The “chinese miracle” has become country by population size, which currently
a widely used term in development studies, accounts for 22% of the world’s population. This
inspiring developing countries to achieve high goes hand in hand with China’s resource scarcity
levels of prosperity, living standards, and stability problem as a structural adversity constraining
over the last decade. The popularity of this term its development potential. China possesses only
can be explained in large part by the fact that 7% of the world’s arable land and freshwater
China has enjoyed unprecedented economic resources and 8% of the world’s natural
success in world history (Zakaria, 2011; resources. Furthermore, only 19% of its surface
Gürcan 2021a), despite enormous historical, area is suitable for human habitation, and 65% of
demographic, geographical, and geopolitical its surface area is rugged. This severely cripples
adversities. China was one of the world’s poorest China’s farming capabilities and facilitates
countries before the socialist revolution in 1949. ethnic heterogeneity as a potential impediment
In the early revolutionary era, China struggled to political cohesion (Morton, 2006; Naughton,
much to overcome its crippling semi-colonial 2018). Another adversity threatening China’s
legacy characterized by the medieval conditions economic development concerns geopolitical
of an agricultural economy and the weakness of its circumstances. Cases in point are how China’s
industrial base. History aside, China is the largest membership in the United Nations was stalled
B R I q • Volume 3 Issue 2 Spring 2022
until 1971, and the US resorted to military should also note that China has risen to status
interventions in China’s neighboring regions to of the world’s largest lender to the developing
suffocate the revolution. The current geopolitical world, second-largest investor in foreign direct
circumstances find their sharpest expression in investment (FDI), and top leader in green
the current US containment strategy and the bonds and credits. China’s contributions to
US-led trade and technology war against China green finance also bring to mind China’s global
(Gürcan, 2019; Gürcan, Kahraman & Yanmaz, leadership in sustainable development. China
2021). has recently emerged as the world’s top leader
in green transportation, the largest producer of electric buses and the largest market for Since 1979, China is the only electric vehicles and bikes. Similarly, China’s
country that has remained status as the world’s top producer of solar,
untouched by any economic crisis. wind and hydroelectric power is closely related
The 1979-2018 period testified to its reputation as the world’s top investor in
to an average economic growth sustainable energy technology (Gürcan, 2021aGürcan (2021a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).
rate of 9.4% in the lead of the CPC, Besides China’s historic success in economic
making China the world’s second- and environmental development, one should
largest economy, top producer, also note that the Chinese economic miracle is
and the leading exporter of credited for 70% of global poverty eradication
between 1990 and 2015 (Gardner, 2018Gardner (2018). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). technological goods. This article aims to decipher the formula behind China’s historic economic success and
Despite such adversities, China has developed offer fundamental hints to guide developing
an exemplary model of economic development countries in their endeavors to reach an advanced
that inspires much of the developing world. stage of economic development. The article
Since 1979, China is the only country that has suggests that the Chinese economic miracle can
remained untouched by any economic crisis. be explained by a four-fold formula: a) devising
The 1979-2018 period testified to an average an autocentric economic model aspiring to
economic growth rate of 9.4% in the lead of the improve national autonomy and cushion the
CPC, making China the world’s second-largest impact of foreign interference, b) insisting on
economy, top producer, and the leading exporter socialism and the leadership of the CPC, which
of technological goods (Hu, 2020Hu (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). By 2015, allows for strategic coherence and long-term
China came to assume the global production of planning to overcome free-market anarchy, c)
40% of washing machines, 50% of textiles, 60% creating a state-driven industrial base fueled by
of buttons, 70% of shoes, 80% of televisions, national science and technology policies, and d)
and 90% of toys. Recently, China has made adopting a balanced approach to development
significant progress in producing higher-value centered on attaining a higher sociocultural and
added products in the computer, aviation, and ecological quality of life. This formula is derived
medical technology sectors, among others. One using the method of descriptive case study, which
Mao Zedong, the founder of the People’s Republic of China. (CGTN, 2017CGTN (2017). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)
is a research method that consists of an intense The Legacy of Mao Zedong’s
historical study of “a single instance of an event “Big Push” Strategy
or phenomenon” by “get[ing] the history down
for the possible benefit of later policymakers” The roots of the Chinese economic miracle
and drawing “memorable analogies that later can be traced back to the early phase of the
practitioners use to identify... strategies that Chinese revolution under the leadership of
work” (Odell, 2001: 162). The present article Mao (1949-1976). Mao’s leadership adopted
provides an intense study of the phenomenon what might be called a “big push strategy” for
called the “Chinese economic miracle” by rapid industrialization to -catch up with Wes-
distilling policy lessons for developing countries. tern powers that once succeeded in turning
It is structured in three sections. The first China into a semi-colony. This strategy relies
sheds light on the Mao Zedong era, which was on central planning, by which the state “chan-
characterized by a centrally planned economy nel[s] the maximum feasible investment into
and a big push strategy, whereas the second heavy industry” and “mobilize[s] saving and
addresses the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin investment, sacrificing consumption today in
eras with a special focus on reform and opening- order to benefit future generations” (Naugh-
up. The subsequent section shifts the focus to ton, 2018: 65). Indeed, the big push model -as
the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras by revisiting an economic term that can be generalized to
the success of China’s social development other countries- found its sharpest expression
strategies. It also points to the leading role of the in the Chinese context under the name “Great
state in China’s economic development and its Leap Forward”, which was part of China’s Se-
contribution to innovation and technology. cond Five Year Plan (1958-1962). This being
said, the general trend that characterized the current economic policies are still grounded on
period between the First Five Year Plan and Mao’s legacy of big-push industrialization.
the Fifth Five Year Plan (1953-1980) complied Mao’s strategy of economic development
with the Big Push Model for the most part: In 1953, the central government launched its Mao’s strategy of economic first FYP (1953-1957), which aimed at turning China from a agricultural country into an addevelopment draws its strength
vanced industrial country with a focus on the from the principles of “socialism
development of the heavy industry. The next with Chinese characteristics”.
five FYPs put emphasis on agricultural and industrial development. The second FYP (1958draws its strength from the principles of “soci- 1963) carried on the industrial development alism with Chinese characteristics” (有中国特 centered on heavy industry. The major tasks of the third one (1966-1970) were to develop 色的社会主义). These principles proceed from
agriculture and strengthen basic industries. The the assumption that universal models or widely
fourth (1971-1975) set goals for output of agri- accepted standards “must be combined with
culture and industry and investment in infrast- specific national characteristics and acquire a
ructure. The fifth FYP (1976-1980) set up a goal definite national form if it is to be useful” (Mao,
of building up an independent and relatively 1967: 61), which also applies to the usefulness
complete industrial system (CGTN, 2020CGTN (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). of economic development strategies. With the-
A word of caution is warranted at this point se principles in mind, Mao calls for abandoning
before proceeding further. History as an acade- dogmatic and bookish interpretations by “see-
mic discipline provides us with a powerful tool king truth from facts” while learning from past
to learn from humanity’s past struggles and suc- mistakes and successes. Mao’s “socialism with
cesses (Gürcan, 2008Gürcan (2008). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). However, judging past Chinese characteristics” is thus a call for integ-
actions by today’s moral standards would nullify rating socialist principles with China’s historical
the scientific value of history, setting the ground peculiarities and changing realities (Mao, 1971;
for misleading analogies. The case of China un- Gürcan, 2008). This framework later encouraged
der Mao’s leadership is not immune to this prin- Chinese policymakers to create an endogenous
ciple. As Barry J. Naughton argues, therefore, economic model based on socialism (Naughton,
“at the time of the birth of the PRC, many pe- 2018; Currie-Alder, 2014; Harrison, 2020).
ople believed that this [big push strategy] was Mao’s big push strategy encouraged heavy
the best approach to development”, despite hu- investments in both physical and human capi-
man costs (Naughton, 2018: 65Naughton (2018). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Nevertheless, tal, which led not only to significant scientific,
the ultimate result of this strategy was a histo- technological, and industrial advances but also
ric economic success, which can inform today’s to the inclusion of a majority of the Chinese
policymakers about the use of public-driven or population in the public health and education
state-guided economic development models to systems for the very first time in China’s history.
be redesigned in conformity with today’s mo- Scientists and engineers were mobilized under
ral standards. One should also note that China’s a centralized science and technology system,
Former president Hu Jintao greets former leader Jiang Zemin during a ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Sunday, October 9, 2011, to mark the centennial of the 1911 Revolution. (China Daily, 2011China Daily (2011). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)
providing the human capital necessary for big from 25 in 1931 to 63-66 by 1956 (Kiely, 2015Kiely (2015). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).
push industrialization (Naughton, 2018; Cur-
rie-Alder, 2014; Harrison, 2020). China’s First The Reform and Opening-Up Strategy in
Five-Year Plan was launched in 1953. Befo- the Post-Mao Era
re implementing this plan in 1952, China was
predominantly an agricultural country, and the The policymakers of the early phase of the
contribution of industry to Gross Domestic Pro- Chinese Revolution were experienced revolutio-
duct (GDP) was only 20%, which used to take naries who had successfully carried out a prot-
the smallest share of the economy. In the 1952- racted revolutionary struggle, but they lacked
1978 period, the Chinese economy grew by 6% experience and knowledge in political and eco-
on average, whilst the average growth rate of nomic statecraft. Mistakes were thus unavoidable
industrial output was 11.5% (Naughton, 2018; in the process of exploration through trial and
Chan, 2018; Dollar, Huang & Yao, 2020). By the error. Indeed, it is difficult to over-emphasize the
second half of the 1970s, the big push strategy substantial gains from the big push strategy, whi-
and its policy of high savings and limited indi- ch served as a springboard for the Chinese eco-
vidual consumption resulted in industry over- nomic miracle to build a strong physical and hu-
taking agriculture and the service sector beco- man infrastructure for socialist construction. In
ming the largest sector with a share of 46% in the late 1970s, however, it became apparent that
the economy (Dollar, Huang & Yao, 2020Dollar, Huang & Yao (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). As policymakers’ tendency towards impetuosity and
a result of social advances in public health and rash advances for rapid industrialization was not
education, China’s average life expectancy rose sustainable in the longer term. Moreover, the
late 1970s and early 1980s testified to the exha- note here is that this formula provides an ear-
ustion of the Soviet model of development due lier framework for state capitalism and moder-
to a stagnating Soviet economy coupled with nization: “In addition to modernizing industry
the alienating effects of the Sino-Soviet split, and agriculture, science and culture, we have
which made the Chinese question the feasi- to modernize national defense” (Mao, 1977:
bility of continuing a Soviet-modeled system. 65). Following Mao’s teachings on the Four
In this context, Chinese policymakers grew Modernizations, Deng’s blueprint consists of
a stronger awareness that China is still in the “one focus” (economic construction centred
early phases of socialist construction and that on the development of agriculture, industry,
this situation will last longer than expected due defence, and science and technology, otherwi-
to several constraints, including the long-term se known as the “Four Modernizations”) and
retreat of the international communist move- “two basic points”, i.e. (a) upholding the “four
ment and the advent of capitalist globalization cardinal principles” (upholding socialism, the
under the Third Industrial Revolution. Rela- people’s democratic dictatorship, the CPC lea-
tedly, China’s new leadership forged around dership and Mao Zedong Thought) and (b) the
Deng required an entirely novel framework to policy of reform and opening towards a system
mobilize the economy by taking advantage of of market socialism integrated with the wor-
globalization and ensuring the legitimacy of ld economy (Deng, 1984: 187-188; Wu, 1996;
the economic model after the power vacuum CPC, 1991; Gürcan, 2021b).
created by Mao’s death. According to Chinese It is important to emphasize that Deng’s re-
policymakers, this was a viable alternative to rapidly surpass the Soviet Union and catch up
with the West without sacrificing domestic sta- With common prosperity and
bility. the state’s guidance of the
In the late 1970s, Deng proposed digging economy in mind, Deng rather
deeper into Mao’s theoretical contributions to advocated for the acceleration
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” and of “foreign investment capital preparing a blueprint for China’s modernizatiin a planned way… [by] serving on by shifting the focus from class struggle to the development of the socialist the fundamental task of expanding the country’s productive forces, which are viewed as the economy as a whole”. “foundation” of Chinese socialism (Deng,
1987: 17; Gürcan, 2021b). As originally concei- form strategy does not stem from a neoliberal
ved, this blueprint proceeds from the argument perspective of market fundamentalism. With
that “economic development is our primary common prosperity and the state’s guidance
objective, and everything else must be subor- of the economy in mind, Deng rather advo-
dinated to it,” drawing on Mao’s subsequent cated for the acceleration of “foreign invest-
formula offered in A Critique of Soviet Econo- ment capital in a planned way… [by] serving
mics (Deng, 1987:116; Mao, 1977Mao (1977). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Worthy of the development of the socialist economy as
Deng Xiaoping (right) with Jiang Zemin (left) on November 12, 1989. (China Daily, 2014China Daily (2014). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)
a whole” (Deng, 1984: 96). He thus followed mented in every area of the economy, which
Mao’s (1961: 413) motto “only modernization called for a less centralized system of planning
could save China, only learning from foreign (Naughton, 2018Naughton (2018). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Within this framework,
countries could modernize China.” Similarly, China initiated the era of reform and opening
he refuted the idea “that the market is capita- up by decentralizing agriculture and gradually
list and only planning is socialist” (Deng, 1984: allowing for the privatization of the industry
136). Instead, he insisted that both planning while “open[ing] up [China’s] industrial base
and markets could be used to serve the socia- to foreign contractors… [based on] very strin-
list system, whose essence lies in the “liberati- gent guidelines that foreign contractors had
on and development of the productive forces, to follow” (Marino, 2018:42Marino (2018). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). The idea was
elimination of exploitation and polarization, to benefit from foreign direct investments to
and the ultimate achievement of prosperity for transfer capital and technological knowledge
all” (Deng, 1984: 243). However, these objec- in the longer term by pursuing export-driven
tives can only be realized “step by step” despite strategies (Marino, 2018Marino (2018). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). As such, reform and
complexities and contradictions along the way: opening up were used as vehicles for imple-
“Where conditions permit, some areas may menting an autocentric model of state-guided
develop faster than others; those that develop development without giving up to market fun-
faster can help promote the progress of those damentalism and economic dependency on
that lag behind, until all become prosperous” the West.
(Deng, 1984: 244). The Jiang era (1993–2002) coincided with a
Deng realized that China’s size was too lar- period in which globalization was in full swing
ge for central planning to be effectively imple- and faced with the unipolarization of world
Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping wave to delegates to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on November 16, 2012. (Hua You /China Daily, 2012Hua You /China Daily (2012). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)
politics under the US initiative (Gürcan, 2019; passes a broader scope than mere state owners-
Gürcan, 2021b). According to the KOF Index of hip, including not only state-owned enterprises
Globalisation—which takes into account the eco- (SOEs) but also collectively-owned enterprises
nomic, social and political aspects of globalizati- (COEs) and various forms of mixed owners-
on—the world’s globalization scores underwent hip, such as cooperative enterprises and “equ-
an almost steady increase from 38.43 in 1970 to ity shares in private and foreign firms that are
53.37 in 2002 (KOF Globalisation, 2020KOF Globalisation (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). In held by SOEs and (COEs)” (Wang, 2011: 459).
this era, China’s political and economic fra- In 2000, therefore, China launched a going-out
mework was shaped by Jiang’s “Three Repre- strategy “with the aim of establishing Chinese
sents” theory, which professes to represent “the firms as global players, including SOEs and the
requirements of the development of China’s state-owned commercial banks” (Yueh, 2018:
advanced productive forces, the orientation of 114).
the development of China’s advanced culture, Regarding the “advanced culture” compo-
and the fundamental interests of the broadest nent, Jiang envisioned the development of a
masses of the Chinese people” (Jiang, 2002: 8). national culture that “provide[s] spiritual and
The “advanced productive forces” component intellectual support for economic develop-
of the “Three Represents Theory” takes off ment” in line with such values as self-reliance,
from Mao and Deng’s vision of modernization competition, efficiency, democracy and inno-
(Jiang, 2002: 183). In line with Jiang’s theory, vation (Jiang, 2002:188-189). Finally, when it
the Chinese economy moved towards a socia- comes to the “broadest masses” component of
list market economy with public ownership as the “Three Represents Theory”, Jiang’s vision
the main form. Here, public ownership encom- aimed to “bring the vast fields of society and a
growing market under solid and effective Party Development to the Chinese Dream of
leadership” (Jiang, 2002: 16). According to Ji- National Rejuvenation:
ang, this vision was to be realized by encoura- Towards a Higher Phase of
ging “party building in non-state enterprises” Socialism in the
and extending these efforts towards “private Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping Eras
business owners” (Jiang, 2002: 21-23).
In this period, China witnessed rapid eco- When the Hu administration (2002-2012Hua You /China Daily (2012). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)
nomic growth and industrialization, which al- came into office, China’s productive forces had
lowed for reversing income inequality, remed- already attained a degree of maturity that made
ying environmental damage, and improving it possible to focus on the fight against explo-
social welfare by the end of the 1990s. For one itation and polarization. GDP can be used as
thing, China’s estimated GINI scores had chan- a basic indicator of the level of development
ged from 0.33 in 1980 to 0.35 in 1990 and 0.4 of productive forces, and the data on China’s
in 2000 (Chen et al., 2010: 20; Gürcan, 2021bGürcan (2021a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). GDP point to significant achievements in the
To face such challenges, the Tenth Five Year 2000s (See Figure 1). Formulated in response
Plan (2001–2005) targeted regional disparities, to the rising tide of social unrest and taking
improving the quality of education, expanding advantage of China’s increased level of econo-
forest coverage, increasing disposable income, mic maturity, Hu’s theory of “harmonious so-
accelerating infrastructure development, and ciety” provided a policy framework that targets
bettering medical services (China Daily, 2011China Daily (2011). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). the smoothing of popular unrest.
One should also emphasize that the Tenth Five In this context, the 10th Five Year Plan
Year Plan imposed a stronger emphasis on the prioritized improving China’s social security
public sector: “The ownership system needs to system and state-owned enterprises, whilst
be further improved. We need to uphold the the 12th Five Year Plan focused on environ-
dominance of the public sector of the economy, mental protection as part of Hu’s harmonious
let the state-owned sector play the leading role, development blueprint while also developing
develop various forms of collective underta- education, science, and technology (CGTN,
kings, and support, encourage and guide the
healthy development of private and individual Figure 1. China's GDP (current US$)
Source: https://data.worldbank.org sectors of the economy (Zhu, 2001Zhu (2001). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).” In the meantime, China targeted a total of 120 strategic corporations for state support. These corporations were conceived of as “national champions” who would soon become “global players”, mostly operating in strategic areas such as electricity, coal, automobiles, electronic appliances, pharmaceuticals, transportation, aviation, and information technology (Kiely, 2015Kiely (2015). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). From Balanced and All-Round
2020). Hu’s new policy framework had a strong (Hu, 2007Hu (2007). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.; Gürcan, 2021bGürcan (2021a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Therefore, Hu’s
effect on the inauguration of Labour Contract vision of building a “moderately prosperous
Law (LCL) in 2008 and noticeable increases in society in all respects” led him to emphasize
the minimum wage by local governments. The “running the administration for the sake of
LCL ensures registered employment along with the people” and “seeking harmony in the mi-
contract renewal guarantees, social security dst of differences” (Hu, 2007Hu (2007). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).
funds, and wage standards (Gürcan & Mete, In this context, the Hu administration ac-
2017: 12-13). celerated social policies, state-guided policies,
According to Hu, “social harmony is an and large-scale infrastructure investments,
which the Xi administration later deepened. The Eleventh Five Year Plan (2006-2010) laid
The Hu administration accelerated an even stronger emphasis on the public se-
social policies, state-guided policies, ctor. It thus sought to “push the government
and large-scale infrastructure capital to concentrate in the important in-
investments,which the Xi dustries and key fields critical to the natio-
nal safety and national economic arteries, administration later deepened. optimize state-owned economic distribution, reinforce the controlling force, influence and
essential attribute of socialism with Chinese driving force of the state-owned economy and
characteristics” (Hu, 2007Hu (2007). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). His vision of so- exert its leading function... develop big com-
cial harmony was not limited to promoting pany and big enterprise groups with relatively
“social equity and justice”. It finds its fullest strong competitive power... continue to dee-
expression in “balance[ing] urban and rural pen collective enterprise reform and develop
development, development among regions, multi-form collective economy (PRC, 2006PRC (2006). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).”
economic and social development, relations This plan also accentuated the task of building
between man and nature, and domestic de- an independent base of manufacturing and
velopment and opening to the outside wor- innovation abilities (PRC, 2006PRC (2006). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).
ld” (Hu, 2007Hu (2007). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). One cannot help but notice Based on the context depicted above, gross
that Hu’s vision strongly echoes Mao’s spee- fixed capital formation may be considered a
ch entitled On the Ten Relationships, where basic indicator for infrastructure develop-
he makes a case for balanced development in ment. It includes not only land improvements,
conformity with the concrete reality of Chi- plant, machinery, and equipment purchase
na (Mao, 1974Mao (1974). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). In achieving social harmony, but also the construction of roads, railways,
moreover, Hu brings the “Scientific Outlook schools, offices, hospitals, private residenti-
on Development” to the centre of his policy al dwellings, and commercial and industrial
framework, which consists of making full use buildings. Available data indicate that China’s
of the guidance of science and education to gross fixed capital formation grew by around
promote a balanced, all-round, and sustainab- 7.85 percentage points in 1989-2001. Between
le model of development that puts people first 2002 and 2012, this growth was recorded at
Figure 2. Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP )
9.19 percentage points under the Hu admi- expenditure witnessed a significant increase,
nistration. Worthy of note here is that China’s which amounts to a rate of over 328% (see
state-guided economic development model Figure 3). This situation is no different from
allowed the Chinese gross fixed capital for- China’s expenditure on pension and social
mation to outscore imperialist countries such welfare, having soared by more than 686%
as the US, the United Kingdom, Germany, in the period 1995-2006 alone (see Figure 4).
and France (See Figure 2). Not surprisingly, this is reflected in the inc-
The expansion of China’s social policies can reasing labor share of GDP in China, which
be assessed by reference to data on “public accelerated in 2010 and reached 51.3% by
expenditure on social security and employ- 2017 (see Figure 5). In 2000, moreover, Chi-
ment”, “government expenditure pension and na was the second-worst performer in our
social welfare”, and “domestic general gover- sample of imperialist and developing count-
nment health expenditure as a percentage of ries in the area of general government health
current health expenditure”. Regarding soci- expenditure. However, the 2000s testified to a
al security and employment, China’s public spectacular increase in the ratio of China’s ge-
neral government health expenditure to total as Xi’s diligent efforts later. At this point, it be-
health expenditure, which rose by nearly 34.5 ars underscoring that China’s GINI index re-
percentage points. veals China’s social advances in the 2000s (see
It thus seems that China exhibited the hi- Figure 9). China exhibited similar performan-
ghest rate of increase in our sample, only to ce in its Human Development Index (HDI).
accelerate under the Hu and Xi administra- HDI is a tool that measures human develop-
tions. Available data indicate that public he- ment in health, education, and the standard of
alth expenditure reached a level above 50% living. Overall, there has been a constant inc-
of total health expenditure, starting with the rease in China’s HDI in the period 1990-2019,
year 2010 (see Figure 6). A similar situation which amounts to an increase of 0.262 points
goes for China’s government expenditure on in total (see Figure 10). In the final analysis,
education (as a % of GDP), which rose from one could argue that these socioeconomic ac-
1.88% in 1999 to over 3.75% in 2010 (see Fi- hievements clearly demonstrate the success of
gure 7). An upward trend is also observable China’s model of development.
in China’s average wages. They rose by almost China’s shift to a more people-oriented eco-
237% under low inflation conditions (see Fi- nomic policy framework gained significant
gure 8). All of these developments were refle- pace under the Xi administration. This admi-
cted in the reduction of the GINI index, or in- nistration has continued Hu’s vision of core
come inequality since 2010, mainly thanks to socialist values, deepened the struggle against
Hu’s all-round development strategy, as well corruption and inequality, and achieved no-
Figure 3. China's Goverment Expenditure: Social Security and Employment Source:https://www.ceicdata.com/en/china/government-revenue-and-expenditure/governmentexpenditure-social-security-and-employment
Figure 4. China’s Government Expenditure on Pension and Social Welfare (RMB) Source: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/china/govemment-expenditure-by-other-category/govemmentexpenditure-pension-and-social-welfare-ps
table successes in eliminating pro-American China’s growing self-confidence, driven by in-
elements from the state as a continuation tensifying geopolitical rivalry and the countr-
of Hu’s diligent efforts (Martin, et al., 2021; y’s sustained economic success, also finds its
Dorfman, 2018). In a world characterised by expression in the notion of the “Chinese Dre-
the decline of US global hegemony and the am” (Gürcan, 2021b; China Research Center,
multipolarization of global politics (Gürcan, 2012Gürcan (2012). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Xi describes the Chinese Dream as:
2019; Gürcan, 2021b), Xi strives to restore “A dream cherished and aspired to by the
China’s self-confidence and wealth, which Chinese people and nation, a dream of buil-
finds its fullest expression in the notions of ding China into a well-off society in an all-
the doctrine of “Four Matters of Confiden- round way and rejuvenating the Chinese na-
ce” and the “Chinese Dream”. The origins of tion, a dream for everyone to make his own
the “Four Matters of Confidence” can be tra- dream come true, a dream that the whole na-
ced back to a speech delivered by Hu at the tion strives for, and a dream to show the wor-
18th CPC Party Congress, where he pointed ld China’s commitment to making a greater
to the importance of maintaining confidence contribution to the peace and development of
in the future of socialism, the scientific nature mankind” (Xi, 2014a: 179).
of socialism as a theory, and the superiority As such, the Chinese Dream calls for the
of socialism as a system. In 2014, Xi added a rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by furt-
fourth component, which stresses confidence her deepening Hu’s vision of equitability and
in the value and vitality of Chinese culture. sustainability, without however losing sight of
logical progress; and spur coordinated prog- Figure 5. Labour share of GDP in China, comprising
wages and social protection transfers (%) ress of every aspect of the modernization dri-
Source: https://ilostat.ilo.org ve” (Xi, 2014b: 8-12).
For what came to be known as Xi Jinping Thought, the keys to such rejuvenation are “better education, more stable jobs, more satisfactory income, greater social security benefits, better medical and health services, more comfortable living conditions and a more beautiful environment” (Xi, 2014b: 16). Worthy of special emphasis in this regard is how Xi frames the working class as the “main
Deng’s modernisation plan: force for finishing building a moderately
“We will continue to give top priority to de- prosperous society” (Xi, 2014b: 56; Gürcan,
velopment; put people first; persist in reform 2021b).
and opening up; comprehensively promote Under the Xi administration, China’s sta-
economic, political, cultural, social, and eco- te-guided economic development model –
Figure 6. Domestic general government health expenditure (% of current health expenditure) Source: https://data.worldbank.org
where the state determines the general course Figure 7. China's Goverment Expenditure on Education,
of economic development based on long-term (% of GDP)
Source: https://data.worldbank.org plans and strategies– attained a higher degree of maturity. This level of maturity finds its expression in the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform: "The basic economic system with public ownership playing a dominant role and different economic sectors developing side by side is an important pillar of the socialist sys-
tem with Chinese characteristics and is the position of public ownership, give full play to
foundation of the socialist market economy. the leading role of the state-owned sector, and
Both the public and non-public sectors are continuously increase its vitality, controlling
key components of the socialist market eco- force and influence. We must unwaveringly
nomy, and are important bases for the eco- encourage, support and guide the develop-
nomic and social development of China. We ment of the non-public sector, and stimulate
must unswervingly consolidate and develop its dynamism and creativity (CPC, 2014CPC (2014). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)".
the public economy, persist in the dominant Therefore, one could deduce that in China’s
Figure 8. Average Wages and Salaries in China Source: https://www.economy.com/china/wage-and-salaries
the reform and opening up led to a reducti- Figure 9. China's GINI Index
Source: https://data.worldbank.org on in SOEs from 262,000 in 1997 to 173,000
in 2016, their assets soared from around 12.5 trillion RMB to 155 trillion RMB. Similarly, the net income of SOEs witnessed a significant increase, from nearly 79.12 billion RMB to 2.5 trillion RMB (Lin, et al., 2020: 4Lin, et al. (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). An overwhelming majority of revenues by SOEs is derived from the strategic or top-tier sectors comprising defense, electricity, oil, gas, telecommunications, coal, shipping, aviation, and rail. A substantial part of SOE revenues is also generated by the pillar or middle-tier industries comprising automobiles, chemicals, economic development model, public ownerconstruction, electronics, equipment manuship plays a dominant role with due regard facturing, nonferrous metals, prospecting, for the balance between economic and socisteel, and technology. Lately, biotechnology o-environmental development and harmony and alternative energy manufacturing have between the public and non-public sectors. been included in the middle-tier industries In this context, it is no coincidence that (Asia Society Policy Institute, 2021Asia Society Policy Institute (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.; Pearson, the Chinese economy and its success conti- 2015). Moreover, it is also important to note nue to heavily rely on state-owned enterprises that “private companies, whether individual, (SOEs), which accounted for 40% of China’s small/medium-sized or hi-tech start-ups are GDP in 2020 (Guluzade, 2020Guluzade (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). The main not ‘free’, since they are heavily dependent on function of SOEs as the engine of the Chinese local party members” (De Rambures, 2014: economy lies in supporting capital-intensi- 4). Equally important is how large private ve industries and large undertakings beyond companies such as Huawei enjoy substantial the means of free market actors, contributing to the public goods beyond the sole profit Figure 10. China's Human's Development Index
motive, and correcting market failures (Tay, Source: https://hdr.undp.org
2013, Lin, et al., 2020; Wu & Fan, 2014: 69). Under reform and opening up, SOEs gained greater autonomy, where the responsibilities of central and local governments were expanded alongside those of outside directors. In the 2010s, greater support was also granted to commercial SOEs operating in strategic sectors that are deemed important for national security (Lin, et al., 2020Lin, et al. (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Even though
government support and forge organic rela- position in the economy, e.g. “computers
tions with the People’s Liberation Army (De (Lenovo), petroleum (Petrochina, Sinopec),
Rambures, 2014). Such examples reveal that chemicals (Sinochem), public works (Sandy),
socialism and state-guided development do aerospace (AVIC), shipyards (Ronsheng), ste-
not necessarily contradict the private sector. el (Baosteel), appliances (Haier)” (De Rambu-
More can be said about the increasing res, 2014: 34). Furthermore, 19 out of China’s
importance of China’s state-guided econo- 20 largest companies are state-owned or sta-
mic development model despite reform and te-controlled companies that determine the
opening up. In 1995, the CPC launched an course of the economy. These companies are
initiative called “retain the large; release the among the top 150 corporations ranked by
small” (fangxiao) through sales and merger Fortune Global 500 and mostly operate in the
and acquisition activity, which resulted in a oil, chemicals, utilities, banking, insurance,
more limited number of highly mega-firms construction, telecommunications, and auto-
emerged” with greater economic and politi- motive industries (Wu & Frazier, 2018Wu & Frazier (2018). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). The
cal power (Wu & Frazier, 2018: 132; Pearson, world’s four largest banks –as the main engi-
2015). Large SOEs still maintain a dominant ne of China’s economic development– belong
Figure 11. Adjusted savings: gross savings (% of GNI)
Figure 12. General government capital stock in China period (see Figure 11). This is also reflected
(current cost), in billions of national currency in the spectacular rise of general government
Source: https://www.imf.org/en/Data capital stocks, public-private partnership investments, and private capital stocks (see Figures 12-14). In the 2000-2015 period alone, general government capital stocks witnessed an over 374.5% increase (See Figure 12). This led China to develop the largest industry (as a % of GDP) in our entire sample and become the top performer in medium- and high-tech manufacturing (as a % of manufacturing, value added) among developing countries (see to China’s public sector (i.e. the Industrial & Figures 15-16). Commercial Bank of China, the China Const- The mere growth of capital stocks does not ruction Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China, automatically serve the goals of permanent and the Bank of China). Therefore, they exert and long-term economic development una strong influence on the Chinese economy less they are mobilized to trigger technologiand global economic change. Worthy of note cal progress and innovation. For developing here is that the number of SOEs listed in Forcountries, the scale of mobilization requitune Global 500 witnessed an upward trend red to enable targeted advances necessitates in the 2000s, with their number increasing strong state guidance and strategic planning, from 49 in 2005 to 102 in 2017 (Wu & Frazier, given that the spontaneous functioning of free 2018Wu & Frazier (2018). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). markets cannot satisfy such requirements. The main characteristic of the Chinese mo- This also applies to China, whose national del of economic development lies in that “the science and innovation system was created market is ‘driven’ by a strong government, and at the 1978 National Conference on Science the state sector guides the national economy” and Technology Work convened by the Cent- (Wu & Fan, 2014: 69). State guidance on the
economy allowed China to accumulate large Figure 13. Public Partnership Investments in China
(Billions of US$)
amounts of capital and strategically mobilize Source: https://www.imf.org/en/Data
this accumulated wealth to support the expansion of a productive economy (Yongding, 2014Yongding (2014). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). As such, China stands out as the top performer in gross savings (as a % of Gross National Income, or GNI) among the leading imperialist and developing countries such as the BRICS grouping (i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa) and Turkey. China’s performance exceeded 50% of its GNI in the 2007-2010
ral Committee of the CPC. In this conference, Figure 14. Private Capital Stock in China (Billions of US$)
Deng declared science and technology as part Source: https://www.imf.org/en/Data
of productive forces. The 6th Five-Year Plan in 1982 launched China’s first National Program for Science and Technology Projects, which paved the way for the National Technological Transformation Plan in 1982, the National Key Scientific and Technological Breakthrough Plan in 1982, the National Key Laboratory Construction Plan in 1984, the National High-Technology Development Plan in 1986,
and the Spark Program (Zheng, et al., 2020Zheng, et al. (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Scientific and Technological Progress in 1993,
The year 1988 marked the creation of national which promotes the progress of science and
development zones for new and high-techno- technology as foundations of economic const-
logy industries. An important landmark in ruction and social development (Zheng, et al.,
developing China’s national science and inno- 2020). This legal environment provided new
vation system is the adoption of the Law on momentum for implementing national prog-
Figure 15. Industry (including construction), value added (% of GDP), 2019 Source: https://data.worldbank.org
rams in the 1990s and the early 2000s, inclu- ton, 2018). The latter provides a strategic ro-
ding the National Basic Research Program, admap for China’s scientific and technological
the Knowledge Innovation Program, and the development in three steps:
National Science and Technology Innovation Step 1, China should become an innovative
Program. Two important landmarks in the country by 2020 to give strong support for bu-
late 2000s and the 2010s were the implemen- ilding a moderately prosperous society in all
tation of the National Medium- to Long-Term respects;
Step 2, China should move to the forefront of Plan for the Development of Science and Teinnovative countries by 2030 to lay a solid founchnology and the formulation of the Outline dation for building China into a major econoof National Innovation-Driven Development mic power and a society of common prosperity; Strategy (Zheng, et al., 2020Zheng, et al. (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). The former is a Step 3, China should become an innovation
15-year plan for the period 2006-2020, which power by 2050 to support the building of a
calls for “indigenous innovation” (zizhu chu- prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally ad-
angxin) based on a strong synergy between vanced, harmonious, modern socialist country
firms, universities, and research institutes. It and the realization of the Chinese dream of na-
encourages indigenous innovation through tional renewal (Minister of Science and Tech-
government-funded R&D and state-guided nology, 2016).
megaprojects in strategic industries (Naugh- This outline identifies strategic areas to
Figure 16. Medium and high-tech manufacturing value added (% manufacturing value added), 2019
Figure 17. Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP)
include smart and green manufacturing ch. A case in point is Made in China 2025,
and energy technologies, humanlike ma- China’s national strategic plan for indust-
chine intelligence, natural interaction and rial policy as part of “Industry 4.0”. Launc-
virtual reality, microelectronics and opto- hed in 2015, this plan calls for integrating
electronics, broadband mobile Internet, new technologies into the economy and
cloud computing, the Internet of things, developing a national industrial base led
Big Data, high-performance computing, by indigenous innovation. It thus provi-
mobile intelligent terminals, indepen- des a general framework to mobilize state
dent hardware and software products and support for key industries such as infor-
network security technology, modern agri- mation, technology, robotics, green energy,
cultural technology, and marine, space, sustainable transportation, aerospace tech-
and medical technologies (CSET, 2019CSET (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). nology, ocean engineering and high-tech
China views science and technology as ships, railway equipment, new materials,
a complementary pillar of its economic and pioneering medical and agricultural
development. This is the main reason why technologies. High-tech companies opera-
China’s industrial strategies also reflect a ting in these industries are to be supported
science- and technology-driven approa- through tax incentives, subsidies, low-inte-
Figure 18. The Number of Scientific and Technical Journal Articles Published in 2018
rest loans, R&D funding, and assistance for This makes China one of the world’s top
acquisitions of foreign technology compa- performers in R&D expenditure, which is
nies (Huimin, et al. 2018; US Chamber of mainly driven by government funds (see
Commerce, 2017). Another plan launched Figure 17; Zheng, et al., 2020). Moreover,
in 2015 is an action plan called Internet China’s strong state guidance and strategic
Plus, which aims to use, through fiscal and planning yielded significant results in its
tax policies, state resources to encourage performance related to several important
the application of mobile and digital tech- indicators, including the publication of
nologies into the economy, particularly to scientific and technical articles, the num-
manufacturing, commerce, finance, medi-
cal sectors, government, and agriculture. Figure 19. The Number of Researchers
Engaged in China’s R&D (per millions)
This plan brands mobile Internet, cloud Source: https://data.worldbank.org
computing, big data, and the Internet of Things as the driving technologies of the Chinese economy (China Daily, 2015China Daily (2015). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Within such policy frameworks, China has devoted its efforts to increase its R&D expenditure (as a % of GDP), which rose from 0.56% in 1996 to 2.14% in 2018.
ber of researchers engaged in R&D, and the number of patents, industrial design,
patents, trademarks, and industrial app- and trademark applications by residents.
lications by residents. For one thing, ava- This points to an increase of over 12308%
ilable data reveal that China has become for patent applications and 9040% for in-
the world’s leading country in scientific dustrial design applications between 1992
publications, having overtaken the United and 2019. In the period 2004-2019, China’s
States in 2016 (see Figure 18). In a similar increase in trademark applications amoun-
vein, the number of researchers engaged in ted to 1337%.
China’s R&D rose by almost 200%, from Consequently, 2019 data show that Chi-
around 437 million persons in 1996 to 1.3 na has become the world’s leading nation
billion persons in 2018 (see Figure 19). in patent, industrial design, and trade-
China also witnessed impressive growth in mark applications (e.g. See Figures 19-21).
Figure 20. Number of Patent, Trademark and Industrial Design Applications by Residents (China)
Eventually, the mobilization of capital sto- 22). Here, ICT goods include information
cks to support technological progress and and technology goods, such as computers,
innovation under strong state guidance communication equipment, consumer ele-
has transformed China’s international tra- ctronic equipment, electronic components,
de. 2019 data reveal that China is now a whereas high-technology exports involve
country with the world’s largest share of a longer list of items that supplement ICT
informational and communication tech- goods, including aerospace, pharmaceuti-
nology (ICT) goods exports in total goo- cals, scientific instruments, and electrical
ds exports and high technology exports machinery.
in total manufactured exports (see Figure A final word is needed regarding the
Figure 21. The Number of Patent, Industrial Design, and Trademark Applications in 2019 (by residents)
Figure 22. High Tech Exports in 2019
relationship between the Chinese econo- unched in 2013 on China’s initiative, the
mic miracle and the Belt & Road Initiative BRI aims at establishing broad networks
(BRI). Eventually, the success of the Chi- related to infrastructure, natural resources,
nese economic model has allowed China and investments in more than 152 count-
to gain the status of an “agenda-setter” and ries across Asia, Europe, Africa, the Midd-
“norm-maker” in international politics le East, and the Americas. Today, the BRI
with the rise of China-led initiatives such covers over 70 countries, corresponding to
as the BRI. The BRI focuses on five primary more than 65% of the world population,
areas: intergovernmental political coopera- one-third of the global GDP, and a quarter
tion and consensus building, infrastructu- of world trade. This suggests that the BRI
ral and technological connectivity, com- has become the most comprehensive deve-
mercial connectivity, financial integration, lopment and trade cooperation scheme in
and people-to-people exchange for cultural history (Gürcan, 2020Gürcan (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).
cooperation. While the term “belt” indica- Two crucial observations are worth hi-
tes land pipelines, roads, and railways, the ghlighting at this point. First, the BRI itself
term “road” is used to define offshore lines, reflects China’s state-guided economic ap-
harbors, and other maritime facilities. La- proach. For example, Chinese state-owned
banks and the Silk Road Fund, created by bunk this myth by evincing the Chinese
the collective efforts of these banks, cons- economic miracle and how it has been ac-
titute the engine of the BRI’s financial in- hieved based on empirical evidence. The
tegration and infrastructure investments. findings are hoped to provide developing
Second, the BRI encourages participant countries with considerable insights into
countries to adopt a state-guided eco- how advanced levels of economic deve-
nomy that values infrastructure develop- lopment can be attained through a soci-
ment and environmental sustainability. A alist market economy understood as an
case in point is the Asian Infrastructure early phase in the construction of socia-
Investment Bank (AIIB) as the BRI’s fi- lism. This phase consists of building a sta-
nancial locomotive, which started to ope- te-guided economy that leads the market
rate in 2016 under China’s initiative as forces, where public ownership is used to
“the world’s first multilateral development fuel techno-industrial development and
bank (MDB) dedicated to infrastructure” a sustainable autocentric economy, albeit
(Wilson, 2017Wilson (2017). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). In the Second Belt and closely integrated into the global economy.
Road Forum for International Cooperati- The leadership of a revolutionary party
on, moreover, the BRI publicly announced ensures not only strategic coherence and
its principles for green investment, which long-term planning, but also correction
later led to the creation of several initiati- of market failures and protection from fo-
ves for sustainability, such as the Interna- reign political interference and economic
tional Coalition for Green Development, manipulations.
Sustainable Cities Alliance, Climate Chan- The “cheap labor thesis” is not the only
ge Cooperation Initiative, Environmental derogatory term to describe the Chinese
Technology Exchange and Transfer Cen- economic miracle from a Western-centric
ter, Environmental Big Data Platform, and perspective. Such biased approaches inc-
Green Investment Fund. As part of the lude Mao’s so-called “brutal” legacy, the
Green Belt project, the BRI thus promotes role of foreign investments and integration
green finance, sustainable energy, green into global capitalism, China’s “technology
agriculture, eco-urbanization, and social theft”, and “Chinese imperialism”. First
sustainability (Gürcan, 2021aGürcan (2021a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). and foremost, the evidence suggests that
China’s long-term success greatly owes
Conclusion: Debunking the Myths to Mao’s “socialism with Chinese chara-
about the Chinese Miracle cteristics”, which laid the foundations for
human and physical capital necessary for
The “cheap labor thesis”, i.e. the myth economic development. Indeed, foreign
that China owes its economic success ma- investments do not choose any destination
inly to the supply of cheap labor, is often where labor is cheap, given that attracting
used to derogate China’s historic success. foreign investments requires a sound phy-
In many respects, this article serves to de- sical and human capital infrastructure in
the first place. This being said, it would be red and systematic technology theft. In his
equally misleading to reduce China’s eco- book Trade Secrets: Intellectual Piracy and
nomic success to merely attracting foreign the Origins of American Industrial Power,
investment. Quite the contrary, the Chine- Doron S. Ben-Atar depicts the chief role
se miracle is postulated on an autocentric of spies in launching the American in-
model. It follows that China’s secret lies in dustrial revolution “by illicitly appropria-
attracting foreign investments and using ting mechanical and scientific innovations
state power to maximize technology trans- from Europe” (Macleod, 2005: XXI). He
fer and strengthen the socialist system. describes the systematic technology theft
Moreover, based on the foreign invest- by the US as part of “policies relating to
ment thesis, some argue that the Chine- intellectual property played in promoting
se miracle mostly emanates from China’s the appropriation of smuggled technology
renunciation of socialism and integration which led to the emergence of the United
into global capitalism. In their view, China States as the premier industrial power in
has developed a shared interest with Wes- the world” (Macleod, 2005: XXI).
tern capitalists in joining so-called “global Finally, the globalization of Chinese
imperialism”. However, the intensification SOEs is often misinterpreted as a sign of
of a new Cold War between the United China becoming an imperialist power. Ca-
States and China, which insists on impro- pitalism and imperialist policies inevitably
ving its socialist system, rather invalidates lead to wars. Western capitalism is strong-
such arguments (Gürcan, 2019Gürcan (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). ly predicated on systemic wars such as the
One cannot also equate China’s techno- Thirty Years' War, the Napoleonic Wars,
World War I, and World War II. Moreover, the so-called Western economic success
In contrast to Western capitalism, greatly owes to the forced accumulation
the Chinese economic miracle of wealth through colonialism and sla-
does not originate from forced very rather than the miracle of free mar-
accumulation, wars, and kets (Wallerstein, 2002; Williams, 2021;
colonialism. On the contrary, it Beckert, & Rockman,2016). In contrast to
springs from peaceful development Western capitalism, the Chinese econo-
and international cooperation. mic miracle does not originate from for-
ced accumulation, wars, and colonialism. On the contrary, it springs from peaceful
logy transfer with technology theft. Tech- development and international coopera-
nology theft is often deployed as a “stigma” tion. Understood as such, China’s model
to denigrate China and diffuse Sinopho- also constitutes the living example of the
bia. At this point, it would be helpful to rising relevance and superiority of socia-
recall that even the US economy greatly lism over the capitalist system.
owes its previous success to state-sponso- References
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