Political-Economic Reconfigurations in Global Power Systems: From the 18th Century up Until Today

In the ancient world, ionians believed ception of a global world was reshaped to embrace

that the entire world consisted of the Mediterranean the entire world. In the latter half of the 18th centu-

and its hinterland, while for Chinese living around ry, after the Seven Years’ War, the United Kingdom

the Yellow River the world was oceans at one end re-established a unipolar world power system (Ar-

and great deserts on the other. Both cultures built righi, 2010).

their commercial, political and social networks The 18th-20th century period is referred to as

according their worldview, with their respective Pax Britannica. This continued until World War II,

founders using the boundaries of their world net- following which the world entered the bipolar phase

works to conceive of a global world (Landes, 1998Landes (1998). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). of the Cold War period, when it was shaped by the

Similarly, the Roman Empire had established a un- life or death struggle between the Soviet Union and

ipolar global world, which it perceived within the the United States. Upon the collapse of the Soviet

boundaries of its commercial, political and social Union, the bipolar world order temporarily gave

networks. After its collapse, such a unipolar world way to the 1990s’ Pax Americana. However, the brief

did not emerge again until the 18th century when, time of this period has resulted in the persistence

following the discoveries of the Americas and the of political and economic instability and paved the

linking of the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, the per- way for uncertainty on a global scale. Driven by

such circumstances, we have witnessed the develop- cational system that responds to the requirements

ing economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and of these sectors. Here, “world system” describes the

South Africa (collectively known as BRICS) trying economically, socio-culturally and politically inter-

to develop various alternatives to this unipolar glob- dependence and mutual interactions of actors such

al power (Gürcan, 2019aGürcan (2019a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). as classes, states and companies, while “power” de-

scribes the influence of actors in giving direction to the general course of dependence and mutual inter- "..a requisite condition for a stable actions (Amin 2000Amin (2000). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.; Chase-Dunn & Grimes 1995). 'system' of multipolarity is to rely on

nation-states as the primary political In turn, National Innovation Systems can be defined

entity in world affairs, creating as (Freeman, 1987, page 1) “the network among in-

independently planned National stitutions which create, import, modify and spread

Innovation Systems in selected new technologies in public and private sectors

strategic sectors, and providing an through their efficiency and interaction”.

adequate educational system that Based on case studies, this article goes on to ar-

responds to the requirements of these gue that economically weaker countries would not

sectors." be able to fully benefit from multipolarity unless

This article examines political-economic strat- they satisfy the abovementioned three conditions

(i.e. the strengthening of the nation-state system, egies followed by the major countries that shaped the creation of National Innovation Systems, and the historical course of capitalism. Special attention the existence of a strong educational infrastrucwill be paid to how these strategies have affected ture), which also explains the historical success of the configuration of power in the world. The aim is countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea. thus to understand the effect of global power sys- The article maintains that, as the world is marchtems on the world political economy and to make ing towards a multipolar system, leading econocertain estimations regarding the course of the mies of the Global South seem to establish closer cooperative mechanisms that are being formed in partnership with peripheral economics based on

today’s environment under the initiative of Peo- socio-economic and political strategies inspiring

ple’s Republic of China. As such, the article will humanitarian and peaceful values. However, pe-

undertake a geopolitical-economic analysis based ripheral economies can maximize the benefits of

on incorporated comparison and process tracing. such comprehensive partnerships as the Belt and

This analysis is based on the case of Britain and the Road Initiative, only if they deepened their partici-

United States, which illustrates how unipolar power pation having fully determined their real necessities

systems ­–characteristically underpinned by (neo) and aspirations.

colonial exploitation, zero-sum policies, cyclical The first section of the article introduces its

economic crises and belligerence– are doomed to theoretical and methodical framework. The section

long-term instabilities. The article also argues that a that follows addresses the global power strategy of

requisite condition for a stable “system” of multipo- the United Kingdom during the Pax Brittanica. The

larity is to rely on nation-states as the primary po- third section focuses on the Cold War period, and

litical entity in world affairs, creating independently the final section discusses the crisis of the United

planned National Innovation Systems in selected States’ (US) unipolar strategy and China’s central

strategic sectors, and providing an adequate edu- role in the shift towards multipolarity.

Theoretical and Methodical Framework of global phenomena (McMichael 1990, 2000; Gür-

can 2019b). Case selection is made in accordance Geopolitical economy is a school of international with the principle of historical relations and muturelations established by Radhika Desai (2013) and al determination (McMichael 1990, 2000; Gürcan developed by Efe Can Gürcan (2019aGürcan (2019a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). This school’s 2019b). As discussed in this article, China’s rise in underlying argument is that international politics the global power system during the transition from is shaped primarily by interstate struggles for eco- Pax Britannica to Pax Americana provides a sound nomic power, which thus increases the importance example of the aforementioned historical relations of states as principal actors in globalization. The and determination. critique of imperialism and neoliberal capitalism is While making incorporated comparison, the a defining element of geopolitical economy, which article uses process tracing as a qualitative and infocuses on the manifestations of class struggle in terpretative technique. Process tracing aims to rethe international arena (Desai 2010, 2013, 2015a, veal causal processes in a narrative manner. It often 2015b, 2016; Gürcan 2019aGürcan (2019a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation., 2019bGürcan (2019a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation., 2019dGürcan (2019a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). resorts to logical inferences and refers to important In geopolitical economy, Gürcan highlights historical developments (Gürcan 2019aGürcan (2019a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation., 2019bGürcan (2019a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation., the concept of multipolarization rather than the 2019cGürcan (2019a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation., 2019dGürcan (2019a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). While doing this, process tracing concept of multipolarity because the United States gives primacy to understanding the tools used by still continues to maintain its economic, military key political actors, including their motives, prioriand cultural superiority. Organizations such as ties, perceptions and opportunities (Gürcan 2019dGürcan (2019a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). BRICS have yet to provide a consistent alternative to Indeed, the actor-centered approach of process trac- American-patented neoliberal policies or establish ing is strongly compatible with the tradition of geoa consistent political, economic and military unity political thinking (Gürcan 2019dGürcan (2019a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). among themselves (Gürcan 2019aGürcan (2019a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation., 2019bGürcan (2019a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation., 2019dGürcan (2019a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). In this context, multipolarization is defined as “the Unipolar Systems and the Strategy increasing parity in the global distribution of politof Aggressive Capitalism ical, economic, cultural, and military power” (Gür-

can 2019d, page 557). Hence, the multipolarization As a result of the Renaissance and Reform move-

struggle exists between “dominant states (for exam- ments in the mid-16th century, inter-religious war-

ple, today’s United States) and “contender states” fare brought political and economic chaos to Europe.

wishing to lay claim to global governance. Thus, In these circumstances, individual-based Protestant

geopolitical economy provides a framework to un- financial capital in Western Europe gravitated to-

derstand global power struggles, which is the main wards re-organising its guilds and entrepreneurial

focus of this article (Desai 2013; Gürcan 2019bGürcan (2019a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). bourgeois groups around a nation-state ideology,

Methodologically, geopolitical economy often while England’s Queen Elizabeth decided to mini-

uses incorporated comparison and process tracing. mize foreign dominance in finance by nationalizing

As is implied by the name, incorporated compari- the country’s Catholic capital. With the Spanish at-

son addresses similarities, mutual interactions and tempt to occupy the United Provinces Union (today’s

dependencies across cases, alongside their temporal Holland), England’s economy entered a new era (Ar-

and spatial differences, specificities and tensions. righi, 2010), as individual Protestant capital fled the

The purpose is to comprehend the (re)configuration seemingly endless wars in Europe and sought refuge

in the economies of various countries, but primarily in England’s. Thus, towards the end of 16th century, the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie of the United Provinces Union introduced new knowledge in the fields of finance and production to the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie of many countries. The United Provinces was essentially an agglomeration of individual international capital, and even though it appeared to be a nation-state governed by a Republic, it was not a mercantilist nation-state. As a consequence of its costly wars against Spain and its conception of com-

petition advocating free trade at the international Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping at the first round of the

Leaders’ Roundtable at the Second Belt and Road Forum in

level, by the time the Westphalia Peace Treaty was Beijing, April 2019.

signed in the mid-17th century, the inevitable col-

lapse of the seemingly powerful United Provinces joint stock and commandite companies controlled

Union was already underway (Israel, 1989Israel (1989). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). by the national entrepreneurial bourgeoisie began

Following the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603), trading under the political and military protection

the second milestone to transform the United King- of the nation-state, not only in its colonies, but all

dom socially, economically and politically was the over the world. In their own sphere of sovereignty,

Westphalia Peace Treaty. This brought sectarian Spain, France and even the United States received

wars in Europe to an end and introduced a new an aggressive response from English pirates when

concept of international relations based on the con- they took a stand against this aggressive and ex-

cept of sovereignty as a dominant paradigm. Con- pansionist British entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, and

sequently, European empires started to evolve to- from time to time, there were regional wars with the

wards a nation-state system. Following Britain and English Royal Fleet. In the name of maintaining it-

the United Provinces, countries like Russia, Prussia self as an expansionist and global power, the British

and France strengthened their national entrepre- bourgeoisie and the state’s military often acted and

neurial bourgeoisie as collective entities and joined fought together in overseas regions. In 1707, Eng-

the trade revolution, which was to spread across land had established the United Kingdom, in which

Europe. States-supported national entrepreneuri- Wales and Scotland were included under the lead-

al bourgeoisies entered into a process of becoming ership of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie of these

both internationally-operating entities and a na- countries. Thereafter, the coalition wars, which

tional class, continuing to trade at a global level. The had been occupying Europe since the 1660s, meant

Puritan leader Cromwell, who seized rule in Britain the United Kingdom was able to gradually seize

immediately after the Westphalia Peace Treaty and control of the Atlantic Ocean and North America

the English Civil War, incorporated the British col- trade. Thus, until the Utrecht Peace Treaty of 1713,

onies in all aspects of nation-state sovereignty with it reached across the Atlantic Ocean to any trade re-

practices such as the Cabotage Law, and implement- gions it wished from both France and Spain. With

ed radical “national-economy” policies. English the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, the United Kingdom

derson, 2013). In fact, by gradually expanding its ar-

"While a unipolar system has the eas of influence over time, the British entrepreneur-

ability to forcefully constitute its own ial bourgeoisie has become one of the most efficient

global commercial, political and social players, not only in the global economic system, but

networks wholly in its own interest, also in the global political system (Braudel, 1993Braudel (1993). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

and to control these networks, it England’s Civil War (1642-1651) and Glorious does not mean that, in practice, it can Revolution (1668), led to an understanding among achieve global stability and order." the bourgeoisie of England, Wales and Scotland of

began to take control of other countries’ colonies the importance of unifying themselves under the

in North America and trade across the Atlantic. As umbrella of a British entrepreneurial bourgeoisie

of the third quarter of the 18th century, the British despite differences in belief and culture. With the

nation-state and its entrepreneurial bourgeoisie had Utrecht Peace Treaty, it was then able to test wheth-

snatched the Far East and Pacific colony trade from er it could be efficient at a global level with its unit-

its global rival France and from the previous global ed and supra-national Britain entrepreneurial bour-

power, the United Provinces. Thus, England estab- geoisie identity.

When the British entrepreneurial bourgeoisie lished its unipolar system during this period (Artook control of nation-state government towards righi, 2010Artook control of nation-state government towards righi (2010). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). the end of 17th century, it began seeking solu- While a unipolar system has the ability to forcetions to some of the fundamental problems of the fully constitute its own global commercial, political capitalist production system. In order to delay or and social networks in its own interest, and to conovercome successive economic crises in a milder trol these networks, it does not mean that, in pracmanner, it sought investment areas where growing tice, it can achieve global stability and order. The capital could be absorbed and new markets to sell United Kingdom, for example, has been a leading its stream of products. It transformed its currency player in a capitalist globalisation process that coninto reserve money for international trade, and thus tinuously struggled with economic crises (Polanyi, began using its overseas colonies for both invest-

2001). This being said, as in previous periods, one ment and market purposes. In order to engage in

of the most dynamic forces of the global economic production and investment outside its homeland,

system has been the entrepreneurial class. This class the British bourgeoisie created large scale commer-

initially emerged as an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, cial joint stock companies, which were vested with

and by commandeering the nation-state govern- legal privileges and capable of doing business at

ment, came into power in various countries, but the global level. By building railway and telegraph

especially in Britain. Moreover, through its efficien- networks across North America and India within

cy and dynamism, the en trepreneurial bourgeoisie the first three quarters of the 19th century through

has made significant contributions to maintaining these large scale companies, it established commer-

the capitalist production system by bringing about cial, political and social network systems by means

social and cultural transformations at a global level of which it could both liquefy its capital and market

(Hirschman, 1961Hirschman (1961). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.), and the British entrepreneurial its products, and meet its need for natural resources.

bourgeoisie has played a key role in making Britain However, the economic interests of its colonies, and

a unipolar power since the mid-17th century. (An- especially their needs for goods and services, were

not adequately taken into account while establish- their long-term education program according to the

ing these network systems. This unilateral growth industrial sectors determined in the National Inno-

strategy was able to prolong the existence of the vation System. The industrial sector common to all

United Kingdom as a unipolar global power for just three of these economies was steel and its by-prod-

over a quarter century (Dobb, 1967Dobb (1967). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Although the ucts. At the time, industrialisation was first and

greatest economic crisis experienced by the Unit- foremost considered in terms of steel and its sub-in-

ed Kingdom was the global crisis in 1870s, it was dustries, and steel production was also one of the

observed that it experienced large and small crises main inputs of many industrial sectors. (Freeman

every fifteen to twenty years between the 1760s and and Soete, 1997).

the 1870s. A significant portion of these large and With the technological breakthrough in the

small economic crises occurred in one or two areas sectors determined by the National Innovation Sys-

of the “holy trinity” that was capital, investment and tem and its spread across the sub-sectors in the early

market, or, as in the 1870s crisis, in all three. The 20th century, Germany, the United States and Japan

first signals of these global economic crises were de- had in fact fully established a multipolar system, but

creases in the profit rates of the leading economies each acted as a unipolar power when the opportu-

or secondary global economies (Tutan, 2003Tutan (2003). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). nity arose. These three economies, which began to

face difficulties in meeting their market, investment

The Experience of Multipolarity and and natural resources needs, decided to cooperate

Bipolarity: Aggressive and with some neighbouring independent economies

Friendly Capitalism Strategies to find solutions to these problems based on mu-

The 1870s global economic crisis marked the be- tual interests in sectors such as goods movement,

ginning of the end for the United Kingdom’s ad-

venture as a unipolar power, and the comeback of a "However, when these regional

multipolar system occurred towards the end of 19th collaborations became insufficient for

century as states such as Germany, the United States their increasing production capacities

and Japan challenged the United Kingdom, both and capital generated as a result of their

politically and economically on the global stage technological breakthroughs, the two

(Hobsbawm, 1996Hobsbawm (1996). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). great wars of the 20th century were the

A number of commonalities can be noted in inevitable outcome."

examining how these three contending economies

became competitors of the United Kingdom in a transportation, logistics and mining. The mutu-

very short time. Firstly, all three economies began al-interest principles were based on cooperation in

the process of becoming a nation-state immediate- various fields in line with the needs of these three

ly prior to or following the 1870s crisis by uniting large economies, but also took into consideration

economically, politically and socially. Secondly, in the needs and demands of the neighbouring inde-

order to make a technological breakthrough, they pendent economies.

first planned their industrialization program via a However, when these regional collaborations

maximum of two industrial sectors by preparing became insufficient for their increasing production

their National Innovation Systems in the last quar- capacities and capital generated as a result of their

ter of 19th century, and then immediately prepared technological breakthroughs, the two great wars

of the 20th century were the inevitable outcome. accordance with the principles of mutual interest in

Their ability to continue their collaborations with order to militarily and economically strengthen South

certain regional economies in various areas during Korea against North Korea, South Korea made good

the World Wars was also about respecting and re- use of these collaborations and determined its own

maining faithful to the mutual-interest principles as National Innovation System objectives in the early

much as possible (Landes, 1993 and 1998Landes (1998). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). 1970s. Subsequently, it prepared its mid-term indus-

The question comes to mind of why certain econ- trial development plans. Indeed, over time, South Ko-

omies in South East Europe, the Middle East, Central rea chose to collaborate with United States in fields the

America and South East Asia –who collaborated with former determined in accordance with its National

Germany, the United States and Japan in this manner Innovation System objectives. One such area was the

during the first half of 20th century– failed to match steel sector and its by-products, still at that time one of

the technological development which these three the most important indicators of industrialization and

economies achieved in the last quarter of 19th century. one of the main inputs of many industrial sectors. The

other area was the shipping sector, one of South Korea’s historically strong sectors. In short, South Korea "In the years following the 2008 made long-term plans for use of its limited resources economic crisis, it was understood by all and capital in the most productive manner in order that the United States could not fully

re-establish its own unipolar system." to make a technological breakthrough, carried out

technology transfers in accordance with this plan, and

Part of the answer lies in the National Innovation Sys- shared its market under these conditions (Hobday,

tem. Most of the former preferred to prepare mid-term 1995 and Lundvall, 1992).

industrial development plans instead of constituting Towards the end of the 20th century, this bipolar

their own National Innovation System. Moreover, system came to an end, as the world transitioned once

various collaborations with the three major econo- again to a multipolar power system (Amin, 2000Amin (2000). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.), de-

mies were determined according to the latter’s cyclical spite the United States intention to re-establish its un-

needs, rather than according to industrialization pro- ipolar system. Its plans were stymied by the European

grams. In other words, these regional economies did Union under the leadership of Germany, the new Rus-

not spend much effort on long-term laborious work, sian Republic of Vladimir Putin, which emerged after

but tried to achieve the goals of technological develop- the disintegration of the old Union of Soviet Socialist

ment by cutting corners (Lundvall, 1992Lundvall (1992). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Republics, and China, which rapidly grew and devel-

Following World War II, the multipolar system oped. In the years following the 2008 economic crisis,

evolved into a bipolar one, the two poles of which were it was understood by all that the United States could

the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist not fully re-establish its own unipolar system.

Republics. These actors transformed their currency

into reserve money in economies within their sphere Multipolar Global Power System:

of influence, and collaborated with specific region- Belt and Road Initiative Project

al economies to meet their own market, investment The United Kingdom, together with its entrepre-

and natural resources needs. For example, while the neurial bourgeoisie and commercial joint stock

United States maintained multiple collaborations in companies was the unipolar leader of the 18th and

19th centuries. It satisfied its own demand for raw Kingdom’s historical aggressive capitalism was the

materials and further increased its capital by setting United States in the post-WWII bipolar system,

up railway and telegraph networks in its colonies there were occasions when, in order to limit the

and making large scale investments in various sec- sphere of influence of the Union of Soviet Socialist

tors. While making these investments, it ensured its Republics, it has provided relatively better invest-

own currency was used in those economies within ment and financial conditions in various sectors

its sphere of influence, and made it obligatory for that did take into account the needs and demands

loans necessary for investment in these economies of independent economies. Its above-mentioned

to be provided from its own financial resources. relationship with South Korea provides one ex-

This leadership strategy became the starting point ample of such “friendly” capitalism strategies

(Hobsbawm, 1994Hobsbawm (1994). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). The European Union, the United States and "The European Union, the United States China are the leading economies of the multipolar and China are the leading economies system of the 21st century. However, many ecoof the multipolar system of the 21st

century. However, many economic, nomic, political and social strategies followed by

political and social strategies followed the former two resemble the aggressive capitalism

by the former two resemble the strategies that were the hallmark of the 19th and

aggressive capitalism strategies that 20th centuries. In addition, it has been seen that

were the hallmark of the 19th and 20th leading economies and their immediate followers

centuries." adopting these aggressive strategies have, from time

to time, interfered in the economic, political and of aggressive capitalism. Its investment, for examsocial sovereignty of other countries in the system, ple, in India’s railways and telegraph lines in midand turned towards “post-modern colonization”, 19th century was to serve its own needs and debts with operations focusing on capital-investmentwithout taking into consideration the real needs of and market-related fields. These range from captur- India and others (Hobsbawm, 1998Hobsbawm (1998). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). On the other ing the markets of economically weak nation-states hand, towards the end of 19th century, we see Ger-

many, having been one of the leaders of multipolar through multi-national companies, to ensuring that,

system, providing financing under favourable con- via global financial institutions, those nation-states

ditions and taking into consideration the real needs with insufficient capital remain indebted, and limit-

and demands of independent economies and turn- ing investment by these nation-states to sectors that

ing towards collaboration for various investments. they, the leaders, deem necessary. Thanks to such

The construction of railways by Germany for the operations, the leading economies have found a way

Ottoman Empire at this time with the low-interest to exercise economic, political and social control

loans it provided under favourable conditions and over the economically weak nation-states without

taking in consideration the needs of the Ottomans, physically occupying them.

is one example of the so-called “friendly” capitalism China was recognised as one of the leading

strategies implemented by leading economies in a economies of the multipolar system towards the end

multipolar system (Hobsbawm, 1996Hobsbawm (1996). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). It has been of the 20th century. As of 2018, China’s economy

observed that while the main heir of the United was the world’s largest in terms of purchasing pow-

er, and second only to the United States according to Africa and Eurasian economies through land and

other financial criteria. China is the leading world sea transportation routes, and then trade goods and

economy in terms of direct investment, and is also services. However, at a global meeting held in Bei-

the economy that makes the most national resourc- jing in April 2019 attended by leaders of thirty-sev-

es available to other economies. Yet, its economy en countries and representatives of one hundred

and thirty countries, it was signaled that the BRI

"At a global meeting held in Beijing in could become something greater than a post-mod-

April 2019 attended by leaders of thirty- ern “Silk Road” Project.

seven countries and representatives In order to correctly understand the BRI, it is

of one hundred and thirty countries, it useful to examine it in two different contexts: Chi-

was signaled that the BRI could become na’s existence as a leading world economy within the

something greater than a post-modern multipolar system with the potential to improve its

Silk Road Project." existing position through new economic and polit-

does not appear to have reached the peak of both ical relations, and its declared intention to follow

a smoother and more sharing leadership strategy existing and potential capacity. Indeed, it has been rather than through use of the strategy of aggressive observed that the slowdown in China’s economy in capitalism. recent years is not due to its internal dynamics, but As for the first point, we see that China has rather to its need to reduce its production capacity succeeded in becoming a leading economy in the and slow its growth rate due to the ongoing recesmultipolar system within a very brief period, and sion in many global economies (World Bank, 2019World Bank (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). has done so operating well below its potential capac- China has for a long time been in commercial ity. China has also understood that its economy will and financial relationships predominantly with othbe unable to reach its potential capacity in the longer global leading economies such as United States of term with the industrial, commercial and financial America and Germany. However, it is understood collaboration it has undertaken in the last quarter that, in the near future, the demands both financentury with other global leading economies. For

cially and for goods and services, of these leading this reason, it has implemented the BRI to reach out

economies will remain under China’s potential eco- to a wider area in order to meet the raw material,

nomic capacity. Moreover, in today’s multipolar sys- energy, investment and market needs for sustain-

tem, these economies are China’s main rivals. These ability of the rapidly growing capital and produc-

and other similar reasons lie behind China’s launch- tion capacity in the future. The BRI embraces two-

ing of the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) at the end thirds of the world's population and one-third of the

of 2013, which primarily aims to assist development world's annual Gross Domestic Product. However,

in economies in Eurasia and the African continent rather than implementing colonization or making

through creating new markets, new investment are- use of post-modern versions of the colonisation tac-

as, new raw materials resources and new social and tics, China’s BRI proposes partnerships, collabora-

political cooperation. tions and sharing networks in which everyone will

The BRI initially appeared to have been pre- gain, and through which China itself hopes to reach

pared to carry out infrastructural investments with the long-term potential capacity of its economy.

The second context reveals that China has have made it clear that they want to take new steps

correctly come to the conclusion that as a leading to have policies different from the Marshall Aid,

economy within a multipolar system, not only is it IMF programs or regime change of previous peri-

in need of many economies within its new sphere ods. Those who will decide on BRI strategies are the

of influence in order to gain superiority over other developing and underdeveloped economies in Eur-

leading economies and to reach its potential capac- asia and Africa, all of whom must first determine

ity, but also that these many economies are also in their wishes and needs to be set out in a long-term

National Innovation System that each will prepare. Subsequently, they should put into practice their "It has also become clear that the choice mid-term industrialization program in compliance of strategy does not lie only with China. with their National Innovation System. Only then, It also depends on joint decisions to be

taken by dozens of economies in Africa will these economies should decide whether they

and Eurasia. " will sit at the table with China to participate in its

BRI in accordance with the principles of mutual in-

need of China. It has understood that employment terest and equality.

of the aggressive capitalism strategy by previous

global leaders proved unsustainable in the long Conclusion

term. Armed with this knowledge, in 2013 China Any political or economic rebuilding of the first invited many of Africa’s and Eurasia’s econunipolar system in the near future seems unlikely, omies to join its BRI. Th question is now whethas does a resurgence of the recent bipolar system. er it will employ a friendly capitalism strategy or Instead, we understand that the historical process friendly socialism strategy in establishing these has evolved towards a multipolar system in which new global partnerships, collaborations and sharleading economies form their own peripheral econ-

ing networks. omies based on the political, economic and social

It has also become clear that the choice of strat- strategies they will follow. The last two centuries of

egy does not lie only with China. It also depends on global power relations have demonstrated clearly to

joint decisions to be taken by dozens of economies us the need for these strategies to be “friendly” and

in Africa and Eurasia. These are, for the most part, in accordance with the principle of mutual interest,

economies which are either underdeveloped or de- whether they are in line with socialist or capitalist

veloping, economies which have never engaged in ideologies. Historical events have also taught us that

any long-term National Innovation System prepa- today’s world is rejecting aggressive strategies at the

ration and who have accepted inward foreign capi- international level, and negatively reacts to global

tal and investment flows throughout the last centu- powers implementing these strategies at the first op-

ry based on their own mid-term industrialization portunity. With both unipolar and bipolar systems

programs and the demands of leading economies, having a structural tendency to apply aggressive

and taking into consideration the needs of the mo- strategies, it is clear that a multipolar system will

ment. continue to grow for the foreseeable future.

The BRI is much more than the former Silk The BRI is China’s proposal for collaboration in

Road. Those who wish to implement this project a multipolar system. It has been prepared in accord-

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