank’s 2030 corridor estimates are based on a broader regional model that includes Türkiye and cannot be treated as precise country-level outcomes. These limitations are explicitly acknowledged in the findings section.
Historical Trajectory of Relations
The first period, extending from diplomatic recognition in 1971 to the late 1980s, was one of cautious normalization. Türkiye’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China was closely tied to Cold War conditions and to changes in China’s representation at the United Nations. Bilateral relations were initially conducted through limited diplomatic contacts; in the 1980s, trade and official visits increased as economic opening accelerated in both countries (Atlı, 2013Atlı, A. (2013). 12 Mart Muhtırası ve Türkiye’nin Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti’ni tanıması [The March 12 Memorandum and Türkiye’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China]. In S. Esenbel, İ. Togan & A. Atlı (Eds.), Türkiye’de Çin’i düşünmek: Ekonomik, siyasi ve kültürel ilişkilere yeni yaklaşımlar [Thinking about China in Türkiye: New approaches to economic, political, and cultural relations] (pp. 147-169). Boğaziçi University Press.; Duan & Aydın, 2024Duan, J., & Aydın, H. (2024). Nation building processes and bilateral relations between China and Türkiye: Comparison of 20th and 21st centuries. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 26(5), 659-680.). The relationship lacked a strategic framework during this period; the principal achievements were mutual recognition and the establishment of regular diplomatic contact.
The second period, from 1990 to 2009, was marked by economic relations expanding more rapidly than political relations. The end of the Cold War, China’s integration into global production networks, and the further opening of the Turkish market to foreign trade expanded bilateral commerce. Türkiye’s exports to China, however, did not diversify at the same pace, and the import imbalance persisted. This period established the basic structural pattern that would become more pronounced in later years: despite stronger political contacts and growing trade volume, Türkiye’s share of the Chinese market and China-originated productive investment in Türkiye remained limited (Dilek et al., 2019Dilek, Ş., Özdemir, B. Z., & İstikbal, D. (2019). Asya yüzyılında Türkiye-Çin ekonomik ilişkileri [Türkiye-China economic relations in the Asian century]. SETA Publications.; Öniş & Yalikun, 2021Öniş, Z., & Yalikun, M. (2021). Emerging partnership in a post-Western world? The political economy of China-Turkey relations. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 21(4), 507-529.).
The third period began with the elevation of relations to “strategic cooperation” in 2010 and acquired an institutional connectivity dimension through the 2015 alignment memorandum. The memorandum of November 14, 2015, provided a political and legal basis for cooperation between the BRI and the Middle Corridor in road, railway, and port connections (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2016). 2016 yılı başında dış politikamız [Our foreign policy at the beginning of 2016].). This development does not mean that all elements of the two initiatives were automatically integrated. Route priorities, financing, technical standards, and local development objectives require bargaining and coordination as much as they do complementarity (Hussain, 2021Hussain, E. (2021). The Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor: Complementarity or competition? Insight Turkey, 23(3), 233-250.).
The fourth period, beginning after 2022, has been characterized by the growing importance of geopolitical risks and supply-chain security. The Russia-Ukraine War and sanctions against Russia increased the risk premium for transportation along the Northern Corridor, drawing greater attention to the Middle Corridor as an alternative, diversifying route. During the same period, US-China technological competition and the European Union’s policies to reduce China-related economic risks complicated the room for maneuver available to Türkiye as a NATO member and participant in the EU Customs Union. The 55year relationship is therefore better understood not as a linear rapprochement but as a selective partnership in which diplomatic cooperation, economic asymmetry, and security constraints are managed simultaneously (Tekdal, 2024Tekdal, V. (2024). Greater autonomy through closer relations with China? Revisiting the Turkey-China engagement. OASIS, 39, 103-120.; Ülgen & Umarov, 2024Ülgen, S., & Umarov, T. (2024, October 17). Transatlantic policies on China: Is there a role for Türkiye? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.).
This periodization reveals both continuity and change in bilateral relations. The continuity lies in Türkiye’s desire to diversify its economic relations with China and to offset the trade deficit through investment; this objective has persisted from before 2010 to the present. Change is evident in the instruments of the relationship: strategic cooperation was added to the initial agenda of diplomatic recognition and trade after 2010, corridor alignment after 2015, and supply-chain resilience and productive investment after 2022. Nevertheless, greater institutional density does not mean that interdependence has become symmetrical. While the official page on political relations emphasizes strategic cooperation and high-level contacts, the economic series shows a persistent deficit (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-a, n.d.-bRepublic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.-a). Türkiye-Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti ekonomik ilişkileri [Türkiye-People’s Republic of China economic relations]. Retrieved July 27, 2026, from). This gap constitutes the central analytical tension of the 55-year relationship.
Power Transition and Geoeconomic Connectivity: The Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor
China’s rise over the past quarter century has rested on an accumulation of capabilities that extend beyond production scale. Advanced manufacturing, energy and digital infrastructure, research and development, logistics, and development finance have increased China’s weight in international economic networks. Although this transformation gives China greater influence over regional rules and connections, it does not mean that all outcomes are determined unilaterally by Beijing. China’s rise unfolds through the interaction of identity, interdependence, and regional strategy, while partner countries’ regulatory capacities and national priorities significantly shape outcomes (Liu, 2010Liu, Q. (2010). China’s rise and regional strategy: Power, interdependence and identity. Journal of Cambridge Studies, 5(4), 76-92.; Rolland, 2017Rolland, N. (2017). China’s Eurasian century? Political and strategic implications of the Belt and Road Initiative. The National Bureau of Asian Research.).
Announced in 2013, the BRI is a multidimensional policy framework encompassing ports, energy networks, financing, digital connectivity, cross-border production relations, and land and maritime transportation routes. The initiative’s official discourse emphasizes common development and mutual benefit; analytically, however, outcomes vary depending on project selection, debt sustainability, procurement transparency, local employment, environmental impacts, and production linkages. The World Bank (2019World Bank. (2019). Belt and Road economics: Opportunities and risks of transport corridors.) emphasizes that lower transport costs can generate gains in trade and income, but that these gains will not be distributed evenly without complementary reforms and risk management. The BRI should therefore be reduced neither to an infrastructure project alone nor presented as a model that automatically produces inclusive development.
Türkiye’s vision for the Middle Corridor refers to a multimodal network through which freight originating in China and Central Asia reaches Europe via the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway, Marmaray, and Türkiye’s railway and port connections are major components of this network. The corridor offers a complementary opportunity for diversification alongside the northern route through Russia and maritime shipping. However, maritime crossings, differing rail gauges, port transshipment, border delays, unpredictable tariffs, and incompatible digital documentation increase transport time and cost. Geographical shortness, therefore, is not equivalent to operational superiority (Hussain, 2021Hussain, E. (2021). The Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor: Complementarity or competition? Insight Turkey, 23(3), 233-250.; Ülgen & Umarov, 2024Ülgen, S., & Umarov, T. (2024, October 17). Transatlantic policies on China: Is there a role for Türkiye? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.).
The World Bank’s (2023World Bank. (2023). Middle trade and transport corridor: Policies and investments to triple freight volumes and halve travel time by 2030.) model projects that, if the necessary infrastructure investments and efficiency measures are implemented, freight along the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor could approximately triple relative to 2021, reaching 11 million tonnes by 2030, while travel time could be reduced by half. The same report states that, without these improvements, demand would remain 35% below the projection. More importantly, China-Europe trade crossing the Caspian is expected to account for only about 1% of total China-EU trade in 2030. This finding shows that the corridor is valuable primarily for regional trade and supply-chain diversification rather than as a single route capable of replacing global maritime transport.
Tangible investment in physical capacity is important for removing bottlenecks on the Turkish section of the corridor. In December 2024, the World Bank approved USD 660 million in financing for the Eastern Türkiye Middle Corridor Railway Development Project. The project aims to electrify and modernize the 660-kilometer line between Divriği, Kars, and the Georgian border, with the potential to increase annual freight capacity from approximately 750,000 tonnes to 20 million tonnes (World Bank, 2024World Bank. (2024, December 5). World Bank approves $660 million for Türkiye to expand low-carbon rail network to boost growth and jobs.). The approved financing amounts to USD 660 million. Planned capacity, however, is not realized traffic volume; unless border crossings, Caspian ports, and infrastructure in neighboring countries are improved simultaneously, investment in a single rail segment will not increase corridor performance to the expected extent.
Strategic alignment between the BRI and the Middle Corridor, therefore, depends on three conditions. First, infrastructure investment must be complemented by common operating standards for customs, tariffs, data sharing, and timetables. Second, increased transit volume should generate value-added services in Türkiye, including storage, maintenance, insurance, financing, and digital logistics. Third, logistical flows should be linked to local production by creating manufacturing and export clusters along the corridor. If these conditions are not met, Türkiye’s geoeconomic importance may increase while its economic returns remain limited to transit fees and a narrow range of logistics services.
In evaluating the corridor, the narrative of a “China-Europe land bridge” must also be distinguished from its regional-development function. In the World Bank model, most future volume derives not from transit between China and Europe, but from regional trade among Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Türkiye, and Europe (World Bank, 2023World Bank. (2023). Middle trade and transport corridor: Policies and investments to triple freight volumes and halve travel time by 2030.). This is not a weakness from Türkiye’s perspective; rather, it shows that measuring the corridor’s success solely by the number of China-Europe containers is too narrow an approach. Türkiye’s principal gains may arise through improved access for Anatolian production centers to markets in the Caucasus and Central Asia, logistics and processing activities in the eastern provinces, port-rail integration, and the capacity to generate return cargo. Because insufficient return cargo increases the movement of empty wagons and containers and reduces cost advantages, export diversification is also a corridor policy.
Structural Asymmetries and the Transition from a Transit Country to a Joint Production Hub
The central problem in Türkiye-China economic relations is not simply the size of trade, but its imbalance and the composition of trade. According to the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.-aRepublic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.-a). Türkiye-Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti ekonomik ilişkileri [Türkiye-People’s Republic of China economic relations]. Retrieved July 27, 2026, from), Türkiye exported USD 3.3 billion to China in 2023, imported USD 44.98 billion, recorded a total trade volume of USD 48.3 billion, and ran a trade deficit of USD 41.7 billion. In 2025, exports remained at USD 3.3 billion, while imports rose to USD 49.6 billion and the deficit to USD 46.3 billion. The ratio of exports to imports was only approximately 7.3% in 2023. This persistent gap points to a structural asymmetry that temporary exchange-rate movements cannot explain.
Product composition makes the technological dimension of this asymmetry visible. Türkiye’s principal exports to China include marble and travertine, metal ores, chromium, copper, iron, zinc, and boron products. Imports from China are led by telephones, automatic data-processing machines, electronic communications equipment, compressors, and converters (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-aRepublic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.-a). Türkiye-Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti ekonomik ilişkileri [Türkiye-People’s Republic of China economic relations]. Retrieved July 27, 2026, from). Based on International Trade Center data, Yılmaz (2022Yılmaz, B. (2022). Trade relations between China and Turkey: A comparison with the European Union (Research Division Asia Working Paper No. 1). Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.) calculates that electrical machinery and equipment (SITC 85) and machinery and mechanical appliances (SITC 84) accounted for 51.6% of Türkiye’s total imports from China during 2018-2020. Türkiye’s exports, by contrast, were concentrated in natural resources and products with lower levels of processing. The deficit, therefore, reflects not only a monetary imbalance but also a qualitative difference in technological specialization.
Some of the machinery, electronic components, and capital goods imported from China are used as inputs in production processes in Türkiye. It would therefore be inaccurate to interpret all imports as final consumption or as a “loss of domestic production.” The critical question is how much local value added, exports, and technological learning these imported inputs generate in Türkiye. Publicly available bilateral and firm-level data do not consistently reveal this relationship. Policy assessment, therefore, requires a framework that measures the contribution of intermediate and capital goods to local design, engineering, supplier development, and export capacity, rather than focusing exclusively on reducing imports.
Foreign direct investment data likewise reveal the gap between trade volume and production integration. According to Ülgen and Umarov (2024Ülgen, S., & Umarov, T. (2024, October 17). Transatlantic policies on China: Is there a role for Türkiye? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.), Chinese foreign direct investment stock reached approximately USD 9 billion by the end of 2023. Since 2002, 1,197 Chinese capital companies have been established in Türkiye, accounting for approximately 0.6% of all internationally capitalized companies in the country. Although Chinese investment is visible in strategic sectors such as finance, energy, telecommunications, port operations, and infrastructure, export-oriented manufacturing investment remains too limited in scale to offset the large trade deficit. Investment stock alone must also not be taken as evidence of technology transfer or local value added.
The approximately USD 1 billion investment agreement signed with BYD in July 2024 is an important test case for the transition from a transit function to a production function. According to the announcement, the project plans an electric and plug-in hybrid vehicle plant in Manisa with an annual capacity of 150,000 vehicles, a sustainable-mobility R&D center, and up to 5,000 direct jobs; production is targeted to begin by the end of 2026 (Investment Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, 2024Investment Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye. (2024, July 9). BYD announces landmark USD 1 billion EV plant investment in Türkiye.). These are not realized outputs, however, but targets announced in the agreement. The investment’s effect on Türkiye’s emergence as a joint production hub should be measured through the local-sourcing ratio, components and patents developed in Türkiye, R&D expenditure, skilled employment, export share, and Turkish firms’ participation in BYD’s global supply network.
Local value added and technology transfer should not be used interchangeably. Local value added refers to the economic value created in Türkiye through wages, purchases of local inputs, taxation, logistics, and service activities. Technology transfer requires the transmission of production knowledge, design capabilities, intellectual property, or advanced engineering practices to institutions and employees in Türkiye. An assembly plant may generate high employment and substantial purchases of local services, but technology transfer may remain limited if key components are imported and design decisions remain abroad. Conversely, a smaller R&D partnership may produce long-term technological effects through patents, licensing, or specialist training. Investment volume, local value, and technological learning should therefore be monitored as separate indicators in assessing a joint production hub.
Taken together, the indicators place Türkiye between a pure transit country and an institutionalized joint production hub, but in an intermediate position dominated by the transit function. Railway investments and the Middle Corridor’s growing visibility strengthen its logistical advantage. The persistently high trade deficit, the division between raw-material exports and technology-intensive imports, the relatively limited scale of productive investment, and the lack of public data on realized technology transfer, however, show that the characteristics of a joint production hub have not yet been demonstrated. Geography is a necessary precondition, but it is not itself a transformation of production.
The first axis of policy solutions is exports and market access. Türkiye’s exports to China should be diversified toward higher-value-added fields such as processed minerals, machinery and automotive components, medical technology, chemicals, food, and digital services. Compliance with health and technical standards in the Chinese market, product-specific protocols for agricultural and food products, e-commerce channels, and distribution partnerships can support this objective. Success should be monitored not only by export value but also by the number of new products, the share of processed goods, service exports, and durable market access.
The second axis is the quality of investment. Incentives should be tied not only to the amount of capital, but also to indicators such as the local-sourcing ratio, R&D expenditure, skilled employment, joint patents, engineering training, export capacity, and environmental performance. Joint ventures and supplier-development programs can facilitate Turkish firms’ participation in the global value chains of Chinese companies. If public support is calibrated to realized production and technological outputs rather than to announced capacity, the gap between investment volume and development impact can be reduced.
The third axis is data and institutional monitoring capacity. An annual “economic partnership performance framework” could be published under the Türkiye-China Joint Working Group. The framework should monitor the trade balance, the technological intensity of products, the share of greenfield investment, local sourcing, joint R&D and patents, skilled employment, exports to third countries, and the corridor’s time-cost performance. Aggregated indicators that protect firm confidentiality would allow investment agreements to be assessed in terms of public benefit and reciprocity.
Türkiye’s Strategic Balancing Role and Its Limits
Türkiye’s role in Eurasia arises from the combination of its geographical position, institutional ties, and diplomatic capacity. Its location at the intersection of the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean—together with its NATO membership, Customs Union with the EU, position in the Organization of Turkic States, and responsibilities for Black Sea security—enables Türkiye to engage simultaneously with different centers of power. These characteristics do not make Türkiye the “sole” actor capable of stabilizing the power transition in Eurasia. More cautiously, Türkiye may be regarded as one of several actors capable of making a limited but significant contribution through transportation, crisis diplomacy, and regional networks.
The first limit on this balancing capacity is the US-China strategic competition. Advanced technologies, telecommunications, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and investment in critical infrastructure are increasingly treated as matters of security policy. Türkiye’s NATO obligations and regulatory integration with the EU market may impose constraints on technological cooperation with China regarding data security, export controls, competition, and standards alignment. At the same time, treating all Chinese investment as a security threat would also constrain opportunities for production and the green transition. A workable strategy should be based not on a claim of equidistance among actors, but on sector-specific risk assessment, supply diversification, and transparent investment screening (Tekdal, 2024Tekdal, V. (2024). Greater autonomy through closer relations with China? Revisiting the Turkey-China engagement. OASIS, 39, 103-120.; Ülgen & Umarov, 2024Ülgen, S., & Umarov, T. (2024, October 17). Transatlantic policies on China: Is there a role for Türkiye? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.).
The second limit is the social and political significance of the Uyghur issue in Türkiye. The Uyghur diaspora in Türkiye, cultural and historical ties, and human-rights debates make it difficult to separate Ankara-Beijing relations entirely from other economic issues. A persistent difference remains between Beijing’s emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs and Türkiye’s social sensitivities. Ignoring this issue will not build trust in the relationship; high-level dialogue, consular access, open communication about cultural and religious rights, and the protection of the diaspora’s safety are necessary to keep the disagreement manageable (Öniş & Yalikun, 2021Öniş, Z., & Yalikun, M. (2021). Emerging partnership in a post-Western world? The political economy of China-Turkey relations. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 21(4), 507-529.; Ülgen & Umarov, 2024Ülgen, S., & Umarov, T. (2024, October 17). Transatlantic policies on China: Is there a role for Türkiye? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.).
The third limit is the possibility that economic networks may become instruments of coercion. Dependence on a single supplier at critical nodes in telecommunications, finance, energy, or transportation can give the actor at the center of the network disproportionate power over information and access (Farrell & Newman, 2019Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42-79.). For Türkiye, the trade deficit and dependence on China for certain technological inputs require a balance between short-term cost advantages and long-term resilience. Open procurement, cybersecurity audits, interoperable standards, source diversification, and contractual dispute-resolution provisions can reduce this risk. Strategic balancing should mean measuring and managing dependencies, not denying them.
The economic sustainability of Türkiye’s balancing role also depends on whether its Western and Asian connections are framed as mutually exclusive alternatives. Europe remains Türkiye’s largest export market and regulatory reference point, while China is important for technology, capital goods, financing, and access to Asian markets. Pursuing these two orientations simultaneously requires that Chinese investments comply with EU competition, environmental, and product-safety standards; that goods produced in Türkiye meet Customs Union rules; and that security consultations with allies be held on sensitive technologies. Successful balancing will arise not from making institutional commitments ambiguous, but from coordinating cooperation with different partners around clear rules and national industrial objectives.
A New Peace Perspective and Sustainable Cooperation
In this study, the “new peace perspective” is used not as an established, independent theory in the international relations literature but as an integrative analytical framework for assessing Türkiye-China relations. The concept does not limit peace to the absence of armed conflict between states; it jointly considers the contribution of balanced economic interdependence, sustainable development, institutionalized connectivity, and uninterrupted diplomatic dialogue to predictability. This approach draws on Galtung’s (1969Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. Journal of Peace Research, 6(3), 167-191.) distinction between negative and positive peace, Keohane and Nye’s (2012Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2012). Power and interdependence (4th ed.). Pearson.) framework of complex interdependence, and debates on commercial peace.
According to the commercial-peace approach, deepening economic relations may increase the opportunity costs of conflict and diplomatic rupture. Oneal and Russett (1997Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. M. (1997). The classical liberals were right: Democracy, interdependence, and conflict, 1950-1985. International Studies Quarterly, 41(2), 267-294.) provide evidence that reciprocal trade can reduce the probability of interstate military conflict. This outcome, however, is not unconditional. Barbieri (1996Barbieri, K. (1996). Economic interdependence: A path to peace or a source of interstate conflict? Journal of Peace Research, 33(1), 29-49.) shows that intense dependence may increase the risk of dispute when the nature and symmetry of economic ties are not taken into account. In Copeland’s (1996Copeland, D. C. (1996). Economic interdependence and war: A theory of trade expectations. International Security, 20(4), 5-41.) trade-expectations approach, the decisive factor is not merely current trade volume, but expectations about whether mutually beneficial trade will continue in the future. Farrell and Newman (2019Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42-79.), meanwhile, demonstrate that asymmetric networks may be used for sanctions, surveillance, and access restrictions.
The causal mechanism underlying the new peace perspective comprises four links. First, balanced trade, reciprocal investment, and joint production increase the costs of political rupture for both sides. Second, transportation and production networks increase the number of firms, workers, local governments, and expert communities that benefit from the continuation of the relationship. Third, joint working groups, data sharing, and dispute-resolution mechanisms reduce misperception and uncertainty. Fourth, mediation and crisis diplomacy keep communication channels open during periods of political disagreement. Connectivity contributes to stability only through these institutional and diplomatic intermediate mechanisms.
The mechanism’s boundary conditions are symmetry, institutionalization, diversification, and positive expectations about the future. If the trade deficit continues to grow, dependence on critical inputs remains one-sided, investments fail to generate local benefits, security dilemmas intensify, or economic networks are used for political coercion, greater connectivity may not produce greater peace. The USD 41.7 billion deficit in Türkiye-China relations in 2023 and the technology-intensive composition of imports directly engage this boundary condition. The new peace perspective is therefore not a deterministic proposition that “trade guarantees peace,” but rather a conditional claim that interdependence, managed through balanced and reliable institutions, can reduce the risk of conflict.
China’s Global Development, Global Security, and Global Civilization Initiatives present an official discourse on global governance that emphasizes development, sovereignty, dialogue, and cultural diversity. The Global Civilization Initiative was announced in 2023, centered on the principles of respect for the diversity of civilizations, mutual learning, and people-to-people exchange (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2023Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2023, March 16). Xi Jinping attends the CPC in dialogue with world political parties’ high-level meeting and delivers a keynote speech.). These documents reveal Beijing’s policy preferences and legitimizing discourse; they do not constitute independent empirical evidence that the initiatives produce peace in practice. Their significance for Türkiye-China relations depends on testing concrete investment and diplomatic mechanisms against the criteria of reciprocity and transparency.
Türkiye’s complementary contribution lies in its capacity for mediation and facilitation. Following the “Mediation for Peace” initiative launched by Türkiye and Finland within the United Nations in 2010, the Group of Friends of Mediation was established; Türkiye has hosted the Istanbul Mediation Conferences since 2012 (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2022, March 9). 8. İstanbul Arabuluculuk Konferansı hakkında [On the 8th Istanbul Mediation Conference] [Press release No. 80].). During the Russia-Ukraine War, the talks in Antalya and Istanbul, and the Black Sea Grain Initiative launched on July 22, 2022, showed that Ankara could open limited, functional areas of cooperation between the parties. The Joint Coordination Center in Istanbul brought together representatives of Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye, and the United Nations (United Nations, 2022United Nations. (2022). Black Sea Grain Initiative: Frequently asked questions.). These initiatives did not end the war; they temporarily facilitated communication and the provision of specific public goods.
The Türkiye-China connection is clear at this point, but conditional. If alignment between the BRI and the Middle Corridor generates joint production, local sourcing, and predictable transportation, the number of actors benefiting from the continuation of the relationship will increase. Regular economic consultation, crisis communication, customs and data standards, the settlement of investment disputes, and inter-university research networks may reduce uncertainty. If trade asymmetry deepens, the Uyghur issue remains a suppressed source of tension, or if technological networks generate one-sided coercive power, connectivity may produce vulnerability rather than stability. The contribution of the new peace perspective to bilateral relations depends on combining China’s investment and production capacity with Türkiye’s connectivity and diplomatic instruments within a balanced, measurable, and institutionalized partnership.
For the framework to be monitored empirically, claims about peace and stability must be tied to measurable intermediate outcomes. The continuation of regular high-level and technical meetings, the resolution of trade disputes through predictable mechanisms, the operation of joint crisis protocols during corridor disruptions, a more balanced distribution of economic benefits, and the preservation of communication channels despite political disagreements are positive indicators. Conversely, sudden trade restrictions, unilateral imposition of standards, making access to critical networks conditional on political demands, investments that fail to generate local benefits, and social sensitivities that interrupt diplomatic communication are signs of failure. These observable outcomes transform the concept of “new peace” from a normative aspiration into a set of analytically testable propositions.
Conclusion
This study has assessed the stage reached in Türkiye-China relations on the 55th anniversary of diplomatic ties by distinguishing between a “transit country” and a “joint production hub.” The research question has a clear answer: Türkiye currently occupies an intermediate position in which the transit function predominates. The Middle Corridor and railway investments in Türkiye increase the country’s logistical importance, but geographical position and transport capacity alone do not create a joint production hub. Such a transformation requires China-originated investments to generate local sourcing, joint R&D, realized technology transfer, skilled employment, and exports to third countries.
Three principal findings support this conclusion. First, exports of USD 3.3 billion, imports of USD 44.98 billion, and a deficit of USD 41.7 billion in 2023 demonstrate the pronounced trade asymmetry in the relationship. Second, the fact that machinery and electrical-equipment groups accounted for 51.6% of imports from China during 2018-2020, alongside Türkiye’s raw-material-intensive exports, reveals a gap in technological specialization. Third, although Chinese investment stock of approximately USD 9 billion at the end of 2023 and BYD’s production and R&D plan indicate transition potential, realized local value added and technological outputs do not yet substantiate the claim that Türkiye is a joint production hub. The World Bank’s projection of 11 million tonnes for the Middle Corridor in 2030 is likewise a conditional regional opportunity; the expected share of approximately 1% of China-EU trade reveals the corridor’s limits.
The article’s theoretical contribution is to integrate power transition and geoeconomic connectivity through production indicators and a conditional peace mechanism. The new peace perspective does not treat trade and infrastructure as automatic peace-producers; instead, it identifies a balanced distribution of economic benefits, positive expectations for the continuation of future cooperation, institutionalized dispute resolution, and supply diversification as necessary conditions. At the policy level, priority should be given to annual performance indicators, local sourcing and R&D requirements in investment incentives, customs and digitalization alignment, and transparent management of technological risks. Green transformation, electric mobility, renewable energy, the digital economy, and university-industry cooperation are the principal fields through which logistical proximity may be converted into a production partnership.
The study’s limitations are the irregularity of firm-level data on local value added, joint patents, technology transfer, and investment performance, and the fact that the 2030 corridor figures are model projections rather than realized data. Document analysis reveals mechanisms and indicator patterns within the relationship, but it does not measure the magnitude of causal effects. Future research should compare the effects of local sourcing, R&D, and exports using Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) microdata, UN Comtrade product-level series, firm surveys, and case studies of Chinese investments in Türkiye. Once such data are available, it will be possible to test more precisely over time whether Türkiye has moved from a transit-dominant intermediate position to a joint production hub. Such monitoring would also enable regular assessment, after the 55th anniversary, of whether the relationship is moving from discourse to measurable production outcomes.
