Peer-Reviewed Article
A Decisive Moment of Truth: The COVID-19 Crisis Unveils the Weaknesses of Western Societies and the E. U.
DOMINIK PIETZCKER Prof. Dr. Public Relations and Communication's Management, Macromedia University of Applied Sciences
Since 2012, Dominik Pietzcker, Dr. phil., is a fulltime professor at Macromedia University of Applied Sciences, Hamburg and Berlin Campuses and a member of the Media Faculty. He studied comparative German literature, philosophy and history at the University of Freiburg/Br., Trinity College, Dublin, and in Vienna. From 1996-2010, he worked as a creative director for political institutions (E.U., the German government's, Federal Press Department) and taught at Universität der Künste (UdK) Berlin, Hochschule für Technik und Wirtschaft (HTW) Berlin and Technische Universität (TU) Dresden. Since 2014, he is an honorary juror at the Foundation of German Entrepreneurs (Stiftung der Deutschen Wirtschaft, SDW). Since 2017, he holds lectures at universities in China, at Zheijang University City College (Hangzhou) and Tongji University (Shanghai). He publishes regularly on intercultural, Sino-German, and socio-economic topics. Email: d.pietzcker@macromedia.de
ABSTRACT All crises – whether they are political, economic, organizational, societal or medical – have one decisive quality: they expose the strengths and weaknesses of the affected system and of all its members. COVID-19 challenges a liberal economic system where personal security, individual comfort and well-being, and the accumulation of wealth are considered to be the highest values. These values, and the way of life that goes with them, are still powerful motivational catalysts in societies based on materialism. Indeed, the free exchange of goods and services, individual mobility, the international flexibilization of production and distribution – all that we call globalization or as an eponym, “global capitalism” (Beckert, 2014Beckert (2014). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) – carry deep, intrinsic risks. One of the most obvious outcomes of the coronavirus crisis is to reveal how easily this interdependent system between global players – enterprises, institutions and states – can be disrupted, damaged and partially destroyed. Those countries that succeeded in fighting, in as fast and draconian as possible, the COVID-19 pandemic will be the global winners of this race against time and spread. Among these countries will certainly be China, South Korea and Singapore, as they all entered the crisis in its early stages and quickly established strict, coherent and elaborate medical regimes (Welter, 2020Welter (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). The economy of the Eurozone, already weakened before the pandemic, has suffered enormously and will not recover soon. Unemployment rates are already increasing dramatically in Southern Europe. Europe, and the E.U. as a political idea and visionary project for so many decades and generations, are facing harder times. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, authoritarian and reactionary neonationalist ideas are likely to gain strength, while the world economy may experience an enduring recession, destroying wealth and stability, and challenging – if not changing – the existing global order. COVID-19 could mark a crucial historical moment: the end of the laissez-faire era, not only in economics and finance, but also in politics, culture and private life.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Asianization; economic crisis; European integration; globalization; neoliberal capitalism
Dreams in the spring; Clouds in autumn. It is easy to meet, and to part too.
Yan Jidao, 11th century (Qiu, 2009, 191)
A Declaration of War Against Reality 2, 2020, the Organization for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development (OECD) published WITHIN MERE WEEKS, THE GLOBAL an interim report under the alarmist title “The economy, medical infrastructure and national World Economy at Risk”. Every single index in
politics have lost their stability and even shifted this report is pointing downwards (OECD, 2020:
into a chaotic path in some parts of the world; 15): “If downside risks materialize, including a
as, for example, in Bergamo, Italy (Zamapano, much wider spread of the coronavirus outbreak,
2020; Jones & Montale, 2020). Already on March and global growth looks set to be much lower
than projected, governments could be faced with The fight against COVID-19 has turned
the challenge of having to respond to significant out to be an epic war against an invisible foe; yet
weakness at a time when domestic policy space every state fights it alone, and sometimes states
is limited.” After a rather pessimistic outlook, the even fight against each other. “America First”
report concludes (OECD, 2020: 14): “Looking was a phrase often heard before the COVID-19
ahead, this episode of weak growth reinforces crisis, but policies of a strictly national perspec-
the need for stronger public investment in many tive can also be recognized among E.U. member
countries, broadly defined to include education states. Tensions between Germany, France and
and health care spending, to support demand Italy have become apparent. French commut-
and boost medium-term living standards.” Since ers crossing the German border to go to work
March 2020, the negative global macroeconomic were abused and insulted as “dirty French” (FAZ,
effects of COVID-19 have accelerated. 2020a). The Belgian politician Charles Michel,
president of the E.U. Council, recently had to explain “why the E.U. is not on the brink of failure”
During the COVID-19 crisis, the (FAZ, 2020bFAZ (2020b). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Spanish foreign secretary Aran-
E.U. proved its inability to speak cha González Laya was asked if the coronavirus
and stand up as one. Instead, since would be “lethal to the E.U.” (González Laya, March 2020, national positions 2020). Are there any symptoms or indicators of have dominated media, economic
discussions and monetary a real political decline behind these questions?
negotiations alike. During the COVID-19 crisis, the E.U.
proved its inability to speak and stand up as one. Instead, since March 2020, national positions
While international organizations have have dominated media, economic discussions
tried to describe, from a very early stage, the and monetary negotiations alike. Of course, all
immediate, mid- and long-term economic and frontiers in Europe were closed – it was never
financial outcomes of the pandemic (Lagarde, easier to fall back to a regime ante the Maastricht
2020; IMF, 2020), national policies have had to treaty and the Schengen agreement.
address unstable situations, risking a total loss Under the rule of a pandemic, isolation
of control. In a decisive moment, French pres- makes absolute sense; as a political symptom
ident Emmanuel Macron used the term guerre in a globalized economy, it is simply devastat-
sanitaire (sanitary war) (Elysée, 2020Elysée (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)1 – not as a ing. A supranational union like the E.U. loses its
metaphor, but as a factual description. His mem- meaning when it only consists of isolated mem-
bres de cabinet obediently took over the phrase bers and ceases to represent a higher order or
of “being at war” (Vignaud, 2020: 29). historical vision. During COVID-19, the E.U.,
1 Speech of Emmanuel Macron, March 16, 2020 (Elysée, 2020Elysée (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.): “Nous sommes en guerre, en guerre sanitaire, certes : nous ne
luttons ni contre une armée, ni contre une autre Nation. Mais l'ennemi est là, invisible, insaisissable, qui progresse. Et cela requiert notre mobilisation générale.” (“We are at war, at a sanitary war. We do not fight against an army, nor against another nation. But the enemy is here, invisible, unpredictable, and progressing. This demands a general mobilization.” [Transl. by the author]) Following the example of the French president, Donald Trump declared himself on Twitter as a “wartime president” and boldly proclaimed “WE WLL WIN THIS WAR” (The Washington Post, 2020The Washington Post (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). See also the critical comment by Susan E. Rice (Rice, 2020 : 9).
and the European Commission as the executive South Korea, too, managed to handle the crisis
institution, were simply non-existent. Peoples – remarkably smoothly and without much ado.
and voters – all over Europe will not forget this The highly digitized infrastructure of both coun-
sign of decreasing relevance, visibility and im- tries enabled officials to initiate punctual meas-
portance. The E.U. missed the chance to prove ures against COVID-19 instead of mass invasive
its strength and unity in a moment of extreme measures. Citizens behaved in a disciplined
external pressure. This critical moment passed manner; the number of those infected remained
without any understanding of its political po- low compared to other states (Normile, 2020Normile (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). In
tential. True statesmanship, once part of the Eu- South Korea, even legislative elections were held
ropean political tradition,2 was entirely missing in mid-April. Public life has returned to normal.3
at a time when it was crucial. This opportunity is now completely lost, leaving disappointment if not indifference towards E.U. politics among citizens and voters.
The Absence of E.U. Politics and Its Consequences During the COVID-19 crisis, every single state could easily do without the E.U. Public health was not a matter of official E.U. politics: member states looked out for themselves and took, or did not take, precautions. But if the E.U. market is common, and frontiers are open for trade and travel, why is there not also a common organ- Statement by the President of the Commission Ursula
izational and infrastructural standard of public von der Leyen and High Representative/Vice-President
health? Unlike Asian states, particularly those Josep Borrell’ (Avrupa Info,2020Avrupa Info (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)
which had learned from the SARS epidemic in
2008, the E.U. member states were not prepared The outcome of COVID-19 may weaken the
for a pandemic, as improbable as it might have E.U. and encourage centrifugal political forces.
seemed beforehand. The successful crisis man- More specifically, the current crisis will lead to
agement of Asian states, among them China, a reorientation towards national agendas of pol-
stands out against the relatively late and hesi- itics and economics. All over Europe, bankrupt
tant reaction of European states. Singapore and airlines are likely to be nationalized (Asquith,
2 If one thinks of such practitioners of power as Cardinal Richelieu and Talleyrand, Cromwell and Churchill, Bismarck and Ade-
nauer, de Gaspieri and de Gaulle, one might come to the conclusion that politics and policymaking have not become more complicated these days, but that today’s European politicians are simply missing any idea for the right moment and its unique (positive or destructive) potential – what the ancient Greeks so rightly called kairos.
3 COVID-19 also dramatically proves that, without digitization, societal survival would not be possible. The digital infrastructu-
re has already proved to be the backbone of the global economy. Now it enables national crisis management and connects human individuals, institutions and scientists all over the world. Go Digital or Die, a popular slogan among start-up entrepreneurs, expresses a higher political and societal truth.
2020); national – not European or global – in- equally gloomy. Millennials in Southern Europe
frastructure in agriculture, medical surveillance, (Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece) see themselves as
pharmaceuticals and digital information is in members of a “lost generation” (The Economist,
demand; for individuals and nations alike, au- 2020a: 20). “After two big crises at a formative
tarky has become desirable again. Even Brexit period of their lives, a politicised and trauma-
is now a marginal topic. Who cares about Brit- tized generation will need to be catered for …
ain’s new “splendid isolation” while COVID-19 The anger built up during the previous crisis has
drives the world economy into the deepest re- not receded. About two-thirds of Spaniards de-
cession since the late 1920s (Riley, 2020; FAZ, clare themselves dissatisfied with democracy in
2020c)? The impact of COVID-19 overshadows their country” (The Economist, 2020a: 20The Economist (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). But
any other political decision in Europe. But what what would be the alternative to democracy?
are the pending consequences of all of these de- Authoritarian national regimes promising more
velopments and powershifts? The actual figures economic security? The rise of anti-establish-
and forecasts for Western economies give an ment movements? The loss of interest in poli-
idea of what might be expected in the aftermath tics? The return of openly fascist ideas in Europe
of COVID-19. (Albright, 2019Albright (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)?4
But the E.U. acts – again – divided. While The symptoms of societal decay are evident.
Southern E.U. member states demand that the In Southern Italy, organized crime replaces state
negative economic effects of COVID-19 should authority, distributing food to the poor and of-
be shouldered fairly by all E.U. members, fering loans to small shopkeepers as financial
wealthier countries like Germany or the Nether- support and compensation for an absent state
lands prefer to continue their policy of national (The Guardian, 2020aThe Guardian (2020a). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). All over Europe, as well
responsibility. Economic disaster is regarded as a as in the U.S., Russia, Brazil and Argentina – to
matter of national policy; every state, therefore, mention but a few – national economies are at
should be held responsible for its own debts and stake and forecasts predict decreasing GDP (The
financial situation. This is a hardliner position Economist, 2020b: 6). As in 2008, economic fig-
that is only shared by the relatively wealthy E.U. ures have turned into nightmares; only this time,
member states. These petty discussions reflect a it might last much longer.
total lack of the metapolitical perspective. “When you are covering the United States,”
says French RFI correspondent Anne Corpet The idea of Europe as a visionary
(Corpet, 2020Corpet (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.), “it’s as if you’re on the frontline project is losing momentum,
of Western culture.” Latest figures from the IMF inspiration and, maybe for the first
(2020) and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2020) time, real relevance. A formerly
indicate a dramatically increasing U.S. unem- powerful political idea – the best
ployment rate – a rise of 16 million between Europe has ever had in centuries
March and April 2020 alone. Only the Great De- measured not in money but in
pression in the 1930s hit harder on the Amer- common cultural values and shared
ican labor market. The European outlook is experiences – is evaporating.
4 Some years before the outbreak of COVID-19, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote: “People want to vote
but they need to eat. In many countries, the climate is reminiscent of that which, a hundred years ago, gave birth to Italian and German Fascism” (Albright, 2019, 112Albright (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).
ber states and their citizens. Without a doubt, from education to economics, from individual rights to institutionalized prosperity, from peace to mobility, the E.U. has a lot to offer. But not to everyone. Social and political reality within E.U. member states (and likewise in non-member states, e.g. Switzerland and Norway) consists not only of those who profit from tax privileges, high educational standards, professional mobility, second homes in the countryside and a relaxed liberal-cosmopolitan lifestyle where minority rights are guaranteed, but also of those who consider themselves not as winners but as losers from competitive markets, global produc-
(Xinhuanet,2020Xinhuanet (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) tion and the growing internationalization of the
economy. These people, large segments of the European population, prefer – for very personal The idea of Europe as a visionary project is economic reasons – protected national markets. losing momentum, inspiration and, maybe for They are also those who are suffering the most the first time, real relevance. A formerly powerfrom the negative impact of COVID-19: small ful political idea – the best Europe has ever had shopkeepers, underpaid staff in restaurants in centuries, measured not in money but in comand cafés, self-employed entrepreneurs without mon cultural values and shared experiences – is much of a financial cushion, blue-collar workevaporating. It could be that these values have ers whose working conditions are dramatically simply become insignificant. Which political worsening5 and all those who have already lost powers will emerge from the void of a weakened or will lose their jobs in an economy already goand disunited Europe? ing into a deep and long-lasting recession. Their skepticism towards a political-economic system The European Unease that could not protect them from loss, depriva-
Even before spring 2020, the E.U. as an institu- tion or even poverty will only grow.
tion struggled with shrinking acceptance among The European idea, once meant as a uni-
citizens and voters. The 2018 elections to the fier and peace-bringer after the bloodshed
European Parliament strengthened the radical and disasters of the early and mid-20th century
political parties in France, the UK, Italy and (Mak, 2007Mak (2007). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.), has lost most of its attractiveness.
Germany. Brexit, much debated since 2016, is It doesn’t reflect the political polarization and
only the most prominent symptom of a stronger radicalization of European societies. The politi-
underlying feeling of unease among E.U. mem- cal climate, already distorted before COVID-19,
5 One should always bear in mind that, for all its enormous potential, the digital revolution is also the main source of a new
kind of poverty and economic dependence: underpaid jobs in Amazon warehouses, self-employed drivers in Western cities without any insurance, sweatshops in South East Asia, etc.
is deteriorating, posing new risks in an already to live up to its ideals: A union that speaks often
unstable situation. Populist parties and right- of solidarity between peoples initially saw little
wing movements are reckless enough to take solidarity. A union often reproached for tech-
advantage of the – from the perspective of their nocracy showed none of it. A union built on the
voters – political impotence of the E.U. “The si- freedom of movement of people and goods has
ren is ringing” (Jones & Montale, 2020Jones & Montale (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.); not only become a chaotic continent of closed borders
for the poor all over Europe, who have become and export bans.” Chaque-un pour soi seems
even poorer by now, but also for well-established to be the realpolitik of each E.U. member state
bourgeois pro-European representatives as they when facing a severe crisis. European institu-
face the growing risk of losing their political in- tions like the European Center of Disease Pre-
fluence and majorities. Those who suffered ecovention and Control (E.C.D.C.) in Stockholm nomic losses during the COVID-19 crisis and or the newly founded RescEU, the European its aftermath will not forget those who left them Union’s organization for crisis response at home alone and did not provide help when it was most and abroad, were more or less invisible during needed. They will remember the pictures of the the outbreak of COVID-19. endless discussions and nightly negotiations at Under the regime of the COVID-19 panthe E.U. headquarters in the Berlaymont builddemic, petty national interests, particularly in ing in Brussels, which ended without a solution. Europe, overshadowed individual sacrifices. They will not consider the E.U. flag with its 12 Acts of solidarity between European states were golden stars as their own anymore. The enor-
mous sum of €2.7 trillion, the new “Marshall more or less entirely lacking. The Italian public,
Plan” for Europe (von der Leyen, 2020von der Leyen (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.), will not whose emotions were fueled by political right-
change their negative attitudes towards the E.U. wing agitation, is openly disappointed at the
unwillingness of relatively rich E.U. member states to share, as true partners, the financial and
Under the regime of the COVID-19 economic burdens of the COVID-19 crisis. Help
pandemic, petty national and solidarity, when it comes to mutual sacrificinterests, particularly in Europe,
overshadowed individual sacrifices. es, have become unpopular among E.U. member
Acts of solidarity between states. Under pressure, individuals and institu-
European states were more or less tions reveal their true reliability and strength.
entirely lacking. Facing hard times could have been one of the
rare cathartic moments of contemporary poli-
Again, COVID-19 exposes one of the most tics: Europe’s “finest hour”. But it turned out that
vital weaknesses of the E.U.: its inability to ex- the European Commission only represented the
plain itself and its vision of a unified and strong political calamity of an organization fragmented
Europe. In its institutionalized form, the E.U. is and disunited by partial economic interests. The
totally helpless against populism. “In this pan- rich member states (Netherlands, Germany and
demic,” writes Scott L. Greer, a professor of pub- others) are obviously not willing to share their
lic health (Greer, 2020Greer (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.), the E.U. “doesn’t appear privileges with weaker partners. Political alien-
ation – or better, political distancing – between take in 50 unaccompanied minor-aged refugees
E.U. member states is already one of the para- from the war-ridden regions of the East. This is
doxical outcomes of the COVID-19 crisis.6 nothing more than a weak humanitarian ges-
ture, tired from former generosity and political
Are There Any Other Humanitarian confrontation.
Topics Left, Apart From COVID-19? Emigration has ceased to be of any public
One of the most astonishing phenomena of the concern. COVID-19 is the ideal pretext, a true
COVID-19 crisis is the total disappearance in deus ex machina, for establishing a restrictive
the Western media of the formerly hot topic of border regime in Europe without facing any
mass migration from the Southern Mediterra- opposition. It also exposes the hollowness and
nean and Sub-Sahara regions. In February 2020, unreliability of European humanitarian en-
11 migrants were assassinated in Hanau, Germa- gagement and the moral hypocrisy of both offi-
ny; one of the most violent and bloodiest xeno- cials and citizens. Turkey, Russia and China are
phobic assaults in recent German history (The not blind to the weak ethical commitments of
Guardian, 2020b). A brief outcry in the media Western Europe.
followed, before COVID-19 swept away any Western Lifestyle and Consumerism,
other topic, including the public debates over Coming to Its End
refugees, asylum seekers, and xenophobic and The coronavirus pandemic might be as costly antisemitic tendencies in Western democracies.
But under the surface of the pandemic, the con- and destructive as going to war. But is it also as
flictual dynamite of a society that suppresses its decisive, brutal and reckless as war? Behind the
inner self-contradictions is still there, ready to epidemiological facts and the obvious dangers of
explode at any given moment. COVID-19 stands another adversary, as hard to
COVID-19 dominates as a monothematic grasp as the virus itself: the corrugated way of
wave the international news circus; be it print, life in Western societies. Nobody was prepared
TV or social media. Obviously, the news in- for the complete shutdown of economic activi-
dustry follows its own rhythm; nevertheless it ty. There were no holidays, either; and what was
is somehow irritating that the destinies of tens left, apart from queueing for food, eating, jog-
of thousands of emigrants are no longer of any ging and watching Netflix or Disney+, was the
public concern. Questions of personal health shocking proof of the hollowness of the West-
and individual well-being are, seen from the ern materialistic way of life. What could be seen
perspective of the broad public, apparently was the abyss of an absolute conceptional, phil-
more important than the fate of the damned of osophical and emotional emptiness, where only
this world. The German parliament, represent- petit-bourgeois anxieties reigned and a diffusive
ing a population of 80 million people, agreed to existential angst lay hidden.
6 These lines were written while the fruitless negotiations between the ministers of finance on “Euro bonds” and other mea-
sures of supranational solidarity were unfolding. Yet it is clear that the times of austerity are over. The E.U. has to prove that its members will emerge from the crisis less damaged than non-member states. Even Brexit has become a question of lower public and political interest. The United Kingdom will probably not do better or worse than the rest of the E.U. Again: The COVID-19 crisis, as a crucial moment of political truth, totally changes proportions, perspectives and relations.
Short after the official lockdown and the de Cultural Criticism and COVID-19
facto curfew in Europe began, the novel La Peste One would have to be politically naïve – or truby Albert Camus was briefly out of stock.7 world ly optimistic – to believe that the E.U. and, in under the threat of infection quickly develops a broader sense, the European idea of partnersocio-phobic attitudes. Once again, reality folship among equals, will be among the winners lows literature; the worldly regime and daily life from the recent developments. COVID-19 has under COVID-19 closely resemble T.S. Eliot’s already given a boost to nationalistic and reac- 1925 poem The Hollow Men (Eliot, 1974: 91): tionary ideas throughout Europe, particularly in “In this last of meeting places / We grope togeth-
er / And avoid speech / Gathered on this beach Italy, France, Poland and Hungary. In Italy, the
of the tumid river”. In times of external pressure, neofascist movement Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers
humility – and not self-confidence – has become of Italy) and its charismatic leader Georgia Mel-
the main virtue. When shops are closed and, oni have become more popular than ever before.
apart from food, nothing can be bought, what The concept of an authoritarian state based on
is the essence of consumerism? Staying at home, reactionary ideas – the late and unlikely herit-
attending webinars, following video conferences age of fascism – has recovered its appeal among
or working on Excel sheets are the main activ- democracies.
ities, apart from eating, sleeping and – at least Authoritarian tendencies become more ap-
in Northern Europe – amassing toilet paper in parent as governments all over Europe demand
astonishing amounts. Refrigerators and freez- unconditional obedience from their citizens.
ers became top sellers overnight (Müßgens, COVID-19 boosts the desire for control and
2020). The masses prepared themselves to out- security; authoritarian policies satisfy these de-
last the crisis. What does all this tell us about the mands. In Germany, where citizens traditionally
self-perception and self-deception of a society believe in state authority and control, the joyless
where entertainment and amusement suddenly atmosphere of total conformity is almost palpa-
turn into fear? ble. “Never in my wildest dreams did I imagine
Behind all these rituals, imposed by a strict seeing in a European democracy a police-en-
medical regime, lies the fragility, fearfulness and forced order that limits personal freedoms”,
emptiness of a hedonistic and post-heroic so- writes Russian editor-at-large Maxim Trudoly-
ciety. Wealthy Western societies have learned ubov (Trudolyubov, 2020Trudolyubov (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). to delegate a lot to absent third parties: hard working conditions, exploitation, poverty, pol-
lution, violence and crime. Now, they learn that COVID-19 unveils the true
everything can be delegated, but not one’s own emotional driving forces behind
fears. Like acid, COVID-19 exposes the unpleas- the mask of peace, profit and
ant aspects beyond the shiny surface of Western prosperity. Without any doubt, we
wealth and values. Materialism easily turns to are on the threshold of a new age
decadence, and decadence to decay. of angst.
7 On April 15, the author interviewed Regina Steinicke, the spokesperson of the publishing house Rowohlt Verlag. Camus’ novel
could not be delivered anymore, at least not without heavy distributional difficulties.
COVID-19 puts democracy to the test as the ing, enlightened discourses, the Socratic right to
antivirus regime oppresses all actions – and even disagree; all forgotten when the political system is
attitudes – that oppose the executive orders. The under pressure. This timeless political lesson about
ratio of seemingly necessary restrictions knocks democracy turning into an authoritarian regime
out all liberal and democratic rights. What is or even a dictatorship has to be learned again and
good for public health can be bad or even dev- again, although it tells us nothing new. Alexis de
astating for a political culture. Obedience and Tocqueville already knew the risks of mass con-
conformism are regarded as social and personal formity, obedience and intolerance within the sys-
virtues; in Germany it has become popular to tem of democracy (de Tocqueville, 1992de Tocqueville (1992). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.).
snitch on neighbors flouting virus rules (Cham-
bers, 2020). This is reminiscent of certain totali- Some Remarks on the Macroeconomic
tarian practices of the past. and Geopolitical Effects of the
COVID-19 Crisis It is strange to observe how easily a plural-
istic and open society can be turned into a ho- COVID-19 stands in the same tradition as the
mogenous angst-ridden community where all European economic crisis of 2012–2014, the
members try to avoid each other. Again, the vi- global financial crisis of 2008 and the brief but
rus brutally exposes the fragility and vulnerabil- intense economic recession after 9/11 in 2001
ity of modern societies and their political-eco- (Hillinger, 2010Hillinger (2010). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). The immediate and indirect
nomic systems. COVID-19 unveils the true effects of the COVID-19 crisis also impose some
emotional driving forces behind the mask of questions that demand political answers: What
peace, profit and prosperity. Without any doubt, is the price of globalization and are we willing
we are on the threshold of a new age of angst. to pay it? Are we ready to live, act and cooperate
Citizens, colleagues and family members are in a world that overnight has become dangerous
avoiding each other. Social distancing, consid- again? How often can an economic system un-
ered before as borderline behavior, has become dergo deep crises before it corrugates and im-
a virtue. Making new contacts is regarded as a plodes? And finally, are we all in need of a new
major offence. Physical contact of any kind has global order?
strangely become a health risk. To love someone For the fourth time since 9/11, the global
is to endanger that very person; whether a part- economy has been devastated by a severe crisis.
ner, a child or a parent. Throughout this period, the economic system,
COVID-19 depicts a society of obedience based on private possession and the accumula-
and conformism. It is not about technocrat- tion of personal wealth, has been heavily backed
ic functionality or what seems to be necessary up by public means. Trillions of Euros and U.S.
from a strictly medical viewpoint – it is about dollars were practically pumped into the stag-
the republican and individual right to agree or gering capitalistic system. As a consequence, af-
disagree with official policy. Mainstream society ter 9/11, 2008 and 2012 many states in Europe
obediently and uncritically follows executive or- and all over the world faced severe budget prob-
ders. Thus, within weeks, COVID-19 has already lems. Public infrastructure was neglected. But
exposed the potential for an absolute Orwellian COVID-19 is not the only thing that kills; pov-
system. Democratic procedures, critical reason- erty, poor social and medical infrastructure, and
an underfinanced state can be lethal too. West- investment, two different politico-economic sys-
ern governments are heavily subsidizing the tems have been competing against each other.
neoliberal economic system and its idea of the On the one hand, the state-controlled capitalism
free market. Risks are carried in public hands, of China; on the other, the self-controlled market
but profits belong exclusively to the sharehold- capitalism of traditional Western understand-
ers. But why should dysfunctional competitive ing. Both models represent giant experiments.
markets be regularly subsidized? When state At the moment, each model is having to prove its
power becomes such a strong economic player capability to adapt to the heavy risks and highly
as during COVID-19, it should also be regard- volatile markets of a globalized economy. COV-
ed and rewarded as such. Are we getting closer ID-19 puts both models to the test. But China
to a multilateral capitalistic system where gov- seems to be in a better starting position.
ernmental control and public shares are the two Geostrategic investments along the Belt
main economic pillars – instead of free-market and Road Initiative (BRI) will not come to a halt,
competition and neoliberal globalization? Mas- although they might be reprioritized or slowed
sive public means are necessary to cover the down. China has no interest in losing its new al-
negative economic effects of COVID-19. When lies along the trade routes and coastlines of Af-
governments step in and take economic respon- rica, South East Asia and Latin America. Unlike
sibility, the discourse on renationalization and the U.S., China has no interest in protected mar-
new forms of capitalism, depending both on kets; meanwhile, international markets depend
state control and the forces of the free market, heavily on Chinese exports. COVID-19 is un-
enters a new stage. Another “new deal” – this doubtedly a backlash against globalization; but
time, paradoxically, without the U.S. – has be- it will not change the historic direction towards
come possible again. Will China be its leader? Asian hegemony (Khanna, 2019Khanna (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.; Maçães, 2018Maçães (2018). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.)
and Chinese dominance in the Eastern hemisphere. The Asian century has just begun; COV- ID-19 will be nothing more than a footnote. Maybe it is worth remembering the Spanish influenza of 1918–1919. It took more lives than World War I, but it had practically no impact on the growing importance, and soon Western hegemony, of the U.S.
“From Russia With Love” – Learnt Lessons From the East Even in a post-COVID-19 world, some major aspects of global importance remain. The dramatic
(China Daily,2020China Daily (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) and unavoidable power shift from West to East
(Rachman, 2016Rachman (2016). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) is not affected by COVID-19;
Since China systematically opened its huge it might even be accelerated. China was the first
market of 1.4 billion consumers to international nation to be hit by the pandemic; but it was also
the first state to get out of the acute state of crisis. “Will China win?” (The Economist, 2020The Economist (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) –
Since the end of March, daily life has returned to the cover title of the April 18 issue of The Econ-
Shanghai (a metropole of 25 million inhabitants); omist – points to the bête noire of European and
since April 11, shops and factories have restarted Western polities: the perception of the growing
their business and production activities in Wu- influence of Asian societies over the occidental
han, once the epicenter of the COVID-19 pan- hemisphere (Khanna, 2019Khanna (2019). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Those states and
demic (Wang & Yang, 2020Wang & Yang (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). As the pandemic national economies which recover the fastest
was reaching its peak, China sent medical equip- from the critical blow of COVID-19 will be able
ment directly to Lombardy, the Italian region that to enlarge their global influence. China will be
was suffering the most.8 Now, China is offering among these states; the U.S. probably not. In fact,
practical help, equipment and medical know- China has offered active help to the U.S., proving how to the U.S. and other Western countries (Cui, its ability to swiftly change its diplomatic tonal- 2020Cui (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). Russia, too, sent medical corps to Northity from competition in a de facto trade war to ern Italy. These gestures generated huge media solidarity and empathy in a moment of common coverage; their propagandistic goals were perfectsuffering (Cui, 2020Cui (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). No other administration ly matched. The East Helps the West out of the has proved capable of reacting in its interna- Crisis: the underlying message is absolutely clear. tional relations as smoothly and quickly as the Chinese, although Russia didn’t hesitate to send medical staff and equipment to Italy. “From Russia with love” was written on the Tupolev transport aircrafts of the Russian air force. It was, as the Italian media observed, the first time since the Napoleonic wars that Russian troops had entered Italian territory (BBC, 2020BBC (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). The Russian PR stunts won global media coverage. The strategists of the Kremlin have well understood that dominance in symbolic pictures and gestures counts nearly as much as military dominance over territories (Corman & Coraci, 2020Corman & Coraci (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.). This is something that the E.U. administration seems to have totally forgotten.
Summary "Everything that happens to human is not
unconcerned." box of medical supply donated by The ideas and findings of this article can be sum-
China to Italy. (Xinhuanet,2020Xinhuanet (2020). The source article does not provide a separate full bibliographic entry for this citation.) marized in a few aphoristic sentences:
8 In Hangzhou, one of China’s wealthiest cities, public buses were painted with the Italian tricolor as a sign of solidarity. These
activities, which had a massive impact on social media, did not occur among E.U. member states. At least the author couldn’t perceive any flag, be it of Italy, France or Spain, on public transport vehicles in Berlin. It seems as if the West has forgotten the symbolic language of solidarity.
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