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Perspective Piece

A ‘New Era’ in the New Middle East: China, Russia and the Reinvention of the South

Abstract

Who would have expected that the BRICS nations could rise and become the potential rival of the G7 countries, the World Bank and the IMF combined? That once seemingly distant possibility now has real prospects which could change the equilibrium of world politics. The more successful BRICS becomes, the weaker Western hegemony over the South will be. Although some Western politicians and media insist on downplaying the group’s role in shaping the new world order, the change seems real and irreversible. Even before the Ukraine war commenced in February 2022, much evidence pointed to the fact that Russia and China’s goal was hardly temporary or impulsive. The very language of multipolarity has defined both countries’ discourse for years, a discourse that was mostly inspired by the two countries’ displeasure with US militarism from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, their frustration with Washington’s bullying tactics whenever a disagreement arises, be it in trade or border demarcations, the punitive language, the constant threats, the military expansion of NATO and much more. While it is too early to determine, with any degree of certainty, the winners and losers of this new configuration, it is almost certain that a US-westerndominated world is no longer possible.

Full Text

Introduction The New Economic Model

The world is changing. it has been Who would have expected that the BRICS

undergoing a seismic change that long preceded nations could rise and become the potential

the Russian-Ukraine war and the recent US- rival of the G7 countries, the World Bank

Chinese tensions in the Strait of Taiwan. and the IMF combined? That once seemingly

What has taken place since the start of distant possibility now has real prospects

the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, which could change the equilibrium of world

and the provocative visit by then-US House politics.

Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taipei in August of BRICS - an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India,

the same year (Huang, 2022Huang (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.), is an acceleration China and South Africa - was supposedly

of existing global shifts that ranged from coined (Goldman Sachs, n.d.Goldman Sachs (n.d.). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) by the Chief

the emergence of new economic alliances, Economist of Goldman Sachs in 2001 as a

geopolitical formations, turf wars and, of reference to the world’s emerging economies.

course, competing political discourses. These It was then known as BRIC; the “S” came later

changes are fully displayed in the Middle East, when South Africa formally joined the group

Africa, and, indeed, much of the Global South. in 2010.

The group’s first official summit was held in The IMF and World Bank are notorious for

2009. Back then, the discussion seemed largely basing their financial support of countries,

abstract. It wasn’t until 2014 that BRICS began especially in the Global South, on political

taking serious steps towards greater integration conditions. This is often justified under the guise of

when the nascent alliance, now including human rights and democracy, although it is related

South Africa, launched the New Development entirely to privatization and opening markets for

Bank with seed money of $50 billion (NDP, foreign investors, usually Western corporations.

2023). This decision meant that the group was As BRICS strengthens, it will have the potential

now ready to take its first practical steps in to help poorer countries without pushing a self-

challenging the dominance of the West over serving political agenda or indirectly manipulating

international monetary institutions, namely and controlling local economies.

the World Bank and the IMF. With inflation hitting many Western countries,

resulting in slower economic growth and causing social unrest, nations in the Global South are

For decades, the US’s greatest taking the opportunity to develop their economic

weapon has been the dollar which, alternative. This means that groups like BRICS

with time, stopped being a normal will cease being exclusively economic institutions.

currency per se and became a The struggle is now very political.

commodity. Rivaling the Dollar The global geopolitical conflict resulting

from the Russia-Ukraine war has driven For decades, the US’s greatest weapon has been

the massive expansion underway at BRICS, the dollar which, with time, stopped being a nor-

especially as financially powerful countries mal currency per se and became a commodity.

have shown interest in the initiative. They Wars have been fought to ensure that countries

include Argentina, the UAE, Mexico, Algeria like Iraq and Libya remain committed to the dol-

and, particularly, Saudi Arabia. lar (Recknagel, 2000Recknagel (2000). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Following the US invasion

Recent financial reports suggest that of Iraq in March 2003, Baghdad returned to sel-

BRICS is already the world’s largest gross ling oil in US dollars. This struggle over the dol-

domestic product (GDP) bloc. It currently lar’s dominance was also felt painfully in Venezu-

contributes 31.5 percent to the global GDP, ela, which has the world’s largest oil reserves and

ahead of the G7, which contributes 30.7 yet was reduced to abject poverty for attempting

percent (Raghavan, 2023Raghavan (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). One of the greatest to challenge the supremacy of Washington and

opportunities and challenges facing BRICS its ubiquitous currency (Worldometer, 2023Worldometer (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

now is its ability to expand its membership Although it will take time, the process of re-

base while maintaining its current growth. ducing international reliance on the US dollar is

Helping new members maintain economic now in full swing. In March 2023, Brazil and Chi-

and political independence is particularly na announced a trade agreement allowing them

vital. to use their currencies, the real and the yuan, res-

Leaders attending the 42nd Southeast Asian Nations Association (ASEAN) Summit pose for a group photo outside the event in Labuan Bajo, Indonesia, on May 10, 2023. (Xinhua, 2023Xinhua (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)

pectively (Betz, 2023Betz (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). This step shall prove con- other Western capitals are worried. They ought

sequential, encouraging other South American to be.

countries to follow suit. The move was neither Following a meeting between US President Joe

the first of its kind nor will it be the last. Biden and 40 African leaders at the White Hou-

One of the main decisions taken by finance se in December 2022, it was clear that African

ministers and central bank governors of the As- countries were not interested in taking sides in

sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) the ongoing war in Ukraine (Abutaleb & Ryan,

at their March 2023 meeting in Indonesia was to 2022). Consequently, US Vice President Kamala

reduce their reliance on the US dollar (Devons- Harris flew to Africa on March 26, 2023, to meet

hire, 2023). They agreed to “reinforce financial regional leaders to push them away from China

resilience… through the use of local currency to and Russia (Signe, 2023Signe (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). That effort is likely to

support cross-border trade and investment in the fail. A perfect demonstration of Africa’s refusal to

ASEAN region.” This, too, is a game changer. abandon its neutrality was seen at the press con-

The BRICS countries are leading the char- ference between Harris and Ghana’s President,

ge and are set to facilitate the rearrangement of Nana Akufo-Addo, on March 28. “There may be

the world’s economic and financial map (Seidel, an obsession in America about Chinese activity

2023). While the West is busy trying to keep its on the continent,” Akufo-Addo told reporters,

economies afloat, it remains wary of the changes “but there is no such obsession here.” (Wootson,

underway in the Global South. Washington and 2023)

Arguing that BRICS is a purely economic group the 20th Century. All of this came to a bitter end

ignores much of the story. The timing of its expan- in the early 1990s. NATO won, while the Warsaw

sion, the stern political discourse of its members, Pact disintegrated rapidly and in the most humi-

potential members, and allies, the repeated visits liating fashion. It was “the end of history”, Francis

by top Russian and Chinese diplomats to Africa Fukuyama declared (Fukuyama, 1993Fukuyama (1993). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). It was the

and other regions in the Global South, and so on, age of Western triumphalism and, by extension,

all indicate that BRICS has become the South’s new more colonial wars, starting in Panama, then

platform for geopolitics, economics, and diplomacy. Iraq, Serbia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

The more successful BRICS becomes, the weaker China factored in all this, not as a major glo-

Western hegemony over the South will be. Althou- bal political player, but as a worthy adversary and

gh some Western politicians and media insist on prized ally. The historic visit by US President Ric-

downplaying the group’s role in shaping the new hard Nixon to Beijing in 1972 thwarted efforts to

world order, the change seems real and irreversible. unify the East as US-Western imperialism (Kra-

us, 2022). That trip, which supposedly ‘changed

‘The New Era’ the world’, per the assessment of then-Ambassa-

dor Nicholas Plat, was, indeed, consequential. It

Since the Sykes-Picot was signed in 1916 betwe- was the beginning of the end of the Soviet as it

en old colonial powers, France and Britain, with gave Washington a massive advantage over rivals.

a minor, but still significant involvement of Tsa- But history is now being reversed in ways a few

rist Russia, the Middle East and North Africa, geopoliticians have successfully predicted.

along with Central Asia, was divided into various

spheres of influence (The Editors of Encyclope- Enter Xi Jinping

dia Britannica, 2023). Global priorities then were

almost entirely Western. The Bolshevik revolu- The final exchange, caught on camera between vi-

tion in 1917 was a watershed moment in world siting Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian

history, as it sowed the seeds for a possibility of host and counterpart, Vladimir Putin, summed up

a new global bloc to rival Western domination the current geopolitical conflict, still in its nascent

(The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, 2023The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). stages, between the United States and its Western

It took decades for that new bloc to emerge. In allies on the one hand, and Russia, China and their

1955, the Warsaw Pact was born (The Editors of allies, on the other (Davidson & McCurry, 2023Davidson & McCurry (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Xi

Encyclopedia Britannica, 2023), unifying the So- was leaving the Kremlin following a three-day visit,

viet Union and its allies against the North Atlan- starting on March 20, that can only be described as

tic Treaty Organization (NATO), a Western mi- historic. “Change is coming that hasn’t happened in

litary alliance that saw the light six years earlier 100 years, and we are driving this change together,”

(Haglund, 2023Haglund (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). The rivalry between both cam- Xi said while clasping Putin’s hand. “I agree,” Pu-

ps was expressed in fierce economic competition, tin replied while holding Xi’s arm. ‘Please take care,

a political Cold War, a low-grade military conf- dear friend,” he added (Muzaffar, 2023Muzaffar (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

lict, and two ideological discourses that defined In no time, social media exploded by sharing that

our understanding of world politics in much of scene repeatedly. Corporate Western media analysts

went into overdrive, trying to understand what for both nations (Baroud & Rubeo, 2022Baroud & Rubeo (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)”.

these few words meant. “Is that part of the change Even then, like other analysts, we did not expect

that is coming, that they will drive together?” Ian such a possibility to be realized so quickly. The Uk-

Williamson questioned in The Spectator (Williams, raine war, in itself, was not indicative that Moscow

2023). Though he did not offer a straight answer, he and Beijing would grow closer. Instead, Washing-

alluded to one: “It is a chilling prospect, for which ton’s response, threatening and humiliating China,

the West needs to be prepared.” did most of the work. The visit by Pelosi to Taiwan

Xi’s statement was, of course, uttered by design. in August 2022 was a diplomatic disaster (Single-

It means that the strong Chinese-Russian ties, and ton, 2022). It left Beijing with no alternative but to

possible future unity, are not an outcome of imme- escalate and strengthen its ties with Russia, hoping

diate geopolitical interests resulting from the Ukra- the latter would fortify its naval presence in the Sea

ine war or a response to US provocations in Taiwan. of Japan. In fact, this was the case.

Even before the Ukraine war commenced in Feb- But the “100 years” reference by Xi tells of a much

ruary 2022, much evidence pointed to the fact that bigger geopolitical story. As Washington continues

Russia and China’s goal was hardly temporary or to pursue aggressive policies – with US President

impulsive (CNN, 2022CNN (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Indeed, it runs deep. Joe Biden prioritizing Russia and his Republican

The very language of multipolarity has defined foes prioritizing China as the main enemy of the US

both countries’ discourse for years, a discourse that – the two Asian giants are now forced to merge into

was mostly inspired by the two countries’ displea- one unified political unit with a common political

sure with US militarism from the Middle East to discourse. “We signed a statement on deepening

Southeast Asia, their frustration with Washington’s the strategic partnership and bilateral ties which are

bullying tactics whenever a disagreement arises, be entering a new era,” Xi said in his final statement

it in trade or border demarcations, the punitive lan- (RFE/RL, 2023RFE/RL (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

guage, the constant threats, the military expansion This ‘no-limits friendship’ (Robinson, 2023Robinson (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) is

of NATO and much more. more feasible now than ever, as neither country is

One month before the war, I argued with my constrained by ideological confines or competiti-

co-writer, Romana Rubeo, that both Russia and on. Moreover, they are both keen on ending the US

China might be at the cusp of some kind of unity. global hegemony, not only in Asia and the Pacific

That conclusion was drawn based on a simple dis- but also in Africa, the Middle East and, eventually,

course analysis of the official language emanating worldwide.

from both capitals and the actual deepening of rela- On the first day of Xi’s visit to Moscow, Russia’s

tions. At the time, we wrote: President Putin issued a decree in which he wro-

“Some kind of an alliance is already forming te off debts of African countries worth more than

between China and Russia. The fact that the Chine- $20 billion (Eruygur, 2023Eruygur (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Moreover, he promised

se people are taking note of this and are supporting that Russia is “ready to supply the whole volume

their government’s drive towards greater integrati- sent during the past time to African countries par-

on – political, economic and geostrategic – between ticularly requiring it, from Russia free of charge ..,”

Beijing and Moscow indicates that the informal and (TASS, 2023TASS (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) should Moscow decide “not to extend

potentially formal alliance is a long-term strategy the (grain) deal in sixty days.”

For both countries, Africa is a major ally in the Chairman Mao Zedung (Kraus, 2022Kraus (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). The impro-

upcoming global conflict. The Middle East, too, is ved relationship between China and the US helped

vital. The April 6, 2023 agreement, which norma- Washington further extend its global dominance

lized ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia, is eart- while putting the USSR on the defensive. The rest

h-shattering, not only because it ended seven years is history, one that was rife with geostrategic rivalry

of animosity and conflict but because the arbitrator and divisions in Asia, thus, ultimately, the rise of

was no other than China itself. Beijing is now a pe- the US as the uncontested power in that region.

ace broker in the very Middle East dominated by Regions that have long been dominated by the

failed US diplomacy for decades (Gritten, 2023Gritten (2023). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). US and its Western allies, like the Middle East and

What this means for the Palestinians remains to Africa, are processing these changes and potential

be seen, as too many variables remain at work. But opportunities. If this geopolitical shift continues,

for these global shifts to serve Palestinian interests the world will, once again, find itself divided into

in any way, the current leadership, or a new lea- camps. While it is too early to determine, with

dership, would have to slowly break away from its any degree of certainty, the winners and losers of

reliance on Western handouts and validation and, this new configuration, it is almost certain that a

with the support of Arab and African allies, adopt a US-western-dominated world is no longer possible.

different political strategy. China and the New Middle East

Regions that have long been An obvious problem with most Western media’s po-

dominated by the US and its Western litical analyses is that they tend to be short-sighted

allies are processing the changes and and focused mostly on variables that are of direct

potential opportunities. interest to Western governments. These analyses are

now being applied to understanding official Arab

The US government, however, continues to read attitudes towards Russia, China, global politics and

the situation entirely within the Russia-Ukraine conflicts.

war context. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken As Chinese President Xi Jinping prepares to lead

responded to Xi’s trip to Moscow by saying that “the a large delegation to meet with Arab leaders in Saudi

world should not be fooled by any tactical move by Arabia in December 2023, Western media conveys

Russia, supported by China or any other country, to a sense of dread. The Chinese leader’s visit “comes

freeze the war (in Ukraine) on its own terms (The against the backdrop” of the Biden Administration’s

Telegraph, 2023)”. It is rather strange but also tel- “strained ties with both Beijing and Riyadh” over

ling that the outright rejection of the potential call differences, supposedly concerning “human rights

for a ceasefire was made by Washington, not Kyiv. and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” Reuters reported

Xi’s visit, however, is truly historic from a geo- (El Yaakoubi & Zhu, 2022El Yaakoubi & Zhu (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

political sense. It can indeed be compared, in both The same line of reasoning was parroted, with litt-

scope and possible consequences, to Nixon’s visit le questioning, by many other major Western media

to Beijing, which contributed to the deterioration sources, falsely suggesting that ‘human rights’, along

of ties between the Soviet Union and China under with other righteous reasons, are the main priority

of the US and Western foreign policy agenda. And, had the leverage of negotiating major economic deals

since these analyses are often shaped by Western in- with China that could benefit multiple Arab states

terests, they tend to be selective in reading the larger simultaneously.

context. If one is to rely exclusively or heavily on the An extremely important caveat is that CASCF was

Western understanding of the massive geopolitical predicated in what is known as the “Five Principles

changes worldwide, one will surely be misled. Wes- of Peaceful Coexistence” (Jiabao, 2004Jiabao (2004). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Based on

tern media wants us to believe that the strong poli- the Westphalian norms of state sovereignty, the five

tical stances taken by Arab countries, such as neut- principles seem to be founded on an entirely different

rality in the case of war (El Yaakoubi & Zhu, 2022El Yaakoubi & Zhu (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.), paradigm of foreign relations, compared to the West’s

growing closeness to China and Russia, lowering oil approach to the Middle East and the Global South,

output, etc., are solely to ‘send a message’ to Washin- in general, extending from the colonial periods to

gton or to punish the West for intervening in Arab the neo-colonialism of post-World War II: mutual

affairs (Sheppard, Brower, & Al-Atrush, 2022Sheppard, Brower, & Al-Atrush (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). respect for “territorial integrity and sovereignty”,

However, seen through a wider lens, these as- “non-aggression”, “non-interference”, and so on.

sumptions are either half-truths or entirely fabri- Chinese-Arab relations follow this model to

cated. For example, the OPEC+ decision to lower this day, with very little deviation. This validates

oil output in October 2023 was the only reasonable the claim that collective Arab political attitudes

strategy to apply when the global market’s demand towards China and Xi’s visit to the Middle East are

for energy was low (Meredith, 2022Meredith (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Additional- hardly an outcome of any sudden shift of policies

ly, Arab neutrality is an equally reasonable appro- resulting from the Russia-Ukraine war. This is not

ach considering that Washington and its Western to suggest that Arab and Chinese relations with the

allies are not the only global forces that matter to US and the West had no impact on the nature of the

the Arabs. It is equally untrue that the Middle East’s speed of Chinese-Arab ties. Indeed, the Chinese

growing affinity with Asia is borne out of recent dra- model of ‘peaceful coexistence’ seems to challenge

matic events, but a process that began nearly two the henceforth modus operandi at work in the

decades ago, specifically a year following the US in- Middle East.

vasion of Iraq. In 2004, China and the Arab League In 2021, China announced projects to build

established the China-Arab States Cooperation Fo- a thousand schools in Iraq, a piece of news that

rum (CASCF) (BRICS Policy Center, 2016BRICS Policy Center (2016). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). occupied substantial space in Arab media coverage

(AFP, 2021AFP (2021). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). The same can be said about China’s

The Forum growing economic – not just trade – influence in

Arab countries (Freidin, 2022Freidin (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). China’s lucrative

CASCF officially represented the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, announced in 2013, fits

government and all 22 members of the Arab League, seamlessly into the political infrastructure of Arab-

eventually serving as the main coordination platform Chinese ties built in previous years (McBride,

between China and the Arabs. This has given China Berman, & Chatzky, 2023). According to the Asharq

the advantage of investing in a collective strategy to Al-Awsat newspaper, Riyadh was the largest recipient

develop trade, economic and political ties with the of Chinese investments within the BRI during the

entirety of the Arab world. On the other hand, Arabs first half of 2022 (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2022Asharq Al-Awsat (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).

Starting in March 2022, Saudi Arabia agreed in the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916, thus dividing the

principle to sell its oil to China using the Chinese region into sub-regions under Western ‘protection’

Yuan instead of the US dollar (Said & Kalin, 2022Said & Kalin (2022). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). and influence, and also the post-Iraq invasion-Midd-

This decision was confirmed a few months later le East, which consequently was seen as the exclusive

during Xi’s visit to Saudi Arabia in December. domain of the United States, Israel, and their western

Once fully implemented, it will have irreversible allies.

repercussions on the global market and the dollar’s Russia and China are now staking claims in the

future status. Assuming that such mammoth region, though using mechanisms wholly removed

changes in global geopolitics were an outcome from the Western style of old colonialism and neo-

of the immediate need for the Arabs to ‘send a colonialism. While the Russians are tapping into the-

message’ will continue to impair the West’s ability ir long Soviet tradition of cooperation, the Chinese

to truly appreciate that the changes underway, not are resorting to a more ancient history of friendly

only in the Middle East but worldwide, are part of trade and cultural exchanges. Now that Beijing has

permanent shifts to the world’s political map. The developed a more candid and unapologetic approach

sooner the West achieves this realization, the better. to foreign policy, China’s status as a new superpower

Considering all of this, it would be misguided to shall demonstrate its effectiveness in the Middle East

suggest that large political entities like China and in unprecedented ways. The Iran-Saudi Accords were

Arab countries combined are shaping their foreign a tremendous achievement for the new politically-o-

policy agendas, thus staking their futures, on knee- riented China. However, the road ahead is still chal-

jerk political reactions to the attitude of a single lenging, as the region is rife with foreign contenders

American President or administration. and old and new conflicts. For China to succeed, it

must present itself as the new just and fair model,

Conclusion away from the West and its violent legacy.

(The managing editor of the Palestine Chronicle,

The road ahead is not entirely clear. But numerous Italian journalist Romana Rubeo made significant

signs, accompanied by tangible changes, suggest that contributions to this article.)

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Cite this articleAPA 7
Formatted citationAPA 7

Baroud, R. (2023). A ‘New Era’ in the new Middle East: China, Russia and the reinvention of the South. BRIQ Belt & Road Initiative Quarterly, 4(3), 82-92.

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