An Unconventional Reading of China’s Foreign Economic Policy: A Phase of Fluidity and Transformation

Introduction 2011) offered new thinking on IR, foreign policy,

warfare, and strategy. Moreover, the communitarian

CONTEMPORARY IR THEORY, DOMINATED teachings of Confucius and Mencius are often

by Western schools of thought (Muppidi, 2012Muppidi (2012). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.), referenced in the construction of Asian values and

clouds the lens of analysis when Chinese foreign provide an alternative to European and Anglo-

economic policy, including the BRI, is the focus American liberal individualist values. Arrighi

of attention. China’s construction of a worldview, (2007: 329) argues that strong central supervision

which integrates indigenous philosophy and by Chinese political power never rejected “the

culture, has its roots in the late 19th and early 20th Confucian ideal of social harmony in favour of a

centuries, when China assimilated intellectual view of unfettered struggle in the marketplace.”

ideas from Japan and elsewhere to modify its Thus, the notion of a distinctively East Asian

system of governance while maintaining territorial international order is often premised on deep

sovereignty and limiting colonial encroachment Confucian political, social, and cultural affinities,

(Deng, 1998Deng (1998). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.; Noesselt, 2015Noesselt (2015). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). The ideas of non- which are at odds with the liberal prescription of

alignment and non-exclusionary regionalism democratic peace (Acharya & Buzan, 2010Acharya & Buzan (2010). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). In this

developed by Nehru and fellow Asian and African view, liberal intervention in East Asia, such as in

leaders in the 1950s differed substantially from the Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, can be seen as

military blocs of the classic European balance of an attempt to split the region from its historic links

power model (Grabowski, 2019Grabowski (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). to China for Washington to impose its evangelical

Mao Zedong’s Three Worlds Theory (Wang, vision of political and cultural authority.

A key contribution, therefore, is to illustrate Daoism and Confucianism, often viewed through

how China’s indigenous Marxist IR theory has the prism of hierarchy, value non-interference.

provided new perspectives on the theory and This means the Chinese cultural understanding of

practice of global governance. Leading Chinese win-win cooperation views success and prosperity

IR scholars, such as Wang (2021), Yan (2021) and as a mutually entailing process in which China’s

Yang (2021Yang (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.), are informed by Chinese history, national interest is viewed as mutual interest (Ames,

philosophy, and culture, and provide improved 2007; Dellios, 2017). Thus, Xi’s plan for National

analytical frameworks and better theoretical tools to Rejuvenation is built on a vision of “a community

understand the relationship between China’s foreign of common destiny” and avoidance of regional or

policy and the deployment of the BRI (Smith, global hegemony (Dellios, 2017: 231).

2017). One example is Zhao Tingyang (2006), who In light of these general findings, the remainder

wrote that China’s problems cannot be explained by of the article summarises and reflects on the key

European and Anglo-American theories because internal and external developmental determinants,

they generate tropes and motifs of China, such as innovations, deployments and implications of

the China threat, debt trap diplomacy, and the rise China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

of China theses. For Zhao (Do, 2015: 23), realist and

liberal theorising, which ignores traditional Chinese A New Substructure for Global

thought and its unique system of worldview, values, Economic Development

and methodology, “can explain conflicts, but only

Chinese thought can fully explain harmony.” In A thorough appreciation of the BRI’s significance

this holistic view, Confucian thought provides the requires recognition that the initiative forms

impetus for creating a harmonious world order of part of a larger and longer-running mission of

inclusivity that minimises inequality and promotes National Rejuvenation. The BRI is fundamental to

collective responsibility. China’s pursuit of the Two Centenary Goals, the

While Chinese scholars have sought to develop a constitutional addition of Ecological Civilisation

new theory of a harmonious international political and the reframing of economic advancement within

system, Xi Jinping’s vision for National Rejuvenation the Dual Circulation paradigm. China’s pursuit

has been the most visible attempt to put such ideas into of National Rejuvenation was also affected by its

practice. Xi’s vision of a pluralistic and harmonious relations with other regional and global powers.

community of shared values “preclude[s] the idea of For instance, between 2017 and 2021, China’s

one civilisation imposing itself on another” (Dellios, implementation of the BRI project was significantly

2017:227). The BRI’s win-win concepts of trust impacted by the escalating Sino-American “strategic

building and mutuality are deeply rooted in China’s competition” (Lippman et al., 2021: 1) and the

philosophical past. Confucianism and yin-yang emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic.

both view “harmony as including opposition as a This article offers a corrective view of the BRI,

productive force” (Wang, 2018: 6), which supersedes rooted in Marxist historical analysis and Gramscian

the Hegelian-Marxist dialectics of struggle; thus, approaches to hegemony. It finds that China is a

each side requires the other to maintain the culturally distinct yet natural nation-state with a

system. Moreover, the distinctive teachings of both legitimate claim to seek advancement within its

national interest (Deng, 1974Deng (1974). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). This explains China’s 2021). Thus, analysis has reached quite different

consistent approach to strengthening its offensive/ conclusions than the consensus from most Western

defensive arrangements in its near periphery, politicians, scholars, and media outlets, whose

protecting its merchant fleet from piracy (Erickson narratives about the BRI tend to obscure facts

& Strange, 2012), and a minimal need for overseas pertaining to its deployment and purported benefits

military installations (Brewster, 2018; Liu & Yin, as well as its challenges. In particular, this article

2018). China has leveraged a web of bilateral, argues that realist assessments of the BRI, which

trilateral, and multilateral networks and forums to focus on wealth and power, ignore the contextual

gain diplomatic traction. China’s so-called ‘wolf- importance of Chinese philosophical influence on

warrior’ diplomacy (Zhu, 2020Zhu (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) is often referenced the conceptualisation of the BRI and how internal

to highlight China’s robust counter to legacy liberal and external forces are balanced to create harmonious

state accusations and allegations of human rights relationships, whether economic, political, or

abuses, military/naval assertiveness and political social. Western political elites often ignore or fail

influence. However, the 2021 Canadian attempt to to grasp the theory and practice of socialism with

garner votes in the UN about China’s alleged human Chinese characteristics. To do so requires a fuller

rights and forced labour practices in Xinjiang understanding of the complex amalgamation of

revealed China’s growing multilateral and diplomatic cultural, social, ecological, political, and economic

influence. Canada’s ambassador to the UN circulated organisational concepts included in Confucianism,

a document that garnered the support of over 40 Daoism, Buddhism, and Marxism, such as ‘yin-yang’

countries. However, not one was a Muslim state, (Wang & Zou, 2011Wang & Zou (2011). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) or ‘the principal contradiction’

and China countered with a document supported by (Xinhua, 2017Xinhua (2017). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

over 60 countries, which included almost all Muslim Similarly, Beijing’s deployment of the BRI is

states, many of which are BRI partners (Liu, 2021Liu (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). grounded in Chinese notions of reciprocity outlined

in Xi Jinping’s formula for “a new type of international

Beijing’s deployment of the BRI relations featuring win-win cooperation” (Xi, 2017:

3). As such, external reciprocities require renewal is grounded in Chinese notions or reform of the international system, including

of reciprocity outlined in Xi respect of political sovereignty and avoidance of

Jinping’s formula for “a new type external conflict. Internally, continuing reform

of international relations featuring based on Marxist notions of a ‘better state of being’

win-win cooperation”. (Yilmaz, 2016Yilmaz (2016). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.; Eskelinen et al., 2020Eskelinen et al. (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) underpins the

identification of ‘the principal contradiction’, which

Marxist analysis of the BRI’s origins and in post-Mao China, is state-led responses to improve

operations reveals that the BRI material substructure the material well-being of citizens (Xinhua, 2017Xinhua (2017). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

is pan-continental, primarily centred on developing These internal and external yin-yang equilibria

countries, and harnesses global trade and investment have evolved into the theoretical model of a Dual

as a key means to check and reverse emerging Circulation, which encompasses a better state of

trade protectionism and regional economic blocs being as universal and embeds the notion into

(Dakila, 2020; Global Times, 2020; Amendolagine, constructing the BRI.

By December 2022, 48 countries had signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with China to cooperate under the BRI framework. (Fudan University, 2023Fudan University (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)

What are the key internal and external development model offers a clear alternative to the

developmental determinants, innovations, colonial period, endless wars, financial bubbles,

deployments and implications of China’s Belt and perceived economic, technological and vaccine

and Road Initiative? The research supports the apartheid of the so-called rules-based order.

argument that the BRI constitutes a new global

material infrastructural substructure. Moreover, The Extension of China’s Economic And

the BRI has accelerated an emerging multipolar Political Influence

order and, more specifically, a China-EU-US

“tripolarity” of trade and investment (Dent, The BRI and its structural siblings, namely Dual

2004: 214). This does not, however, equate to a Circulation, Ecological Civilisation and Digital

new tributary system, which relied on ritualised Transformation, are often framed as geostrategic

interaction with the middle kingdom, as some and geoeconomic challenges to the rules-based

observers assert (Doğan, 2021; Freymann et al., order that has governed international relations

2021). Rather, Xi’s ‘community of shared future since the Industrial Revolution (Liu, 2019Liu (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

for mankind’ equates to a new approach to However, Washington, and to a lesser extent, its

multilateralism, non-interference, and consensus- allies, seem unwilling or incapable of adapting

building. For the 84% of the world’s population to the new paradigms for development and

that lives in the global south, China’s economic governance, which emanated from Western

philosophical thought and its later assimilation US patents, components, and software. During the

and adaption to primarily Asian influences. Thus, COVID-19 pandemic, demand for semiconductor

the US-led alliance network has turned away from chips, a key component of all electronics, was

liberal and later neo-liberal economic competition impacted by major supply disruptions. The

manifested in globalisation and global governance. resulting shortages, however, were largely a direct

Rather, the rules-based order increasingly relies result of the Trump administration’s 2018 trade

on economic sanctions (Coates, 2020Coates (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) and, and tech war with China (Brown, 2021Brown (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

more recently, knowledge exclusivity, including In 2018, Xi Jinping told a joint meeting of the

limits on Chinese students’ access to advanced Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Academy

scientific studies in US universities (Chen, 2021; of Engineering that independent technological

Hollingsworth et al., 2021) and technology and and institutional innovation was the only path to

export bans (Soliman et al., 2020Soliman et al. (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.; Ye, 2021Ye (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). reach the “commanding heights” (Qiushi, 2018:

This article argues that US sanctions and export 3) in scientific and technological competition.

restrictions, exercised to constrain economic Furthermore, to ensure that “key and core

development in recalcitrant nations and arrest the technologies are self-developed and controllable

decline of US technological advantage (Darby & (…) the initiatives of innovation and development

Sewall, 2021), may constitute what former Iranian must be securely kept in our own hands” (Qiushi,

President Rouhani (2005) labelled “technological 2018: 3). Additionally, prime resources should

apartheid.” be focused, and strategic planning made to deal

with “key areas and stranglehold problems” (Qiushi, 2018: 3). Henceforth, China’s indigenous

The BRI’s focus on economic semiconductor production and industrial

development has increasingly digitalisation was upgraded to a national core

turned toward adopting and goal and Chinese technology industries began

concerted efforts to remove US software/hardware evolving “digital industrialisation components and licenses by 2025. In other

and industrial digitalisation”. words, a key consequence of US securitisation

and sanctions over semiconductor supply chains,

The BRI’s focus on economic development 5G and other technologies was accelerating

has increasingly turned toward adopting and China’s digitalisation processes (Li, 2021Li (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). As

evolving “digital industrialisation and industrial such, the BRI has become a digital substructure

digitalisation” (Xi, 2021c: 2Xi (2021a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.), constituting the for telecommunications (5G), computing, AI

core of an emerging Sino-digitalisation of global and big data, logistics, biotech, and fintech. This

industry and telecommunications. As such, BRI digital road supports the lucrative and expanding

partner countries increasingly benefit from the superstructures of e-commerce, social media,

cost advantages of China’s capacity for innovation payment platforms, entertainment and share-

at speed and scale – the smartphone and computer economy applications adopted by commercial and

markets in Africa, India, ASEAN, and China are all consumer markets in Asia, Africa, and increasingly

currently dominated by Chinese producers using the US and Europe.

The 19th Meeting of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the 14th Meeting of the Chinese Academy of Engineering were inaugurated on May 28, 2018 at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, the capital of China. (Xinhua, 2018Xinhua (2018). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)

China is creating new digital standards, due cannot be matched by the core liberal

in part to cultural, social and language states. Additionally, the long list of US-led

particularities but in larger part as a response political, diplomatic, economic, and military

to the US-instigated trade-tech war and a operations that target China’s periphery and

renewed push for self-reliance. China is BRI extensions are seen in Beijing as having

also accelerating knowledge dissemination varying degrees of short-term effectiveness,

to its BRI partner countries via advanced but over the longer term, only hasten declining

telecommunications that have moved beyond US global power projection. Pertinent evidence

simply globalising trade and knowledge. As in this regard includes the ineffectiveness of

such, global challenges are recognised in all American sanctions against China for alleged

corners of the world as the primary danger to systemic repression in Xinjiang and the US

humanity’s very existence: withdrawal from Afghanistan, a return to

With the future of the Planet being the key the JCPOA and China’s 25-year development

to the destiny of humanity, the ‘Planetisation’ agreement with Iran, US warmongering over

of our policies may be the new form of Taiwan and acquiescence to the One China

globalisation, a more humane approach to Principle, overestimating EU support for US

globalisation (Raffarin, 2021: 7). leadership and underestimating EU strategic

China’s capacity to conceptualise, organise, autonomy. The significant contradictions

and deploy large-scale and long-term between core liberal state anti-China political

initiatives, both internally and externally, rhetoric and China’s patent centrality in global

trade networks can be seen as evidence of geoeconomics” in the practice of international

China’s continental rescaling of the global relations (Dent, 2004: 214; Beeson, 2018Beeson (2018). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). The

political, economic, and security architecture practice of neo-liberalism and interventionism

toward multilateralism, multipolarity, by the US, under both Republican and

and planetisation. In other words, despite Democratic administrations, set the US on a

concerted asymmetric and hybrid assaults by course of domestic political polarisation and

the fractious US-led coalition of core liberal obscurantism vis-à-vis internal governance

states, the BRI’s public roads (Xi, 2021aXi (2021a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) and and factual evidence about the rise of China.

provision of global public goods constitute a In The Discourses, Machiavelli (1975) posits

secure and stable material substructure for that freedom produces prosperity greater

long-term global economic development that than tyranny or corrupt republics. In The

supports an emerging continental alignment Leviathan, Hobbes (2018) discusses the notion

of trade blocs. These trade blocs include the that freedom is the power to act without

EU, CEEC, RCEP, USMCA, CPTPP, EEU, AU, interference, where the absence of interference

GCC, and Mercosur, in which China remains by external actors is what confirms the presence

the single largest member or external partner. of freedom. These proto-realist arguments

In this view, China exerts increasing influence support China’s statements and claims of the

in the “three prosperous ‘triad’ regions (North importance of non-conflict, non-interference

America, East Asia, and Europe) [which] and non-aggression as pillars of its foreign

dominate the world economic system” (Dent, policy (Yang, 2021Yang (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

2004: 214). China is not alone in its vision of a multipolar

order less constrained by an exploitative USled liberal order. While liberal values retain a

China is not alone in its vision degree of attractiveness globally, partial, but not

of a multipolar order less complete, rejection of the US-led liberal order is

growing as an increasing number of governments constrained by an exploitative seek systems that are not “Western, not liberal, not

US-led liberal order. liberal democracies, maybe not even democracies

[…] because they have proved more successful in

Beijing’s deployment of the BRI has largely responding to global economic turmoil” (Boyle,

benefited from the US pursuit of foreign 2016: 35). Orbán’s statement referred to the

and trade policies designed to constrain imposition of liberal values and legal restrictions

and contain China’s national rejuvenation. had made it increasingly difficult for countries

While China made relative economic gains such as Hungary and Poland to engage in a new

as the US prosecuted its War on Terror, the type of economic nationalism that could protect

advancement of national rejuvenation benefited their interests in the global economy. There

proportionally more from its accession to the is much debate over the causes of the rise of

WTO in 2001. These analogous paths reflect illiberalism (Zakaria, 1997; Kalb, 2018; Posen,

the “relative global shift from geopolitics to 2018; Hendrikse, 2021).

The "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", first formulated by the then-Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and later adopted by the Non-Aligned Movement, express the aspirations of today's world. Zhou Enlai (middle) and Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Ali (right) and his wife (left) during the Bandung Conference. (Xinhua, 1955Xinhua (1955). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)

However, the negative consequences COVID-19 pandemic rapidly spread.

of neo-liberalism, the post-2001 US-led The greatest failure, however, lay with

War on Terror, the US-induced Global the United States, which catastrophically

Financial Crises, and China’s economic failed to manage its own epidemic, much

success were contributing factors. The mass less lead others in managing theirs. Against

movement of refugees from conflict zones, this background, any hope of a return to

rising government debt, increasing trade the previous liberal order premised on US

competition with China, and neo-liberal power is now extinguished (Boyle, 2020:

reductions in the provision of public goods 51).

and services exacerbated social tensions. China looms large in US Realist analysis

In Greece, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria of the declining influence of the liberal order

and Germany, neo-Nazi parties gained and US capacity to maintain proportional

momentum, and right-wing populism saw control of global supply chains (Ikenberry

modest election success in France and the et al., 2022). The US-led geoeconomic

UK (Boyle, 2016Boyle (2016). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). The 2016 election of pressure and primarily maritime security

Donald Trump signalled that illiberalism deployments have contributed to the

had also festered in the US and would diversification of China’s global trading

become alarmingly apparent as the global network. Moreover, the net effect of the

US-instigated and continuing trade- public advantages and the ability of citizens

tech war, which restricts knowledge and to acquire goods for enjoyment resulting

technology transfer, constitutes a new form from rising material wealth (Xinhua, 2021bXinhua (2021b). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

of knowledge apartheid and has further This freedom is closely associated with

motivated China’s efforts to construct Marxist notions of equitable distribution

advanced technology supply chains free of of economic development and expressed

US-controlled intellectual property rights. within the vocabulary of socialism with

Chinese characteristics. Likewise, the concept of a community of shared future for mankind includes the moral universalism The concept of a community of Confucian and Daoist thought about of shared future for mankind societal and natural harmony (Zhao, 2006;

includes the moral universalism Wang & Zou, 2011). Understood in this

of Confucian and Daoist thought way, freedom is promoted as a pillar of

about societal and natural the BRI economic development model

harmony. in several ways. First, the BRI is an open

inclusive model that does not insist on

For Chinese leaders, Donald Trump’s geopolitical or ideological alignment.

blaming of China for the pandemic (Pan, Second, the BRI economic development

2021: 42) and the core liberal states’ record model has a high degree of flexibility,

of COVID-19 cases and deaths is another ensuring adaption to both the legacy and

example of a failure of Western leadership – a new infrastructure development initiatives

“Westfailure.” For Pan (2021: 40), Westfailure of partner countries. Third, China relies on

demonstrates “the racialised politics of an extensive network of consensus-building

security and insecurity in Western security consultative frameworks and forums.

thinking and practice [and] undermined Fourth, China promises and practises both

the self-image of Western security and non-interference and non-intervention.

superiority vis-à-vis the rest of the world.” As such, the BRI economic development

As such, the legacy liberal state policy model requires continuing optimisation of

response to vaccine research, production, its governance, finance and sustainability,

and distribution constituted a form of particularly in face of legacy liberal state

vaccine apartheid. Beijing’s pandemic criticisms (CFR, 2021CFR (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) and attempts to

response displayed a moral approach to mount counter initiatives such as the “B3W”

global challenges upheld in China’s vision (Build Back Better World) (G7, 2021: 24).

for the BRI and its governance. More recent US-led counter initiatives,

In contrast to the increasing “neuralgia such as the Quadrilateral (Mahbubani,

and anxiety” in the US (Wang, 2021: 4), 2021) and AUKUS arrangements (Strangio,

China’s economic vigour can, in large part, 2021), display a hybrid model of both hard

be attributed to the pursuit of private and (military) and soft (economic) components.

Implications allows China to increasingly diversify resource

acquisition, especially in Africa and Central

The adoption of the Gramscian perspective Asia, and consequently exercise greater

on hegemonic and counter-hegemonic great proportional control of commodity pricing

power competition (Gramsci, 1971; Yilmaz, as trading volumes in Shanghai, Hong Kong,

2014) reveals that since at least the Obama era and Shenzhen (Petry, 2020Petry (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.; Yang et al., 2020Yang et al. (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

‘pivot to Asia’ (FPI, 2014FPI (2014). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.), the democratisation Ongoing construction on all BRI corridors

of global economic development has become has consolidated and extended the transport

subject to ideological narratives of (US) network, including surrounding industrial

liberal democracy versus (Chinese) illiberal parks, FTZs, and SEZs. The launch of the

authoritarianism (Biden, 2021: 9). Moreover, BRI corridor into the Bay of Bengal through

the pernicious, and largely unsubstantiated Myanmar was delayed due to the military’s

human rights allegations, and consequent rejection of the 2020 election results (Chan,

sanctioning, emanating from Washington 2021). Nevertheless, the first cargo shipment

obscures evidence of both regional and from Singapore via Yangon Port arrived in

global economic vitalisation achieved via the China’s southwestern city of Chengdu in

BRI material substructure of connectivities. August 2021 (CGTN, 2021CGTN (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

Primarily motivated to constrain China’s Significant negative narratives, primarily

development and stability, the US seeks to from Washington, about China’s pursuit of its

form a democratic club of former imperial national goals are supported with little or no

and legacy colonial states to prolong American factual evidence. Rather, Xi’s characterisation

hegemony and bolster its declining influence of the BRI as a “public road” connecting over

in the global multilateral hierarchy, of which it 170 countries and organisations that includes

was the major architect (Wren, 2020Wren (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). third-party cooperation (Xi, 2021a: 8Xi (2021a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) holds

There is contention surrounding whether true. Furthermore, the BRI’s official alignment

the BRI was part of China’s grand strategy to with the UN 2030 SDGs and continuing reform

extend its political, economic, and possibly of sustainability and governance policies, often

military influence to undermine the so- following constructive criticism emanating

called liberal rules-based order centred on from bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral

US economic predominance and military forums, demonstrates a high degree of

preponderance. However, Xi Jinping has institutional adaptability. China increasingly

consolidated the CPC policy direction, emphasised that the BRI was fundamental

consistent with the reformist faction to both the internal Central and Western

originating with Deng Xiaoping, and peace Development Plan (China Daily, 2021China Daily (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) and the

and development continue to characterise the Northeast Revitalisation Plan (CSET, 2021: 80;

new era. China’s economic influence continues Xinhua, 2021). In response to the challenging

to accumulate as a result of its increasing global environment, China has repositioned

trade volumes along the BRI southern sea and its economy toward Dual circulation.

western land extensions. Significantly, the BRI This entailed directing the BRI’s further

deployment toward non-state investment in global economic development framework. This

construction, manufacturing, logistics, and has been confirmed by the recent “recoupling”

services that offer extensive synchronicity policy of the Biden administration (Moriyasu,

between China’s internal strategic assets and 2021; Tiezzi, 2021: 5) and reaffirmation of the

external resources, markets, and consumers “Taiwan Agreement ” (Reuters, 2021a: 1). As

globally. Moreover, the success of the AIIB and such, the US accession to China’s terms on

its cooperative framework points the way for trade, most notably in expanding trade deficits,

future collaborative refocusing of multilateral and security concerns (One China Policy)

financial institutions. A pertinent example confirms the view that the BRI’s role as the

is that India, which, despite its continuing new material substructure for global trade and

reticence to participate in either the BRI or investment has strengthened Beijing’s hand

RCEP, remains the largest single recipient when dealing with Washington.

of AIIB loans, including significant loans for The strengthening of Sino-Russian

health and COVID-19 response (Krishnan, cooperation following the 2007-2008 GFC

2020; PTI, 2020). and the imposition of US and EU sanctions

on Russia following its 2014 annexation of Crimea is of great importance. Russia’s long border with China and geographical extent, Russia’s strategic partnership stretching from the Pacific to the Baltic, with China is especially relevant ensures its indispensable partnership role in

when considering China’s efforts the deployment of the BRI. Russia’s increasing

to revitalise connectivity choke provision of energy commodities via the BRI was

points such as Iran, Syria, and exemplified recently during power outages in

Venezuela. China’s industrial northeast (Qi, 2021; Reuters,

2021b). Russia’s strategic partnership with

China has recognised that to confront China is especially relevant when considering

conflict, global pandemics, pollution, terrorism, China’s efforts to revitalise connectivity choke

corruption and climate change, a tripartite points such as Iran, Syria, and Venezuela.

cooperation and coordination mechanism can In particular, the Sino-Russian strategic

be realised with the EU and US. Furthermore, partnership is significant for the Korean

the UN and G20 would be included in such an peninsula and Northeast Asian economic

initiative. Thus, the initial extreme competition integration. Post-conflict Afghanistan presents

posture of the Biden administration (Japan a new set of challenges against a background of

Times, 2021) was perceived in Beijing as a multilateral cooperation on managing strategic

geostrategic window of opportunity in which space as multipolarity amplifies. Beijing’s

the shift in global wealth and power, accelerated efforts to counter legacy liberal state assaults

by the COVID-19 pandemic, allowed time for include key BRI nodes such as Xinjiang, Hong

China to transition its economy and industrial- Kong, Myanmar, Cambodia, the Horn of

manufacturing base towards a vision of a new Africa, Greece, and Hungary.

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