China’s Participation in the Conflict Resolution in Sudan and South Sudan: A Case of “Creative Mediation”

The history of china-sudan relations pendence in 2011. Since 1989, China had been

goes back the Ancient Silk Road linking Sudan’s keen to strengthening its relations with the new

eastern ports to trade with the Middle East. The Sudanese regime to break the international iso-

relations flourished between the 10th and 15th lation imposed by the United States and its allies.

centuries. Diplomatic relations between the two More importantly, Beijing became a net import-

states began in January 1959. Sudan was the first er of oil products in 1993, and a net importer of

country in sub-Saharan Africa to recognize the crude oil in 1996. Since then, the new situation

People’s Republic of China (PRC). Before the 1989 has required the adoption of a “going out” strat-

military coup, there was a positive image between egy to searching for energy, investment in oil

the rulers, people, and elites of Sudan regarding and gas. In 1994, Sudan invited China National

China’s contributions to the rapprochement and Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to conduct a

development of Sudan. During this period, China preliminary survey on Sudan’s oil sector. Presi-

provided Sudan with developmental assistance, dent Al-Bashir’s visit to Beijing in late 1995 had

which amounted to $ 95.6 million and contrib- resulted in an agreement to provide low-interest

uted to the establishment of the textile industry soft loans to Sudan and signed an agreement to

and the construction of roads, bridges, and hos- finance oil development in Sudan. Subsequent-

pitals in Sudan (Large, 2008Large (2008). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Sudan also actively ly, CNPC started operations in Block 6 (Al-Ma-

contributed to bolster China’s strategic interests in mas of Kordofan and South Darfur), and in late

Africa and the Red Sea. 1996, other oil companies were also discovered.

Following the military coup in 1989, Su- At the beginning of March 1997, oil explora-

dan’s domestic affairs had gone through three tion operation started in South Sudan, CNPC

notable phases that have had a major impact signed a cooperation agreement with Petronas,

on Sino-Sudanese relations: (1) The military Is- Talisman (then Arakis) and Sudapet to develop

lamist regime; 2) The Darfur crisis in 2006 and three oil blocks and share investment risks (Ab-

the Chinese response; 3) South Sudan’s inde- delbagi, Siti-Nabiha&Shahbudin, 2013). China’s

economic expansion in Sudan had also broken international community on the other hand. The

the international isolation imposed by the inter- International community had criticized China’s

national community on Khartoum in the pretext policy in Sudan and argued that the oil relations

of “supporting terrorism and human rights vio- between the two countries had supported and

lations in Darfur and South Sudan”. On August encouraged the Sudanese government to carry

12, 1993, the US State Department designated out “genocide” in the Darfur region: Sudanese

government used oil revenues to buy weapons Sudan as a “state sponsor of terrorism” (U.S. and killed dissidents in Darfur, and thus China Department of the Tresuary, 2017U.S. and killed dissidents in Darfur, and thus China Department of the Tresuary (2017). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Khartoum indirectly supported the killing of people in the also viewed Beijing as an attractive political and region. economic partner. The relation between China China saw a political solution as the only and Sudan was mutually beneficial: Sudan made way to address the crisis and began to use its

rapid strides in the development of its oil indus- influence in the United Nations to pressure the

try, and China gained important test points for Sudanese regime to accept the deployment of

the technical development of its oil-owned com- hybrid UN-African Union mission forces. Bei-

panies, which were technically lagging behind jing also began to keep itself away from being

major international oil companies. China had deeply involved in Sudan’s internal affairs and

played a significant role in the re-orientation of opened the door for the international commu-

Sudan’s foreign economic relations toward ‘Asia’. nity to punish the Khartoum government for its

The top export destinations of Sudan are the assumed attempts to assassinate the Egyptian

United Arab Emirates ($1.71B), China ($611M), President. Beijing allowed the passage of three

Saudi Arabia ($600M), India ($426M); the top UN Security Council resolutions against the

import origins of Sudan are China ($2.34B), the Khartoum government, resolutions 1044, 1054,

United Arab Emirates ($972M), India ($834M), 1070, which included imposing a kind of diplo-

matic threat and pressure on Sudan. China also Saudi Arabia ($638M) and Russia ($636M) played a mediator role between Sudan and the (OEC, n.d.OEC (n.d.). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which resulted in the Comprehensive Peace

China’s mediation endeavors reflect Agreement (CPA) in 2005. On 9 July 2011 South

its cautious measures to maximize Sudan became the newest country in the world,

its economic interests and minimize and China immediately announced its recogni-

its political venture. tion of the new country and established diplo-

matic relations with South Sudan.

However, The Darfur crisis in 2005 put Chi- It is apparent that China seeks economic

na’s national interests and national identity in a benefit in Sudan and South Sudan, thus it is hard

quandary between adhering to the doctrine of for China to shy away its political responsibility

non-interference and safeguarding its national for conflict resolution, albeit reluctantly. China’s

interests in Sudan on one hand, and interna- mediation endeavors reflect its cautious meas-

tional pressure on Beijing and strengthening its ures to maximize its economic interests and

national identity as a responsible power in the minimize its political venture.

1. The Concept of China-Styled fails to manage and resolve the conflict. It is a

Creative Mediation in International complex process with rarely positive results. Con-

Conflict Resolution flicts can easily escalate into wars as a result of the

There are two types of protecting states’ overseas mediator’s calculations and motives. In a way, any

interests: one is the use of force by a state with- external actors may become a formal or informal

out the consent of the host state, and sometimes mediator.

under the authorization of the UN Security Bercovitch divides the mediator into three

Council, to protect its national interests that are categories: individuals, countries and institu-

facing multiple threats. The second one is the use tions (organizations). The international mediator

of diplomatic tools, based on the consent of the aims to influence or change the conflict system

target state and under the authorization of the through its resources and diplomatic tools. These

UN Security Council such as mediation, con- resources illustrate the behavior and strategy of

structive involvement, indirection engagement, the mediator, which include good offices, crea-

and consultation with a state concerned. Crea- tive conciliation, mediation, constructive engage-

tive mediation diplomacy is based on the right ment, negotiation, and arbitration (Bercovitch,

of protecting overseas interests under the inter- 1996; Bercovitch&Houston, 1996). Ravan also in-

national law and the consent of the host states. troduces six types of resources or so-called “rules

The diplomatic tools of China’s creative media- of influence”:

tion diplomacy are based on the types (strategic Reward Resources: the ability of the media-

political, security, economic and ideological) tor to provide tangible covenants and benefits to

and degrees (vital, major, survival) of national the warring parties such as the form of economic

interests in Sudan and South Sudan, along with assistance.

adhering to the doctrine of non-interference in Coercion Resources: the threat of the media-

other’s internal affairs. tor to withdraw mediation or punish one or both

Western academics have made significant parties such as the use of his economic influence

contributions to understanding the mediation to force the warring parties to conflict resolution.

theory and its dynamics, terms, methodolo- Referent Resources: the use of shared identity

gy, and mediators and adversaries (Bercovitch, or ideologies between the mediator and the con-

1991a; Bercovitch, 1991b). Mediation is an exten- flicting parties.

sion of negotiations where the conflicting parties Expertise Resources: The mediator’s experi-

accept the involvement or assistance of external ence and superior ability to manage and resolve

parties without breaking international law or conflict.

the state’s sovereignty, or a low-cost and flexible Information Resources: The ability of the me-

strategy, legitimately and creatively adopted by diator to disclose valuable information that lead-

external security actors and international organ- ing to the changing outcome of the conflict.

izations. The success of mediation depends on Legitimacy Resources: Legitimate resourc-

the experience and efficiency of the mediator and es are linked to the internal values of the parties

successful judgment on the conflict from all di- which the mediator has the right to change or in-

rections. Therefore, the mediation process often fluence the conflict.

Western Mediation Diplomacy Diplomacy

Commercial and Political/Diplomatic

Interests

Attitudes of Mediators Proactive Selective on a case-by-case basis

Mediation Process Agenda-Setting Agenda-Revising

Resources that Mediators Commit to Major Resources Minor Resources

Primary Goals Conflict Resolution Conflict De-Escalation

Source: Sun & Zoubir, 2016: 240.

The choice of these resources also depends international community. A positive mediator

on the nature of the conflict and warring parties, is supposed to be neutral and proposes a just

the characteristics of conflict management and solution and uses his influence and international

methods of conflict management. It also links to prestige to push the conflict process towards an

the type and degree of mediator’s interests in the effective position and influence on the warring

host state. When the ongoing conflict threatens parties to accept a settlement and negotiation.

the mediator’s interests, the mediator has a de- Sun and Zoubir (2018) argue that China

fensive attitude, and even it engages in joint me- takes a proactive mediation in conflict resolu-

diation (for example, Russia, Iran, and Turkey tion in order to protect its security and political

cooperation in the Syrian crisis). There are also interests. Unlike what it has done in the North

two types of mediators: A negative mediator in- Korean nuclear issue, Beijing adopts Quasi-Me-

terferes to spread more chaos or to forge security diation Diplomacy in the Middle Eastern and

alliances with one of the warring parties in or- African security issues to protect its economic

der to harm the interests of other external actors and strategic interests. China’s approach in Su-

or other mediators; a positive mediator seeks to dan and South Sudan has provided all warring

conflict resolution to protect his interests and parties with economic assistance, trade conces-

enhance international peace and security and re- sions such as lower tariffs on imported goods,

duce the consequences of acute conflicts. While and invited the leaders of all parties to visit

private motives are usually related to the reduc- China and in some cases provided military as-

tion of the indirect effects of the mediators such sistance to reach an agreement between the con-

as trade disturbances, refugee flows are threat- flicting parties. Beijing also has used economic

ened their commercial interests in a troubled clout and international status to compel warring

country. Besides the interest-based approach, parties that don’t want to resolve the conflict.

humanitarian concerns or human rights are also This study introduces a new concept of

an important factor that leading the mediator to “creative mediation diplomacy” to understand

strengthen its status or national identity in the China’s involvement in the conflict resolution

of Sudan and South Sudan and asserts that this Between 1990 and 2006, Sudan’s oil exports to

concept has undergone gradual steps, includ- China increased from 266,126 to more than

ing indirect participation, cautious participa- 6.5 million tons. In 2005 and 2006, China im-

tion, negotiation, and multilateral participation. ported 47% of Sudan’s total oil production (UN

These steps are determined by the type and de- Comtrade Database, 2007). However, China’s

gree of China’s interests in the region. Moreover, economic interests had been affected by the vol-

the variables and characteristics of the nature of atile security environment in Sudan. In 2004, the

the conflict and the warring parties, the char- rebels abducted Chinese citizens and sent them

acteristics of conflict management (the degree to the southern part of the country, which had

of conflict) also affect the tools of its mediation driven Beijing to engage in Sudan’s conflict res-

diplomacy. Even though this concept shows the olution. China’s engagement in the Darfur cri-

evolution of China’s non-interference policy sis had undergone gradual phases of its creative

without adhering to the main principles of this mediation diplomacy in line with the evolution

very policy, the debates over China’s dynamic of non-interference principle.

approach in conflict resolution still raises many • Passive Participation

questions whether or not the dynamic process of At the beginning of the Darfur crisis, China

Chinese engagement in conflict resolution still did not respond directly or pay much attention to

adheres to the principle of non-intervention, es- the crisis. The Sudanese government convinced

pecially China’s growing overseas interests, the Beijing that the crisis was just an internal chaos

increasing participation in UN peacekeeping and the army could control it. The internation-

missions in strategic regions and new concepts al community saw this internal chaos as “geno-

and calls in the new era regarding a community cide” and denounced the regime’s crimes in Dar-

with a shared future for humankind and forging fur. China supported the Sudanese government

a new international system based on multilater- against external intervention and stressed the re-

alism and win-win strategy. spect for state sovereignty and non-interference

in Sudan’s domestic affairs. For example, China

2. China’s Creative Mediation resisted the UN-planned sanctions to adopt a

Diplomacy to Settle the Darfur US-backed resolution of imposing sanctions on

Crisis in Sudan Sudan (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Chinese

Following the Cold War, China-Sudan relations representatives at the United Nations portrayed

have been characterized by steady expansion of Darfur’s crisis, not as genocide but as domestic

trade and investment, especially in the energy violence over natural resources involving the Su-

sector. The CNCP has become the largest for- dan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and

eign investor in Sudan’s oil sector and acquired Equality Movement (JEM). China called on the

the largest overseas projects. Chinese private United Nations to provide financial assistance to

small businesses have also entered the Sudanese the African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission

market and invested in various sectors, such as in Sudan (Large, 2011Large (2011). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

agriculture, beverages, shoemaking, and enter- • Double Mediation

prise creation. According to the United Nations, China’s engagement in the Darfur crisis had

China accounts for 64% of Sudan’s trade volume. undergone a shift from passive participation to

active engagement and multilateral mediation vate persuasion and continuous consultation.

between the Sudanese government and the in- This was reflected in its support of the United

ternational community to persuade Khartoum Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) in

to accept a joint agreement and deployment of Darfur, which ran counter to President Bashir’s

peacekeepers. In April 2004, after the Sudanese wishes in particular. In addition, Chinese rep-

government signed the Humanitarian Ceasefire resentatives and senior aides had formally crit-

Agreement and rebel movements withdrew from icized the policies of the petrified Sudanese re-

Darfur, the Sudanese government allowed AU gime undermining the settlement of the crisis

peacekeeper to deploy as a monitoring mission and stressed the mandatory recommendations

in Darfur (AMIS) (De Waal, 2007De Waal (2007). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). The oppo- to conflict resolution. Then Chinese President

sition stressed that China backed the Khartoum Hu Jintao sent a message to Bashir that China

government and viewed the crisis as an internal backed UN Resolution 1706 and expressed his

affair of the government in Khartoum. Following willingness for the Sudanese government to ac-

the incident, the Chinese government sent an as- cept the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeep-

sessment mission led by the Ministry of Foreign ing force during his visit to Sudan in February

Affairs, which included representatives from the 2007 (Embassy of People’s Republic of China in

Ministry of Commerce and CNPC and recom- the Republic of Estonia, 2005). In other words,

mended new measures to conflict resolution. China’s efforts had focused on persuading the

China also supported United Nations Mission in Sudanese government to accept the deployment

Sudan (UNMIS) to play a role in planning the of the UN-African Union hybrid peacekeeping

2010 referendum that determining Darfur as an mission and encouraging mediation actors and

autonomous region. Since 2006, Beijing gradu- international organizations to urge opposition

ally stepped up its efforts to persuade the Suda- groups to engage in negotiations with the central

nese government to accept UN Resolution 1706. government. Because of the lack of contact with

opposition groups, the Chinese government has paid much attention to the Sudanese govern-

China used creative legitimate ment, not as neutral as it is a commitment to the

mediation to persuade the policy of non-interference.

Sudanese government to conflict • Creative Mediation Diplomacy

resolution and called for political China persuaded the Sudanese government

dialogue and consultation, rather to accept UN resolutions and became more in-

than hard political tools such as telligent and proactive in exerting pressure on

sanctions and military interventions. Khartoum. Sudan regime rejected any replace-

ment of African Union troops by UN troops, as well as the invitation to attend the special meet- Beijing considered that a neutral posiing of the Security Council. China used creative

tion or friendly relations would undermine the legitimate mediation to persuade the Sudanese

chances of steady progress towards peace and government to conflict resolution and called for

security in Darfur. It adopted a strategy of “in- political dialogue and consultation, rather than

fluencing without interference”, which was based hard political tools such as sanctions and mil-

on respecting state sovereignty, pushing for pri- itary interventions. China had dispatched 275

engineering troops, 100 transportation troops, and 60 medical personnel for the UNMIS; and 315 engineering troops for the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). China’s attempts have succeeded to persuade Khartoum to join the meeting table at the high-level consultation on the situation in Darfur at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa on 16 November 2006. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also proposed the deployment of a

hybrid African Union-UN peacekeeping force A group of 165 Chinese peacekeepers were preparing to

and 22,000-strong policeman. However, the Su- leave for South Sudanese capital, Juba from Zhengzhou,

the capital city of central China’s Henan Province, on

danese position was stubborn and rejected the Sept. 11, 2018. (Xinhua)

plan. When President Omar al-Bashir arrived in Beijing for the Forum on China-Africa Cooper-

ation Forum, Chinese President Hu Jintao for- The US and Western countries launched

mally called for peace and security in Darfur. He horrific campaigns against China to boycott

also sent a message to the Sudanese government ‘China’s Olympics and decided to impose fur-

that Beijing supported and respected Annan’s ther restrictive measures on Khartoum. In May,

plan (UN News, 2006UN News (2006). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Chinese Ambassador Liu Guijin visited some

He also proposed four principles for con- African countries and talked with the Sudanese

flict resolution: respecting Sudan’s sovereignty, government, the Arab League, the African Un-

maintaining local stability in the region, up- ion, and many Western countries to reach some

holding political dialogue and coordination common views for conflict resolution. Since

on the basis of equality, and strengthening the 2001, China abstained eight times of 22 UN Se-

constructive role of the AU and UN in the cri- curity Council resolutions on Darfur crisis. In

sis (Pen, 2007Pen (2007). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). China has decided to provide June 2006, the Chinese government provided

40 million Renminbi (RMB) in aid to the Darmodest aid to Darfur, including donations of $ fur region. ‘China’s diplomacy has gradually 3.5 million to the AMIS (Permenant Mission of changed from conveying the message to active the People’s Republic of China to UN, 2008Permenant Mission of changed from conveying the message to active the People’s Republic of China to UN (2008). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). persuasion and working with the international Some observers and academics have argued community (China Daily, 2007China Daily (2007). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). In April 2006, that Beijing abandoned the doctrine of non-in- Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister and Special

Envoy Zhai Jun visited the continent and made terference and its mediator role in Darfur, which

good efforts to persuade Khartoum to accept the marked a change to its traditional foreign policy.

Annan plan. China stressed that the root of the However, China’s creative mediation diplomacy

crisis is the development issues. For this reason, in Darfur’s conflict resolution is encompassed

China urged the Sudanese government to im- by multilateralist efforts. In this perspective,

plement the development plan and reformed its with the consent of Sudan, peacekeeping forces

economic plan. Additionally, the international was deployed under the joint authorization of

community called to provide financial assistance the UN and the AU. Beijing stressed the role of

to Sudan. the Sudanese government in cooperation with

the UN and the AU and underscored the task Darfur has carried out 636 sorties, rescued more

of the African Union. Morover, China provid- than 280 people and delivered 3,800 passengers,

ed assistance to the AU and used its economic 220 tons of cargo, 16.6 tons of dangerous goods

influence to force Sudanese government to con- such as weapons and ammunition (Yang, 2019Yang (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

flict resolution. In 2011, China also welcomed On 12 December 2018, China has dis-

the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, which patched 100 blue helmets to take part in a one-

was signed between the Sudanese government year peacekeeping mission in Darfur. In July

and the Liberation and Justice Movement in 2019, the 140 soldiers of the 2nd China Medium

Doha and commended the ongoing efforts of Utility Helicopter Unit (CMUHU02), has award-

the Qatari government and the Arab League. ed UN peace medals (Sudan Tribune, 2018aSudan Tribune (2018a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

China was the first country outside Africa to de- They have helped to establish UNAMID’s infra-

ploy a 315-member multi-function engineering structure, including the construction of camps,

unit for a hybrid (United Nations-African Union the construction of protective fences and guard

Mission UNAMID) peacekeeping operation in towers, carrying out community projects in Dar-

Darfur. UNAMID is the second-largest peace- fur, most notably the development and mainte-

keeping mission around the world after United nance of Nyala airports in South Darfur and Al-

Nations Organization Mission in the Democrat- Da’een in East Darfur.

ic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), with more In June 2019, the UN Security Council split

than 20,000 troops, military personnel, police over the withdrawal of a peacekeeping force de-

and personnel of various nationalities, an esti- ployed in Darfur between Europeans and Afri-

mated $ 1.4 billion for 2014 (UNAMID, n.d.UNAMID (n.d.). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). cans who demanded a suspension, while China

These steps prove that China’s creative media- and Russia supported the continuing of the mis-

sion. Since 2018, the political landscape in Sution diplomacy in Darfur conflict resolution led dan has dramatically changed after the Sudanese to some developments in its non-interference military removed Omar al-Bashir from his posipolicy, but without prejudice to the basic princition as President of Sudan. Before the handover ples of this policy, which are based on respect for of power to the transitional government, some Sudan’s sovereignty. It did not seek to change the European members have pointed to the situaregime and bring chaos in the country. tion of Sudan and the absence of a government On 10 July 2017, UNAMID has announced at the time, but China and Russia stressed that

the launch of a plan to reduce the number of its the internal crisis is only the responsibility of

military by 44% and the police by 33%. The tar- Sudan state.

get for ending the mission is 30 June 2020 (Unit- China’s gradual steps of creative mediation

ed Nations, 2017). China provided the missions diplomacy toward the Darfur crisis was mainly

with four Mi-17 helicopters which are mainly driven by strategic economic and political inter-

tasked with 24-hour air patrol, battleground re- ests. China’s diplomacy has focused on reconcil-

connaissance, transport peacekeepers, evacua- ing between short-term gains with the long-term

tion of rescued personnel and air supplies provi- stability in Sudan and the expectations of other

sion. So far, the Chinese helicopter contingent to actors. China recognized that the escalating vio-

Chinese President Hu Jintao welcomes South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, April 24, 2012. (Xinhua)

lence would jeopardize its economic interests in 3. China’s Creative Mediation in

Sudan and the potential of Darfur unrest could South Sudan’s Cessation

reach South Sudan after peace has been settled, China has been keen to portray itself in the Afrias well as China’s oil interests which stretching can continent as an economic partner; however, across Chad, Libya, and Ethiopia throughout the conflict between South Sudan and Sudan has the threats of refugees and rebels from Darfur. pushed Beijing to increase engagement in Horn Therefore, Darfur’s stability was embedded in of Africa’s security affairs. The reason lies in its regional security. China’s respect state’s sovergrowing interests in the region and enhancing eignty and refusal intervention in Sudan had led its great power diplomacy with the Chinese the harsh criticism of western against this policy.

In this direction, Western countries launched a through its participation in the UN peacekeep-

big campaign to boycott the Beijing Olympics, ing operations in the continent. In fact, China

which raised China’s concerns about its national had been engaging in friendly exchanges with

identity in the international community. China South Sudan in the 1970s when China decided

did not adopt a unilateral position or isolate it- to send the first medical teams of agricultural ex-

self from the international community. In other perts to help South Sudan. In January 2005, Chi-

words, its mediation was based on cooperation na was one of the mediators between North and

with the international community and partici- South Sudan during the signing of the Compre-

pation in multilateralism efforts. hensive Peace Agreement, which ended 22-years

of civil war, and paved the way for a referendum CPA asserts the respecting of existing contracts

for South Sudan’s independence. In March 2005, and granting South Sudan 50 percent of all oil

a high-level SPLM delegation paid an official vis- revenues produced in the southern oil areas.

it to Beijing, which considered the first official The Chinese government has adhered to its tra-

contact between two sides. In February 2007, ditional doctrine of non-interference and ac-

during President Hu Jintao’s visit to Sudan, he knowledged the appropriate and legitimate role

met Vice President Salva Kiir and invited him to of the core state in maintaining state unity. By

Beijing to discuss the common cooperation and avoiding political fragmentation, it has accepted

development projects (Zhang, 2011Zhang (2011). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). the importance of political stability and refused

external interference that supports “regime

The Chinese government change.” However, Sudan’s internal situation was

has adhered to its traditional suffering from the weakness of the central gov-

doctrine of non-interference and ernment to exercise effective control over its full

acknowledged the appropriate and jurisdiction and the state’s sovereignty, which led

legitimate role of the central state to armed conflicts in Darfur and South Sudan.

in maintaining state unity. The CPA transformed the Sudan People’s Liber-

ation Movement (SPLM) into a national unity

In September 2008, China opened its con- sharing power with the central government. This

sulate in Juba and then started diplomatic rela- agreement enabled China to begin the process

tions with South Sudan, which allowed China of negotiation and communication with South

to strengthen direct channels of communication Sudan. Political communication between China

with the Government of South Sudan, having and the SPLM was extremely sensitive because

gained independence from Sudan on 9 July 2011 of ‘China’s political, economic and military sup-

as the outcome of a 2005 agreement. The Chi- port to the central government in Khartoum in

nese government respected the results of the wartime and its refusal to deal with the SPLM.

referendum and was one of the first countries in However, the two sides have found pragmatic in-

the world to recognize the new country. In July terests that have opened the door for enhancing

2011, Jiang Weixin, China’s Minister of Housing mutual needs and prospects for mutual benefit.

and Urban-rural Development, attended South

Sudan independence celebrations as President 4. China’s Creative Mediation between

Hu Jintao’s special envoy who sent a congrat- Sudan and South Sudan Conflict

ulatory message to President of South Sudan Oil is a vital commodity for both Sudan and

and established diplomatic relations with the South Sudan, but the two countries have not

country (Munene, 2019Munene (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). In April 2012, South agreed on what the south should pay as transit

Sudan President visited China, and the South fees to send its oil exports through northern

Sudan Embassy in Beijing hosted the first in- ports. Therefore, oil production faced political

vestment forum between Juba and Beijing to turmoil both inside and outside South Sudan.

identify investment and trade opportunities. Oil The 2012 Oil Revenue Sharing Agreement was

has been very important in the wealth-sharing primarily used by Sudan to ease economic pres-

protocol between North and South Sudan. The sure, was halted by a dispute over the value of

using oil pipelines and led to the closure of the and citizens. South Sudan had used its new sov-

pipeline to South Sudan, which was producing ereign political influence to pressure China Na-

350,000 barrels per day (Sudan Times, 2017Sudan Times (2017). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). tional Petroleum Corporation and its partners to

In January 2012, the Government of South bolster Juba’s position in negotiations with Su-

Sudan made a radical decision to close the oil dan over pipeline fees. Despite the development

pipelines and relations between two sides had of good relations between the Government of

sharply deteriorated to the extent that in April Southern Sudan (GRSS) and Beijing, China was

2012 the increased cross-border tensions with involved in disputes over oil transit charges be-

an SPLA attack on the Heglig oil field. The oil tween Sudan and South Sudan, threatening oil

facilities were severely damaged and production supplies between the two countries. China has

ceased for more than a month, aggravating the been seeking to maintain good relations with the

economic crisis in Sudan and South Sudan. On two countries since South Sudan declared inde-

September 27, 2012, Sudanese President Omar pendence from the north, but the disputes have

al-Bashir and South Sudanese President Salva tested China’s ability to balance the two coun-

Kiir signed a series of agreements for conflict tries. China called both sides for implementing

resolution, which set relatively low transit fees the agreement and sent its former special envoy

of $ 1 per barrel, while processing and transport to Africa, Liu Guijin, to solve the disputes be-

charges were close to commercial rates. In addi- tween two governments over transit fees be-

tion, a $ 3.028 billion was a transitional financial tween oil shipments that threatening oil-sup-

arrangement payable to Sudan over a period of plies. South Sudan authorities expelled the head

three years and a half is transferred at a rate of of China-Malaysia oil company Petrodar and

$ 15 per barrel of oil shipped from Port Sudan accused Chinese oil companies of helping Sudan

(United to End Genocide, 2012United to End Genocide (2012). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). seize South Sudan’s oil, which was exporting oil

However, the September 2012 agreement through a Petrodar pipeline.

was not immediately implemented, because Su- SPLA also abducted twenty-nine Chinese

dan wanted to see a significant improvement in citizens working in Sinohydro for the construc-

the security situation of the borders. Ultimately, tion of a highway. The decision of shutting down this dilemma was addressed and oil production oil production had led to a large deficit in oil-dein South Sudan resumed in April 2013. In Seppendent economy revenue and GDP in Sudan tember 2013, South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir and the government’s sudden loss of more than visited Sudan for a summit to resolve disputes 90 per-cent of oil revenues. The decision also reand promote cooperation. The summit led to sulted in a series of interconnected crises experisignificant improvement in relations between

the two countries. However, Sudan and South enced in the economy and in financial, security,

Sudan’s security landscape has transformed political and humanitarian areas in South Su-

from inter-State conflicts to intra-State conflict. dan. In March 2015, Juba requested a reduction

Sudan has experienced uprisings as a result of of the financial outcome of oil transit due to the

deteriorating economic conditions, and a civil decline in world crude prices below $ 30 a barrel,

war in South Sudan also erupted in 2013. but Sudan refused this request, which was also

China attaches great attention to the region’s suffering an economic crisis. In December 2016,

stability and peace due to its overseas interests the oil ministers of Sudan and South Sudan

held talks in Khartoum upon the revision of the (African Development Bank Group, 2013African Development Bank Group (2013). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Chi-

southern oil transit fees (Sudan Tribune, 2016Sudan Tribune (2016). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). nese companies and workers have been robbed,

South Sudan’s production fell from 350,000 kidnapped, and faced with minor crimes and

barrels per day (BPD) after independence to property threats. Chinese officials discussed

150,000 BPD due to the eruption of the country’s whether the withdrawal in favor of its nation-

civil war in December 2013 between President al interests or the losses will harm its interests

Salva Kiir and rebels led by his former deputy abroad. The Chinese leadership has recognized

Riek Machar. Sudan and South Sudan signed a that the Libyan experience and the decision of

number of agreements, including an oil agree- abandoning oil fields and other investments

ment in 2012 in the Ethiopian capital Addis were a big mistake.

Ababa, sponsored by high-level African mediation. In September 2017, Khartoum signed an China’s resources are economic agreement with South Sudan to reactivate the influence, humanitarian aid,

stalled oil fields in the south, where both parties and peacekeeping. Beijing has

agreed that Khartoum would provide technical benefited from its political and

assistance and electricity supply to oil fields in economic influence in South Sudan

the south (Sudan Tribune, 2018bSudan Tribune (2018a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). In August and succeeded in bringing the

2019, South Sudan’s oil minister revealed that government and the rebel group to

his country increased oil production by 6000 the table.

barrels, bringing the total production to more

than 180 thousand barrels per day, pointing out South Sudan’s economy is heavily depend-

that the increase was achieved after the country ent on oil revenues. In turn, the China National

resumed oil production in blocks 1 and 2 in the Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), one of the larg-

manga field, which was closed six years ago due est oil companies in the world, controls around

to insecurity in the northern parts of the country 40% of the two main oil consortia in the country

(Sudan Tribune, 2019Sudan Tribune (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). (Kuo, 2017Kuo (2017). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

Therefore, China used its economic influence

5. China’s Creative Mediation in South as a coercion resource for its creative mediation

Sudan’s Civil War (2013-2019Sudan Tribune (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) diplomacy in order to pressure the Government

China saw itself as a newcomer in the South Su- of South Sudan to protect oil fields and cease hos-

danese conflict resolution. Its investment and tilities and implement a ceasefire. Chinese par-

protection of its nationals became a part of Chi- ticipation can also be considered as a responsible

na’s response to the conflict from mid-December initiative to safeguard the future of South Sudan’s

2013. Bilateral trade between China and South economy and security in cooperation with in-

Sudan reached $ 534 million in 2012; more than ternational and regional organizations. China’s

140 Chinese companies registered in South Su- resources are economic influence, humanitarian

dan, including energy, engineering, telecommu- aid, and peacekeeping. Beijing has benefited from

nications and infrastructure (Xinhua, October 8, its political and economic influence in South Su-

2013), as well as more than 23,000 Chinese res- dan and been successful in bringing the govern-

idents was in South Sudan before the civil war ment and the rebel group to the table.

Following the outbreak of the South Sudan Beijing has asserted its commitments to

civil war, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, protecting oil infrastructures and integrating its

during his visit to Saudi Arabia, in December economic interests with Sudan and South Su-

2013, underlined that China would make ef- dan. China called the regional organizations to

forts to sustain peace and security negotiations discuss conflict resolution. A case in point is the

between the South Sudan government and rebel UN and AU Peace and Security Council com-

groups (Wang, 2013Wang (2013). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). In January 2014, Wang Yi muniqué in May 2011, which stopped the at-

met with representatives of the two conflicting tempts of external actors to interfere in the con-

parties of South Sudan in Ethiopia, asserted the flict between Sudan and South Sudan in Abyei.

importance of South Sudan’s stability and devel- Since the outbreak of the civil war, Beijing

oping economy, and called the Government of has provided military support to the Govern-

South Sudan and the rebel group to immediate- ment of South Sudan to defer the rebel group

ly cease fire and activate peace talks to end the and secure oil facilities. According to the Min-

wave of conflicts (Wang, 2014Wang (2014). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). In August 2014, istry of Finance and Economic Planning, the

China put forward a four-point solution to end GRSS has received Chinese arms supplies, worth

the civil war and subsequently supported the en- some $46.8 million from China North Industries

gagement of the IGAD. In January 2015, Beijing Group (NORINCO). The rebel group has de-

held a meeting in Khartoum, which included stroyed some of the oil installations and threat-

South Sudan’s warring parties, Ethiopia, Sudan ened to attack and destroy other facilities. China

and IGAD, which was an attempt to solve the has sought to protect oil facilities in the troubled

differences between Sudan- South Sudan rela- Greater Nile region through negotiations with

tions as a result of Sudan’s support of South Su- the rebels and the government and provided fi-

dan’s rebels. nancial support to secure the oil infrastructure.

Military support has provoked much controversy and doubts about China’s mediation in South Sudan’s conflict resolution. In September 2014, the reported statement of the Chinese embassy in Juba stated that Beijing would stop the remainder of its arms deal and the Chinese Foreign Ministry has also announced that Beijing would dispatch a full infantry battalion to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (Zhao, 2014Zhao (2014). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Ambassador Zhong Jianhua arrived in Kenya to attend a special IGAD session on South Sudan on December 27, 2013, and also visited South Sudan and Ethiopia afterwards and asserted that China seeks to Leader of the female peacekeeper unit of Chinese peacekeeping infantry batallion to South Sudan; Yu maintain peace talks and request the continued

Peijie sings songs with local children in Juba, South production of oil facilities and the protection of

Sudan, on April 30, 2018. (Xinhua) Chinese nationals and investments in turbulent

areas. In July 2018, South Sudan’s president has 2018b). In January 2019, The WFP welcomed a

signed a peace agreement with rebels during the $7 million contribution from Beijing to support

IGAD summit (United Nations, 2019United Nations (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). China and maintain food assistance in South Sudan. In

has urged parties to fast-track its implemen- April 2019, the two sides signed two infrastruc-

tation and end the conflict in the region. The ture development agreements, which included a

Chinese Embassy in South Sudan said: “Beijing grant to the South to rehabilitate the Gore River

supports efforts to restore peace and stability in Bridge and build a 1.48-kilometer road linking

South Sudan and sincerely hopes that relevant the bridge to Wau (Al Ain, 2019Al Ain (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). China has also

parties in South Sudan will be able to leave their provided a grant to develop and modernize Juba

personal problems and focus on the interests of Training Hospital, the country’s largest public

the people, establish peace, abide by and speed health facility. As a result of these investments,

up the implementation of the peace agreement Juba has announced to triple the amount of oil

and achieve lasting peace in the region.” (China to the Export-Import Bank of China to support

Daily, 2019). Since the outbreak of civil war in road construction projects linking the capital

Juba, China has provided at least $49 million of and other cities.

humanitarian assistance, with $10 million to the China has also played a prominent role in

World Food Programme (WFP), other food and peacekeeping operations in South Sudan. For

medical assistance aid (FOCAC, 2018aFOCAC (2018a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). example, in December 2015, China has sent 700

From the perspective of human rights, Chi- troops to the UNPKOs in South Sudan, the first

na has made visible and effective contributions. battalion to a peacekeeping operation. It has also

For example, Beijing has built a Juba Train- deployed 350 peacekeepers in South Sudan- in-

ing Hospital and an outpatient and emergency cluding medical staff, engineering units, and

center. In February 2017, the two sides have liaison officers, which provided medical assis-

signed an agreement to develop the Juba Hos- tance to both local refugees and peacekeepers,

pital and renovate the Care Mayardit Women’s besides the provision of logistics support to in-

Hospital in the South Sudanese city of Rumbek. ternational humanitarian organizations.

This agreement is part of a $ 33 million medical

assistance, which was pledged by the Chinese Conclusion

government to improve South Sudan’s health This paper introduced the new concept of “cresector. In 2017, China has donated 100 million ative mediation diplomacy”, which reveals Chi- RMB worth the food for emergency humanitarina’s involvement in the conflict resolutions of an aid to South Sudan and contributed 5 million Sudan and South Sudan. This mediation is based

USD to WFP for a quick response of emergency on diplomatic resources (economic influence,

to South Sudan. China’s role in the United Nations, development

In September 2018, At the meeting with and military aid, and multi-cooperation efforts)

President Salva Kiir on the sideline of the FO- to address the conflict and bring the conflict-

CAC Beijing Summit, President Xi Jinping an- ing parties to the negotiating table and reach a

nounced that the Chinese Government would peaceful solution. This is geared to protect Chi-

provide South Sudan with emergency human- na’s interests in the region and adheres to the ba-

itarian aid worth 100 million RMB (FOCAC, sic principles of non-interference policy.

H e n d E l M ah l y Ma hhoud S ulta n - D ega nd S un, C hina ’s Pa r tic ip a tio n in the C onflic t R es olution

This mediation has gone through gradual changes taking place in the African continent,

steps, or the so-called meditation tools, which the international community, and the policies

are also determined by the degree and type of of other external security actors in the region,

China’s interests in the region. China’s media- along with China’s growing interests in Africa.

tion combines pragmatic mediation or private As a new comer in the Horn of Africa, China’s

mediation that focuses on protecting its huge creative mediation is experimental, and it will be

investment and Chinese citizens, with general increasingly implemented in a cautious manner.

mediation that includes resolving the dispute

to maintain the two countries’ economies and References

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